Vorkosigan

I have no real problem with his claims about theoretical anarchism, but his analysis of the Galileo case is, I think, wrong. Up until a few months ago I used to buy the argument that it was possible in 1633 to be a Copernican, but I don't any more.
And I think he commits the very error he accuses science of, of overpowering his opponents by force -- of rhetoric, in this case -- rather than by persuasiveness of argument. The last section, where he discusses science and colonialism, is just flat absurd and confused. For example, read the section on myth and science -- and note how he has confused, probably deliberately, the social effects or functions of science-as-ideology with its content:

• "Modern society is 'Copernican' not because Copernicanism has been put on a ballot, subjected to a democratic debate and then voted in with a simple majority; it is 'Copernican' because the scientists are Copernicans and because one accepts their cosmology as uncritically as one once accepted the cosmology of bishops and cardinals."

As if heliocentricism was not tested each and every time someone sends up a satellite or picks up a telescope....

Feyerabend was the first writer to really effectively deploy rhetoric as a weapon against science and its accompanying ideologies. Sometimes he is very effective -- one of my favorite pieces is his dissection of the statement on astrology that dozens of notables signed. Some of it is just shit:

• 'While the parents of a six-year-old child can decide to have him instructed in the rudiments of Protestantism, or in the rudiments of the Jewish faith, or to omit religious instruction altogether, they do not have a similar freedom in the case of the sciences. Physics, astronomy, history must be learned. They cannot be replaced by magic, astrology, or by a study of legends."

As if there were no real-world ethical consequences of adopting legends in place of reliable methodologies about the world. He tries to deal with that below, where he does a sudden retreat, substituting the idea of "replacing" science with bullshit with "augmenting" science with bullshit. Or, as if it were impossible to learn both at once.

Of course, his idea is that democraticizing science means giving everyone a vote on outcomes:

"It is the vote of everyone concerned that decides fundamental issues such as the teaching methods used, or the truth of basic beliefs such as the theory of evolution, or the quantum theory, and not the authority of big-shots hiding behind a non-existing methodology."

But before his was talking about inputs into methodologies, now suddenly he thinks that science can be ignored and reality determined by vote. This sort of rhetorical veer between opposing or unrelated points of view is commonplace and contemptible. The work, especially the final chapter, is pure bullshit. I'd have to go back and read the section on Copernicus and Galileo more carefully, but Feyerabend does not make much of real case -- other than the emotional rants and rhetoric -- for his position.

And Bede, at least part of the reason no other scientist was prosecuted was because everyone got the message. As Descartes noted. "I don't sail against the wind." Lots of scientists suffered, though, from Xtian persecution in and major and minor ways, as time went on. For example, there was a sharp decline in scientific publications after 1550 in Spain, because the Spanish sucked up Catholic anti-Reformation attitudes -- Philip himself was pro-knowledge, an enthusiast of math, but he adopted policies and attitudes that blunted the impact of the Scientific Revolution in Spain. Like Descartes, scientists felt Galileo's imprisonment as a cautionary tale. Plus, at that time, Europe was splitting into States where the Church had no control. One reason science could advance was because there were places were the Church could not stamp out or suppress or curb independent thought.

Obviously, the Church's initial position was that the earth was the immovable center of the universe, otherwise Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler would not have felt compelled to produce material reconciling Heliocentricism with the Bible!

Also, Bede, Kepler's math was checked in 1631 when it successfully predicted a transit of Mercury across the Sun's face. His math was thirty times more accurate than anyone prior to him. Yes, by 1633, when Galileo was punished, the data were already available suggesting that Kepler and Copernicus were most likely right....

Vorkosigan


Vorkosigan

Hugo Holbling

I guess i'll have to hit the books again, if you and Bede disagree.

I got more than i bargained for! Thanks for going into more detail, as i'm interested in your opinions on Feyerabend.

I don't think PKF himself would have a problem with your criticism; he said himself that his work wasn't to be taken seriously, although subsequently revising it ad nauseum. Nevertheless, it's clear from his correspondence that he wasn't aiming to make a watertight case against anything. Thus far the criticism of his work that i've studied makes the point that his political views formed his philosophical outlook, not the converse; moreover, his commitment to an epistemological pluralism could only be argued for by force of rhetoric if he could hope to remain consistent with his ideas.

Thanks for your thoughts, anyway. Have your read any of his essays, which go into more depth and are considerably less rhetorical? Feyerabend was an interesting character, i think, and - apparently - one hell of a teacher!

Bede

Agreed about Kepler, but you remember that Galileo refused to accept Kepler's model. Essentially, the argument at G's trial was between Copernicus and Tycho Brahe which on empirical grounds is a tough one to call. Mind you, had G argued Kepler (or at least the small bits that with hindsight we have decided we like) the outcome probably wouldn't have been much different. But then if G was less arrogant and more responsive to other people's ideas the trial probably wouldn't have happened in the first place.

On Feyerabend, I agree with much of what you say about where he was coming from politically. He really was a relativist (unlike Kuhn who is just mistaken for one). However, the points he makes about G's pictures of the moon being grossly inaccurate, the inability of most people to see what G said they ought to through a telescope and the old bugbear of the tides remain valid despite where he then tries to take his ideas.

Also, I disagree with the church having had much effect in cowing scientists. The French and Germans were written out of Anglo Saxon histories of science (such as the lie that Priestley discovered Oxygen - we only know from hindsight he managed to isolate it but then got everything about it wrong. It was of course the French Catholic Lavoisier, who's head was cut off by those freethinking Jacobins, who deserves all the credit). I see no evidence that G's trial had anything other than a marginal effect - it would be hard to be more Catholic than ancien regime France which was just as impressive as late seventeenth century England in science.

Yours

Bede

Bede's Library - faith and reason

Vorkosigan

Agreed about Kepler, but you remember that Galileo refused to accept Kepler's model. Essentially, the argument at G's trial was between Copernicus and Tycho Brahe which on empirical grounds is a tough one to call. Mind you, had G argued Kepler (or at least the small bits that with hindsight we have decided we like) the outcome probably wouldn't have been much different. But then if G was less arrogant and more responsive to other people's ideas the trial probably wouldn't have happened in the first place.

Bede, that's absurd, you're blaming the victim here. Tycho versus Copernicus is also beside the point. The Church had no business sitting in on a scientific dispute, and it had no business punishing people who disagreed with it.

On Feyerabend, I agree with much of what you say about where he was coming from politically. He really was a relativist (unlike Kuhn who is just mistaken for one).

A good way to put it! poor Kuhn, the most misused academic of our time, outside of Chomsky.

However, the points he makes about G's pictures of the moon being grossly inaccurate, the inability of most people to see what G said they ought to through a telescope and the old bugbear of the tides remain valid despite where he then tries to take his ideas.

But he also makes some unwarranted points. For one thing, others did see what Galileo saw -- Kepler published a defense of G's claims about the satellites of Jupiter. I think Feyerabend's comments about there being no theoretical underpinning for the telescope were overdrawn. There was no valid theory of anything in the 17th century, but a great deal of empirical experience. G's drawing of the moon was wrong, but he was correct in saying it was not a perfect sphere.

Also, I disagree with the church having had much effect in cowing scientists.

Let's say, people had to walk more softly....and the Church's attempts failed because of the political splintering of Europe and its lack of temporal power. The spirit was willing, but the flesh was weak. Remember, in countries where the Church/Christianity was powerful temporally, the scientific spirit generally waned. Russia, Spain, Austria....

I see no evidence that G's trial had anything other than a marginal effect -

Well, read Descartes' postulates from his 1644 publication of the heavens. All of them deal with the problem of Copernicus vs Tycho (Ptolemy being a dead issue), and he is careful to toe the line. I think, though, a lot of the underlying problem was the failure of anyone to appreciate the idea of gravity, and so much of the struggle was understanding how things could move rather than whether if they were. Though Kepler came close. He was following the same mystical/mathematical path as Newton, and appreciated the fundamental relation that the sun somehow drives the whole system. If he had only lived longer, he might have discovered gravity.

Although, it is wonderful to see how much you know now, Bede, how rapidly you have assembled all this data and how easily you move around in it. You should be proud.

Vorkosigan

Bede

Vork,

Thanks for the kind words - it is appreciated.

While it is entirely true that the church had no business telling people what scientific theories to believe, the point I am trying to make is that the science is not the reason for the clash but the medium through which it happened.

Following the work of Mario Baigioli, I have been struck just how similar the G affair is to what happened to various royal favourites in England. Francis Bacon was done for bribery, Walter Rayleigh for annoying the Spanish, Thomas More for treason, Buckingham sacrificed to parliament, Wolsey for not getting a divorce. Only Bacon escaped with his life. With G, the Vatican was doing no more than cutting him down to size as powerful people had got pissed off with him. Had he annoyed the English monarch, the cutting down to size would probably have involved an axe, but as usual the Church was more forgiving than the secular powers of the time - it wanted repentence rather than a victim - a demonstration of both power and magnamity at the same time. Descartes was right about need to step carefully but this was a universal thing as in an absolutist culture you could not cross anyone in power and expect to get away with it. To single out the Vatican for particular odium would be unfair.

As a Catholic, my regret is the Vatican can still sometimes act like a renaissance state while most of the rest of Europe has grown out of it.

Yours

Bede

Bede's Library - faith and reason