Zulu

Just curious: how many people here are utilitarianists? If not, what moral philosophy do you abide by [at least in theory]?

From what I gather it seems that utilitarianism is the only theory that makes any real sense. All other deontological theories seem to be driven axiomatically without reference to anything tangible. In essence, when you boil right down to it...they're either concealed forms of Utilitarianism or completely meaningless. Alternatively, each of them could be argued for under a utilitarianistic frame of mind.

Am I stating the obvious or am I way off track? It seems like even several esteemed ethicists don't seem to get this point right. They argue incessantly about slavery being potentially compatible with utilitarianism which they claim immediately discredits it. However, if you reason through it, wouldn't this imply that either slavery isn't all that bad or that it is a necessity in the current situation? I can't think of anyway to refute utilitarianism--it seems to be true almost by definition. It's almost a logical proposition. Sort of akin to saying that we only do things which we percieve as being good--the alternative just doesn't make sense.

Any thoughts?

Also, for the utilitarianists here: what type of utilitarianism do you adhere to? What do you make of potential happiness? What are your thoughts on negative utilitarianism as opposite to classical and preference utilitarianism?

Cheers!

-Zulu

Alonzo Fyfe

I would end up being categorized as a type of "desire utilitarian".

You can find some of the specifics of my defense of utilitarianism in Part VII and Part VIII in the Ethics Without God series that I am posting.

99Percent

The immediate problem that I see with utilitarianism, is who determines what is good or bad? I think only the individual can determine it and that means there can be no meaningful utilitarianism on a societal level.

Dr. Retard

I think this criticism of deontology won't fly. Utilitarianism has the same problem (if it is indeed a problem).

Deontologists say that certain actions are, independent of their consequences, right. "Action A is right" is a morally primitive statement, one that cannot be explained further in terms of other moral concepts, or derived from some more fundamental moral principle.

Utilitarians say that certain states of affairs (the realization of pleasure, or the satisfaction of a desire) are good. "State of affair S is good" is a morally primitive statement, likewise.

Both are putting their foot down somewhere. Deontologists when it comes to actions, utilitarians when it comes to states of affairs.

Dr. Retard

99% said:
I think utilitarianism says no one determines what is good or bad. For example, a hedonic utilitarian would say pleasure is good and pain is bad. The end. No one determines that fact. It's just a fact.

VivaHedone

I'm broadly utilitarian. Where I struggle, however, is when utilitarianism comes up against the rights of an individual. If abusing the rights of one individual would lead to greater happiness for others, would that be right? And to what extent?

Zulu

Alonzo,

What is a desire utilitarian? I'll have a look at the page a bit later on... seems interesting at first glance.

99percent,

I agree that utilitarianism doesn't necessarily work at the societal level. At least not if expressed explicitily [as Sidgwick pointed out]. But on some level, all policies are utilitarian in nature, anyway.

Dr. Retard,

It is a problem and I don't think Utilitarianism has it. Utilitarianism refers back to something tangible: happiness and pain [albeit subjective in some cases, but that's beside the point]. Deontological ethics refer back to abstract principles which are in essence meaningless. Why is one better than the other?

But deontologists don't refer to happiness while Utilitarianism does. If a deontological ethic leads to an overall loss in happiness how can it be defended?? What vague principles can supercede happiness unless they make an indirict or implicit reference to happiness?

It would be right, because an overall greater happiness would be achieved. However if the rights are so strongly infringed then perhaps taking them away would come at too large a price.

Taking someone's life [innocent or not] to save the world would be justified.

Taking away someone's right to alcohol because you might prevent an injury to someone is not justified because it sets a negative precedent...the result of which would result in more unhappiness than had you taken action.

Utilitarianism just doesn't have any theoretical flaws. It cannot be defeated, insofar as I can tell. Of course, I'm open to any good counter arguments.

-Zulu

Edit: I suppose a strong case could be made for rejecting practically applied Utilitarianism. However, this doesn't reject it in theory.

Dr. Retard

I don't agree. Say utilitarianism refers back to pleasure and pain; it says that these tangible things bear moral qualities.

Deontology also refers back to tangible things: actions. It says that this action is right, and that action is wrong. These tangible things bear moral qualities.

Both appeal to abstract principles: "Pleasure is good" or "Action A is right".

Zulu

But why would actions be intrinsically morally linked?

I see your point, and I have to concede that both Utilitarianism and Deontology are essentially axiomatic in nature. It seems to me however that happiness/pain is much more morally significant than actions. Actions are only significant insofar as they affect happiness.

The way deontology can be defeated is by being taken individually and addressing flaws in it. Suppose a deontological philosophy suggests that we should never infringe upon liberties except when those liberties infringe on those of others. This obviously means that killing innocents is wrong. How would this person feel if we had to kill 1 person to save 10 000? My feeling is that at some fundamental level we are all utilitarians. Deontology, to draw a parallel, is much the same as solipsism--nobody truly believes in it.

Cheers,

-Zulu

Alonzo Fyfe

Generally speaking, a desire utilitarian holds that the "right act" is that act which is motivated by "good desires", and "good desires" are those desires which tend to have the best consequences.

The specific version of desire utilitarianism that I defend holds that all value that exists describes relationships between states of affairs and desire. Intrinsic value does not exist. Desire-dependent value is the only type of value that exists. A desire is good to the degree that the desire tends to cause actions that fulfills desires generally -- such as a desire to help others. A desire is bad to the degree that the desire tends to cause actions that thwarts the fulfillment of desires generally, such as a desire to rape or kill.


This is a poorly formed question. It assumes that what is good or bad is a matter to be decided. In fact, it is a matter to be discovered. As with all discovery, people will disagree.

The only value that exists describes a relationship between a state of affairs and a desire. And desires exist in the minds of individuals. But, as an individual, my mind is not the only mind that exists. There are other minds, that contain other desires, and those other desires are knowable. I can know about the values that exist independent of my own desires. The substance of these values that exist are not decided upon by me, they exist out there to be discovered in just the same way that other people with other minds exist out there to be discovered.


With respect to many types of utilitarianism, your objection is quite sound. All deontological theories, and most utilitarian theories, require that intrinsic values exist. For the deontologist, this intrinsic value resides in right action. For the utilitarian, it resides in ultimate consequences (e.g., pleasure, happiness, life.)

If intrinsic values do not exist, this eliminates all forms of deontological ethics and those forms of utilitarianism that depend on intrinsic value.

There is also a form of desire utilitarianism that says that desire fulfillment has intrinsic value. But, it is not a necessary component of desire utilitarinism. All that is required is that all human action is motivated by desire. This does not mean that desire fulfillment is the END of human action. Rather, the END of human action is to realize the object of a desire.

A desire is a propositional attitude -- a description of the structure of a person's brain that can be expressed in the general form A desires that P, where P is a proposition such as "my child is well of" or "Jennifer is having sex with me" or "the spotted owls are not in danger of extinction."

A person with a desire that P tends to act in such a way to make P true (or remain true), with that tendancy dependent on the strength of the desire. The end of human action is not in something like "My desire that Jennifer is having sex with me is fulfilled." Rather, it is in something like "Jenniver is having sex with me," where the tendency to pursue this end is coded in the brain as a desire.

All values are desire dependent. For all P, P has value if and only if -- and only in sofar as, somebody (or something) somewhere has a desire that P (or, in the case of instrumental value, if P is useful in bringing about Q, and somebody, somewhere, has a desire that Q).

Actions have value only insofar as the actions are themselves desired, or the action is useful in bringing about a state of affairs that is desired. But actions must be caused. It is nonsense to say that a person "ought to have done otherwise" but not to say that the person "ought not to have had those desires that would have caused him to do otherwise." Every statement of the form "A ought to have done otherwise" must carry with it the implication that "A ought to have wanted to have done otherwise."

So, every statement about what a person ought to have done implies a statement about what the agent ought to have wanted. And if that statement about what the person ought to have wanted is false, then the statement about what the person ought to have done is similarly false.


Then you are not a utilitarian.

By the way, the desire-utilitarian system that I describe above and am describing in more detail in the EThics Without God series I linked to above handles rights theory in a sense.

What we call a right can often be reduced to a good desire. A desire utilitarian can easily translate talk into a "right to life", for example, into a statement like "All good people (people with good desires) have an aversion to killing others." The right to liberty translates into an aversion to imposing one's will upon others by means of violence being a good thing. A right to property translates into an aversion to stealing being good.

Now, one advantage that I think desire-utilitarianism has over right theory (besides the fact that rights theory depends on intrinsic values, and intrinsic values do not exist), is that it best accounts for exceptions. Rights theories need to add epicycles upon epicycles to account for all of the exceptions and qualifications about what is right. For example, is it permissible to kill an innocent shield? Under certain circumstances, yes. Rights theory has difficulty handling this situation. Desire-utilitarian theory says that people ought to have a very strong aversion to killing the innocent, but even at this strength this aversion can at times come into conflict and be overridden by other good desires.

The fact that one has an aversion to killing the innocent is displayed by the degree to which the agent looks for other alternatives -- if he doesn't look very hard he does not care enough about avoiding harm to the innocent. And it is shown in the regret he feels and the struggle that he goes through when he is forced into such a situation where he must kill the innocent. No sighs of regret again implies a weakness in the agent's moral character.