ex-preacher

Warning: this is not a threat, nor is it coercion. It is only a friendly warning of a natural consequence. If it were a real threat, you would be instructed to proceed to a nearby shelter. This is only a test.


luvluv - have you heard of Pascal's Wager. It's a bad bet.

Pomp

bd-from-kg,

I'm following most of your argument and even, amazingly enough, finding myself in agreement with you on most points, but I have to ask you what on earth makes you say:

In fact, an even more self-evident principle applies in this case: If God desires X, X must be intrinsically desirable.

How does one agent's desiring X, even if that agent happens to be omniscient, omnipotent, omniwhatever, lead you to the supposedly self-evident conclusion that X is intrinsically desirable?

luvluv

Everybody keeps mentioning Pascals wager but I don't know what it is. Can y'all enlighten one such as I?

Pomp

luvluv,

Everybody keeps mentioning Pascals wager but I don't know what it is. Can y'all enlighten one such as I?

I'm here to serve.

Basically, <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theism/wager.html" target="_blank">Pascal's Wager</a> runs like this: If the Xian god exists, and condemns non-Xians to hell then the cost of nonbelief is much higher than the cost of belief and, to be safe, one ought to be a Xian. The key flaw in the Wager is that it overlooks all other religions. If, for example, Allah exists then Pascal, despite his prudence, is raosting in hell right now.

Dianna

This has been a fascinating thread. The above quote still stands out in my mind. Luvluv seems to say that God's constant presence would have an influence on people's decision-making ability regarding his existence and would therefore be considered coercive. And yet, God's NONpresence has certainly influenced the decision-making ability of millions.

It is the lack of evidence for god, its lack of presence in our world, that leads me to assume it doesn't exist. If Luvluv's god exists, it has coerced me into not believing in it by its hiddenness--it has interfered with my freewill to choose by not adequately showing me that there is even a choice to be made.

Dianna.

bd-from-kg

Pompous Bastard:

Obviously it doesn't imply that if the agent isn't God; as I said, this principle comes into play here only because the agent is God.

As to the "self-evident validity" of the principle: as I hope you've figured out by now, I'm arguing from luvluv's premises, the point being to show that his position is inherently unreasonable if not self-contradictory. In terms of a Christian frame of reference, it seems to me that this is self-evident.

luvluv

Dianna:

You're on an atheist board, so I assume you do know there is a choice to be made. You have made it.

And despite the fact that God is hidden, most people on the planet believe He exists. So He is not asking the impossible of you.

Pomp

luvluv,

And despite the fact that God is hidden, most people on the planet believe He exists. So He is not asking the impossible of you.

All he asks is that you pay no attention to the man behind the curtain.

Pomp

bd-from-kg,

As to the "self-evident validity" of the principle: as I hope you've figured out by now, I'm arguing from luvluv's premises, the point being to show that his position is inherently unreasonable if not self-contradictory. In terms of a Christian frame of reference, it seems to me that this is self-evident.

All right, point taken. I was just curious as to how you had discovered that the first horn of Euthyphro's dillemma was self-evidently true.

[ April 20, 2002: Message edited by: Pompous Bastard ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Pompous Bastard:

Actually it doesn't matter which horn is true, or even whether the dilemma is valid. All that's needed is that a thing is desirable if and only if God desires it.

However, I notice that the principle as I stated it isn't quite valid. God can desire things as means to ends - i.e., as instrumental goods. (Although it has been argued that this is impossible since God is omnipotent; Since He can simply will the end itself, He has no need of "means". But we'll let that pass.) Thus it isn't true that the mere fact that God desires something implies that it's intrinsically desirable. So here's a more rigorous form of the argument.

Anything that God can be said to desire "most" in any meaningful sense must be intrinsically desirable, because if He desires it as a means to something else, that "something else" must be more desirable. Thus, if I want a pot so that I can fix some chicken soup and want to cook chicken soup so that I can eat it, eating chicken soup must be more desirable (to me) than having the pot.

So if God desires our happiness (or other good) "above all else", whatever that means exactly, it must mean at the least that it is intrinsically desirable.