Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by theophilus :

What I said is that all professional apologists are willing to play the game and use "evil" to stand in for something else. To refuse to do so is petty and unhelpful.

I'm not appealing to any authorities here. I'm mentioning several famous presentations of arguments from evil, all of which you seem to have missed. I think if you're going to try to argue against the evidential argument from evil, you should pick one of the ones leading atheologians actually propound.

Yes, the famous G. E. Moore shift. If you can support (2), you have reason to deny (3). So we'll see if you can at the end of this post.

I can do so because of induction. Most possibilities are not actual, and we have no reason to believe all the suffering is justified.

That's some nice argument by assertion. Do you deny induction? Do you deny that most possibilities are not actual? Do you deny that there is no evidence that all our suffering is justified? Unless you can justifiably answer "yes" to one of those, you have to accept my conclusion.

But that's no evidence that Christianity is true (instead of just useful), so you've failed to support (2) above. And so the argument from evil stands.

Just in case you've missed it, here's my response to presuppositionalism. If it's presented as "Christianity is the only way to function epistemically so we must assume it's true to function epistemically," at least. My response is that I can assume that epistemic foundations exist as brute facts, so I don't need to believe in God. No one can find a way to show that epistemic foundations require God, only that if God exists, epistemic foundations will exist.

On the other hand, maybe your flavor of presuppositionalism is that the best explanation for why epistemic foundations exist is that God exists. And I'd have to say that that's just not very appealing to me. Epistemic foundations seem to be the sort of stuff that could be brute facts, when they're not just consequences of our language. Knowledge is possible, but why shouldn't it be? Why would it be surprising that epistemic foundations existed? And why can't they be brute facts?

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by theophilus :

Can't explain what? What can't I explain?

Philosoft

I don't remember saying anything about the "survival of the race."

Why? It seems to be enough that most people consider governed society a benefit to survival.
Or you could try addressing my actual argument.

Philosoft

Well, if we can discuss the purposes God has for allowing evil, then we're not discussing the UPD.
And I still see no connection to the Unknown Purpose Defense.

Jobar

Philosoft is right, theophilus. What you are trying to discuss here seems to be presuppositionalism- in fact, IMO practically every post you make is a presupp argument. You are constantly implying (or outright saying) that all atheists are materialists, and that no abstract or ethical truths are possible starting from a materialist worldview.

Look, we are all willing to listen to you if you can make a coherent case for all this. But dragging every thread you post to off to an argument about presupp is not going to be allowed. Start a thread on the subject, and we will all join in. (And, if experience is any guide, mince your argument to pieces- but if you can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen!)

mattdamore

Tom, this in response to your initial post.

Now consider another position, which I'll call (D*). (D*) claims that it's possible that God has an extra reason for preventing suffering beyond the obvious one, and claims, further, that this possibility provides good reason to think God will prevent suffering beyond what he normally would.

First, just for clarification purposes, what is this 'obvious' reason which lies behind this 'extra' reason that D* provides? Unless your hinting at the various possible reasons articulated in the literature on the subject of evil, I might not be on the same page. Second, how probable do you think it is that God would be at liberty to actualize this extra reason, considering that God's omniscience is working in conjunction with His omni-benevolence? The position of retaining God's obvious reason seems to make more sense, because God, in the utilization of His omni-attributes, brought about this reason, presumeably because it was better, on some level, than the extra reason. Thirdly, I don't follow how it could be concievable that God would act against that which He normally does, at least on a moral level, since, I would argue, that God's moral disposition is immutable.

Of course, these question could be a little of the point, in that you could be raising these possibilities for the purpose of showing the futile end the apologist tries to reach in raising possibilities of her own. Then I must ask what is so manifestly wrong with the raising of these possibilities to thwart the critic's accusations with God being either logically incompatible with evil or evidentially improbable with regard to either the Christian God or the a God with the explicated omni-attributes.
I may be missing your point. If I did, I apologize. I already see that this particular post has extended to two pages; none of which I have been able to read.

It seems to me that we have no principled reason for deciding (D) provides 100 russells, but (D*) provides fewer than 100 russells. Each identifies a possibility and suggests that the mere possibility is enough to sway one's assessment of an inference.

At first glance , I would assume that that principled reason isn't supposed to serve as a deciding factor between choose from D and D*, but between believing what D advocates as opposed to believing the initial accusations proposed by the proponent of PoE. When you say ' sway one's assessment of an inference', is this in regard to the choosing between D and D* or between what D advocates and what the initial proponent of PoE advocates? If the former, I don't see how this would follow. If the latter, then your conclusion doesn't really do what you want it to do. I also don't follow how you prescribed the amount of russells to both D and D*. Why not give D* 100 russells, and give D fewer than 100 russells?

I also don't agree with the fact that the possibilites serve to actually 'sway' one's assessment altogether. If by 'sway', you mean automatically arrive at the conclusion that the critic of PoE is right and the proponent is wrong. The only 'swaying' I see is both sides of PoE admitting the possibilites of both D and D* and, therefore, neither come to the dogmatic conclusions that the critic or the proponent of PoE is right (only right in the sense that both sides admit the existence of the possibilites)

If I'm right, this completely neutralizes the version of UPD I'm considering. I think the best thing to say is that a mere possibility provides no argumentative weight for or against the evidential argument from evil.

The kind of possiblity that should be raised is not any ole' possibility that may be tossed in the air, because in the context of the evidential arguement, contrary possibilites can be brought up. The bringing up of possibilities is only effective in the context of the logical problem of evil, not the probablistic/evidential.

Here is my train of thought regarding the purpose of possibilities with regard the evidential argument from evil:

1. When I think of the EAE, I think of her arguing her case on the basis of various gratuitious evils that she has discovered.
2. These gratuitious evils lend creedence to the probable fact that it is plausible to think that God doesn't exist.
3. Therefore, it is implausible to believe that God exists.

Since every gratuitous evil makes it implausible that God exists, it's sensible to conclude that He probable doesn't.

The 'possibility factor' (PR) comes in when it seems that the proponent of EAE says that these gratuitous evils are logically incompatible with the 'probable existence' of God. Now it seems that PR is relevant. I am aware of other routes the apologist can take when dealing with gratuitous evils, but this, I think, is the most relevant, considering the context.

So, in the context of EAE, PR is relevant is answering proponents, because they are said in the service of dismantling the implicit logical incompatibility between the existence of gratuitous evils and the probable existence of God.

Those are my first thoughts. Tear them to shreds, so I can get more precise with my terms. I already have a gut feeling that my arguments are weak, terms vauge, etc ...

Thanks beforehand!

MattDamore

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattdamore :

That one ought to try to prevent evil because it's bad when people suffer.

I see no reason to rate it lower than .5. In fact, it would probably be quite high, because God is omnipotent.

Yeah, but no one's saying he'd act differently from how he acts in the actual world. I'm saying how he acted in the actual world would have been different, because of this extra reason.

Oh, they work all right to thwart the logical incompatibility claim.

Because a possibility won't answer a probability, crudely. God would probably have prevented more evil. Maybe he has a reason not to, but that's not the same as probably he has a reason not to.

This is in regard to choosing between what the proponent of D advocates (that the EAE is weak) and what the proponent of EAE advocates (that EAE is strong).

Because there's no principled way to choose, so we have to do it equally.

I agree, and that's why I think UPD doesn't work against EAE.

Well, let's be careful. Gratuitous evil is indeed logically incompatible with God's existence. Van Inwagen and Hasker don't think it is, but they're wrong.

Now, the current amount of evil isn't taken to be logically incompatible with God's existence, as you know, but perhaps, as you say, logically incompatible with God's probable existence. It doesn't seem to me that this way of speaking makes too much sense. Whether God's existence is probable seems to be an epistemological question. So the current amount of evil, if it's logically incompatible with God's probable existence, just means that we aren't possibly justified in saying it is not the case that God probably doesn't exist (whew, that's a lot of negatives), right? Then the "possibility factor" would say "Hey, maybe we might be justified in thinking it's not the case that God probably doesn't exist." And my possibility factor in response would be that maybe we have even more justification for thinking God probably doesn't exist than what we know already.

theophilus

Well, actually, you can't explain anything. But, to be more precise, this was in response to your QUESTION.

"So you think moral obligations do exist independent of humans' minds. I understand why you think that -- you believe in God -- but that doesn't tell me why I should think that. "

If you don't want to include the original references, that's your choice, but it's not my responsibility to go back and remind you of what you said previously.

Thomas Metcalf

theophilus :

Let's review.

I said:

You said:

Now, understandably, I asked for the referent of "it." Maybe it means the referent of the "that" at the end of my quote. At the end of my quote, "that" refers to the proposition "Moral obligations exist independently of humans' minds." So you must be asking me to explain why moral obligations exist independently of humans' minds. But if you'll actually read my post, you'll see that I don't even accept that position, so it's awfully strange for you to ask me to explain it.

That's why it's kind of insulting when you say something like this:

...When in fact, you're the one misreading my post in the first place.

So let me ask you again. What am I supposed to be explaining? What fact to I accept for which I don't have an explanation?

mattdamore

Yo Tom!

I think a couple things could be said that would digress us into territory that would be off the topic of PoE. First, I would question the truth-value of the above quote (AQ) in relation to God, because the 'oughtness' prescribed to God in AQ is not on the same playing field. I believe that the 'oughtness' of AG is trumped, on God's infinite level, with another maxim that should be considered:

S: One ought to utilize suffering if and only if that suffering is a necessary condition for the person under suffering to come to knowledge of God, salvation, etc. . .

Since S can only be accurately followed by God, then the recognition of the S is inapplicable to humans. If there is no applicability of S to humans, then AQ does not lose it's objective status, since their is no trumping involved. Shandon L. Guthrie writes in an article, http://sguthrie.net/evil.htm, And the only reason why God would want to allow evil in His plan of creation is if He had an overriding desire. Typically, theists affirm that God has such an overriding desire, namely that people are brought to a point of spiritual well-being or salvation. With respect to this as God's primary motivation, the existence of evil is not so problematic. In fact, it seems to be quite instrumental given that there seems to be a correlation between immense suffering and pain and belief in God. If suffering yields up more believers in God for their spiritual well-being then it should not at all seem dubious that God would permit evil. Moreover, the presence of evil may actually have a spiritually therapeutic effect. Certainly everyone has said or has heard a parent say to a child, "I spanked you because I love you." In the same way evil may be seen as an instrument of God to "correct, purify, and instruct." So, I believe that S has some support.

I guess I just don't see how it is rated so high, since I believe that if this extra reason did in fact exist, then the state of affairs explicated by that extra reason would exist, since the utilization of the proper attributes that God possesses would have commenced. I believe that God's omni-benevolence would have met the requirements of the extra reason a long time ago. Since this extra reason doesn't seem to be actualizing, then maybe we should look at the validity of the truth-value of the extra-reason instead of God's character or existence.

Why is one forced to go down the avenue of denying God what the PoE tries to deny Him because of the fact that the extra reason is postulated? Why not deny the truth-value of the extra reason, because how God acts in the actual world is not different?

But the possibility being explicated is not aimed towards that improbability aspect of EAE, but towards the logical incompatibility of either D and D* or gratuitous evil and the probable existence of God (I realize you make a note on this latter conjunction).

Well then this is where I believe that logical possibilites can become effective, since in the above quote there involves logical incompatibility. Since it can't both be true at the same time and in the same relationship that EAE be both weak and strong, then logical compatibility is involved. If logical compatibility is involved, then possibilites are relevent. So, within the EAE, we have found an aspect of EAE which can be countered with logical possibilities.

I haven't looked too much into how they're compatible. We could discuss that if you would like. I could take the position of their compatibility for fun, so you could make clear what your view on that particular subject happens to be.

But don't you see that the possibility factor does it's job! It does away with the alleged logical incompatibility of evil and the probable existence of God. If there is no logical incompatibility, which seems to be the implicit foundation upon which the EAE rests, then EAE as a whole can be partly dismantled, by attacking the logical incompatibility aspect inherent within EAE. If this part of EAE is attacked and possibilities become necessary for this attack, then would not EAE as whole collapse? Sure you might have another possibility, but don't these same contrary possibilities exist with the logical problem of evil? But the bringing up of the contrary possibilities doesn't, as you know, in any way take away from the destruction of the logical problem of evil, since possibilities made logical incompatibility disappear. But if this same 'kind' of logical incompatibility can be made impotent from within EAE, and if it is said that inherent within the essence of EAE is this logical incompatability, the different contrary possibilities would seem to have power to destroy this logical incompatability, thereby making EAE fail.

Further, what would have to take place for the possibility you raised in order for that possibility to hold true. If my possibility was contrary to yours, and the evidence for my possibility out-weighed yours, would not this take away from the existential probability of your possibility? Because for your 'further justification' of God's non-existence consists of anything, would it not have to include other arguments which seek to prove His non-existence, besides EAE, since we are arguing from within the logical contours of EAE?

Sorry if I lost you. I'll clarify when needed.