Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Bill Snedden · 04-30-2003, 11:15 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by luvluv
It doesn't fail because it isn't a formal syllogistic argument, it is a form of reductio absurdium. Isn't that a legitimate means of arguing in favor for something?

Absolutely, although it isn't really a reductio. It's a retorsion, a form of argument against the counterfactual. In fact, it can be formulated as a syllogism. David Byron posted the following possible formulation on the VanTil mailing list in Feb. of 1998 (I've corrected some of the typos and included his comments on the steps as he did, in {}):

Quote:

DEFINITIONS:

(a) X is a network of propositions constituting the non-
negotiables of the Xian worldview.
(b) E is human experience (some combination of empirical data,
rational method, and mental process)
(c) P is some person
(d) Q is some proposition
(e) "~" means "it is not the case that"--classical negation.

ARGUMENT:

[1a] (If E is intelligible, then X are true)
{to be proved}

[2a] Assume that ~(If E is intelligible, then X are true)
{negation of [1a], ad argumentum}

[2b] (E is intelligible) and ~(X are true)
{negated conditional}

[3] If (E is intelligible) then (P can have knowledge of Q)
{definition of "intelligible"}

[4] If (P can have knowledge of Q) then ((Q is true) AND (P believes that Q is true) AND (P is warranted in believing that Q is true))
{definition of "knowledge"}

[5] if (P is justified in believing that Q is true) then ((P can have transactions1 with abstract entities [such as laws]) AND (P can have transactions2 with concrete differentiated entities [such as the referent of Q]) AND (P can relate transactions1 to transactions2))
{stipulated condition of warrant}

[6] However, ~(P can have transactions1 with abstract entities [such as universal laws]) OR ~(Pcan have transactions2 with concrete differentiated entities [such as the referent of Q]) OR ~(P can relate transactions1 to transactions2)
{premise?: the strong Van Tilian claim}

[7] Therefore, ~(P can have knowledge of Q)
{negated conjunction, Modus Tollens}

[8] Therefore, ~(E is intelligible)
{negated conjunction, Modus Tollens}

[9] Therefore, ~((E is intelligible) and ~(X are true))
{negated conjunction}

[10] Therefore, ~(E is intelligible) or (X are true)
{De Morgan's law}

[11] Therefore, (If E is intelligible, then X are true)
{material implication}

Quote:

Originally posted by luvluv
Without a foundation of knowledge, the claim even to know that the transcendental argument begs the question is itself unjustified.

And this is essentially one of the primary arguments against the TAG. Namely, that a "foundation" for knowledge might not be possible or needed. Coherentists have all but eviscerated foundationalist epistemology and the definition of knowledge as "justified true belief". Whether or not their criticisms are accurate is certainly a matter of debate, but the attack can't simply be ignored.

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Dr. Retard · 04-30-2003, 11:31 AM

TAGers, to my eyes, resemble those who press moral arguments. They claim that naturalistic approaches to epistemology or morality are hopeless inadequate. And yet they never interact with naturalistic approaches to epistemology or morality. What gives?

(At least the essay at the URL given above talks about naturalist approaches to epistemology, though, as I've said, it's more book report than argument, and not particularly current).

Goliath · 04-30-2003, 12:09 PM

luvluv,

Quote:

It isn't a syllogistic argument, if I understand it correctly, trying to PROVE the existence of God.

Yes it is. It is summarized as follows:

God exists and is the foundation of all knowledge.

If God didn't exist, we would have no foundation for knowledge.

Therefore, God exists.

It is circular, and therefore fallacious.

Quote:

It simply says the existene of God is necessary for us to believe that we know anything.

And theists have failed again, and again, and again, and again, and again to prove this assertion. Asserting it one more time will NOT make it true!

Quote:

At any rate, how do you KNOW, the argument begs the question?

Simple: by examining the argument. Why do you ask such obvious, inane questions?

Sincerely,

Goliath

Goliath · 04-30-2003, 12:14 PM

Bilbo,

Quote:

Whatever defects transcendental arguments exhibit (whether of local or global scope), this isn't one of them. Perhaps you're just unfamiliar with indirect proof proceedures.

I'll have you know that I've spent eight years in college (undergraduate and graduate school combined), and am a little over one year away from obtaining a PhD in Mathematics. Before you attempt to snidely lecture me further on logical arguments, I would ask what qualifications you have to do so. How many years have you spent studying Mathematics or logical arguments?

Quote:

A TA for God (or anything else for that matter) does not "assume" its transcendental premise, so much as it *deduces* the truth of that premise from an "assumption";

Incorrect. The transcendental argument relies on the following assertion: God exists and is the basis for all knowledge.

Sincerely,

Goliath

SRB · 04-30-2003, 01:01 PM

Quote:

DEFINITIONS:

(a) X is a network of propositions constituting the non-
negotiables of the Xian worldview.
(b) E is human experience (some combination of empirical data,
rational method, and mental process)
(c) P is some person
(d) Q is some proposition
(e) "~" means "it is not the case that"--classical negation.

ARGUMENT:

[1a] (If E is intelligible, then X are true)
{to be proved}

[2a] Assume that ~(If E is intelligible, then X are true)
{negation of [1a], ad argumentum}

[2b] (E is intelligible) and ~(X are true)
{negated conditional} [from 2a]

[3] If (E is intelligible) then (P can have knowledge of Q)
{definition of "intelligible"}

[4] If (P can have knowledge of Q) then ((Q is true) AND (P believes that Q is true) AND (P is warranted in believing that Q is true))
{definition of "knowledge"}

[5] if (P is justified in believing that Q is true) then ((P can have transactions1 with abstract entities [such as laws]) AND (P can have transactions2 with concrete differentiated entities [such as the referent of Q]) AND (P can relate transactions1 to transactions2))
{stipulated condition of warrant}

[6] However, ~(P can have transactions1 with abstract entities [such as universal laws]) OR ~(Pcan have transactions2 with concrete differentiated entities [such as the referent of Q]) OR ~(P can relate transactions1 to transactions2)
{premise?: the strong Van Tilian claim}

[7] Therefore, ~(P can have knowledge of Q)
{negated conjunction, Modus Tollens}

[8] Therefore, ~(E is intelligible)
{negated conjunction, Modus Tollens}

[9] Therefore, ~((E is intelligible) and ~(X are true))
{negated conjunction}

[10] Therefore, ~(E is intelligible) or (X are true)
{De Morgan's law}

[11] Therefore, (If E is intelligible, then X are true)
{material implication}
Regards,

What a silly and inefficient argument! For starters, why can't we just as well substitute for the definition of X? How about if X is the following pair of propositions: (i) Christianity is false, (ii) I am currently sat in a bath of custard. In that case I should think the conclusion would be false, so which premise would the author reject?

The main problem here is premise (6). In plain English it states that every person knows nothing at all about at least one of these categories:

(i) anything relating to abstract laws,
(ii) anything relating to concrete particulars
(iii) how abstract laws and concrete particulars are related to each other.

Note that (6) is not derived from the assumption for reductio, (2a), but is stated as a premise! It entails a radically skeptical view of human knowledge. I doubt very much that Van Til would agree with it, as is claimed. Did he really think that nobody knows very much? Note that (6) also entails that there is no such thing as an omniscient person, so presumably entails the nonexistence of God.

A much simpler, shorter and clearer version of the argument above, that captures its main point, is this:

(a) No person knows anything much.
(b) Therefore, no person knows anything much or Christianity is true [from (a) by addition].
(c) Therefore, if any person knows anything much then Christianity is true [from (b) by material implication].

This argument is deductively valid. Here premise (a) plays the part of premise (6) in the argument above. The argument I present here is far more efficient than the one above, but every bit as loopy. I can only think that the author got lost in the maze he created for himself.

SRB

Bilbo · 04-30-2003, 06:37 PM

Earlier, I wrote:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whatever defects transcendental arguments exhibit (whether of local or global scope), this isn't one of them. Perhaps you're just unfamiliar with indirect proof proceedures.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To which Goliath responds:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I'll have you know that I've spent eight years in college (undergraduate and graduate school combined), and am a little over one year away from obtaining a PhD in Mathematics. Before you attempt to snidely lecture me further on logical arguments, I would ask what qualifications you have to do so. How many years have you spent studying Mathematics or logical arguments?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I don't see why you feel the need to disclose your academic pedigree (or question mine) in response to negative evaluations of your claims regarding logical deficiencies of TAs, rather than engage those evaluations head on. Appeal to Authority settles little. Such appeals don't supply necessary or sufficient conditions for comprehension of transcendental analysis, the synthetic a priori, or the relation those things have to logical fallacies and objectionable circularity.

My speculation about your acquaintance with specific proof proceedures resulted from a natural interpretation of your (unqualified) remarks regarding assumptions supposedly made by the proponents of TAs. Your subsequent remarks to others seem to confirm the reasonableness of that interpretation.

As an aside, it might interest you to know that there are numerous philosophers (Barry Stroud, Robert Stern, Harry Frankfurt etc) that are critical of TAs, yet neglect to ascribe the sorts of defects to them that you do. (Always a good policy in philosophy to check whether or not you're screaming into a vacuum

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A TA for God (or anything else for that matter) does not "assume" its transcendental premise, so much as it *deduces* the truth of that premise from an "assumption";
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Incorrect. The transcendental argument relies on the following assertion: God exists and is the basis for all knowledge.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You refer, somewhat speciously to *the* transcendental argument (affixing the definite article) yet I wonder what argument you're refering to specifically. Certainly not one I've seen recently, not in print at least. In any case, threadbare statements such as the one above (along with acerbic tone of your posts) don't lend much credibility to the idea that your interested in accurately characterizing the issues anyhow.

As I hinted abit earlier: A transcendental thesis is not some bald existential claim; rather, its typically framed as a modal conditional, the antecedent of which is some contingent intentional phenomenon, and the consequent of which is (supposedly) an ontological condition for that phenomenon. The truth of the consequent then (in some sense) depends on the truth of the other component of the conditional (ie - its phenomenological aspect).

So given one common understanding of how these matters are framed, your claims regarding circularity and question-begging appear to require a facelift.

Regards,

Bilbo

Bill Snedden · 04-30-2003, 07:05 PM

Let me say first that it's certainly not my intent to argue for TAG. I merely wanted to show that it could and had been put into a formal structure.

Quote:

Originally posted by SRB
What a silly and inefficient argument! For starters, why can't we just as well substitute for the definition of X? How about if X is the following pair of propositions: (i) Christianity is false, (ii) I am currently sat in a bath of custard. In that case I should think the conclusion would be false, so which premise would the author reject?

Well, yes that's true. One of the as-yet-unresolved issues with TAG is "what X and why?" The proponent of TAG will argue that only Christian theism (specifically, Reformed Calvinism) satisfies the necessary requirements to serve as a foundation for knowledge (Van Til claimed that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity solved the Problem of Universals.

) but that is obviously open to a lot of argument.

I'd certinaly contend that it's far from evident why only CT would satisfy the preconditions of knowledge, even from a strictly foundationalist viewpoint.

As far as the "inefficient" criticism, remember that it is of necessity an argument by retorsion. To formulate it directly would create a circularity.

Quote:

Originally posted by SRB
The main problem here is premise (6). In plain English it states that every person knows nothing at all about at least one of these categories:

(i) anything relating to abstract laws,
(ii) anything relating to concrete particulars
(iii) how abstract laws and concrete particulars are related to each other.

Note that (6) is not derived from the assumption for reductio, (2a), but is stated as a premise! It entails a radically skeptical view of human knowledge. I doubt very much that Van Til would agree with it, as is claimed. Did he really think that nobody knows very much? Note that (6) also entails that there is no such thing as an omniscient person, so presumably entails the nonexistence of God.

Well, no that's not exactly what [6] says. In effect, it depends upon [4] which defines knowledge as justified true belief, and [5] which says that in order to have knowledge, a person must be able to relate the abstract to the concrete. [6] then does indeed draw on the problem of universals to deny that persons can have knowledge of both the abstract and the concrete at the same time. Essentially saying that although we have beliefs, we do not have knowledge (defined as JTB; didn't Gettier pretty much put the nail in that coffin anyway?).

And, yes, that is really what Van Til claimed although I'm not sure that current TAG proponents would phrase the argument in exactly the same way. Van Til claimed that knowledge (as JTB) was only possible for God, so if knowledge existed, then God must exist.

And Byron probably should have been more explicit in his definition of P. P does not include God, so [6] does not entail the non-existence of God (although that would be funny!

)

Quote:

Originally posted by SRB
A much simpler, shorter and clearer version of the argument above, that captures its main point, is this:

(a) No person knows anything much.
(b) Therefore, no person knows anything much or Christianity is true [from (a) by addition].
(c) Therefore, if any person knows anything much then Christianity is true [from (b) by material implication].

This argument is deductively valid. Here premise (a) plays the part of premise (6) in the argument above. The argument I present here is far more efficient than the one above, but every bit as loopy. I can only think that the author got lost in the maze he created for himself.

I like it! Although you do have some hidden premises (what are the conditions for knowledge, what is knowledge, etc). But I think you're right in that it pretty much captures what they're saying...

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Jack the Bodiless · 05-01-2003, 04:09 AM

Quote:

But isn't it true that there is no fundamental basis for knowledge? That doesn't bother any of you even a little bit?

Leave the theists out of it, how do you feel justified in claiming to know anything? Reading this, I kind of thought the point was that you are making presuppositions ANYWAY in claiming that your knowledge about the world is real in any sense, so why is one presuppostion superior to another?

This keeps coming up, but here we go again...

Our perceptions and reason give us a basis for knowledge that's as fundamental as anything ever gets. If they're wrong (the "brain in a jar" scenario), then we cannot know that. We must presuppose that they are reliable.

We admit that: the TAG proponent does not. TAG is an exercise in self-delusion. The TAGian believes he is safe from the "brain-in-a-jar" scenario, whereas in actuality he is not.

It's all about making unsupported assertions and then hiding them in a fog of pseudo-logic. At the heart of any TAG is wishful thinking: "I assert that this is true because I WANT it to be". Every TAG contains an unsupported statement of faith.

I could just as easily assert that SRB's bath of custard is the ultimate foundation of knowledge: but is a custard-centered worldview therefore superior to one in which I assume the reliability of my perception and reason?

Especially as the existence of custard is itself derived from perception. How do I know that custard has ever existed, whether in a bathtub or not?

Try asking a TAGian how he knows what the Bible says, or even that the Bible exists. They must first presuppose that their perceptions are reliable, just as we do.

Goliath · 05-01-2003, 07:13 AM

Bilbo,

Quote:

I don't see why you feel the need to disclose your academic pedigree (or question mine) in response to negative evaluations of your claims regarding logical deficiencies of TAs, rather than engage those evaluations head on.

I apologize for the opening of my reply to you. I read a tone in your post that (upon a subsequent reading) probably wasn't there. Regardless, I did tackle the issues head on, and shall continue to do so in this reply.

Quote:

As an aside, it might interest you to know that there are numerous philosophers (Barry Stroud, Robert Stern, Harry Frankfurt etc) that are critical of TAs, yet neglect to ascribe the sorts of defects to them that you do. (Always a good policy in philosophy to check whether or not you're screaming into a vacuum

Irrelevant. It makes no difference if 5, 50, 500,000 or 10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10 ^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^1 0^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^ 10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10 ^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^1 0^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^ 10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^10^5,324,982,374, 928,357,986,529,387,429 people disagree with the transcendental argument in a different way than I do (and yes, when I say "the transcendental argument," I'm referring to the TA for the xian god that has been talked about in this thread).

Quote:

As I hinted abit earlier: A transcendental thesis is not some bald existential claim;

Incorrect, yet again. As far as I can tell, the trascendental argument can be summed up as follows:

1. God exists and is the basis for all knowledge.

2. All attempts to base knowledge on anything other than God fail miserably.

3. Therefore, God exists.

If you can't see why this argument is circular, then there is little that we can discuss in this, or any other, thread.

Sincerely,

Goliath

Dr. Retard · 05-01-2003, 07:33 AM

Looks to me like people, advocates and critics alike, disagree about what TAG is even supposed to be (much less whether it's any good). This is a regrettable consequence of the rhetorical grandstanding that so characterizes presentation of the 'argument'.

In any case, debates over whether TAG is circular or otherwise flawed are only fruitful if everyone pins down what exactly the argument is under discussion. Otherwise, it's bobbing for greased fishies.

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04-30-2003, 11:31 AM	#32
Dr. Retard Senior Member Join Date: Mar 2001 Location: Tucson, Arizona, USA Posts: 735	TAGers, to my eyes, resemble those who press moral arguments. They claim that naturalistic approaches to epistemology or morality are hopeless inadequate. And yet they never interact with naturalistic approaches to epistemology or morality. What gives? (At least the essay at the URL given above talks about naturalist approaches to epistemology, though, as I've said, it's more book report than argument, and not particularly current).

04-30-2003, 06:37 PM	#36
Bilbo Regular Member Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Canada Posts: 180	Earlier, I wrote: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Whatever defects transcendental arguments exhibit (whether of local or global scope), this isn't one of them. Perhaps you're just unfamiliar with indirect proof proceedures. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- To which Goliath responds: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I'll have you know that I've spent eight years in college (undergraduate and graduate school combined), and am a little over one year away from obtaining a PhD in Mathematics. Before you attempt to snidely lecture me further on logical arguments, I would ask what qualifications you have to do so. How many years have you spent studying Mathematics or logical arguments? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I don't see why you feel the need to disclose your academic pedigree (or question mine) in response to negative evaluations of your claims regarding logical deficiencies of TAs, rather than engage those evaluations head on. Appeal to Authority settles little. Such appeals don't supply necessary or sufficient conditions for comprehension of transcendental analysis, the synthetic a priori, or the relation those things have to logical fallacies and objectionable circularity. My speculation about your acquaintance with specific proof proceedures resulted from a natural interpretation of your (unqualified) remarks regarding assumptions supposedly made by the proponents of TAs. Your subsequent remarks to others seem to confirm the reasonableness of that interpretation. As an aside, it might interest you to know that there are numerous philosophers (Barry Stroud, Robert Stern, Harry Frankfurt etc) that are critical of TAs, yet neglect to ascribe the sorts of defects to them that you do. (Always a good policy in philosophy to check whether or not you're screaming into a vacuum quote: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A TA for God (or anything else for that matter) does not "assume" its transcendental premise, so much as it deduces the truth of that premise from an "assumption"; -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Incorrect. The transcendental argument relies on the following assertion: God exists and is the basis for all knowledge. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You refer, somewhat speciously to the transcendental argument (affixing the definite article) yet I wonder what argument you're refering to specifically. Certainly not one I've seen recently, not in print at least. In any case, threadbare statements such as the one above (along with acerbic tone of your posts) don't lend much credibility to the idea that your interested in accurately characterizing the issues anyhow. As I hinted abit earlier: A transcendental thesis is not some bald existential claim; rather, its typically framed as a modal conditional, the antecedent of which is some contingent intentional phenomenon, and the consequent of which is (supposedly) an ontological condition for that phenomenon. The truth of the consequent then (in some sense) depends on the truth of the other component of the conditional (ie - its phenomenological aspect). So given one common understanding of how these matters are framed, your claims regarding circularity and question-begging appear to require a facelift. Regards, Bilbo

05-01-2003, 07:33 AM	#40
Dr. Retard Senior Member Join Date: Mar 2001 Location: Tucson, Arizona, USA Posts: 735	Looks to me like people, advocates and critics alike, disagree about what TAG is even supposed to be (much less whether it's any good). This is a regrettable consequence of the rhetorical grandstanding that so characterizes presentation of the 'argument'. In any case, debates over whether TAG is circular or otherwise flawed are only fruitful if everyone pins down what exactly the argument is under discussion. Otherwise, it's bobbing for greased fishies.

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