Clutch

Remember, if god is atemporal then he does not know "the future". He knows everything that happens, in a tenseless sense of "happens". However many possibilities there are in advance of the fact, in the event only one thing happens. God's knowledge of what we call the future is just a knowledge of what that one thing is, in each case. The important point is that this knowledge does not impugn the nature of the events themselves, which can be random or whatever.

Philosoft

I don't know what to think about divine atemporality. It presents a logical contradiction to talk about an atemporal being performing actions, but that can seemingly be overcome by the assumption of a sort-of "God-time" that is wholly distinct from space-time.

However, I think there is still a potential problem. If the set of all events that God "sees" amounts to a single timeline, no other possible worlds can obtain. That is, if God is aware of two discrete events, E1 and E2, that are linked causally and temporally, it can only be the case that E1 causes E2, if God's knowledge is exhaustive, regardless of the means by which God knows. If God is not aware of a potentiality, E2*, then E2* has no possiblity to obtain. If God is aware of E2*, then his knowledge is necessarily probabilistic.

Thoughts?

mnkbdky

This will be my only post on this subject, because I have become aware that one can invest entirely too much time to these conversations and neglect their other duties. Well, maybe I will be respond again, but it will not be as quickly as I had with the materialism post. With that said let me begin my statements on this topic.


It has been stated that

1) If God G knows at time T that subject S will choose choice C at time T1, then S is not free regarding C at time T1.

which entails,

2) If G is omniscient, then G knows at T what S will choose at T1

it is then stated,

3) G is omniscient

4) Therefore, G knows at T what S will choose at T1 (from 2, 3)

5) Therefore, S is not free regarding what S will choose at T1 (from 1, 4)

Comments:

First, that G knows P entails that P is true, however, that G knows P does not mean that G determined P to be true.

Second, notice the direction of entailment DE and direction of determination DD. Entailment means, proposition P entails proposition Q if and only "if P is true but Q is false" is a contradiction. Determination means, A's obtaining determines B's truth if and only if the explanation of B is true is that A obtains.

Now, let us look at an example:

Assume that Jerry is going to be propositioned by Marissa to cheat on his fiancee with her tomorrow, but quiet out of characted decides not to. Then it is true that (J) Jerry will not cheat on his fiancee tomorrow with Marissa. It is also true, then, that (G) God knows Jerry will not cheat on his fiancee tomorrow with Marissa.

From this note DE and DD

DE is from (G) to (J). That is, proposition (G), "God knows Jerry will not cheat on his fiancee tomorrow with Marrisa entails proposition (J) "Jerry will not cheat on his fiancee tomorrow with Marrisa if and only "if (G) is true but (J) is false" is a contradiction;

whereas

DD is from (J) to (G). That is, (J)'s obtaining determines (G)'s truth if and only if the explanation of (G) is true is that (J) obtains.

It is perfectly compatible to say with (G) being true that Jerry freely chose not to cheat. This is because it is Jerry's choice that caused God's knowledge. It is not God's knowledge that caused Jerry's choice.

Now it might be objected that Jerry did not make the choice until T1 and thus God could not know it at time T. That is, if (J) is the cause of (G) then (G) cannot obtain until (J) obtains, thus negating God's foreknowledge. In reply,

1) If God is omniscient, then, God knows the truth value of all future tensed statements.

2) God is omniscient

3) Therefore, God know the truth value of all future tensed statements.

4) (J) is a future tensed statement

5) Therefore, God know the truth of (J).

Now it might be objected first, that future tensed statements have no truth value since the state of affairs has not obtained or second, that if future tensed statements are either true of false then determinism is true. Both of these objections fail for the following reasons.

First it does not seem to matter if the state of affairs has obtained or not for their to be a statement. For instance, it seems that the statement, "Clutch will either respond to this post or he will not" has a truth value now. That is,

1) It is true right now that (A) either (i) Clutch will respond to this post or (ii) Clutch will not respond to this post.

2) Now, (A) is in the form ([(i) or (ii)])

3) A statement in the form of (A) is true only if its components--i.e., (i) and (ii)--are either true of false.

4) Therefore, (i) and (ii) are either true of false.

5) Either (i) and (ii) are true of false

6) If (i) is true, then some future tensed statements are true

7) If (ii) is true, then, some future tensed statements are true

8) Therefore, some future tensed statements are true

9) Some future tensed statements are true

10) If some future tensed statements are true, then future tensed statements can be true

11) There, future tensed statement can be true.

This gets rid of the first objection, but does this entail determinism. Well, I guess that depends on whether you think statements have causal powers. I tend to think only those things that have a will, that is, those things that are conscious and are capable of making plans can cause things to happen. And unless I am mistaken statements are not causal agents. That is, statements are not conscious entities that have the ability to make plans. Now, maybe you think that my making the statement, "Clutch will respond to this" causes Clutch to respond. In that case, I have a lot of control over Clutch's life. And if that is true, then I also say, "Clutch will concede defeat regarding his PC theory and will adopt dualism." The fact is that the truth value of the future tensed truth statement concerning a free agent is detemined by the choice of the agent, not vice versa.


p.s., I learned these arguments from Yandell's P of R book. The scenarios are different but the arguments are the same. Always beware of plagarism--taking credit for what is not yours. Though, it could be argued that these are common knowledge arguments since they have been around for so many years. I, however, will still give him his props.

Nowhere357

If logic contradicts direct experience, then logic is wrong.

If logic says I don't feel pain, yet I feel pain, then logic is wrong.

If logic says that my decision can be known, before I have made that decision, then logic is wrong.

Logic, after all, is a tool we use to investigate reality, and nothing more.

This seems to be the logical fallacy of distraction, by false dilemma. Dualism is not the sole remaining option.

Kevbo

I think the point that many people have forgotten about is that we are not simply talking about an omniscient god, we are talking about a god who is both omniscient and omnipotent, and who created the universe.

This god set up all physical constants, types of matter, network interactions between particles, and so on. He not only knows everything, he set it up to be that way!

Now, you might think this is ludicrous, because you can say something like, "Well, I'm going to do something completely random and on my own free will like not having lunch this afternoon. I just randomly thought about that by my own volition, so it can't possibly be predetermined." However, you'd be wrong, because God set up all the dominoes at the beginning of the universe. Through a long chain of events, this created me, who posted a message on a web board that led you to your decision. Not only did our omniscient god know that was going to happen, he made the universe in such a way that it would!

mnkbdky

I have a question because I am not sure on Kevbo's position; Was God free to create? That is, could God have chosen not to create? or was he determined too?

Was God free to chose any set of compossible dominoes or was his choice of dominoes--events that would take place--determined to?

compossible means any set that is logically possible.

p.s., man, I alreay broke me rule. It is too tempting though.

Nowhere357

I have direct experience of my free will. This invalidates your conclusion.

How do you define the word "random"?

Clutch

No, since determinism is a thesis about causation. There's a crucial difference between future-tensed facts or statements being true in the past, and future events being causally determined in the past. The former does not entail that the future is determined.

The argument in question is not Yandell's from 1999, instead dating back to an earlier philosopher of almost equal status, named Aristotle. (His solution was to reject Premise 4.)

A lucid treatment of the matter is found in Paul Horwich's Asymmetries in Time, pp. 28-33 (1987, MIT Press).

mnkbdky

Clutch and I seem to have a pattern of talking past one another. But I was wondering, wasn't that what I meant--that statements don't have causal powers--by making the distinction between DE and DD.

Wasn't this clear when I said, "The fact is that the truth value of the future tensed truth statement concerning a free agent is detemined by the choice of the agent, not vice versa." Wasn't this to say that the event (E) causes the statement (S) to be true, not vice versa.

Again, wasn't my point of naming Yandell to say where I got the arugment for the post. That is, I was not using Aristotle as my source.

Clutch, I hope that I am not misreading you, because really, we have to get on the same page sometime.

Kevbo

You have direct experience of what you percieve to be free will, but is really a microscopic illusion based on ignoring the framework of your decision.

In the same way that a young-earth literalist defines "created kind." Like a weasel.