mhc

P1: In order for something to exist, it must exist as something.
P2: Nothing exists which does not exist as something.
P3: The knowledge that "I know nothing of X", constitutes some knowledge of X.

What do you think of these propositions?

Luiseach

They say more about the 'knower' in Proposition 3 (the 'I' in 'I know nothing of X') than they do about 'what is being known' or 'what is being not known.'

jpbrooks

Hello mhc!

The first two statements P1 and P2 seem trivially true, while in the third statement (P3), the term "knowledge" would have to be replaced by another term, such as "claim", in order to obtain a true statement. If one truly knew nothing of X, one could not know enough to make a statement that refers to X.

I'll be back later.

pmurray

The act of naming a thing, or refering to a thing specifically, is an existence claim. For this reason

'X' does not exist

is always meaningless. Try it: "that beach ball on the table there does not exist".

Existence, therefore, is not a property which a thing may or may not have. It is the very act of being a thing. The best you can say is "there exists no thing x such that a(x), b(x), c(x) etc".

pmurray

The other problem is one of reification - of not recognising different classes of existence. For instance, mickey mouse exists - as a fiction. Pythagorous's theorem exists as a nessesary truth. We must not equate all classes of existence with objective existence. By objective existence, I mean existing as an object - a collection of matter and energy in space time.

excreationist

You'd have knowledge about the word "X" and the fact that you don't know what "X" is supposed to refer to (or "mean"). So you'd have knowledge about the word's existence, but not the thing it refers to (its meaning).

paul30

What do you mean by "something" in P1 and P2?

Without some kind of definition or demarcation, I am lost.

Witt

pmurray:
The act of naming a thing, or refering to a thing specifically, is an existence claim. For this reason

Hi pmurray,

I do not agree that naming is an existence claim.
There are many names in ordinary language that do not refer.

'Vulcan', the name of the planet presumed to exist within our solar system, by Newtonian physics in order to explain the unusual perbutations of Mercury's orbit, and it is known that Vulcan does not exist, in virtue of relativistic physics.

Naming alone does not assure existence of the presumed term.

The present existent king of France, cannot exist!

pmurray:
'X' does not exist is always meaningless. Try it: "that beach ball on the table there does not exist".

Again, I disagree.
X exists, is true if and only if there is some primary statement that x has, is confirmed.

For example:
The present king of France does not exist.
That which is not equal to itself does not exist.
The integer betweeen 1 and 2 does not exist.
etc.

" 'X' does not exist is always meaningless." is false.

Described things may or may not exist. (with or without names)

pmurray:
Existence, therefore, is not a property which a thing may or may not have. It is the very act of being a thing. The best you can say is "there exists no thing x such that a(x), b(x), c(x) etc"

Of course, existence is a property of things.
It is the property of: the logical sum of primary properties.

That something exists, means, there is some primary predicate that is true of it!
For all things: concrete, abstract, physical and fictional!

There is but one meaning of existence, and it applies to all things in the same way.

Witt

Witt

What do you think?
P1: In order for something to exist, it must exist as something.
P2: Nothing exists which does not exist as something.
P3: The knowledge that "I know nothing of X", constitutes some knowledge of X.

What do you think of these propositions?
-----------------------------------------------------

P1: In order for something to exist, it must exist as something.

Quine would say: to say that something is, is to say that it is some existent thing.

I am not so sure.

If we maintain that, all values of our variables necessarily exist, then, x exists ..cannot be denied.

But, we do not assume that all (contingent) values of our variables 'necessarily' exist.

It seems to me, imperative that we permit the possibility that the things we are talking about 'might' not exist.

What do you think?

Witt

Witt

What do you think?
P1: In order for something to exist, it must exist as something.
P2: Nothing exists which does not exist as something.
P3: The knowledge that "I know nothing of X", constitutes some knowledge of X.

What do you think of these propositions?
-------------------------------------------------------

P1, is the theorem, Ey(x=y).

P2, is the theorem, ~EyEx(x=y).

P3, is false.

Witt