Tyler Durden

Hello Bill Snedden

What is the boundary between intrinsic structure and property then?

Right, which is why I have no problems doing away with such hacks and stick to a pragmatic outlook that decides truth is endorsement and there is no need to worry about a fictional relationship to non-linguistic reality.

Through difference and repetition of experience we ascribe properties

Right! There�s no inamenable object, precisely because there�s no �description-independent� way to account for reality.

John Page

Like the brain processes that give rise to words?
Wow! Intersubjective agreement on something.
It is existent to me, the question is how does it becomes existent to me. Your mind/brain is different so it appears differently to you. Are you proposing a brand of nominalism where things spring into existence merely because we name them?
If we can tell between two things, is this not some form of dualism?
Your mind is different than my mind. We are attempting to use words to describe differences in elements of our thinking. Are you saying your mind consists of nothing but words, that your brain is not intrinsic to your mind?
...yes, and by using language as a means of communicating ideas and concepts...
...that may or may not be common between minds. You're playing with a chiecken and egg issue here and have not responded to my observation that reality existed before humans. Or do you persist in explaining this as a play on words? No I don't take the LOI to be transcendent, it was invented by humans.
I have to go - but it was nice to see words failing you at the end of your previous post.

Skol, John

Bill Snedden

Well, on it's most basic level, I suppose it's the distinction between universals and particulars...

Wait, that can't be right. By "non-linguistic reality", do you mean to imply that there is a reality apart from language? But hasn't your whole thesis up to this point been that there is not?

Experience of what? Differences in what? In your previous post you implied that there wasn't anything in particular to experience. Now you seem to be saying that there is.

I think you meant to say "unamenable", but regardless this really doesn't answer the question I asked. How does the lack of amenability to structure contribute to our ability to impose structure upon the world? In other words, to return to the distinction between property and structure, how does the non-existence of particulars facilitate the creation of universals?

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Hugo Holbling

I think that was Tyler's point: there's no need to worry about that idea.

Gurdur

Excellent thread.

John Page

Sorry you didn't get it. Try this. There is "Tyler's mind" and "not Tylers mind". I am part of "not Tyler's mind". Tyler's statements are relative to his state of mind, Tyler's state of mind knows no absolutes or transcendent universals therefore Tyler's POV is subjective.
I didn't say it was, I just asked you a question - is truth arbitrary?
We invented rules of various logics by comparing reality with natural language descriptions of reality. Language is required to describe a logic, but is not required for its operation. Go look at one of Babbage's machines.
Sure - but think why you are putting the word world in quotes. Which 'world' are you talking about, as fast as you can divide the world I can say they are just different views that form part of the whole. Neither of us is "right" or has a "right version" but this is more to do with relativism. (Nominalism, I feel, must embrace relativism since the "fixed object" that you seem to accuse me of believing in cannot exist.)
Like I said at the start, echoing Nelson's opening gambit, words are part of the world. What would you calling that part of the world that is not words - real, physical, matter.... what?
Accrding to your earlier post, menaing is cause by the relationships between the words at play. Are you now saying that meaning is uncaused and floats around in the ether randomly connecting to bits of language that somehow cross our minds?
Precisely, I don't think creationism need have anything to do with nominalism. I see Bill picked up on your claims about anything having an intrinsic anything. If so, the words are meaningless and something like ID Theory would need to be pulled out of a metaphoric (but meaningless) hat.
Such as?
"Mind" is certainly a word used to denote a concept but no problem, just substitute "Nervous System" for "Mind". Your nihilistic attitude to causality is curious - make everything an object then there is no means of interpreting and comparing the two artist's pictures, make everything a subject then conversation becomes vaccuous - literally nothing (no object) to talk about.
Should I intersubjectively agree that? Are you proposing the kind of private language that is inaccesible so nobody can disprove its existence - if so, then back to dualism with you.

Let's face it, without objects nominalism doesn't mean a thing.

Cheers, John

Luiseach

The discussion of 'truth' could make an interesting subject, but perhaps not for this thread, which is intended for something else?

[Edited to add]...on the other hand, are we still discussing Hugo's interchange with the prof? Or have we moved on? Or back?

P.S. the nose-picking image...*shudder*...

PPS...I'll need to read Hugo's response to Gill again if we are talking about it.

John Page

Lu:

Yes, the author's self portrait leaves a lot to be desired - but that's representationalism for you.

BTW I agree with his overall observation on truth, see here , but if you want to start another thread I'd be real interested to get into how, posted by Tyler Durden, "Truth is determined by agreement, by majority, by popularity, by consensus, by our psychological deficiencies." - particularly the latter.

Cheers, John

Hugo Holbling

Now i feel like a tyrant...

Here's a suggestion, Luise: why not start the thread you are interested in yourself, as John remarked? I'm sure plenty of people will contribute.

Evidently not. You could bring up a point or two on the matter in your own thread, perhaps.

Luiseach

Agreed!