enfant terrible

Those examples seem to be poor analogies based on the summary of the Court's holding (admittedly I did not read the entire opinions, so I may be wrong in some conclusions). In Ladue there does not seem to exist a "compelling interest" as the aesthetic interest in reducing visual clutter can hardly trump First Amendment rights. Note, in contrast, that I stated "if the state found, in a reasonable manner, that bumper stickers cause a substantial number of traffic accidents" as a condition for the validity of a bumper sticker ban. Reducing the number of traffic accidents, and hence saving lives, has a far better chance to pass as "compelling interest" under the strict scrutiny doctrine. I think it is quite obvious that Ladue could satisfy only the rational basis doctrine, which does not apply to FA cases.

In Airport Commissioners the problem was overbreadth of the regulation. It was so obviously not narrowly tailored that I wonder how the case even reached the SC. The regulation, taken seriously, would have made it illegal to wear a tie-died shirt in an airport!

StrictSeparationist

My point in bringing up these cases is that Ladue may very well stand for the presumption that prohibiting an entire medium of communication- in Ladue, yard signs, and in your hypothetical, bumper stickers- may well be unconstitutional no matter what sort of interest the regulation furthers. It's a sort of corollary to the overbreadth doctrine, if you will- it doesn't deal with the actual content of the speech (and whether it's protected or not) as traditional overbreadth cases do, but rather the manner in which they're expressed. And by the way, if you'll notice, one of the interests the city of Ladue offered to support its ban on yard signs is that they might "distract motorists". The Court gave short shrift to that justification, and I suspect it might do the same with bumper stickers.

Airport Commissioners was indeed decided on overbreadth grounds alone, but I wasn't really referring to the holding in that case. I was talking about the Court's consideration, however perfunctory it may have been (as indicated in the concurrence by Justice White) that an airport terminal might be a traditional public forum. Although the Court didn't reach that question, if it indeed had answered in the affirmative, it would have opened the doors to assertions that other media of expression (bumpers of cars, perhaps) are traditional public forums, even though they haven't been around as long as public parks or sidewalks.

Having said that, I do regret phrasing my post in the way I did- your hypothetical would not be "in violation of" Airport Comm'rs, but that case does raise some interesting constitutional questions that apply to your scenario.

enfant terrible

This I think is one of intellectually most interesting areas of First Amendment law. I am really not sure what is right here, but (a very passionate separationist - and pro-choice - though I am) I am inclined to think this ought to be allowed.

A necessary condition, which must be cleared first, is that no funds that the state would collect for a regular license plate are diverted to ChooseLife. I'll just assume this is true; if it weren't, it would be such a blatant violation that no further discussion would be necessary.

The next question is whether this is consistent with disbursement of funds from other special plates. For example, if "Save the Manatee" plate funds go to whatever environmental organization applied for it, and they give it to Sierra Club and whoever they want, then this condition is satisfied.

After that, we must ask if religious organizations should have equal access to such funds as secular ones. I think that FA actually requires that they should. When you get such a license plate, you are essentially making a private charitable contribution. The proceeds should go where you'd like them to go. If you buy an environmental plate, you probably want to help environmental organizations; if you buy an anti-abortion plate, I cannot imagine what other than Christian organizations you would want to help. The state acts just as a conduit.

Finally, is it legitimate for the state to be such a conduit if religious funds are included? Is this something like the German church tax, which would clearly be illegal in the US? No, the church tax is a conduit for church funds only, it does not include symmetric treatment for secular charities; this is symmetric. Is it like school vouchers - facially symmetric, but in fact helping churches disproportionally? No, it seems this is the only one of the many special plates that directs significant funds to churches. The law applies to all special license plates, it was not designed specifically for this one, so its consequences must be viewed in total, not just with respect to "Choose life" plate in isolation.

In conclusion, I cannot see a FA case against this plate. On the other hand, I can see how disallowing this plate, while allowing others, would violate FA. So I conclude that the plate is completely legal under the US Constitution.

enfant terrible

But this "might" is only a speculation. In my hypothetical, factual evidence is assumed.

As for the "public forum" in A.C., I have no doubt the roads are a public forum as well. But that just mandates strict-scrutiny analysis; it does not summarily grant absolute freedom of all expression.

GaryP

It is not the message that bothers me; at least certainly not to the point of road rage.

It is the knowledge that MY side of this controversial issue is NOT represented by the state of FL whereas the other side is.

enfant terrible

Well, that does not appear to be the state's fault, does it?

GaryP

Agreed. But freedom of expression should not, IMO, be based upon whether 15,000 people would buy a certain plate or not.

Perhaps a group such a NARAL could go through the process.

enfant terrible

How is your freedom of expression affected? You can put a pro-choice bumper sticker on your car, and I'd guess it will cost you a lot less than a special license plate.

GaryP

But the pro-life plate could be seen as an endorsement of that postion by the state.

Therefore, that position is more valued than the opposing one.

enfant terrible

Is the relevant issue whether it could be seen as an endorsement, or whether it is in fact an endorsement of the position by the state? I think only the latter is relevant.

Most court decisions that enforce church-state separation could be seen as endorsement of atheism; actually it seems that a lot of fundies see them that way indeed. Should that be a concern for judges?