lpetrich

Over in Formal Debates and Discussions, of course. My comments on the latest round of debate:

I wish to first comment on Andrew_theist's comment about his worldview including the belief that miracles "occasionally" occur. This seems to me to be a convenient escape hatch, because the rarity hypothesis can make the hypothesis of their occurrence difficult to falsify. If I claimed that I had teleported myself into your home, but that I did it only a few times during the past decade, and only very briefly, it would be difficult for you to falsify that assertion.

As Richard Carrier has noted in "Why I Don't Buy the Resurrection" and other places, miracles don't happen the way they used to, judging from the reports of them, an interesting fact already apparent in the eighteenth century. Why have miracles become much more rare, if not nonexistent?

I wonder how many pagan deities fit in, because they are often depicted as having origins, even if those origins are at the beginning of everything else. And pagan religions are much older than Xtianity.

Andrew_theist mentions the origin of the Big Bang as a serious unknown in modern science. I actually agree with that assessment, since Hawking's Singularity Theorems and physically-reasonable equations of state lead to a quantum-gravity epoch, and quantum gravity is still a great unknown. I have not followed Stephen Hawking's work on this problem very much, because I think that we need a more complete picture of quantum gravity than what he has been working with.

However, that argument is another version of the "God of the Gaps" argument. And furthermore, what kind of deity could one reasonably deduce from this? One who likes to create Universes just for the fun of it? I remember from my childhood that I would blow soap bubbles and be fascinated by pillbugs; perhaps that has predisposed me to consider such hypotheses.

Andrew_theist quotes Hugh Ross on the amount of helium coming out exactly right, and that too little or too much would be bad. Too much would mean too little hydrogen, which might certainly be bad, but too little is actually no real disaster -- stars can form helium in their cores, as the Sun does.

As to the knife-edge of expansion rate, that's what's led to the "inflation" hypothesis, that the Universe got flattened out by an early phase of exponential expansion. But whether the necessary elementary particle field exists is another question; in all likelihood, its mass is a GUT-scale mass, making it too large to be accessible in any feasible experiment.

As to Frank Tipler claiming to have demonstrated "the central claims of Judeo-Christian theology", he is being very selective about that theology, because he's disqualified its more fundamentalist versions at the start.

I'm not sure what to say about MadMax's response other than to express broad agreement with it; I might end up picking nits in his response, however.

lpetrich

I'll now take on the March 9 round:

I can't find much to quarrel with in MadMax's statement, other than to note that many people have claimed to have directly perceived various supernatural/non-natural entities -- gods, angels, demons, devils, saints, ghosts, etc.

In fact, Metacrock seems to be claiming the same thing -- that we have some sense that enables us to directly perceive the Metacrockian God.

And worldviews derived from mystical experiences sometimes treat such experiences as the only true perceptions and all other perceptions as essentially hallucinations. See, for example, Mark Vuletic's discussion of the Yoga-Patanjali and the Cloud of Unknowing.

However, the claim that a direct perception is supernatural may still fit into MadMax's view that such claims are made on the basis of a supposed lack an explanation in terms of natural laws.

Now to Andrew's statement. I have more to quarrel with, of course.

Andrew says: "Max has become a victim of the mindset of naturalism, that if there is a deity it must be something we can explain and whose properties can be analyzed." Which seems to me like changing the rules in the middle of the game.

He also claims that "the success of naturalism is predicted by theism", which I believe to be a gigantic non sequitur. The idea that some superbeing had designed the Universe implies nothing about its "design", because that premise does not give any hint as to what design that being had chosen -- that being could have chosen *anything*.

He claims that "... the wide acceptance of evolution was due to the acceptance of naturalism as properly defined. " as if there aren't other reasons for accepting that evolution has happened.

He tries to drag in the question of free will, but I don't see what that proves. He continues with

If naturalism is true as William Lane Craig puts it we,

are just accidental by-products of nature which have evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal speck of dust lost somewhere in a hostile and mindless universe and which are doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time.

This is not a necessary part of metaphysical naturalism, but just a description of the Universe in which we live. If the Universe had some very different natural laws, we could have existed as long as the Universe has, we could find essentially all the Universe easily habitable, and we could live forever if we want to. Natural laws that make this happen may have to be very strange natural laws, but I don't see how such natural laws would be impossible.

Furthermore, a creator that is responsible only for the Universe's natural laws and for starting it off had clearly produced exactly the sort of Universe that Mr. Craig had griped about. So the hypothesis of such a creator (or creators!) is of little help here.

And finally, I ask once again, how would the decrees of a deity be objective morality?

Vorkosigan

The problem, though, is that Andrew thinks he is making an argument, whereas all he is doing is bellyaching about naturalism. I think somewhere in his heart he thinks everyone got up one morning, about 1860 or so, and decided that naturalism was the only way to go. Andrew seems unaware that methodological naturalism was invented by theists....

I looked over the debate and found little, actually to respond to in Andrew's post. After all, all you can really say to grumbling is either "That's too bad" or "buck up, mate!" Madmax has my sympathies. I hope Bede takes Andrew under he wing and teaches a him a little about science.

Michael

madmax2976

Well, the debate is over. In retrospect, I thought the format of the debate a bit awkward. I'm more used to a post-response type format (reading them) rather than the simultaneous posting method that we used.

While its true that someone will "get the last word" with that type format, it seems a little easier to keep on track with the issues.

As this was my first formal debate, I'd be interested in hearing any critiques of the debate.

I might address some of Andrew's last comments here as well, since I think he is very confused about several issues. Hopefully that won't be breaking any formal debate rules.

lpetrich

My comments on the second round:

Andrew's viewpoint reminds me of how paranormalists' powers have a tendency to disappear when skeptics are present. He feels compelled to argue that miracles are extremely rare, as if the hypothesis of their occurrence cannot hold up under scrutiny in the vast majority of cases.

Furthermore, his hypothesis is contrary to views that were common in most previous centuries; histories of past centuries would often feature miracles. However, as David Hume and Richard Carrier have noted, why have miracles stopped happening over recent centuries? Where are those who work the sort of miracles that many medieval saints had worked? Which present-day wars have featured the sort of divine intervention that the Iliad had described for the Trojan War?

The same way that the divine-origin theory of lightning is considered unscientific. Lightning has the properties of a giant electric spark; so if every lightning strike is a divine act, then each and every bolt of lightning was carefully made to seem like a giant electric spark.

Actually, there is a kind of "designer" of life that is completely consistent with metaphysical naturalism: extraterrestrial visitors, perhaps time-traveling ones. However, we haven't found any fossilized spaceships or genetic-engineering laboratories, at least not yet.

In effect, a form of "theism" where the creator hides after creating a Universe that runs according to natural laws, thus inducing us to become convinced of metaphysical naturalism. This is something like the Philip Gosse Omphalos created-appearance hypothesis, which states that the Universe is only about 6000 years old, as the Bible indicates, but that it was created with the appearance of much greater age.

It's no more circular reasoning than rejection of the Omphalos hypothesis is.

Also, if the Universe was created by some intelligent superbeing, it could just as well have been created by Tootchko the Magnificent, who likes creating Universes just for the heck of it, in the fashion that I had blown soap bubbles when I was a child. I remember being fascinated by the bubbles' iridescent colors, and I remember how the fading of a bubble's colors would be followed by its popping.

I suspect, however, that Andrew will have great difficulty thinking outside of the box of his theological beliefs and considering either extraterrestrial visitors or the Tootchko hypothesis.

I don't have much to say about MadMax's comments, however.

madmax2976

Now that the debate is over, I’m going to respond to Drew’s concluding statement. I don’t want to let his severe confusion of the issues go without a response.

First I will accept Drew’s virtual handshake offer from his last post. I would have included some personal remarks, but I was so pressed for space it just didn’t happen.

Now lets deal with Drew’s comments from his last post.

<strong> Here Drew essentially concurs with the superior probability of naturalistic answers for phenomena – “supernatural intervention is rare at best”, and we are to evaluate “from the perspective of natural mechanistic causes first”. This all sounds great. Now what we need from Drew is precise criteria which tells us when he considers it no longer appropriate to look for naturalistic causes and why others (scientists) should adopt this criteria as well.

Its important that this criteria clarify why scientists are simply being wrong-headed by assuming a naturalistic answer will be found even though they don’t know such an answer will be found. If its just a matter of a supernatural answer being possible, this obviously won’t be sufficient since practically anything is possible.

<strong> The problem is that there are no real “theories” regarding intelligent design. There is only speculation and conjecture. How could such speculations be considered scientific being that they are, so far, completely untestable and unverifiable? What evidence has been presented as to how this intelligent design was to have taken place? What evidence is there to indicate the method by which this design was implemented? What is the evidence for the existence of the supposed intelligence itself? What is the distinction between intelligent design and natural design? What are the demonstrated limits of natural design? How are the assumptions of natural design arguments – the physical constants could have been different – to be verified? How is special pleading to be avoided if it is argued the complex, intricate, intelligent designer requires no designer itself, but the universe does?

Drew’s problem is that he doesn’t understand how science operates. It is not the business of science to leap to conclusions when investigation reaches a dead end. He will see this himself if he just takes the time to provide one practical example of science doing as he proposes – just one.

<strong> Naturally. Accepting the real possibility that this “firm, unshakable faith in naturalism”, is really just a common sense assumption due to the failure of supernaturalism and the demonstrated effectiveness of naturalism would completely ruin Drew’s argument. Rather than speak directly to the issues, he attacks naturalists in regards to what he thinks their motivations “really” are. I could just as easily make arguments about the motivations of theists, but it wouldn’t be any more valid an argument than Drew’s is. Enough already with these ad hominem fallacies.

<strong>[quote
Surprisingly, the only evidence that has been raised in favor of naturalism is the success science has had by subscribing to the philosophy of naturalism. However one could just as well claim that is evidence in favor of theism. Modern theology holds that we live in a created material universe. There is nothing about the worldview of theism that suggests such effort would not be met with success.
</strong>[/quote]

This is false. I laid out 3 arguments that support the naturalistic position. Historical precedent, lack of evidence for the supernatural and the success of methodological naturalism. But notice how weird Drew’s reasoning is - The success of naturalism isn’t something that threatens his theism, rather its something that actually supports his theism. So, as naturalism continues to push the supernatural farther and farther back from the realm of probability, showing it to be “rare at best”, and thus increasing the possibility that it is even non-existent, somehow, this is actually supporting the case for the supernatural. The mind boggles at such logic.

<strong> Incorrect. Science has demonstrated its superiority over supernaturalism so often, it is assumed that for any mysterious phenomena there is a naturalistic explanation. If evidence can be presented to counter the overwhelming data that supports such an assumption, then Drew should stop complaining and present it.

<strong> Time for reasoning 101. We are given some phenomena X. We attempt to investigate X in order to understand and learn the truth about it. We accumulate as much evidence as we are able but unfortunately our evidence is insufficient to reach any definitive conclusion. What are our options?

1. Withhold judgment until more evidence comes in. A completely respectable, honest position to take. If you don’t know, admit that you don’t know and move on.

2. Admit that you don’t know the answer to the questions regarding X, but hypothesize as to where the answers will most likely lie based on the evidence that you do have.

3. Disregard the fact that you don’t know, forget about precedent, ignore the strength or weakness of the evidence, and leap to a conclusion.

I put myself in the camps of #1 and #2. It has been my experience that most theists fall into option #3, though it seems quite illogical to do so. Drew might categorize himself as following option #2, so lets give him the benefit of a doubt and assume for a moment that he does. If so, his entire diatribe against naturalists becomes null and void – that is unless he wishes to set up another double standard whereby theists can hypothesize where the answers to certain questions may lie but naturalists can’t.

Drew seems to continually forget in his rallies against naturalism that this all about which is most likely: naturalism or theism. Naturalists don’t conclude a naturalistic answer for mystery’s, but they do consider the probabilities for where the answers will most likely be found. It may be that Drew disagrees with what naturalists would consider most probable, which is perfectly fine, but that hardly warrants the completely false description he gives above of how naturalists operate.

What I think Drew, like most theists, wishes to avoid is having to actually demonstrate that any theistic hypothesis is more likely than other non-theistic hypotheses. In order to do so, rather than just attack naturalism, he will have to actually provide positive evidence in favor of his position. This evidence will have to show theistic assumptions of a supernatural answer more likely than naturalistic assumptions for a naturalistic answer. As I have argued, and as Drew has even admitted, there are valid reasons to take the latter position rather than the former.

<strong> No kidding. That’s what our debate was about – the preference for one explanation over another – and why. I have pointed out glaring holes in Drew’s “evidence to the contrary”. Until he plugs them, his arguments cannot stand up. (more on this below)

<strong> I know what Drew is suggesting, I just haven’t seen him effectively argue for why I or anyone else should hold to his conclusion. He has completely failed to demonstrate why his “model” is superior although he seems able to assert that it is. That is where the crux of this debate lies, not in his opinion of naturalists motivations.

<strong> Incorrect. I presented overwhelming evidence that favors naturalistic assumptions over supernaturalistic ones when faced with otherwise inexplicable phenomena. Drew has even concurred that naturalistic answers are more probable, yet he has failed to lay out any criteria for when naturalistic assumptions should be abandoned in favor of supernaturalistic assumptions.

Furthermore, I completely disagree that Drew’s supernatural hypotheses offer any explanation at all. All he has done is point out a potential mystery and invoked a deity because he is unable to actually explain some phenomena. He position is no different than that of the many ancient people that have come before him, invoking deities whenever they were unable to actually explain something like the weather, lightning, or disease.

<strong> Typical. I ask Drew to defend his argument that the physical constants could have been different than they are, but instead he demands that I defend the possibility that they couldn’t have been otherwise. This is called the shifting of burden fallacy. It is Drew that attempted to argue from this point, not I, and thus it is he who is required to support it and demonstrate that it is not because of his own “bias and personal preference” that he assumes this premise is true. All I have done, and all I am required to do, is point out very real weakness that must be addressed before the conclusion of the argument can be considered valid.
(This is philosophy 101. )

Drew may not like the idea of having to support the premises for any argument he makes, but that’s irrelevant. With any argument offered there are premises and a conclusion. It is up to person offering the argument to support the premises they believe leads to the conclusion. If someone can point out that one or more of the premises is unsupported or unverifiable, then this exposes a glaring whole in the argument. Drew cannot verify the premise of his argument - he has not even attempted to support that it is more likely than the possibility I offered. Thus his argument fails.

<strong> More attempt at ad hominem. I could lodge similar accusations against Drew. He doesn’t want to find the truth, but rather has a deep seated belief that his deity exists and will bend and twist whatever evidence or arguments are available in order have everyone else believe it as well. – Of course I know better than to argue this way

<strong> This is terrible. I presented evidence that overwhelmingly supports naturalism and naturalistic assumptions over supernaturalistic assumptions – particularly when faced with a mystery. Drew has even admitted that naturalistic answers are more likely and that the supernatural is “rare at best”. Just how rare it is, he has not qualified, but the evidence supporting naturalism gives us plenty of reason to believe it is so rare as to be non-existent.

Drew’s arguments from Design and First Cause contain serious weaknesses, which refute his belief that he has presented evidence “contrary” to naturalism. He has not laid out any criteria for determining when naturalistic assumptions should be abandoned in favor of supernaturalistic assumptions. He has presented no direct evidence that supernatural entities or forces even exist. He has been unable to provide any precedent for believing that supernatural explanations have ever triumphed over naturalistic ones.

In short his case has been woefully inadequate for the task at hand and he will have to do far better to support it.

Andrew_theist

To lpetrich and all,

In many years of debating and discussing this issue with atheists, agnostics and skeptics it has always been on an uneven playing field. The idea being that they merely had a lack of belief and theists were making a claim therefore they alone had the onus of proof. By framing the question in such a fashion they have the advantage of merely raising objections and a little hand waving to theism and all is well. In the thread ‘what will it take’ I pressed the issue further about what it would really take to convince someone of the merit of theism. One person commented that even if someone were decapitated and suddenly healed this could still be a natural event at the hand of unseen aliens.

This lead to my conclusion I have been fostering a long time. That for many, maybe most atheists that it is not so much a lack of belief in theism as it is an unshakable, unmovable conviction in the truth of naturalism that is the real issue at hand. Now the discussion can be argued on an even keel. I admire and appreciate Max for being willing to argue this on a level playing field. I think Max can attest it is much more difficult to argue two competing belief systems than merely defending a ‘lack of belief’. I think lpetrich believes he can do the same thing, offer a few objections and assume all should believe in naturalism as an act of faith. I think when the two belief systems compete toe to toe it is obvious that theism has much more reason to think it is true.

To Max,

As much as you would like to continue the debate the fact is you had the same rules and conditions and length of time to respond as I did. I'll respond more once the judges have cast their lot.

For sprited but friendly discussion Please visit <a href="http://pub22.ezboard.com/bgwnn" target="_blank">Challenging Atheism</a>

madmax2976

To my knowledge there was no rule set forth which characterized it as inappropriate or forbid either of us to discuss the issues further once our debate was concluded. As a matter of fact, I was under the impression that this was one purpose for this particular thread.

Perhaps the moderators can chime in here and resolve any perceived improprieties there might be. I will abide by whatever they think appropriate. Unless they deem my continuation of the discussion as inappropriate, either with Andrew or anyone else, I see no reason to discontinue.

Vorkosigan

One person commented that even if someone were decapitated and suddenly healed this could still be a natural event at the hand of unseen aliens.

That's right. You offered no protocol to help us distinguish whether the event was caused by a supernatural power, a psychic power, or naturalistic means not yet understood. That's the point I was making. If we were to see something of this nature, how would we know the source of the "miracle?" It's been months now and you have never supplied an answer, just more affirmations of your ironclad, ignorant beliefs. So give me the protocol for distinguishing "natural" events from "supernatural" ones, Andrew.

I am unsurprised that you mention this. It is pretty clear, Andrew, that you do not understand the issues at all. Consider this comment:

I think Max can attest it is much more difficult to argue two competing belief systems than merely defending a "lack of belief".

Andrew, atheism is not a belief system. You've had this explained to you about a hundred times, so it is difficult for me to believe you can't understand it. Atheists can be Confucians, Buddhists, pantheists, total skeptics, and many other things besides. Besides atheism, what do these groups have in common? You have confused atheism with metaphysical naturalism. All metaphysical naturalists are atheists, but not all atheists are metaphysical naturalists. Many atheists -- like my Buddhist wife, for example -- believe in the supernatural. My wife is an atheist who thinks naturalism is a stupid idea. How do you account for her in this erroneous "atheism-is-a-belief-system" idea you keep spouting?

The reason it is difficult to "debate" this with you is that you keep confusing methodological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism, and atheism. They are three different things.

• methodological naturalism is an assumption made by scientists when they do their work. It is a posture for critical examination of reality. Many who use methodological naturalism in their scientific work are not atheists. Many who use methodological naturalism in their scientific do not believe in metaphysical naturalism. Many scientists believe in god(s), and many atheist scientists believe in psychic powers.
• metaphysical naturalism is the belief that there are no supernatural powers and that reality at all times operates under physical laws. Note that this is a limited philosophical position, not a belief system. Metaphysical naturalists can be moral relativists or moral objectivists, Communists or neoliberals or Rand-ites, or many other things besides.
• atheism is simply the belief that there are no gods. Atheists do not share any other traits other than that. There is no "system of atheism." The idea you are arguing against, Andrew, is a creation of your own mind. The difficulty stems from having to educate you, not from arguing with you.

You seem unwilling to do the kind of reading you would need to understand these ideas. At this point I do not know what to do, except keep explaining. Ignorance can be cured, but deliberate deafness can only be waited out.

Michael

[ March 13, 2002: Message edited by: turtonm ]</p>

Vorkosigan

I think when the two belief systems compete toe to toe it is obvious that theism has much more reason to think it is true.

Here's another error. Which theism? Hindu? Greek? Christian? Islamic? Sunn'i? Shi'ite? Mormon? Catholic? Shinto? Folk Taoist? Kikuyu? They're all different, you know. In order to establish the truth of your theistic belief, you must refute not only atheism, but all other theisms as well.

Michael