sotzo

Dear materialists:

Is it your view that determinism must follow if materialism is true?

I am defining determinism here as "a theory or doctrine that acts of the will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws".

Under this view, thoughts/beliefs would amount to chemical reactions with no governing will. In othere words one would not hold to a belief because it were true, but because biochemistry causes it to be believed.

So, with these assumptions, I would like to know your responses to my opening question. Also, if you disagree with my assumptions, critique those as well.

cheers!

jkb

excreationist

sotzo:
Well that's what materialism is all about... what else is going to cause it? Souls? God?

Well people still make decisions or "selections" though it is dependent on their current physical environment. There is still a plan being carried out and goals - so I'd say there is a "will". (If will means "goal")

BTW, I think determinism implies that things are predictable and predestined but what if things are random (but are statistically semi-predictable)? I would say that is "non-deterministic".

[ June 11, 2002: Message edited by: excreationist ]</p>

AtlanticCitySlave

The answer is simply "no". Many, if not the majority of materialists, are not determinists, and seem to fall under compatibilism (compatibalism). For one example, Michael Tye of Temple University, is a physicalist/materialist, is, last time I heard, a compatibilist. I'm not really sure if I would classify myself as a materialist, but I do know of many who would say determinism does not necessarily follow from materialism.
Take care.

Gurdur

No.
Wrong definition, and a circular argument in itself with a predestined outcome (determined determinism).
Precisely; but only because you assumed your conclusion in your initial assumptions.
This is also built upon upon a subtle circular argument.

This one's been done to death so often I'll just cut-and-paste my own previous words:

Free will to a limited degree is seemingly a given among humans of reasonable psychological health; free will being meant here in the popular sense of the phrase, as the facility of control over one's actions and thoughts (again, to a limited degree).
Debates on hard or soft determinism versus free-will always seem to devolve into tediously solipsist stances that, while internally coherent, are circular in definition and often semantically conflated or confused
The evidence is cogent and multifarious that we are often able to change our behaviour through long-term and persistent changes in our attitudes, owing to the evolution of self-aware consciousness and "overseer" neural cognitive circuits.
Determinist appeals to neurology do not succeed, since evidence, for example, showing initiation of motor acts before awareness of the putative volitional nature of those motor acts only pushes back the question of free will into the so-called unconscious part of the mind, i.e. the non-ego part of consciousness, and moreover does not disprove or obviate whatsoever the fact of being able to change over time behavioural patterns (often without a change in external enviroment).

excreationist

AtlanticCitySlave:
What about quotes like this:
<a href="http://web.syr.edu/~jddraege/compatibilism.htm" target="_blank">http://web.syr.edu/~jddraege/compatibilism.htm</a>
<a href="http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/2178/compat2.html" target="_blank">http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/2178/compat2.html</a>

sotzo

Gurdur:

Much appreciation for your response!

Wrong definition, and a circular argument in itself with a predestined outcome (determined determinism).

As to wrong definition, how so? Furthermore, a definition doesn't have the capacity to be circular since it is a statement of the meaning of a word and not an argument. I think you've mistaken definition for argument.

Precisely; but only because you assumed your conclusion in your initial assumptions.

My initial assumption is a definition. If you disagree with that definition then explain why. As it stands, based on that definition I am asking how materialism can avoid the results of determinism (ie, no justified true beliefs). Put more formally (though from a person not trained in formal logic mind you! , with M=materialism and D=determinsism and W=will

If M, then D
If D then not W
If not W then no justified true beliefs, since justified true beliefs requires the presence of W.

Sotzo previously: In othere words one would not hold to a belief because it were true, but because biochemistry causes it to be believed.

This is also built upon upon a subtle circular argument.

Which argument are you referring to?

Free will to a limited degree is seemingly a given among humans of reasonable psychological health; free will being meant here in the popular sense of the phrase, as the facility of control over one's actions and thoughts (again, to a limited degree).

Agreed.

Debates on hard or soft determinism versus free-will always seem to devolve into tediously solipsist stances that, while internally coherent, are circular in definition and often semantically conflated or confused.

Okay.

The evidence is cogent and multifarious that we are often able to change our behaviour through long-term and persistent changes in our attitudes,

Agreed, otherwise this exchange is meaningless...

owing to the evolution of self-aware consciousness and "overseer" neural cognitive circuits.

So, are you saying that material gives rise to non-material? Even granting the evolution of "self-aware consciousness and "overseer" neural cognitive circuits" you are allowing here for some"thing" which can govern the behavior of these biochemical activities - what is that "thing"?

Determinist appeals to neurology do not succeed, since evidence, for example, showing initiation of motor acts before awareness of the putative volitional nature of those motor acts only pushes back the question of free will into the so-called unconscious part of the mind, i.e. the non-ego part of consciousness, and moreover does not disprove or obviate whatsoever the fact of being able to change over time behavioural patterns (often without a change in external enviroment).

I agree that determinism cannot answer the question. What I am asking is if materialism is able to account for any other conclusion.

cheers,

jkb

sotzo

AtlanticCitySlave:

Thanks for your response!

I'm not really sure if I would classify myself as a materialist, but I do know of many who would say determinism does not necessarily follow from materialism.

How would such people justify the conclusion that "determinism does not necessarily follow from materialism".

cheers,
jkb

tergiversant

I am a materialist and a determinist, but I do not see how the latter dogma may be said to follow from the former without the following premise:

P) All the "stuff" in the universe follows deterministic natural laws.

I happen to think (P) is true, but not by virtue of the truth of materialism, but rather due to consistent empirical verification.

tergiversant@OklahomaAtheists.org

<a href="http://www.OklahomaAtheists.org" target="_blank">ATHEISTS of OKLAHOMA</a>

"Atheists are OK."

[ June 11, 2002: Message edited by: tergiversant ]</p>

DRFseven

Yes, you are so right that initiation before action only pushes the "free will mechanism" back into the unconscious, and ignores the fact that there must be a neural correlate for THAT, unless one assumes a spooky force, which is a weak argument, indeed. The business about "change without change in external environments" is a baloney sandwich (possibly with some herring) because the change is in mental mediating events, not external environment.

sotzo

Greetings tergiversant!

P) All the "stuff" in the universe follows deterministic natural laws.

I happen to think (P) is true, but not by virtue of the truth of materialism, but rather due to consistent empirical verification.

If I have understood you correctly, I think you are confusing why P is true versus how we know P is true.

My initial question is not concerned with how we know P is true, but rather if materialism necessarily results in P. My follow-up question is that if P results necessarily, how do we justifiably call one belief "true" and another "false".

cheers
jkb