Ensign Steve

Is Ted's issue that he is feeling regret? He doesn't feel especially guilty, probably, because he didn't know, at the time, that he could have acted differently. But now he regrets that he didn't know, at the time, that he could have acted differently. Trust me, regret, remorse, guilt, all can exist independently of theism. I was raised atheist, but you just ask my mom if I have anything to feel guilty about! Maybe it helps me separate the two ideas, given that even though my position on atheism is solid, I have no idea where I stand on determinism v. free will.

Are these the same people who say that we godless heathens have no morals?

Ensign Steve

Wait, wait, I misunderstood. You are saying that some say that atheism does not jive with free will? And my argument is I am an atheist, and I feel like I may or may not believe in free will, therefore it does. Not a good argument!

But I would really like to read somebody else's argument about why atheism does not jive with free will. One that does not say that all atheists are naturalists are materialists are determinists.

Biff the unclean

It seems to me that "free will" is usually used by Theists to describe a state where God is not imposing his will on you.

So it is pretty much meaningless. Much like the term "non-smoker" would be if no one had ever smoked anything. It describes a normal condition, but in relation to something that it isn't, and in terms of something it couldn't be.

The IPU could decide that you would grow a horn in the middle of your forehead, but she doesn't in respect for your "free from horn." To say that you posses "free from horn" does describe your normal condition but has the false implication is that your normal condition is due only to the good graces of the IPU.
"Free Will" is your normal condition with the false implication that it is due only to the grace of God.
In both 'free will' and 'free from horn' you have a nonexistent being not doing anything, and getting the credit for not doing it. Just about what you would expect a nothing to do.

Abrupt

Well, I quite agree. As I understand it, the problem is supposed to be that having "free will" requires having the capacity to be able to do otherwise given the same exact situation. If you want to defend this kind of "free will" (and I don't see why you would), you have to argue that Ted's propositional attitudes cannot be ascertained from his brain state (or from a complete description of the universe, for that matter), leading to some kind of dualism.

A minor quibble:

You say,
and
Not to imply that you think otherwise, but there's nothing non-reductive about the way you described your solution. When I think "non-reductive physicalism", I think content instrumentalism and Brentano's thesis. When I think "propositional attitudes are physically constituted", I think intentional realism.

erehwon

Each person has a free will, and they also have a compulsion to act according to their beliefs. Otherwise their belief structure is redefined. If a person subscribes to a set of beliefs that constitutes a religion they are compelled to follow those beliefs.

Therefore your question is flawed in essence, but not in human fickleness.

If a person truly cleaves to a set of beliefs and then acts naturally on those beliefs in total freedom that is free will. If in your example they do not act on the freedom of free will, an anomaly is created hence the afterthought/regret. A conflict is created.

In Christianity the subscription to your fellow humans is “beloved, let us love one another, for love is of God’ and everyone that loveth is born of God, and knows god. He that loveth not, knows not god, for God is Love”.
If Ted is a Christian, to not to act in the freedom of free will and love and therefore help/acknowledge this man in someway is to commit himself as a prisoner, as he has forsaken the freedom to act appropriately under his belief structure. The jailer is his own conscience.

In essence Ted the Christian working in free will would have helped this person in some way. In human fickleness he was preoccupied in another set of beliefs contrary to Christianity, we all do this.

If Ted was into Confucianism he would have also helped.

In Hinduism he would have also helped.

In Taoism he would have also helped.

In Judaism he would have helped, and so with Shinto, Buddhism, Baha’i, Islam, Zoroastrianism, Jainism and Sikhism.

Free will should not be castigated in honour of human fickleness.

Ted the Atheist would have helped as well, if his belief system so predisposed him to respond in helpfulness, again free will. Ted the Atheist would have also been imprisoned by this own conscience later, not because he had not done Gods will which ipso-facto is free will by definition of subscription, but in this case by his own free will by definition of his intrinsic belief system.

God only has to be inserted if your belief structure calls for God to be inserted.

Ted the philosophically innocent would have acted in innocence and not have to consider any of this as he would have left the situation where it was, and not carried it with him to his destination as we did.

Ted would maybe be considering whether he had time to grab a quick beer or whether it was too early to have one.

Clutch

Constitution is not identity, for one thing, and identity does not imply reducibility. Instrumentalism is something else altogether; and B's thesis doesn't really cut any direction on this. It's more a desideratum on any adequate account of the mental, rather than a feature of some particular account.

I think that any instance of digestion is entirely physically constituted. But I don't think that biology is reducible to physics. Mutatis mutandis...

Clutch

Well said. One way of framing my point is this: Philosophically naive Ted uses the phrase "the same situation" as he uses phrases like "the same way" (Would you cook steak again please, the same way as last time?), "the same dog" (That's the same dog that dug up the garden last week!) and so forth.

Philosophical identity is a strict and unusual notion that cannot be read into Ted's beliefs about his freedom. Ted's belief that he could have done otherwise in the same situation is true, I would say. But the relevant notion of sameness does not individuate situations to include the precise microstate of Ted's brain. Ted doesn't conceive of the counterfactual situation as being exactly similar, after all: he conceives of his actions as being different! Whether he knows it or not, then, Ted is committed by his belief to the c/f situation's being different in whatever respects are entailed by his actions being different.

Clutch

Jennifer,Right about what I'm saying. And I don't think that what you said is that bad an argument, either! After all, what I'm urging is that we must always begin with the question of what phenomenon is to be explained. That we often believe that we could do, or could have done, otherwise is a phenomenon to be explained. By contrast, baroque theistic fancies about contra-causal possibilities, &c, are not phenomena to be explained. They are themselves part of an explanation for the first phenomenon, one that is motivated by the idea that a merely naturalistic account leaves something out.

But I don't see where a merely naturalistic account leaves anything out. So I'm asking to be shown. So far, though... nothing.

Ensign Steve

Thanks, Clutch, for understanding, even though I may not have expressed myself all that eloquently. The reason I have suspended judgement on free will v. dertminism is that I really don't see a difference between whether I am actually making a choice or whether it just feels like I'm making a choice. Either way, I'm faced with thousands of choices a day, and they need to be made. Whether I could have done it differently, I may never know. There is no god that comes into play, in my own decision making.

Abrupt

Fair enough, but I still wouldn't call causal functionalists and such "non-reductive".

No, identity in general doesn't, but the view that mental or intentional states are identical with physical states is pretty univocally labeled reductive. If you were to say that beliefs and desires are causally active physical states in the brain, nearly everyone I can think of would agree that your view is a reductive physicalism or materialism of one sort or another.

*frown*

Non-reductive physicalists to me are Quine, Sellars, Dennett, Davidson, and etc. Near as I can tell, these guys are all instrumentalists about content (intentional states are theoretical entities used to describe the behavior of physical systems... sounds like instrumentalism to me), and while Brentano's thesis need not be tied to any specific position, it has a lot to say in favor of their view.