diana

What follows is a piece of an e-mail discussion I've been having with a new friend. You'll note places that are somewhat disjointed, and that is because this piece falls in the middle of an ongoing conversation (but I think the gist is preserved, so I essentially reproduced it verbatim, as it gives you the flavor of the thing).

He's very earnest and sincere, not to mention polite, so I ask that all replies assume his goodwill.

He's touched on several points that I feel others are far better to address than me--in this bit, C.S. Lewis' arguments for objective morality--so I have elected to take this conversation public for that purpose.

He asked if I'd read C.S. Lewis' Mere Christianity, and I said some of it, explained briefly why I feel Lewis' premises are only assumptions and assertions, and asked if there was any specific part he'd like to discuss.

HIM: The part where he argues that the inborn sense of right and wrong implies an outside source. In a nutshell, in the same way Lewis argues that this sense of right and wrong, which must be COMPARED to some standard is the way I would argue that I can look at a human body and surmise a designer.

ME: Please refresh my memory. How does he support the idea of an "inborn sense of right and wrong" again? Unless you can somehow support the "inborn" part, the rest of the argument falls apart.

HIM: In Reader's Digest form, CS Lewis argues that any statement that says "That is wrong" whether its murder, hitting old ladies, or failing to allow someone to enter traffic points inherently points to some absolute standard of right and wrong. If each person was able to determine right and wrong for themselves, chaos would result. The fact that there are generally agreed "rights" and "wrongs" defaults to a standard outside of ourselves. For example, its almost universal that murder is "wrong".

ME: I think he used "I've looked at many of the world's cultures and they agree on certain aspects of right and wrong" as his evidence that we have an inborn sense of right and wrong. Is this his argument in a nutshell?

HIM: Its more that we see somethings and instinctively know its wrong. We would judge a 3 year old that burned puppies alive as morally undeveloped or corrupted or stunted. Why? Because we expect a 3 yr old to recognize the sounds a puppy makes as it burns to death as pain. We would also expect the 3 yr old to see causing pain as wrong and at least seek help for the puppy once the pain started. This is one example of the inherent sense of right and wrong and not merely a group concensus.

ME: If so:

1. The world's cultures have completely different ideas of what's right and what's wrong. His "evidence" was skewed.

AND

2. Even if it could be demonstrated that most cultures agree that certain things are acceptable and others unacceptable, this only demonstrates that they've separately reached similar reasonable conclusions about what kind of rules are necessary if groups of people are to live together in harmony and what rules will serve to protect their own (individual) assets from others.

HIM: I would agree BUT see above.

ME: But different cultures have decided that a man can only have one wife, or can have many wives. Or, conversely, that a woman can have several husbands. Or, even, that men and women don't have to be "linked" to any specific partner at all.

Some have condemned premarital sex. Others have encouraged it. Others don't care.

Different cultures tend to agree that it isn't acceptable to kill people of your own clan without provocation, but disagree on how ok it is to kill outsiders for no good reason.

Evidence of an inborn sense of right and wrong? Oh please.

HIM: I point to yourself. What is an act you would never perform? Why?

ME: Besides...we can introduce Occham's Razor into the proceedings: the simplest explanation that addresses all observed phenomena is most likely the accurate one. (This is not to say that other explanations aren't possible--just that they're less probable.)

Hence, an explanation of some common "morals" of the world's people can be explained with their need to live in groups peacefully (safety in numbers). Postulating a god to explain something this simple unnecessarily complicates the whole shebang. As a matter of fact, postulating a god to explain anything you don't understand invariably introduces more problems than it presumes to solve.

(I expect him to register here and post soon. He seems to think C. S. Lewis makes a good argument. Any takers?)

d

jlowder

Hi Diana,

You may want to let your friend know that Lewis received a book-length critique by John Beversluis. Beversluis's refutation included a refutation of Lewis' attempts to use morality to provde God. Here is the bibliographic citation:

Beversluis, John. C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmanns, 1985), pp. 58-83.

This is very weak. On the assumption that theism is true, I agree that the existence of God can explain our sense of right and wrong. But on the assumption that God does not exist, it doesn't follow that our sense of right and wrong cannot be explained. All that follows is that our sense of right and wrong cannot be explained by appealing to God. As it turns out, there is a good Darwinian explanation for our moral sense, an explanation that is fully compatible with the nonexistence of God. On the assumption that evolution is true, we would expect human beings to have an intuitive sense of moral right and wrong. Such an evolved moral sense would increase genetic fitness, since humans are by nature social animals and a moral sense would foster cooperation among humans. Therefore, it seems to me that our sense of right and wrong can be explained with or without God. Everything else held equal, I see no reason to believe that the God explanation should be preferred over the Darwinain explanation.

(See Larry Arnhart's Darwinian Natural Right for more discussion on our evolved moral sense.)

Any statement that says some action A is morally wrong points towards a belief in moral realism. (In other words, ordinary language points against the view that morality is subjective, where some action like murder could be "wrong for you" but "okay for me.") But moral realism does not point towards a supernatural source, and moral realism does not mean there are moral absolutes (moral principles that have no exceptions). For example, it may be the case that murder is objectively morally wrong, but there may be objective exceptions to the prohibition of murder.

I hope this provides some help.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

Aethari

I think a lot of things can be said here...his argument for objective morality seems pitiably weak. My thoughts:

While I agree that your points 1 and 2 are fairly valid, and that he doesn't fully address the problems raised by them, they struck me as being unnecessarily defensive. Agreed, we can blunt his argument by trying to invalidate the premises, but it seems stronger yet to even grant the premises, and draw a radically different, and much more believable conclusion.

However, before I address that, I think your point #1 could be rewritten to be slightly stronger. I would disagree with your first point as it is stated, because I think all societes agree on at least one general moral precept- it is wrong to cause unwarrented harm (or death). At least so far as I know anthropology, there are not, and have never been any societies which advocate sadism. Cultures that promote a seemingly more 'barbaric' or 'violent' moral system still seem to hold to this general principle of not harming without just cause. Whether this cause is the will of a god, a criminal offense, or anything else, this is unrelated. What pertains is that all suffering that is prescribed is the result of some reason beyond 'the thrill of it'.

Now, onto the real meat. I honestly think that the very best that he, or Lewis, could do is to accept my reformulated point from the preceding paragraph. On reflection, at least, I can think of no part of 'universal' human morality that is not some extrapolation of 'Harm not without Just Cause'. (I would certainly be interested in any attempt contrary to this.) Assuming we grant my principle, for this post labelled as P1, we can begin to construct a much more satisfying conclusion to explain P1.

On one hand, we have the hypothesis of Objective Morality, HOM, which states that P1 exists because a transcendant, universal, and eternal moral truth exists. There are problems with HOM from the onset, because we immediately have to question if there IS a trascendant reality, and HOW this universal truth is sustained. Is is an idea in the mind of God? Is it a universal constant like the physical constants? Or what?

While HOM does explain our P1, it does so with an appeal to unprovable and untestable supernatural elements and more than a fair share of metaphysics. (Which would all have to be proven/fleshed out/defined before HOM had any validity.) I think we can create a better hypothesis to explain P1, and I would do so in the hypothesis of Innate Morality, or IM.

Subjectivists argue that morality is decided by the invididual (they deny P1, presumably), and Objectivists will argue that morality is a universal as stated in HOM. IM takes a middle road, and argues that all universal morality is not a product of a transcendant truth, but rather our physiological makeup. (Subjectivists, of course, will deny P1, but that seems to be quite difficult from how I see things.)

I would argue, on IM, that P1 is true because of our genetic/neurochemical makeup combined with our fairly high-level intelligence. One way of arguing IM would be to try the following:

-All humans have felt pain
-(Sane) Humans never preform any action without some justification. (Be it rational, emotional, impulsive.)
-Humans realize that pain is worse than the denial of impulsive/emotional elements, and hence condemn harm without a rational cause.

Or perhaps on a different tack:

-Human genetics works in a way that discourages the aggressive destruction of one's own kind. (Obviously this trait would be selected against.)
-Human intelligence extrapolates that harm should also not be brought against other life forms and inanimate systems, because they recognize harming humans as essentially 'wrong'.

Now, both of these are somewhat hasty and broad attempts (yes, it is way too late here), but I think you should get the general idea. IM creates a purely naturalistic explanation for P1, and we have seen (in miracles, for example), that naturalistic explanations are always more rationally justified than supernaturalistic ones. See Hume's argument against miracles, Ockham's Razor...etc. As cognitive and genetic science advances, I think we will see a LOT more about exactly why we think and feel as we do. IM is not scientific fact because of where cognitive science currently stands, but it seems that most formulations of IM (such as presented above), are still preferable to HOM. In the case of HOM, we have transcedental truths being sustained in an abstract and unproven reality via untestable and unknown means. In IM, we have theories, psychological data, and biological information which points to a naturalistic explanation whose exact nature has not yet been confirmed. Take your pick. On a note, I feel IM becomes even more attractive because it provides a reasonable explanation for psychopaths and homicidals. If P1 is resultant from biological systems, a malfunction in said system would explain psychopathic behaviour. However, HOM fails to explain why a tiny minority of humanity fails to agree with P1. Are their 'transcendant-truth-antennae' out of whack? I've always questioned these universals on the grounds that there is never a decent explanation for people who 'fail' to percieve universals. And of course, explanations like 'the Devil make them do it' are wholly unsatisfactory, and only serve to make HOM that much more an ad hoc moral hypothesis.

If the proponent of HOM denies P1, they are obviously without a boat to sail on. If they accept P1, HOM always fails against a reasonable construction of IM. I'm sure my argument could be tweaked a great deal, and probably made far more coherent than my 12:15am blathering, but I think what I wrote suffices to convey my point.

Please forgive any spelling/grammar, I'll check it when I'm sufficiently awake.

-Aethari

[ October 20, 2002: Message edited by: Aethari ]</p>

jlowder

You have confused moral objectivism with some sort of platonic approach to ethics. The "hypothesis of objective morality," as you put it, does not require a "transcendent reality." All it requires is that moral principles are true or false independently of opinion. That's it. There's no appeal to supernatural entitities, Platonic forms or non-natural entities.

As John F. Post writes in his book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0801419689/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">The Faces of Existence</a>, "the mere fact of widespread moral disagreement does not by itself imply that there are no objective values about which to disagree, any more than disagreement in science implies that there really is no truth of the matter there."

In his book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0791436942/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">Darwinian Natural Right</a>, Larry Arnhart lists four sources of moral disagreement:

<a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/" target="_blank">Quentin Smith</a>, in his book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0300062125/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">Ethical and Religious Thought</a> responds to the argument from ethical disagreement as follows:

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ October 20, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

Vorkosigan

I don't agree with either of Smith's points, but don't want to start a debate here. In any case, Pomp and I covered CS Lewis in a big way back in March.

<a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000067&p=" target="_blank">Mere Christinanity</a> and <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000078&p=" target="_blank">The Problem of Pain</a>

There most of your friend's questions get addressed. Why don't you invite him here?

Vorkosigan

diana

I did, Vork. There's a 24-hour wait period (plus he's en route to Alaska at the moment). He'll be with us as oon as he gets settled in there (a couple of days, I suspect).

One of my main reasons for bringing the discussion here was because I remember seeing a couple of in-depth threads on Lewis and didn't want to reinvent the wheel.

Thanks for the links!

d

Aethari

jlowder-

Thanks for the reply, but I'm still somewhat in the dark as to what you mean. Perhaps I was unclear (which is quite possible, considering when I wrote that), but I was referring to Lewis' conception of objective morality when I used HOM. Perhaps I should clarify I a few more things, forgive me if I was somewhat muddled in the original post.

First, I would not argue that what I called IM is an objective morality, because I would say that it is only true because in this case we are of the opinion that what is instinctual = what is moral. I would further argue that no physical system, be it genetics or neurochemistry, can impose any objective morality upon the universe. As far as any naturalistic impulse towards a certain action exists, it does not create some objective dictate of right and wrong. We choose some instincts to perserve as moral, and choose others to degrade as immoral. No physical system can possibly generate an objective morality, since our moral interpretation of any system is wholly a matter of opinion and custom.

This leads to what I perhaps did not say strongly enough in my earlier post: any attempt at objective morality seems to require a supernatural reality. As I argued above, no objective morality is going to stem from a physical system, it seems the only way to have an objective moral truth exist is to place it in some sort of supernatural realm of ideas. If you agree that an objective truth can't originate from any given collection of matter, it seems necessary to post a supernatural reality, or else there is simply no-where for the morality to go. The questions are, as I think I mentioned in my earlier post: How does this morality exist? What sustains it?

This seems reasonable enough to me...where am I going wrong here? I can't see how an objective moral scheme could originate from anything but a Platonic scheme of ideas and truth.

-Aethari

jlowder

I agree, and I did not suggest otherwise. I was simply responding to your comments about our sense of right and wrong.

Well, I think you are asking excellent questions that are absolutely fundamental in moral philosophy. But, just so you know, there is a large group of nontheistic moral philosophers who hold precisely the view that you say they cannot: there are a large number of nontheistic moral philosophers who are moral objectivists. I don't mention this as an appeal to authority, but just so that you aware of it.

I think the reason you cannot "see how an objective moral scheme could originate from anything but a Platonic scheme of ideas and truth" is that you have misunderstood what it means for morality to be objective. (And, by the way, I think you are also confused about Platonism. Platonic != supernatural.) As nontheist John Post writes in his <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0801419689/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">textbook on metaphysics</a>,

And elsewhere, Post writes:

Thus, objectivism in ethics no more requires an appeal to myserious Platonic entities than objectivism in science.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

Aethari

jlowder-

That helps!

That makes the term 'objective' much clearer than it was before. I hadn't considered objectivity in such a sense before, and that certainly clarifies what you were saying earlier.

However, I don't see how that follows. I can't see any possible movement from physical constants to 'thou shalt strike the olde lady with a bus.' More after the next quote.

This still seems iffy to me. It is one thing to say that 'the atom has property X' based upon observations of said atom, but it seems entirely different to say 'the atom ought do X' based upon observation.

It feels to me that Post is putting far too much trust in the explanatory power of 'natural fact'. I still cannot see how any physical data can translate into a moral dictate, because there is no recognizable and objective way for moving from normative observations (science), to prescriptive truths (morality).

Perhaps this is the crux of my question. What process can anyone use to discover an objective moral truth embedded in physical data, without ruining the objectivity of the process? No interpretation seems, (to me), to hold any more validity than the other. One philosopher might interpret data X to reach dicate Y, and one might interpret X to reach Z (or ~Y)...can there ever be a preference between the two, assuming that neither side rests on fallacious reasoning? Arguing that 'what is natural is moral' seems to have no greater an a priori desirability than arguing that 'what is natural is not moral'.

Perhaps this can be taken even further: how could we objectively interpret any collection of information of data to reach moral truths, barring the existence of a 'higher power'? Now that you've clarified definitions, what I'm saying seems to make a bit more sense (to me, at least). I'm no longer arguing that an objective moral scheme requires a supernatural realm, but that we can never be guarenteed an objective interpretation without such a thing. The difference is between a moral truth existing, and us accurately knowing said moral truth. Am I making sense?

How do philosophers like Post have any assurance that their natural moral codes are not essentially subjective interpretations? Barring an extreme view that morality can be obtained in a logical argument from physical data (or does such an argument exist?), what process is used to 'extract' moral truths from an essentially normative set of information? In essence, it seems that subjective interpretation techniques damn any attempt at deriving objective morality from a non-authoritative source (such as a god).

I hope I'm not bogging you down in questions

-Aethari

[ October 21, 2002: Message edited by: Aethari ]</p>

jlowder

I wrote:

Aethari replied:

I'll attempt to answer this, and save the remaining questions until you are satisfied with the answer to this one.

John Post explains the concept of determination as follows: "When we say one thing determines another, we mean that given the way the first is, there is one and only one way the second can be." Post says that the following principle is true:

Thus, moral properties supervene on natural properties in the sense that nothing can differ in its moral properties without differing also in its natural properties. That is what Post means when he says that moral properties are determined by natural fact.

Jeffery Jay Lowder