Clutch

This collates some thoughts and posts I've had about ID-ology over the past six months or so. Feedback most welcome. These are slightly variant ways of making the same basic point -- really, a familiar point about the vacuity of ID's tight little circle: infer god's preferences from the properties of the world, then explain the properties of the world as arising from god's preferences.

First gloss:

ID-ologists claim that there's something about our universe in virtue of which it "looks designed".

But no matter *how* the universe had turned out, it would look designed; all you need to do is postulate a designer who wanted the universe to look that way.

And that's all that ID-ers actually do, regarding our universe: postulate a designer whose preferences are for a universe that looks like this one. Hence to make the claim that *this* universe looks designed is to have pointed out nothing special about our universe.

And if nothing particular to our universe justifies the ID claim, it's not an empirical theory or explanation.

As long as *anything* existed, it would be just as good -- that is, just as bad -- an argument, deriving its force not from *design* features, but from the conviction that there being something rather than nothing requires a supernatural explanation.

Hence it is really just the Cosmological Argument from Contingency, in search of a research grant.

Second gloss:

It's absolutely fundamental to probabilistic ID arguments that there are many, many other ways the universe might have been. All I'm doing is taking up their claim that, of all the ways the universe *might* have been, the way it *is* is special -- because it "looks designed".

But whatever its properties had been, the universe would have "looked designed", in exactly the same sense -- namely, by a designer who wanted it to look like *that*. So the way the universe actually is contributes nothing to the ID argument. The argument would work as well no matter how the universe had turned out.

Notice, therefore, that ID rationally implicates nothing particular about this universe. That's why it isn't science. It's transcendental reasoning about contingency and necessity, dragged through some epicycles intended to make it seem empirical. It ain't.

Third gloss:

ID-ologists try to run an instance, for our universe, of the allegedly explanatory schema "U's containing feature F is explained by the postulation of a U-designer with a preference for feature F", (where U is a schematic letter ranging over possible universes and F ranges, for each U, over features of that universe). For example, "Our universe's containing basic particles with mass values such that, given the physico-chemical laws of the universe, life as we know it is possible, is explained by the postulation of a designer that prefers such masses, such laws or life as we know it."

The only way to have this be something other than the trivial modally "local" instance of the schema would be to have independent evidence for the existence and nature of a particular suitable agent associated with our universe.

There is no such independently successful argument for the existence of a designer with the relevant preferences (or, if there is, trot it out).

So all we have are the instances of the schema appropriate to our universe. But the schema itself makes no mention of our universe in particular. It has instances for every universe; hence its having instances in our universe reflects nothing about a special designedness manifest in the empirical features of our universe.

beausoleil

I feel the same about some (I emphasise some) evolutionary arguments as reported. Species x exhibits trait y which gave it an advantage. How do we know it conveyed an advantage? Because those members of species x that have it survived.

Yes, there can be arguments about why such a trait conveyed an advantage, but I wonder how much they are post hoc constructs. They sound plausible, but how often is there independent verification that the given trait is a survival property?

But the point is that the vast majority of (as far as we know) possible universes would not be capable of supporting beings to do the observing and postulating. They wouldn't 'look designed' since there would be nobody or nothing to 'look'.

I'm not a supporter of intelligent design, but let's not throw the baby of scientific enquiry out with the bathwater of arguments by design.

[ June 26, 2002: Message edited by: beausoleil ]</p>

Clutch

Beausoleil, thanks.

This can hardly be "the point" of ID-ology, though. First, because ID-ologists themselves systematically deny it via the "firing squad" analogy, and second, since it's plainly irrelevant. You might as well say that if every sentient creature in the universe died, then the mass-energy equivalence would no longer explain the operation of stars -- because, hey, there'd be nobody around to understand the explanations.

My point is straightforward: the existence of Fs is not explained by the postulation of a designer who loathes Fs. You need not just a designer, but one with the right intentions -- intentions to make a world that looks like [pointing] *that*.

Now imagine all the many ways that ID-ologists insist the universe could have been (on utterly opaque grounds, let me add, but that's another story). Point at any of those universes while reciting the above story and saying "...like *that*". See how that works just the same way for any universe?

Nothing empirical there.

beausoleil

In fact I would say that. For stars and planets to exist, the principles by which the universe operates have to have certain properties. For me to exist in a mental state that makes me say "something is explained by something else" requires a similarly (perhaps even more) tightly constrained set of properties.

There could be various explanations. For instance, perhaps there are a huge number of universes exhibiting the whole spectrum of properties - it would then be no surprise that one existed that we can be in. Perhaps they are distributed by something like the many-worlds principle of quantum mechanics.

The observation of supposed 'fine-tuning' of the universe doesn't require design, but it's not yet obvious that it has no significance.

[ June 26, 2002: Message edited by: beausoleil ]</p>

Peez

Biologists may sit around and idly suggest that such a trait must be adaptive because it is there, but that sort of reasoning will not get you published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal. You seem to be suggesting that evolution rests in some way on circular arguments such as the one you suggested. Please provide an example. I can speak from personal experience: my doctoral thesis involved the adaptive nature of certain traits. I never assumed that the traits that I looked at were generated by natural selection, and certainly no biologist was going to take me seriously if I claimed this based on the sort of circular argument that you described. I had to conduct experiments and observations to find evidence that the traits are, indeed, adaptive. Even then, I could not assume that they always were in the same way (though it would then be a reasonable inference). I am only aware of one universe that we can be sure is possible. You may assume this, but note that we don't even understand everything about this universe, let alone some others that may or may not be possible. I don't see the danger. What we need is an empirical test of design. I don't see how such a test is possible, but if someone can provide one then scientists will be all too happy to conduct the test.

Peez

[ June 26, 2002: Message edited by: Peez ]</p>

Clutch

Well, I think this is drifting off topic. I will simply observe that you appear to be confusing "X explains Y" with "Somebody knows that X explains Y". Certainly there is an actualist subjective understanding of "explain", but my point does not employ it.

Presumably you think that if everyone were dead, there would still be a mass-energy equivalence. And stars would still operate. Would the former cease to explain the latter? In a very clear sense, the answer is No. The equivalence would still explain the operation, and nobody would be around to know this.

beausoleil

Well, I'm glad but not surprised that the research literature is more rigourous. I guess I'm mostly thinking about the sorts of reports that appear in the popularising press.

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I think the argument against design might become worse, not better, if this were shown to be the only possible universe

The problem isn't posed by the observation of other universes. It's posed by observations that make sense if there are lots of other universes that are otherwise unobservable. Or if there is a principle forcing universes to have the properties ours has. If there is such a principle, where did it come from? - I think the ID crowd would have a field day.

(I'm a scientist myself incidentally.)

To me this seems the wrong way round. Investigating why the universe we observe has the properties it has is a perfectly valid scientific discipline. We can reason from our existence to properties of this universe which can then be sought and verified. Argue that there is no need for a 'designer' by all means - but don't assert that there is nothing worthy of investigation in the fact that the properties of the universe are such that we can be in it.

The evidence is what it is. It might be explained by a 'designer' - but that's not a theory I favour and there are other candidate explanations. But it simply isn't the case that there is nothing requiring an explanation.

Peez

I would disagree. If only one universe is possible, then the probability of the universe being the way that this one is (in the absence of a designer) should be 1.00. I would not argue that there is nothing worthy of investigation in the origin of the universe. Rather, I would argue that such investigations are, by definition, not science. I would define science, simplistically perhaps, as a search for natural explanations for natural phenomena. I would limit "natural" to this universe, so that anything outside of the universe itself would be outside the province of science. I agree, but I would argue that a "creator" outside of the universe is not subject to scientific inquiry. Other forms of inquiry, certainly, but not based on natural, empirical evidence from within the universe.

Peez

beausoleil

Well, I think whether the universe is the only one possible may be predicted by theories that have observable consequences. At some point, for instance, some properties of our universe were set by some mechanism. We can hope to understand through experiment and theory what that mechanism was. If we discovered that the universe cycled from big bang to big bang, with each cycle having different properties, then an explanation of the apparent 'good fit' would be natural. (Just a for instance - not suggesting this is indicated)

Science is about observables - theories of the origin of the universe have observable consequences. I suspect the scientists who spend their careers studying these fields might be a little taken aback to hear they aren't engaged in science.

I don't see any empirical evidence of a creator and, personally, have no belief in one. But I don't think I'm prepared to say it is in principle impossible that there will ever be evidence.

beausoleil

I'm not in the slightest bit confused - I was just pointing out that when you talk about 'looking designed' you are imposing a constraint on the sorts of universes under consideration. For a universe to 'look designed' requires it to have properties capable of sustaining complex lifeforms. Universes without complex lifeforms don't look designed because there is no looking (unless you posit an outside agency observing it, like a designer perhaps? ) They are however conceivable - universes in which carbon was never synthesised for instance.

Actually, I don't think saying this universe looks designed adds anything to saying it is a univese in which the question of whether it looks designed can be raised. The question is why there is such a universe when we're not yet aware of any constraining principle.

Your argument is that any universe has a specific set of properties, and any one set, if observed, might be said to be evidence of design.

The problem is that you're focusing on the wrong word of 'looking designed'. A creator could design a universe in any way he felt like, but the universe that exists is one in which there is looking. This seems to require a very narrow set of parameters, at our current level of understanding, and as yet we have no explanation. It doesn't require a designer, though.