xoc

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The question is, how does one define real? Are real things those which have height, breadth, depth, and measurable/energy (phenomena that touch the senses or can be measured by devices) or is there any allowance for the other mental faculties to apprehend "reality?" The "types" and classifications by which we define things, the way we divide things logically, are not physical objects yet we cannot escape their presence and continue to use the higher "logical" (rather than physical) and "abstract" (rather than exact instances) to describe the "physical" world. Considering the necessity of these processes, how can we write them off as being "unreal" just because they don't have spatial qualities?
Pretty much. Like I was saying in the dualism thread on EoG board, the theologians of the Middle Ages believed in "subtle matter", the creeds affirm that Christ is of "one Substance" with the father, "energies" of the Holy Ghost etc. The spiritual creatures have matter-like qualities and manifestation- we could be simply talking about a different kind of physicality. But I suppose this "spiritual substance" vs. "physical substance" is a different division than logical/physical divisions.
Considering the unique properties of electromagnetics radii in comparison to our sluggish physical cases, it doesn't seem that unreasonable for people to have supposed this. Obviously the Relativistic equations prove a primacy in importance of "light"; (and other electromagnetic radiation) it forms the standard by which other phenomena can be measured(a blessed constant). My question is "why?"

jpbrooks

I agree that the boundary between "mind" and the rest of reality can be viewed as arbitrary (or even as non-existent). Placing that boundary at various points in the "physical" world yields different (but complementary) perspectives on the data of our experiences (viewing these various perspectives from an epistemological rather than an ontological standpoint).
Thus, from that standpoint, the "holistic" views of reality that rule out the materialistic standpoint, in (for example) scientific inquiry, are just as reductionistic as "scientific materialism" itself.

-John Phillip Brooks

[ January 27, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p>