Travo5

Howdy everybody,

We are discussing Plato's epistemology in philosophy right now, and I would like to drag the discussion over here. These are my intentions in making this post. First, I would appreciate commentary to make sure that I am understanding this. Second, I would like to hear criticisms from dissenters. Thanks alot!

From what I understand, Plato's epistemology is divided into four groups: understanding (e.g. higher forms*), reasoning (e.g. mathematical forms), perception (e.g. sensible things), and imaging (e.g. pictures).

These four groups are then sub-divided into two more groups. The objects of understanding and reasoning fall within the scope of the intelligible world, and the objects of perception and imaging fall under the scope of the sensible world. According to Plato, the intelligible world (world of forms) is superiorly "real" and, the knowledge, or epistime, it provides is more valid than the sensible world's knowledge, doxa. Plato asserts that the sensible world is a world of becoming, flux, and imperfection while the intelligible world is a world of being, perfection, and permanence. In other words, the qualitative properties of a given entity are eternal and unchanging while that entity may undergo several changes.

So, why are the forms more real than material objects? Plato answers this through analogy. He gives four reasons.

1) As Things are more permanent than images, the forms are more permanent and stable than things.

----Example: Consider the nature of humanity. By removing one human or all of them, does that change the 'whatness' and 'thatness' of what it is to be a human.

2) As things are more accessible, less perspetival than images, the forms are more accessible and less perspectival than things.

3) As the order in things explains the order images, the order in forms explains the order in things.

4) As things are more important epistemically for knowledge than images, the forms are more important epistemically than things.

I am having trouble understanding where Plato makes the connection on these last three anaglogies. Why do the forms explain the order of things? Why are forms more accessible/less perspectival than things? Why are the forms more epistemically valuable than things?

If anyone could give me a hand, then I would be grateful. If you are still reading, thanks for your time

Regards,
Travis

[ September 13, 2002: Message edited by: Travo5 ]</p>

Feather

Dunno how knowledgeable of mathematics you are, but here goes:

I'm assuming you've not read his "Cave analogy."

The basic premise is simple: there are a bunch of people that are constrained to one wall of the cave. This wall is transparent to a kind of fire behind the people, but not to the people themselves. The fire casts shadows of things on a wall. The shadows are "images," and the things are "things."

As far as being more "valuable," I think Plato was really stretching. His epistemology essentially boils down to this: "I rationalize reality." Thus reality is defined entirely by the mind as opposed to actualy physical objects. At least that's my take on it.

More "accessible" means more tangible and "understandable through the physical senses." The shadows, on the other hand, are more "perspective"--they aren't as "tangible" as the things.

Likewise is the relationship of forms to things. In otherwords, things are "images" of forms.

[ September 14, 2002: Message edited by: Feather ]</p>