DRFseven

Well, of course we can arrive at new concepts and, obviously, we're not born with them. But, for an answer, look at your phrase "arrive at new concepts." Every thing we ever think of is built by examining the only material we have to build out of; stored information that can be associated with other stored information, even if some of the information is quite new (perceived seconds before and held like RAM while categorization and access code is being achieved). You're saying, in essence, "Since I now realize an association I didn't previously realize, I now make a conscious association between x and y, and, thus, several other associations occur. I suddenly "see" and think of the double helix or something that has been swirling around over and over until some connection becomes robust enough to flag one that hasn't "turned on" because the connection has been too fragile or weak. It could be anything, like suddenly thinking of a word in a crossword puzzle after staring at the clue and the words around it for hours or days. What happens is an inaccessible connection became accessible through repeated activation of a similarly coded sequence of stored information. We can only think out of information we have; we can't create it out of whole cloth. We can find previously unfound connections and, thus, think of solutions, inventions, etc., that no one has ever thought of before, but we can't create the bits. By putting the bits together we "arrive at" conclusions; we don't create them.

John Page

DRFseven:

Yes, agreed, our minds appear to be synthesizers.

Cheers!

DRFseven

So, I guess you're saying that's how certain information gets cancelled out; it becomes inapplicable or incorrect according to new associations. But the old "internal bias" just gets replaced with new internal bias because every construct we have is necessarily our own point of view.

owleye

John...

"The abstract entity such as "the concept of cat" does not remain constant. Why? Because our concept of cat and its "place in the world" becomes more sophisticated over time as we learn.

"This makes it impossible for me to give you a reliable answer to your specific question, I do not know how the contents of your mind are organized."

I take it, then, in your theory we do not share concepts. I'm pretty sure this will make it impossible to communicate.

"In some cases, I think we will find that a "higher level" concept cannot be constructed without without first building a "lower level" concept. For example, I cannot imagine how one could conceive of a square root without concepts of quantity (number) and division."

Interesting you call the concept of quantity a "lower level", since I would think it is more abstract than the concept of square root. Nonetheless, it does make sense to call it more basic, or a "ground" or foundation of that which is higher. Thus, I gather the lower the level, the higher the level of abstraction. Perhaps it would be worthwhile calling the one "layers of construction,"and the other "levels of abstraction."

"Back to the cat. If I truly believe that all cats are mammals then the concept of mammals would be at a higher level of abstraction."

The proposition "all cats are mammals" is not particularly controversial, if we restrict ourselves to cats and mammals as they are understood in biology. I had been assuming this. Outside of biology, I'm not sure what 'mammals' means. In any case, the issue here, for me, is how am I to understand what you mean by a level of abstraction. Are we to assume that mammals are an abstraction of cats? What actually makes something a higher level of abstraction?

"However, its amusing to think that in a different part of our mind we might retain the remnants of a structure from the time we knew cats but the notion of mammals had not been introduced. Accordingly our minds might, under certain circumstances, present us the scenario where mammals are types of cat. This could explain explain how confusion arises in our minds."

Concepts, as they might be understood in a theory of Fred Dretske, for example (which I'm partial to) is "Janus-faced." One face, faces outwards and extends itself to all individuals that all under it, allowing us to be able to recgonize objects in accord with that concept. Thus, we could recognize a cat because we hold a concept that does the work of discrimination for us. This is the extension of a concept or that meaning of word in whose name the concept applies to individuals. We can pick out individuals through the concept we hold of them. What you are thinking of as the meaning of a concept is its intension, and possibly, all that is conjured up by its application -- the whole network of connections that are brought to mind wheneve the concept is thought.

"Indeed, what I am proposing is that because the mind does not know beforehand how to structure its concepts of the environment it places concepts at the layer of abstraction that is most coherent. Formalism exposes this process to scrutiny."

If you've ever watched a child learn a concept, it doesn't really take a whole lot (after they reach a certain stage and you can get their attention). They even learn them from pictures, and realize that they merely represent what they refer to. Interestingly, as I think you appreciate, mathematical concepts are quite different in their application than empirical concepts. In mathematics we begin with definitions and from there determine what properties follow from this. In empirically determined concepts, we begin with properties and come to define them only after much hard work and analysis.

"As a footnote, since the relationships between concepts are more likely to be complex "network like" and subject to change I am not proposing that there are strict abstraction levels 1, 2, 3. I can't draw a picture here but with the mental image of a sophisticated back prop network you could end up with relative levels of 1, 1.2 etc."

Though you might not suspect this, I have no good idea what you are talking about.

Regarding the concepts of law, rule and justice, you wrote...

"I would apply the same kind of remarks as above except I'm not comfortable with concepts being contained within other concepts. I think an assumed 1:n relationship can give this appearance of "containment"."

This makes it extremely difficult to know what you mean be "level of abstraction." It seems awfully clear to me that "level" is not a pure concept.

If you think there is merit to the idea of 1:n relationships, I suggest you give at least one example of this. Otherwise I will begin to think you are fitting the world to your theory, rather than actually considering data as independently confirming it.

owleye

John Page

DRF:

Yes, and if the bias was random (as opposed to, say, survival directed) we wouldn't last very long and our actions would be incoherent. I believe that without "causality" the process of perception could not take place and this ultimately agrees with your view (I think) that if we make a choice then something within us must have caused that choice.

Two issues:

1. Why is there an appearance of "free will"?
2. How is the mechanism of "free will" enacted?

Once we have a more complete explanation I think we'll have a much better chance of winning over those who propose a model of divine free will.

If I may propose a mind experiment that IMO points to a gap in your summary explanation. Prior to conception, "we" have no experience or mental constructs because we do not exist. We only gain experience through a phenomenal process that is initially driven by the human genome. Experiences are wide and varied and could be viewed initially as random. The constant element is this "human genetic content". This is the reason behind my thinking that it is process that is more the limiting factor of 'freedom' than experience.

Undoubtedly our experience 'conditions' our thinking and stimulates us but the studies of twins are, I find, very thought provoking. Here's a source reference <a href="http://www.twinstuff.com/entlives.htm" target="_blank">twin studies book</a>.

If our minds include internal processes that help to cancel out experiential bias, our freedom is ultimately limited by genetics. I am stating an extreme case here, but does it make sense to you?

Cheers!

John Page

</strong>
I don't see how you jump to this from what I said. Assume we have a common external reality. Our mind stores an internal representation of that external reality. The external reality constantly changes and we learn about it, thereby updating our internal representation.

Hence the concept of a cat will change over time. We are taught that lions are cats - most kids laugh when they are told this but eventually they reconcile the concept.

What, if anything, do you see in the above preventing communication? If anything, it is the communication that helps "normalize" our commonly held concepts that further aids communication.

</strong>
My point was before one is introduced to the concept "mammal" it does not exist in the mind. Yet one can know the concept "cat" before one knows about mammals. The description in my previous post refered to a (theoretical) process how the newly introduced concept of "mammal" could be inserted at a higher level of abstraction.

To your second question, I'm not sure whether you mean in a definitional sense or how it is actually implemented. In a definitional sense I would suggest applying a relational rule like all cats are mammals but not all mammals are cats, or like all square root formulae contain numbers but not all numbers are contained in square root formulae.

As I think I mentioned, levels of abstraction (e.g. of trash can and trees) cannot be directly compared and the answer as to their relative levels of abstraction will depend on the mind of the individual concerned.

Summary: Our minds contain concepts of things and there will exist dependencies between these concepts. A dependency marks a layer of absraction.
</strong>
Maybe miscommunication again. When I use the term "concept" I'm not considering this as a process, I'm refering (see previous link to my theory of abstraction) specifically to a "template" or "axiomatic concept" that is subjected to the process of the mind.

Why do I adopt this interpretation? While nerve cells come in different types they are relatively homogenous, hence my search for a model of mind that depends on the way the cells are organized rather than what they do - only then can we explain the huge variety of thoughts.
</strong>
I think they all just reduce to axiomatic concepts in the mind that have a different set of relations to the information/concepts they operate on. I keep coming back to the limited diversity in nerve cell types, although I don't discount other parts of our body may participate in processing.
</strong>
I'll try to improve my example. Imagine a number of points, each point representing an instance of spaec/time you have experienced in the past. If all of these "data points" were to be stored in the mind I think we'd rapidly overflow even large capacity of the brain.

So, let's assume we're going to store the relationships between these points. Visualize the points arranged in a circle and connect all points with all other points. We need these relationships to understand how reality works.

I hypothisize that to make most effective use of its cpacity the mind picks out repeated relationships and relationships between relationships and partial fits and so on. Each "set" of relationships is what I term an "axiomatic concept". This is probbaly still not clear but hopefully gives an impression why there is no "strict hierarchy" in levels of abstraction, our mind is relativistic.
Level is not a pure concept! Neither is the uniformity of spacetime! What would you consider a "pure concept"?

Regarding an example of the merit of 1:n relationships, how about the relation between the quantity of synapses and quantity of dendrites in a nerve cell?
</strong>
Criticism accepted, but being wrong is part of theory development. I hope you can see that I am considering facts - that we come to know things through our senses and that our brains comprise cells that are pretty much uniform and differentiated mainly by their relative disposition to other cells.

I don't think I am proposing anything that is inconsistent with scientific fact. I find your final comment ironic when we are considering the mind itself, which seems to adapt itself to the "world" quite deftly.

Cheers!

[ April 12, 2002: Message edited by: John Page ]</p>

DRFseven

OK, thanks to your continued efforts, I think I am beginning to understand your point a little better. This is an aside, but isn't it an awesome thing about our communication that we can keep lobbing these verbal volleys back and forth until a similar construction to the one you've built over time resides, partially uncataloged, but waiting, in some constellation of neurons in my brain, and vice versa? As my daughter says, "Language rocks."

This is my explanation. Since our mental schema began constructing itself early in our infancies, we have no conscious memories of the logistics that have gone into much of the categorization of information that we have incorporated into that structure. Since the motivational system works by virtue of the linkage between cognitive processes and emotion, we move toward decisions "automatically" along those preestablished pathways, motivated by the linked emotions. We can consciously trace some decisions backwards down a few layers, (I bought this car because z, and z because y, and y because x), but that's just the tip of the iceburg; down below consciousness we have a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k,l,m,n,o,p,q,r,s,t,u,v, and w coming up to join x y z. This is vastly simplified because thought is not a linear process; there are peripheral associations coming in from all over. So, the point is that we tend to attribute our behaviors to causes if those causes are traceable; if they're not, if they're below consciousness, we think of them as not having a cause, as just coming up, out of "thin air." I'm constantly amazed that people really think they think things for no reason. They'll say, "OK, I took a walk for no reason. I could have just as easily decided not to take a walk, but I just decided to take one. Nothing made me do it." Well, yes, your thoughts, which would have been different had you had different experiences, made you do it. Your motivational mechanism would have been different.

So the answer to 1. Why is there the appearance of free will? (if you mean why does it seem free to us) is that we are not aware of the automatic underpinning of our thoughts or of the automatic nature of our motivational system.

Or (if you mean why did we evolve to feel as if we have free will), naturally there would have to be survival value in the consequences of perceiving "free agency". We punish behaviors and, due to this, there is constant alteration of the mental schema and its motivational system, so detrimental behavior would tend to change. And certainly not perceiving causation would be the default position in all the other species.

2. How is the mechanism of "free will" enacted?, I think, is answered in the above paragraph dealing with the motivational system. I don't think you mean we need to explain all the way down to the sensorimotor processes of implementing our behavioral choices, as in, say, moving our arm to pick something up.

You'll get no argument from me against our biology being a major factor in our behavior, and I've long been intrigued by twin studies, which, though criticized over some methodology, still yield information that can't be ignored. However, I've come to think of experience as being, truly, all we experience, including our biology. Nature/nurture are so intertwined, there is no way to separate them because we must be alive to experience anything, but without benefit of experience, no behavior could be implemented, no thought formulated. So biology sets limits on what can be expressed, but experience provides the means of particular expression.

It makes sense, I think, to implicate genetics in certain behavioral outcomes, but I don't see why you say that experience is ever cancelled out because individuals still behave according to experience within the confines of their biology; without experience, there would be no behavior, period; they'd be in total sensory deprivation and would cease to live. We are limited by both biology and experience and by the laws of the physical world, as well.

Not that this will make a bit of difference to people who think a god gave us a thing called free will, LOL.

John Page

My daughter is still into Barbies, a concept I will never quire understand....

Thanks for the rest of the post, will absorb and respond later. Cheers!

owleye

John...

"I don't see how you jump to this from what I said. Assume we have a common external reality. Our mind stores an internal representation of that external reality. The external reality constantly changes and we learn about it, thereby updating our internal representation."

Since my response was with respect to cats and mammals, from this response in conjunction with the prior one, I might think you believe it is not possible to make a determination of different levels of abstraction on the basis that external reality changes. Thus, in one time frame of reality, cats might be more abstract than mammals and at another time frame, it could be the reverse, or possibly that they don't have any particular relationship with each other in terms of levels of abstraction. I must admit this reading of your prior remarks sounds pretty odd and it's difficult for my to understand that this is what you really meant.

"Hence the concept of a cat will change over time. We are taught that lions are cats - most kids laugh when they are told this but eventually they reconcile the concept."

According to your prior statement (in conjunction with the leading sentence here), concepts change in relation to a changing external reality. What does this have to do with learning concepts through their being taught to us? Perhaps what I'm missing is that you think external reality is relative to the individual and thus that we cannot make objective judgements. But if so, this gets us back to the problem of shared concepts. What even allows me to be taught that lions are cats?

"What, if anything, do you see in the above preventing communication? If anything, it is the communication that helps "normalize" our commonly held concepts that further aids communication."

Well, yes, I suspect there is a conventional meaning that you can promote by this, but unless you think that is all there is, I suspect there is more to it than "normalization." One way that Kant teaches us is that we share concepts (what you call "commonly held concepts") but not their degree of clarity and distinctness. Thus, we learn through a process that increases clarity through making distinctions, as well as through a process that orders concepts within a species - genera framework -- (i.e., we are seeking a definition of the concept that tells us what something means in such a way that it informs us of what it is generally, and how it differs from other species of the same kind (genus)). It was for this reason that I sought to provide the example of law being a kind of rule. Rule is the genus, and to distinguish law from other rules, I would have to explicate how it distinguishes itself from other species of rules (which I chose not to provide here).

"My point was before one is introduced to the concept "mammal" it does not exist in the mind. Yet one can know the concept "cat" before one knows about mammals."

What makes you think this?

"Summary: Our minds contain concepts of things and there will exist dependencies between these concepts. A dependency marks a layer of absraction."

So the question shifts to what is meant by 'dependency'. I might think this means that in order to understand the concept of cat, I find I it will depend on the concept of mammal. Or is it the other way around. Assuming I'm way off here, I should ask you, what sort of dependency do you have in mind?

"Maybe miscommunication again. When I use the term "concept" I'm not considering this as a process, I'm refering (see previous link to my theory of abstraction) specifically to a "template" or "axiomatic concept" that is subjected to the process of the mind."

(I'm not thinking of it as a process either.) Unfortunately, I am not informed by this at all. What is added to the meaning of 'concept' by modifying it with 'axiomatic' (I think 'template' has some potential. Unfortunately the alleged representation of repeated impressions (using the language of empircism which your theory depends on) that is subsequently reduced to a rule or a concept (which is the way I would understand it) isn't helped by calling it a 'template.') Also see below.

"Why do I adopt this interpretation? While nerve cells come in different types they are relatively homogenous, hence my search for a model of mind that depends on the way the cells are organized rather than what they do - only then can we explain the huge variety of thoughts."

You are developing a model of cognition that depends on the organization of nerve cells and their configuration and relation. This suggests you are defining 'concept' in such a way that it is consistent with your model. This being the case, my interest in your model as an account of the mind is fast depleting. [I suggest a way out toward the end of this post.]

"I think they all just reduce to axiomatic concepts in the mind that have a different set of relations to the information/concepts they operate on."

Until I understand what this means, I will likely not be able to support this conclusion. If what you are referring to is the application of logic and mathematics (i.e., science), then I might be able to agree, but only on the condition that I understand how you think mathematics applies to the world, particularly because concepts (rules, information, relations) are merely formal entities, having no necessary connection to the world.

-----------------
"I hypothisize that to make most effective use of its cpacity the mind picks out repeated relationships and relationships between relationships and partial fits and so on. Each "set" of relationships is what I term an "axiomatic concept". This is probbaly still not clear but hopefully gives an impression why there is no "strict hierarchy" in levels of abstraction, our mind is relativistic."

It seems to me that nothing is gained by calling it an axiomatic concept over and above calling it a concept (or in this instance, an empirical concept, since you have the mind picking out relations from sense experience). An empirical concept is a structure that in its application organizes an object of experience through predicating of that object certain characteristics. (A concept that contains a predicate alone, e.g., the concept of red, is merely referring to the concept in its possible application). Presumably we first learn these concepts though an earlier process called learning. How we learn a concept is itself a fascinating question, and at this point I don't know that your theory is going to illuminate it. If it does, you will have achieved the magic wand of learning, possibly allowing us to become educated in a more efficient way than we are now.

"Level is not a pure concept! Neither is the uniformity of spacetime! What would you consider a "pure concept"?"

Instead of pure, perhaps what I'm thinking of is well-defined (or as clear and distinct as we can achieve). As Kant says, we can't really achieve this status for empirical concepts, it is rather and "idea of reason" that we should improve our understanding by seeking greater clarity through greater distinctions. I.e., it is a task of analysis. To make use of concepts that we already know are confused only adds to the confusion. If we know 'level' is not well-defined (in our mind), we should be seeking to clarify it by making better distinctions, or finding better ways of expressing the phenomena we are trying to explicate.

"Regarding an example of the merit of 1:n relationships, how about the relation between the quantity of synapses and quantity of dendrites in a nerve cell?"

I suspected this, but unfortunately this is a model of the brain, not an example of a 1:n relationship of concepts. (Naturally, this depends on our having a shared understanding of the concept of 'concept'.)

But let me help you out. Consider the concept of 'cat'. What you may be thinking of is not the relationship of 'cat' as it refers to objects in the world, but what other concepts might be connected to the concept of 'cat' in our mind. It might be connected to rats, hats, dogs, mice, and balls of yarn, as well as a myriad of events and experiences (these latter would not actually be concepts, however).

All this is well and good, I suppose, and might help to explain the intensional meaning of the term in each of us, but this usage of 'concept' itself depends on each of these related concepts having some meaning in themselves, or its public meaning, something that is in fact shareable. That is we may not share the same experiences, though we might, and the same connections between the concepts we have learned, but it is likely we can understand each other because we share the same extensional meaning of the concepts we use in language. And it is this latter use of 'concept' that I've been trying to get you to respond to, in its relations with other concepts (i.e., its genera-species determination).

owleye

naasking

Free will or causality?

That's really what it comes down to right? The question of free will depends on whether or not some entity could do something independent of any cause. This implies true randomness, or events that truly have no cause. The question then becomes: is there such thing as true randomness, or is randomness just an illusion, a consequence of a complicated process we simply do not fully understand or cannot yet model deterministcally?

If true randomness exists, then free will can exist somewhere. If existence is purely causal, then free will cannot exist.