Vorkosigan

I wasn't planning to. Michael doesn't seem to be quite... um, up with the play... so far as understanding what the Fine Tuning argument is.
Although, I expect he really does understand but is pretending not to in an effort to make the FT argument sound like a stupid emotional appeal.

I understand Fine Tuning quite well; obviously better than you, or you wouldn't be making an argument that is, in fact, a stupid emotional appeal. FT is the simpleminded recognition that everything in the universe falls within natural cosntraints (no shit? really?) coupled with some entirely arbitrary and subjective conclusions about certain materials and processes referred to as "life."

Michael

Tercel

Of course we have none. (That being Wizardry's point as well) However we do have experience with other intelligent beings. The burden of proof would seem to lie on you if you wish to assert that a universe-designing intelligence would behave significantly differently to any other intelligence. The whole point of induction is that lacking any good reasons why the future should differ from past experience we can reasonably assume that we can make valid predictions based on past experience. And hence our past experience of intelligent beings should give us a reasonable ability to predict the actions of another intelligent being. If you want to alleged differently then you need some evidence.

Sure a universe-designing intelligence might behave differently. But as I have already pointed out, it is not important what the intelligence "might" do, but what the probabilities are with regard to it's likely actions.

HRG

All intelligent beings we know are material.

Thus it is highly improbable that there exist non-material intelligent beings; this factor should of course be included in any probability estimate.
In any case, we have no data for them to draw an inductive conclusion or make a probability estimate.

BTW, do you actually know of any intelligent being which would create gazillions of cubic light years of empty space if his purpose is to create life on one or more planets ?
Unless the alleged intelligent being differs fundamentally from all other observed intelligent beings (non-material, omnipotent, outside the universe ....)

If you take your argument serious, then you should conclude that there are no non-material inTelligent beings:

"our past experience of intelligent beings should give us a reasonable ability to predict the properties of another intelligent being."

I've just changed "actions" to "property"; the rest is yours.

BTW, what is "intelligence", if not a certain ability of human beings ? What we know about it does not include the creation of universes.

Regards,
HRG.

[ March 05, 2002: Message edited by: HRG ]</p>

Vorkosigan

Sure a universe-designing intelligence might behave differently. But as I have already pointed out, it is not important what the intelligence "might" do, but what the probabilities are with regard to it's likely actions.

ROTFL. Let me get this straight....

"...what an intelligence might do"
"what are probabilities with regard to its likely actions"

Tercel, these two clauses mean exactly the same thing. Yet you say the top one is "not important." And you said I didn't understand this discussion. LOL

BTW, what is your database for discovering the probable actions of intelligences?

Never mind that, how do you know it was an intelligent being that created the universe?

Never mind that, how do you know that creating the universe was its intention, and not a side effect of something else it was doing?

I can see why you haven't engaged with any of these questions HRG and I have asked. You don't have the answers.

Michael

Vorkosigan

The burden of proof would seem to lie on you if you wish to assert that a universe-designing intelligence would behave significantly differently to any other intelligence.

Is this a serious comment? If so, Tercel, can you give us a list of universe-designing intelligences so we can learn something about their behavior?

The whole point of induction is that lacking any good reasons why the future should differ from past experience we can reasonably assume that we can make valid predictions based on past experience.

I agree. So give us a list of some universe-designing intelligences known to us, so we can make some inductions. The funny thing is, if you want to make inductions, you need data.

Also, if you Designed a universe in order to get life, as HRG asked, would you make all but a tiny planet on a distant corner of it inaccessible to life as we know it? I never met any architect who Designed a house so that the residents all lived in one tiny corner, and occupied the rest with useless space. Similarly, I have never been on an airplane with only seat, and the rest simply empty space. Can't recall ever seeing a city plan that made the whole thing empty plain......

Michael

[ March 06, 2002: Message edited by: turtonm ]</p>

Wyrdsmyth

Try telling the Enron stockholders it can't happen.

Ender

Tercel we've never crossed paths before- but here goes nothing!

An analogy between objects we know to proceed from design and a natural object is flimsy at best, and at worst, too remote to suggest anything similar.

When the causes of event are exactly similar, then the analogy is dead-on, and inferences we draw from it has cash-value as a stand alone inductive conclusion. But concerning objects that do not have quite the similarity, the analogy is weakened. the inference is less certain, and dependent on the resemblance and similarity.

Analogy syllogism:

• P 1. A's are similar to a's
• P 2. A's are caused by B's
• Conclusion. a's are caused by b's.

A few objections to this syllogism comes to mind: there is no reference to the main element, or how good is the analogy or how close the similarities are between the A's and a's.

Analogy syllogism, improved:

• A's are similar to a's in features of x1, x2,..... Xn.
• A's are caused by B's
• Therefore a's are caused by b's.

The crucial weak spot is how high is the variable 'n' (how many similarities are there between a and A, or God and man) E.g., both a lion and man can move. Man enjoys music. Therefore lions, like men, enjoys music too.

If n is low, the analogy is weak.
If n is high, the analogy is strong.

Here the theist predictably rush to the defense of his faith and inadvertently anthropomorphize God by arguing that the relation between the Designer and man is high.

"This method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being, so remote and incomprehensible, who brears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper."--Enquiry

The essential balance of the analogy in the design argument between anthropomorphism and incomprehensible remoteness is difficult to maintain.

Unless the theist defaults by anthropomorphizing this Designer and reduce Him/It to a magical sky fairy, the analogy of a designer (man) and the Designer fails.

Next!

~Speaker 4 the Death of God~

(((Edited to add the sentence "the essential..")))

[ March 06, 2002: Message edited by: Ender the Theothanatologist ]</p>

Wizardry

Tercel, you can't make generalizations if you only have one sample. As far as we have been able to directly observe, there is only one type of being in the universe that we consider intelligent: humans. You cannot make statements about intelligent beings in general based solely on your experience with humans.

There is nothing intrinsic to the property of intelligence which implies interest in other intelligent beings. We also have no other forms of intelligence around by which to make statements about what is common to intelligent beings. Therefore, your use of induction is invalid.

Peace out.

[ March 06, 2002: Message edited by: Wizardry ]</p>