Thomas Metcalf

Atheology on this board seems to have slowed a bit, at least in what I find directly interesting, so I want to try to spark a little more debate. I'm going to describe two of the more persuasive theist arguments here, and offer my own responses to each. I would welcome any apologetic defenses or additional criticism of these arguments.

A Modal Ontological Argument

This is an a priori argument that attempts to show God's existence to be a necessary feature of the world itself, that God cannot not exist and that we can learn this fact simply by thinking about the concept of God.

(A) If it's possible that God exists, then God exists.
(B) It's possible that God exists.
(C) Therefore, God exists.

The support for (A) is that God is defined as a necessary being (or a being with all possible perfections, which would include that He is necessary). Therefore, it couldn't be that God exists in only some possible worlds, so either He's necessary or impossible. (B) claims He's not impossible, so the proponent concludes with (C) that He exists.

My Response to the Modal Ontological Argument

Kant in Critique of Pure Reason offered two criticisms that are still relevant to the modal ontological argument, although they were leveled at a more Cartesian version. Before I present them, however, I want to register a complaint about the language of the argument itself. If we recall that the proposition "God exists" is an assertion of a necessary truth, we find that each premise contains a nested modal operator. I do not think a sentence with the form, "Possible, necessarily, P" is intelligible. In our case, P would denote "a being with all the properties of God except that may or may not exist necessarily." I just don't think this makes any sense, and it certainly does not work with a possible-worlds conception of modality.

Kant's first objection seems to be that existence is not a property; existence is not a determining predicate. We are not adding anything to something's definition when we say that it exists; we're just affirming whether anything in reality matches that definition. In fact, most systems of predicate logic assume this point from the start; existence is not treated as a predicate, but rather, assumed or denied with quantifiers. (At least one philosopher has proposed replacing the existential quantifier with a "particular" quantifier, but this point is not vital.)

A possible response to the charge that existence isn't a determining predicate is that we often do want to say whether something exists or it doesn't when we're describing it. For example, we say that Achilles is fictional, or that Santa Claus is imaginary. Yet when we make these assertions, we seem to be making at least a conjunction of claims; we claim that Achilles is nonexistent, but we are also claiming that works of fiction have been written about him. To claim that Santa Claus is imaginary, similarly, is to claim that humans' imaginations contain the concept of Santa Claus.

Plantinga and other philosophers have put this point clearly by asking us to imagine a being called an "eunicorn," defined as a unicorn that exists. It would be impossible to deny the existence of this being, but we cannot conclude thereby that eunicorns exist.

Rationalists such as Descartes, who was one of the first to present this argument, might respond that the concept of an eunicorn is not as robust as the concept of God. Perhaps concepts exist in somewhere like Plato's Heaven, and simply by rational thought we can identify which concepts have "real" "existence" and which are just concepts with something such as "existence" tacked on. The atheist may offer in response that this is a very ambitious theory of concepts, and will require plenty of support.

Kant's other objection, relatedly, is that we simply do not try to determine whether something exists by defining it as existent in the first place. For if we already know that something exists, or if we know that it doesn't exist, there is no point in searching for it at all. Rather, we have a conception of something in our minds, and search the universe and the propositions we know as truths to see if we find this object or if we can infer its existence.

What does this have to do with the modal ontological argument? Simply, to assert the necessary existence of something makes the same mistake. If we use the possible-worlds conception, to assert necessity is to claim the property of existence in every possible world. Imagine "nunicorns," a là Plantinga, to mean "necessarily existing unicorns." A similar argument could be made for their existence.

The apologist might reply, finally, that unicorns are not defined to have all possible perfections, so they do not characterize a useful analogy. Yet this response may commit the Converting a Conditional fallacy; certainly, if all possible perfections then necessary, but a being can certain be necessary without having all possible perfections. The theist must still explain why there could be no such thing as a necessarily existing unicorn.

A Teleological Argument from Improbability

This argument concludes from the narrow constraints on the constants of the universe that these constants were chosen by God to produce life.

(A) It was very improbable that the constants of the universe would permit life.
(B) If it was very improbable that the constants of the universe would permit life, then God exists.
(C) Therefore, God exists.

My Response to the Teleological Argument from Improbability

Almost all forms of this argument still suffer from the Lottery Fallacy. But first, I must remind the reader that (A) has not been established. The best the apologist has been able to do is to show that if these constants varied, then life would be impossible, but this is simply a conditional. What is required is the observation that it is likely that they would have varied.

A charge of the Lottery Fallacy is the best way to respond to this argument, however. Mere improbability is not evidence that something did not happen by chance, even if there is some reason to believe someone was in a position to alter the results as there would be with the lottery. If your neighbor were to win the lottery, would you assume that someone cheated? Would you assume that your neighbor cheated, or one of your neighbor's friends? In the case of the universe, we do not even know the chance of Someone being in a position to influence how the universe turned out, nor what it would mean to say something could alter universal constants, nor by what method. We must not only know (1) event e is improbable, but also (2) it is likely that a person with a motive to bring about e was in a position to bring about e. This argument therefore requires question-begging to support (B).

One apologist response might be that the lottery is not a suitable analogy, because the chances of the universe ending up to permit life are much lower. Yet, a moment's thought demonstrates that no matter how improbable the event is, mere improbability will not make it convincing that someone cheated. Would you assume your neighbor cheated if she won a lottery, even if the odds against her were one googolplex to one? Not unless you had good reason already to believe she was cheating.

Conclusion

I consider these the arguments among contemporary theologians that contain a good combination of popularity and persuasiveness, but that each is seriously lacking. I welcome responses to my own criticisms, or additional criticisms.

[ October 11, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Metcalf ]</p>

Kantian

Excellent post, Thomas, as usual! I would add a few comments on Kant's role in the decisive refutation of the classic ontological argument, but i wanted to ask whether you have checked out Metacrock's <a href="http://pub18.ezboard.com/bhavetheologywillargue" target="_blank">website?</a> Reason i ask is because it would be great to read a discussion between the two of you, given that both of you are sufficiently solid in philosophy. I should add the fact that he is much more civil and tolerant on his website as opposed to the rants he posts here from time to time.

~Transcendentalist~

TerryTryon

Any ontological argument I have ever heard has struck me as a non sequitor. My mind rebels at the arrogance of assuming that mental processes have existence that is guaranteed to reflect the real world, when all the illusions, delusions, and fallacies that humans are clearly prone to show that every human thought is to a greater or lesser degree uncertain.

I have always thought the platonic idea of only true forms having existence to be ridiculous, a fantasy world raised in significance over and above sensual perception. The "Allegory of the Cave" went over my head. It was either nonsense or I was daft. It just could not be incorporated into my weltanschauung, even in speculation.

Therefore, using the term "a priori" seems to be a less brutal accusation than "begging the question," but for all intents and purposes are synonymous. Certainly, defining that an entity as necessary and then claiming that must therefore exist is the kind of example a professor would use in Philosophy 101 to illustrate question begging.

Would someone please comment on any conceptual, logical or empirical problems in the above tirade? Bertram Russell said once that for a few moments he was truly convinced by the ontological argument, and I would like to know how.

Automaton

The problem with the modal ontological argument is not only that it is unsound, it is also invalid, by way of being circular. It rests on the premise of "if God exists, God necessarily exists". However the contrapositive of this is "if God does not necessarily exist, God does not exist". Thus, if it is possible for God to be unnecessary, then it is possible for God to not exist, and if it is possible for God to not exist, he cannot be necessary. The apologist must show then, that no possible world in which God is not necessary can be, and in doing this, demonstrate that God is necessary! Hence, the argument is circular.

There is no reason for the atheist to accept the possibility of God defined as a necessary being, because by the law of universal necessity, any possibly necessary proposition must be actually necessary. So the atheist would have to accept the truth of the hidden and unfounded premise that God is actually necessary, which she of course would not.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Kantian:


"...but i wanted to ask whether you have checked out Metacrock's <a href="http://pub18.ezboard.com/bhavetheologywillargue" target="_blank">website?</a>"

Just a little. I'll take a closer look and maybe register there; thanks for the notice.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Automaton:
"There is no reason for the atheist to accept the possibility of God defined as a necessary being, because by the law of universal necessity, any possibly necessary proposition must be actually necessary."

Right. When one draws out the details of the terms mentioned in the argument, one notices that it begs the question. I notice this problem with a lot of rationalist thought; compare Descartes' famous cogito if it is taken to be a priori; if so, it's only a conditional, and conditionals don't really tell us anything. He'd still need something a posteriori to get to the consequent of that conditional. It's a good example of how a priori argument seem only to confirm conditionals.

Kantian

There are other examples what is usually taken to be "certain and indubitable" in classical rationalism, according to a certain brand of skepticism, are interpreted as begging the question, for instance, their defense of the causal principle. It is neither absolutely certain, nor self-evident to reason. When they had claimed such, they went on to offer proof by arguing from the ancient greek biased proposition: ex nihilio nihil fit.(Nothing can come from nothing) This maxim is self-referential in a circular way, as phrased: X must come from X. Nicholas Rescher calls this belief the principle of genetic homogeneity, and advocates its extinction. This proposition is begging the question, since it merely asserts what the causal principle also asserts. The skeptic, in the spirit of David Hume logically proceeds to conclude that there is no rational proof possible for the causal principle: "Every demonstration which has been produced for the necessity of a cause is fallacious."
~Transcendentalist~

TerryTryon

Is the whole of what exists contingent? The cosmological and teleological arguments merely attempt to establish that the universe is contingent. The identity of the necessary entity upon which the universe is contingent is presented as a bald assertion. Even if one could determine on empirical grounds that the universe (the whole of existence) is contingent, there would be no reason to anthropomorphize the necessary entity. Indeed, there would be every reason to expect that the entity would in no way resemble humanity.

Therein lies the rub. On one hand, (the necessary being) god is defined as being without body, parts, or passion, and on the other, he is presented as a loving, beneficent father figure who answers prayers and judges the wicked. This is the core inconsistancy. The concept of god is compartmentalized such that it takes on different attributes based on the needs of the situation. The mishmash of properties assigned to god cannot be unified; thus the believer cannot present a coherent definition and when pressed retreats into mysticism.

The ontological[1] argument is the ground assumption for either the cosmological[2] or teleological[3] arguments. The three hang together to establish a [1]necessary, [2]eternal, [3]creator.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by TerryTryon:

"Therein lies the rub. On one hand, (the necessary being) god is defined as being without body, parts, or passion, and on the other, he is presented as a loving, beneficent father figure who answers prayers and judges the wicked. This is the core inconsistancy. The concept of god is compartmentalized such that it takes on different attributes based on the needs of the situation. The mishmash of properties assigned to god cannot be unified; thus the believer cannot present a coherent definition and when pressed retreats into mysticism."

That's a good way to put a problem most laypersons don't notice about the popular evidential arguments. Each just tries to confirm some attribute of God, and then there's the rather large leap of faith we must make to say that they all apply to the same being.

Vanderzyden

Hello Thomas,

There is so much to tackle in your post. Instead of posting a reply three or four times the length of yours, let me address your "lottery fallacy" as you apply it to the critique of the teleological argument. But first, I cannot resist taking a moment to comment on your first sentence:

Atheology? What is that? Is it "the study of non-existent god(s)", or is it "not (the study of god)". Perhaps you will insist that it is a convenient term for "the study of atheism". But then, I will ask: what is the focus of inquiry, the lack of belief in god(s) or the disbelief in god(s)?

Are you attempting to establish this as a new science? On what "grounds"?

OK, now on to the good stuff...

Although you state one oversimplified caveat near the end of the OP, you do not give this argument a fair treatment. Surely you have read that there are many universal constants. A small variance of any one of them would render life impossible. To permit life, many of these constants (and conditions) could only sustain an infinitesimally small variance. See Hugh Ross's excellent summary:

<a href="http://www.reasons.org/resources/apologetics/design_evidences/designevidenceupdate1998.shtml?main" target="_blank">http://www.reasons.org/resources/apologetics/design_evidences/designevidenceupdate1998.shtml?main</a>

You are correct. Very low probability does not strictlyequate to impossibility. Is it not impossible that the observed anthropic conditions arose spontaneously. I agree. However, let me ask you a question:

What is the probability that your monitor will spontaneously lift off of your desk?

Here is the answer that I am sure you will agree with: Effectively zero. We know that inanimate objects are not set in motion except by an external cause. Inanimate objects are not agents. The same rationale is applied when observing the peculiarities in the cosmos and here on earth. Many people are willing to admit that "things don't just happen". But I don't see that you are affording the same courtesy as you critique this argument. We must remember that our experience tell us that there are always causes behind any observable phenomena.

Now, I don't understand why you introduce "cheating" into your illustration. The ability to influence, to "cheat", requires a context in which the cheating can be accomplished. Something must establish that context, since something cannot come from nothing. You are correlating fine-tuning with cheating. But, of course, the alternative is that there is no lottery at all. In fact, we should reduce your analogy here to a coin toss: one side SOMETHING, the other side NOTHING. Since we are here, we know the side on which the coin has landed. As you can see, I am starting to digress into cosmological considerations, which we must do if we are to pursue your suggestion that "we do not even know the chance of Someone being in a position to influence how the universe turned out". Your illustration points us to the absurdity "out of nothing, nothing comes." (ex nihilo, nihil fit)

It is not only the probability of fine-tuning that must be considered. We must also take information into account. What about genetic codes, such as DNA? What about the physical relationships that are established, say, at the sub-atomic level; or the variety, specificity, and effects of the physical elements. From where does the information inherent in these phenomena originate? One thing is certain: it did not just happen. Coding requires a Coder.

What is the probability that an arrangement of stones in the pattern S.O.S. was not left by a intelligent agent? What is the probability of a bunch of sticks forming themselves into a primitive structure in the remote part of a jungle? Notice that the probability is so low in each of these scenarios that you and I will both say that it is effectively impossible that either could have happened by accident. In fact, you and I operate on such assumptions every second of our lives.

On this view, I would alter this teleogical argument to be more explicit and declare it to be cogent, in and of itself:

(A) Many highly specified universal constants are necessary to permit life.
(B) We observe these constants in nature.
(C) It is effectively impossible that the constants of the universe would otherwise permit life.
(D) It is effectively impossible that the quantity and high specificity of the universal constants would exist without the prerequisite existence of God.
(E) Therefore, a God exists.

You complain about the "weakness" of these variants of the ontological or the teleological arguments. I wonder, have you carefully considered the cosmological arguments? These are much stronger, especially in light of many astronomical discoveries. In particular, I refer to the Kalam argument, espoused most passionately by William Lane Craig. I have examined the recent posts here at Infidels that attempt to analyze this argument, and I find that it has not received a balanced treatment. I plan to post a theist review of that argument soon.

<a href="http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html" target="_blank">http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html</a>

Vanderzyden