Bill Snedden

My question was to clarify what idea. The idea that the connection between language and reality is a fiction or that reality itself is a fiction? Tyler's meaning is unclear to me and while I find the first possible meaning relatively clear, the second appears incoherent.

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Luiseach

Yes, Mr. Holbling...that's what I was suggesting.



[Edited to add link to the 'truth thread']

http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.p...threadid=54896

Dominus Paradoxum

His statement is self-refuting. When he says "reality has no intrinsic structure", I think he takes it to be true that reality really doesn't have any instrinsic structure, else what does he mean by saying it has none? If reality has no instrinsic structure, it can't be intrinsically nominalistic either. If the structure of reality is determinded by the way we describe it, then according to some descriptions there will indeed be an absolute truth, because that that is they way they concieve things. Indeed, according to some conceptual schemes God will indeed exist. And what, pray tell, do you mean by saying that truth is what works? If by calling what works 'true' you mean only that it does in fact work, you state a tautology, and if you mean that its working shows anything about 'the way things really are', a contradiction. Incidentally, I don't believe in 'paticulars'. What makes you so confident that they exist?

Tyler Durden

*beep* I understand your programme, but you�ve made way too many short-cuts with this statement.
A line is not an existing object predicated by sensations. It is rather an artifact of man' conceptual scheme.
Different? Different from what? I don�t do metaphysical entities.
Not at all. Things become more identifiable when we conceptualize them in language. And the only way to do that is participate in a social activity.
Nice try. Dualism is an ontological joke, no thanks to Descartes. We can tell between two things, because of differentiation and repetition in shared experience.
Pardon me, the empiricist in me suddenly retched. We do have private experiences, but that�s about as far as I�m willing to go.
Our thoughts are beholden to language, sure, but I see no point in playing with metaphysical entities like the mind and engaging in bad philosophy.
Proof that intersubjectivity is possible even at the philosophical level! Well, at least for us both.
If the law of identity was invented by humans, then why do you persist in calling some identifiable structure transcendent, which is reality, and prior to humans� existence?
Actually, the picture represents a thousand or two words that should illustrate perfectly the answer such poorly phrased questions deserve.

Tyler Durden

By george, you�ve nailed it. And after George Berkeley, I have a hard time respecting Platonists who privileges universals over particulars in a hierarchical scheme that structures their thinking.
No, just that there is no need to posit such a �non-linguistic reality� and worry about whether our beliefs, ideas, thoughts correspond to it.
That�s pretty much the gist I�m selling here.
I meant the experience of day to day activities, hopefully. By difference, I�m looking at Hume�s empiricism in a post-foundational way. Difference is more primordial than representational thought, or possibly ontologically prior to representation. And in my previous posts I did not imply that there was nothing in particular to experience, because all we experience are actually particulars. But at the same time we identify those particulars, we�re ascribing intrinsic properties by generalizing from the particulars we experience. I think? so we should be cognizant of our own participation.

Yes, it�s possible to experience and identify particulars by differentiation, yet deny that anything has intrinsic properties in a mind-independent or language-transcendent way.

John Page

Didn't answer the question, did you?
Gratifying that you're agreeing with my criticism of Nelson's expurgation.
So, by implication you are agreeing that "metaphysical entities" are different than other entities. Does this mean some language has more meaning than others? Your refusal or inability to put forward an epistemology demonstrates that your system (if it could be called that), is nominal.
Not the only way, Tyler. Please demonstrate how this assertion is true.
Now how does this differentiation work? Why does this experience have to be shared?
Please note that I am not disagreeing that the development of languages implies or requires shared experiences, however, you seem to overlook observations of non-shared experiences.
Go on, be a devil, try and explain something for which there are no words! (This is called learning about the world)
I don't agree that our thoughts are beholden to language. What is the basis for this claim other than you don't think so?
well, it has to be for both of us language machines, otherwise it wouldn't be intersubjectivity, would it?
From another thread, (I'll find the link if you wish) stuff (language, objects, whatever) outside our direct experience has a lower epistemological status than direct experience. We can report direct experience using language, but that doesn't mean that experience is only language. Do you agree this? If not, please enlighten me as how I can have non-language experiences (winces in indescribable pain).
Go look in the mirror - see any language?

Cheers, John

Bill Snedden

Berkeley....blech...

But your point is well taken. It's most likely that I would fit into the "nominalist" bucket myself, if I had to attach a label.

Isn't it possible that these are two different things? Whether or not such a "non-linguistic reality" exists doesn't necessarily mean that I have to worry about correspondence with it.

IOW, can't I be a realist and a pragmatist, too?

I take this to mean that you would say that a "non-linguistic reality" doesn't exist. Would that be correct?

What exactly does that mean? That there's no existence apart from words or that we cannot describe existence apart from words? The latter seems reasonable, the first incoherent; but perhaps I misunderstand you.

Seems eminently reasonable, but doesn't your statement "Difference is more primordial..." contradict your earlier statement about the non-existence of non-linguistic reality? If anything is ontologically prior to representation, then it by definition must be a non-linguistic something.

Well, I thought you did imply that, but obviously I misread you. I agree with your statement WRT particulars, but now you go on to say:

I quite agree that we must be cognizant of our participation, but how can we differentiate particulars one from the other if there are no intrinsic characteristics by which to differentiate?

IOW, if there are no intrinsic properties, how do we differentiate?

I must admit that I can't see how. How do I tell an orange from an apple if neither one admits of any specific characteristics?

An explanation would be greatly appreciated!

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Dominus Paradoxum

A highly contentious notion. Introspection has proven time and time again to be a fairly theoretical enterprise, and people usually find what they expect to find. Both Blanshard and the later Russell (in Enquiry into meaning and truth) found their experience to be composed entierly of what Blanshard called 'specific universals', things like the specific shade of greyness of this background, which are 'universal' because repeatable in differing contexts. That shade might turn up again later in my experience or someone else's, and still remain the very same shade that it is. The same hold true of relations. The relations 'five feet distant from' and 'one hour later than' would also be specific universals. And so it is quite possible to concieve that everything is composed of bundles of specific universals which are individuated by their relations to everything else existent. In this conception, there's no room for 'paticulars' left over. But you'll probably ignore this, as you did my previous reply.

Tyler Durden

Very good post, Dominus Paradoxum. However, I do read your posts, so i didn't ignore them. I would pick up your gauntlet of Platonia, but i have other interlocutors to attend. Wait your turn!

Tyler Durden

Here�s a webpage that further illustrates Berkeley�s criticism of abstract general ideas.
What other epistemological model is there that entails correspondence than representationalism?
No, because they adopt two different theories of truth entirely foreign to one another.
Actually that we don�t have to worry about such existence or postulate problematic notions about anything non-local and existence, because we�re locked into our language.
The first one seems too anti-foundational, and the 2nd one seems to be all Goldilocks � just right!
Fear not. After listening to you, I don�t even understand myself.
Likely, but not necessarily, because I�m trying to resolve the metaphysics of difference with a pragmatic account of ordinary language� I see the difficulty too. On the one hand I have transcendental empiricism, and on the other, a bastardization of Wittgenstein and pragmatism.
Is that right? Why do you suppose that?
We ascribe the characteristics, through a conceptual schema, so there aren�t any pre-conceptualized particulars. Since there are no pre-conceptualized particulars, there are no intrinsic properties. How�s that?
I�m not sure. Maybe there�s an ontological commitment to intrinsic properties we don�t have to posit?
We already tell the difference between these two because of our pre-existing social structures (language, culture, customs). Maybe? So it�s not a private enterprise between a lonesome individual and his environment.
Your participation is greatly appreciated!