Michaelson

First off, I'll just say that I'm writing an essay on this topic, and so there is a degree of self interest in starting this thread. However, I don't plan on plagiarising from this site or anything of the type, I just want to garner discussion that might prove helpful to my topic. I want to make this clear, because last time I started discussion on a topic I planned writing an essay on in the political forum, a whole bunch of people suggested I try doing my own research, told me there are sites that would write the essay for me and so on. I don't think there's anything wrong with wanting to discuss a subject I'm studying, but if any of you do, then now you know and just don't respond.

Better yet, tell me what your objections are.

Having said that, I was wondering first, after reading the "materialists are (possibly) Irrational" thread, what general school of thought Locke would be considered a part of in terms of his view on personal identity? In my course we have discussed Locke and only Locke. I haven't ever heard of the Bundle Theory or any others, and strictly speaking I don't think my lecturer is looking for us to delve into these areas, however I would like for my own purposes to have an idea of what the different theories are. So would anyone be willing to give a list of the main theories of self, and maybe some sources I could look at to get a general overview of them?

Secondly, and more specifically, I was wondering if anyone could help me out with a specific objection I have towards Locke's theory. He claims that identity is located in our consciousness, and that we remain the same person only so long as we are linked by memories to our previous selves. What I take him to mean here, is that even if we can't specifically remember something, if it could conceivably be remembered, there is still a conscious link. So I couldn't say that I am the same person as I was on my third birthday, which I remember, but not the same person as I was the day after my third birthday, because my experiences on that day, and reflection upon those experiences at the time, had a causal effect on my experiences the next day and so on right up until the present day.

However, Locke himself uses the example of amnesia to argue that the same human being might not remain the same person. So, if I'm hit on the head and lose all memory, I am not the same person as I was before I was hit on the head. However, I can't see how this can be reconciled with the possibility of regaining memory at a later date. To clarify, before being hit on the head, I am person X. After losing all memory I am person Y. Then I regain my memory at a later date, and become person Z. It seems to me, here, that Y=Z, and X=Z, however Y/=X. Does that possibility destroy Locke's claims, though, or is there a way around that objection?

Assuming I'm not treated like a filthy intellectual thief, I might re-post to this thread from time to time as I develop ideas about the theory.

Cheers.

John Page

Assuming the attribution correct, I think Locke has the location of identity in the "wrong" consciousness, i.e. the subject rather than the observer.

It is in the mind of the observer that the judgement "does this person have identity X" is made. Of course, one can observe one's own qualities but objectivity in this case would be very difficult, although I do admit Locke's point that such an exercise would permit comparison of memories inaccesible to the external observer.

Hence "I'm just not myself today" and "He's like a new man".

Cheers, John