Clutch

matt, I have identified the hinge principle of the apologetic you have been presenting, namely,

When we recognize the possibility of factors beyond our knowledge that would justify an apparent moral degeneracy, we must withhold judgement.

You finally seem to grasp the unhappy consequences to which this commits you, since you are backpedalling furiously:

But you seem not to understand the import of the position you have been rehearsing. You have indeed explicitly advanced the identified principle many times; indeed, you do so again in the above quote. And I have "come back on" the point (if that means "demolish") in each of my replies.

To reiterate: You allow that it may be possible (you should probably say that it is epistemically possible) for the world to have less evil while having as much or greater good. But the heart of your claim is that there is no ruling out the prospect of factors hidden from our knowledge -- factors through which the levels of suffering and happiness are somehow linked. If that's the case, then reducing suffering would, as a matter of logico-metaphysical necessity, require reducing happiness as well, perhaps even disproportionately. Presumably your claim is roughly analogous to the water-H2O case: Someone in ignorance of important facts might think it possible that there could be water in a world lacking hydrogen; someone in ignorance of other important facts might think it possible that there could be as much or greater good in a world lacking as much evil/suffering. Since, as you claim, "one cannot prove" that this is not the case, we must withhold judgement.

Which is exactly what the identified principle captures, and what you have repeatedly cited "the professor at Bemidji State" to establish:
The only difference is that my explication of the principle does not restrict itself to merely consequentialist moral considerations. This is just a matter of basic competence, since there exist more than merely consequentialist moral considerations; however, nothing in the reasoning from (A5) to moral nihilism depends upon this complication.

None of this is very difficult to understand; SRB has seen through to the crux of the matter very nicely, using one of the examples I've cited above. Your claim: Not knowing every moral-consequentially relevant fact, one cannot prove that a genuinely global improvement to this world is possible. Hence one cannot claim that this world is morally subpar. A precisely analogous claim: Not knowing every moral-consequentially relevant fact, one cannot prove that the Holocaust was not morally correct and praiseworthy. Hence one cannot claim that the Holocaust was morally subpar. As the professor of philosophy at Bemidji University observes: we must "suspend judgment ... when our evidence neither confirms nor disconfirms" a proposition.

Finally, your evasion about atheist philosophers -- the "historical panoply" which quickly becomes "many", while naming and competently discussing exactly none -- is embarrassing you badly. If you don't know what you're talking about, and cannot even be moved to acknowledge the ineptitude of citing Skinner as a contemporary moral philosopher, you should quietly drop it. The fact is that virtually all philosophers would reserve the expression "moral nihilism" for positions that define themselves as morally nihilistic. My point is that, upon reflection, there is a perfectly appropriate application to the expression to Christianity, given its usual theodicy. The nihilism consists not in holding that there are no moral truths, as with the usual notion of nihilism, but rather in holding a view that entails that we are never in a position to make moral judgements. That nobody else has made this observation -- or rather, your ignorance about whether anyone else has done so -- is entirely irrelevant.

mattbballman

Jamie,

The major disagreement between Tom and I is the radix of Guthrie's essay on Theodore Drange. The essay Guthrie wrote is devoted to explaining why one cannot assume that a possible world makes for a feasible world. And the various illustrations and counterfactuals explicated in our exchange have flushed out that controversy. There is no way to prove that such counterfactuals are compossible with Situation L. Even more startling, it turns out that if the counterfactuals are possibly true then certain compossible states of affairs might actually be contradictory (think of that Peter and the aardvark example). Guthrie's essay takes the next step: Even if one could prove that Situation L is feasible, what is to preclude us from thinking that such a world might actually be underpopulated?

Remarkably, none of these issues have been addressed. Instead, Tom keeps repeating his mantra that "If it's possible to conceive of then it's feasible for God." But this assumes what needs to be proven!

matt

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattbballman :

"Even if one could prove that Situation L is feasible, what is to preclude us from thinking that such a world might actually be underpopulated? ..."

"Instead, Tom keeps repeating his mantra that 'If it's possible to conceive of then it's feasible for God.' But this assumes what needs to be proven!"

Please indicate where I have used "If it's possible to conceive of then it's feasible for God" as my sole response.

These assessments illustrate the mistake you (and Guthrie) have made from the beginning. A mere "maybe" will not suffice, especially given the evidence I have marshalled that you have consistently and utterly failed to answer. This fact has now been recognized by several other posters.

God is omnipotent. Therefore, all else equal, a situation is more likely feasible than infeasible. To put it another way, imagine that God weren't omnipotent. Do you see why there would be better reason, in this case, to think that a world might be infeasible?

There are evils that do not appear to have anything to do with free will. Therefore, all else equal, the abolition of these evils does not seem to produce an infeasible world. Imagine that the only evil in the world were moral evil. Do you see why there would be better reason, in this case, to think a world might be infeasible?

And as for your latest "maybe," that is, maybe this world will be underpopulated, I must again remind you that God's omnipotence and the evils that seem to have nothing to do with free will both provide further background probability that L will not be underpopulated.

So let me make your response easier with two questions:

Do you understand why God's omnipotence provides antecedent reason to think a situation is feasible?

Do you understand why the fact that some evils appear to have nothing to do with free will provides antecedent reason to think a situation is feasible?

mattbballman

Tom,

God's omnipotence may certainly be necessary to account for a feasible world but nothing has been proved beyond speculation why God's omnipotence is sufficient to account for such a feasible world. This is why your conclusion that the possibility of Situation L entails the feasibility of Situation L is non sequitur. Regarding the evils in the world having no bearing on free will, you yourself have announced that they only "appear" to have no bearing on free will. This was what I was driving at when I explained why no one, due to the inscrutable nature of our historio-geographic web of causal connectivity, can possibly prove how one free creaturely event in history has no bearing on another event. My appeal to Chaos Theory exemplified this.

matt

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattbballman :

"...nothing has been proved beyond speculation why God's omnipotence is sufficient to account for such a feasible world."

But that's not required. All we need is for L probably to be a feasible situation, and all that requires is that one instance of intense apparently gratuitous suffering with no visible and salient free will decision could be removed without decreasing the total goodness in the world. The fact that God is omnipotent provides reason to believe that for any situation, all else equal, it is more likely feasible than infeasible. At this point, there is argumentative weight towards "L is feasible" as a result of God's omnipotence, and to answer it will require argumentation from your side to the point that, either, L is infeasible, or God's omnipotence provides no reason to think L is feasible.

Suppose that God were only as powerful as a human. In this situation, would you think that L is just as likely to be feasible as it is now?

"This was what I was driving at when I explained why no one, due to the inscrutable nature of our historio-geographic web of causal connectivity, can possibly prove how one free creaturely event in history has no bearing on another event."

Again, you'd have to make it plausible that every way to bring about L will actually produce unknown evil effects, and I doubt that anyone will find this intuitively obvious. I agree that, often, free events have unforeseen consequences, but for creaturely freedom to be relevant, it must appear likely that all ways to produce L will run afoul of problems with creaturely freedom.

Suppose that free will didn't exist. In this situation, would you think that L is just as likely to be feasible as it is now?

mattbballman

Thanx for this discussion, but I said a couple posts up that that would be my last. Sorry for not staying true to my word.

Thank VERY MUCH for this fruitful discussion, tom.

matt