bd-from-kg

To all:

Continuing with the discussion in my previous post:

1. Why it is reasonable to say that something can have value even if no one values it

As I’ve pointed out repeatedly, the question of whether and when something may be said to have value is basically linguistic. Values don’t “exist” in the sense that houses and trees exist, or even in the sense that properties such as hardness and redness exist. To a non-objectivist, saying that something has value does not mean that it has an inherent property of being valuable. It simply means that it is desirable (in some sense, which depends on the context) to try to preserve it or bring it into existence.

Once this is understood, it should be immediately obvious that it is reasonable to say that something can have value even if no one values it. It simply means that it is sometimes desirable to bring something into existence even if no one values it.

Here’s yet another example where this is clearly the case. Suppose that the inhabitants of an isolated island are experiencing a famine. They have no way to get off the island or to communicate with anyone else, and no one else even knows that the island exists. So they’re on their own. But unknown to them, there’s a large cache of food that was stored in an underground cavern by previous inhabitants, in such a way that it would be preserved for hundreds of years. Does this food have value to the inhabitants? Of course! If they happen to discover it they’ll survive; if they don’t they’ll die. If something like this isn’t valuable, what is? Yet no one values it, because no one knows that it exists. So here is a clear cut case of something that has value even though no one values it. Of course they have the potential of valuing it, and I would agree that something cannot reasonably be said to have value if there are no possible conditions in which someone would value it.

Sometimes the circumstances that would cause someone to value something involve more than merely knowing that the thing in question exists. For example, consider a hypothetical book in an unknown language that contains the secret to creating a stable, productive society of free, happy, and rational people. Suppose that this book is well known, yet it is not valued because no one understands it. Yet assuming that there is actually some way to translate, it is valuable nonetheless. (For example, there might be an as-yet-undiscovered “Rosetta Stone” that holds the key to translating the book’s language into a known tongue.) Here the thing in question is valuable but isn’t valued because its value is unappreciated due to a lack of understanding. Note that the “Rosetta Stone” itself may be in the same category: its existence may be known, but its significance unsuspected. Would it be of value for someone to figure this out? Of course! And this would be so even though no one would have any interest in figuring it out (because no one would realize that there was anything to figure out).

2. Why we must say that something can have value even if no one values it

So far I’ve been content to simply point out examples where it’s obvious that given the way value language is actually used something would be said to have value even though no one valued it. But now I want to show that this is not an arbitrary choice; that using value language in this way is essential to its function.

The function of value language obviously has to do with thinking about which of various choices is preferable. For a consequentialist like me, this works as follows: one assigns “value” to various aspects of the consequences of the various possible choices and then compares the “total value” of the consequences of the available choices. The choice whose consequences have the most “total value” is the “right” one. Here “right” can be meant in any of a number of senses, both moral and nonmoral. For example, it can mean simply that it’s the choice that’s most in one’s self interest, or that it’s in the agent’s best interest, or that it’s best for the country, or for mankind as a whole. Of course, how we assign “values” to the consequences depends on what we mean by “right”.

Now let’s look at one more example. Years ago Mr. Furbish knew that he was going to die soon. He had a daughter, Patsy, who was just a week old. But he didn’t like her much; he had desperately wanted a boy and blamed her for being a girl. Still, he knew that if Patsy inherited the estate she would be likely to have a happy, productive life. On the other hand, Furbish really loved his cat Max; Max had been his only consolation for the last several years. In the end, he left the estate to his cat.

Since then Patsy has lived in poverty. Not only was she unable to afford to go to college; she has not received an education that would prepare her for college. Not surprisingly, she blames her Dad. She thinks that her ability to lead a happy, productive life was more important (i.e., had more value) than Max’s living in pampered luxury for his last year or two.

Now the point here is not whether Patsy is right, but whether her opinion is reasonable. At the time, there was no one who valued Patsy’s future happiness, but there was someone who valued Max’s happiness. So, if a value required a valuer, Patsy’s future happiness would have had no value at the time, whereas Max’s had at least some value. So Furbish would have unquestionably made the right decision, and it would simply be nonsensical to think otherwise.

But it is plainly not nonsensical to think otherwise. In fact, I daresay that most of us would agree with Patsy that Furbish made the wrong decision. Thus, if we were to accept that as a matter of definition there can be no value without a valuer, we would be forced to what most of us would consider an absurd conclusion, in this and many other cases. But the function of “value language” is not to force us to any specific conclusions at all, but simply to facilitate our thinking about such questions. Thus acceptance of the idea that there can be no value without a valuer would prevent “value language” from serving its intended function. So any definition of “value” that includes or entails this is unacceptable.

jlowder

(I'm finally able to participate in this discussion board again. I'm getting caught up on some old threads.)

I wrote:
To which Ms. Siv replied:

Nicholas Rescher, in his book Introduction to Value Theory (Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 16 provides the following classification scheme for values:

1. Material and physical. Ex: health, comfort, physical security
2. Economic. Ex: economic security, productiveness
3. Moral. Ex: honesty, fairness
4. Social. Ex: charitableness, courtesy
5. Political. Ex: freedom, justiced
6. Aesthetic. Ex: beauty, symmetry
7. Religious. Ex: piety. clearness of conscience
8. Intellectual. Ex: intelligence, clarity
9. Professional. Ex: professional recognition and success
10. Sentimental. Ex: love, acceptance

Jeffery Jay Lowder