Pomp

Alonzo,

I'm getting a little confused responding to you in two seperate threads. Maybe we should consolidate our discussion into one of them?

Again, 'real significance' has the same issues as 'ought'.

What issue is that?

The suffering of a rapist's victim might not have any significance to the rapist. But that is why we call the rapist evil. Because even though the woman's suffering does not have significance to him, it has significance to somebody.

I don't follow. You seem to be saying that, for example, if A has a reason to prefer X, but B does not have any such reason then B is "evil." Is this true in all cases, or only when A's reason is a "moral reason?"

In a society where there are some people who wish to promote good and thwart evil, it does have an effect -- it tells those people what it is they are to promote and/thwart.

But why would anyone desire to promote good or thwart evil, in the abstract? Now, I'm sure you could give us a "moral reason" to prefer to do so, but you've stated that a "moral ought" only has any effect in a society where people already desire to promote/thwart good/evil. You've got some circular reasoning there. I apologize if I've misconstrued your argument.

One gets at the meaning of moral by looking at how it is used. And one of the essential components of moral is that it is irreducibly interpersonal. This is part of the reason why I think that individual subjectivist alternatives do not work -- because they are irreducibly intrapersonal.

Subjectivist morality is not, in my view, irreducibly intrapersonal. Subjectivist moral theories deal primarily with interpersonal negotiations and agreements.

Alonzo Fyfe

Subjectivist morality is not irreducibly intrapersonal -- but individual subjectivism is. Because the only reasons that matter belong to the individual making the decision. To him or her, everybody else is simply a tool -- a thing -- whose welfare is considered relevant only insofar as they are useful, and discarded when no longer useful.

Consider, again, our thief. Let us assume that the thief is in a situation where, if he kills the innocent person who surprises him, he can get away with his crime.

Practical-ought dictates that he kill the witness.

If moral-ought is identical to practical ought, then killing the witness also become the right, noble, honorable, praiseworthy thing to do.

Which, to say the least, is a very strange way of talking.

You may want to answer that, in saying that the thief is morally wrong, I am importing my own subjective values -- my own desires.

This is false. I am not making my evaluation on any subset of desires (values) -- not just the thief's, not just the victim's, not just my own. I am making an objective determination based on all of the (subjective) reasons that exist independent of who has them.

You may then say that this moral-ought has no relevance to the thief. If he has no practical-ought reason not to kill the witness then he will kill the witness. The witness is dead. For all that this interpersonal ought accomplished it might as well not exist at all.

In this limited scope, this is true. But, in a larger scope -- in the real world made up of billions of people -- there are some who want to be 'good people' and 'do the right thing' -- if only they knew what this was. To whatever degree people have these desires and interests, interpersonal subjectivism tells them what to do.

What about the person who does not want to be 'a good person' or 'do the right thing?' Well, they can still be manipulated into acting like a good person and doing the right thing through the appropriate use of sanctions that impact the reasons they do have. If they value only their own comfort, then set up policies where failure to do the right thing will lead, as much as possible, to them finding themselves in an uncomfortable situation.

Yet, again, we only know if we are manipulating them into doing the right thing if we know what the right thing is. Interpersonal subjectivism provides a unique objective right answer to this question true for all people, considering all of their (subjective) interests.

[ March 22, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]

[ March 22, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Vorkosigan

But, basically, within the two cultures there is a disagreement as to the effects of the action. One says that there are effects which children have a reason to avoid; the other culture says that there are no such effects. The existence of these external reasons determines whether the action is moral or not.

Alonzo, all you did was rephrase my question as a statement and avoid answering it. My question has nothing to do with cultural relativism. It simply asks, given the wide variation in what is considered a "moral" act, how can you go about determining which acts are morally actionable?

Michael

Michael

Alonzo Fyfe

By determining who is right with respect to whether there exists these effects that the child has a reason to avoid.

Which is the same method that we would use to resolve a difference of opinion where one culture believes that sickness is caused by "bad air" and another believes it is caused by bacteria.

Alonzo Fyfe

PB:

I would like to add that there are always some people in a society who HAVE A REASON to promote morality.

Whereas moral judgements are based on all of the reasons that exist (regardless of who has them), and all other ought judgements (e.g., practical ought) are based on a mere subset of all of the reasons that exist,

Whereas the reasons that exist but that are being excluded by the non-moral ought judgement belong to somebody.

The 'somebody' who HAS A REASON being excluded by the nonmoral ought judgement at the same time HAS A REASON to promote the moral ought judgement over the nonmoral ought judgement.

To the degree that any society is immoral (excludes certain reasons that exist from decisions of what ought to be done), to that same degree certain people within society HAVE REASON to promote morality over the status quo.

Malaclypse the Younger

Alonzo Fyfe

This is the fundamental misunderstanding of moral subjectivism.

Practical-ought's exist objectively. However, the subjectivist does not consider them identical to moral-ought's; indeed the subjectivist by definition considers the presence or absence of practical-oughts to be entirely irrelevant to moral-oughts. It is a straw-man fallacy to conclude that he does.

To the subjectivist, moral-oughts are only by subjective values. The existence of a subjective value without regard to any practical-ought, establishes a moral-ought to that person.

Practical-ought's are just (essentially) physics. It is physically possible to mass-murder people, to kill and eat people, to torture babies. The subjectivist merely states that he has opinions about certain physically possible actions, and he is willing to act on those opinions. That's all.

To condemn instead of praise the thief or the murderer has nothing to do with whether that persons actions are or are not rational to him.

There is a difference between subjective value statements (i.e. "X is good") and objective value statements ("A believes 'X is good'" or "n% of people belive 'X is good'"). To make rational decisions based on objective value statements is a pragmatic decision, and is need not take into account whether the subjective value statements have any objective truth value.

It is clear that Jeffery Dahmer valued killing and eating people. The subjectivist simply notes that fact. It is objectively true that Dahmer held the opinion that killing and eating people was valueable. Thus Dahmer was acting rationally. Indeed, our treatment of him was consistent with this opinion: We imprisoned him as a criminal, we did not treat him for mental illness.

The ordinary subjectivist holds the opinion that it is wrong for others to kill and eat people, and is willing to coerce others to fulfill that value. There is no contradiction between these two positions; by definition, subjective opinions differ. The subjectivist does not by definition believe that Dahmer was irrational "objectively wrong", he merely holds an opinion in conflict with Dahmers, and is willing to impose that opinion by force.

Since it appears that most people hold the opinion that killing and eating people is wrong, it becomes an effective pragmatic strategy to declare the action illegal and set up an apparatus to coercively implement that opinion. If, however, the subjectivists opinion is in the minority, then it is a poor pragmatic strategy to declare the action illegal. This observation seems to conform to what actually happens in reality.

Of course. The existence of a subjective value is a reason. The existence of a subjective value offers a reason to coerce the fulfillment of that value in others. Of course, there are other, pragmatic, reasons to choose or not choose to attempt to coerce others.

I'm simply unable to understand the rest of your post.

If I have no subjective reason at all to perform an action, under what circumstances should I perform that action? Show me an example. Remember that persuading me that tne action benefits me, or that you (or others) will apply coercion if I do not perform that action are subjective reasons (presuming I subjectively value freedom from coercion) for me to perform that action, and contradict the antecedent.

[ March 22, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

I had stated in earlier posts that there are different types of moral subjectivism (and, ultimately, one type that I defend).

The problems that I listed are problems with a particular type of subjectivism called agent-subjectivism.

If you want to say that this is a fundamental misunderstanding of agent-subjectivism, please explain how.

If you want to say that this is a fundamental misunderstanding of all subjectivism, then your objection is a non sequiter, because I never claimed that it applied to all types of subjectivism.

Note: Your objections seem to be from the point of view of assessor-subjectivism, which -- I will admit -- does not reduce moral ought to practical ought the way that agent-subjectivism does.


Yes, but one cannot divorce any analysis from the content of those opinions. If a person has the opinion 'X is wrong' what, exactly, is he saying? Is he saying that 'God does not want people to do X?' Is he saying that 'X has some intrinsic property of not-to-be-doneness?' Is he saying 'X? Yuck.'

Subjectivism is saying a lot more than that X has 'an opinion.' It is saying that he has a certain, specific type of opinion. There are certain opinions that are incompatible with subjectivism entirely. And there are certain opinions that are compatible with some types of subjectivism but not others. So the content of the opinion is crucial.

It depends on what you mean by 'should'. If you mean practical-should, there is no reason why you practical-should perform the action by hypothesis. Since practical-should only considers the reasons that you have, and you stipulated that no such reason exists.

If you mean moral-should, where moral-should is based in part on reasons that exist other than your own, then you moral-should perform the action under those circumstances that all of the reasons that exist (including reasons that are not yours) suggests performing the action.

Malaclypse the Younger

Alonzo Fyfe

Ok. I'm apparently having a bit of trouble following your argument then. My apologies.

I maintain he is saying "X? Yuck". Any claim to the objective truth of "X? Yuck" seems unfounded. He may believe X has the objective property of not-to-be-doneness, but I maintain that position is unsupported, and thus fallacious.

He might also be saying "Y yum; X is an efficient way to bring about Y; X yum or X ho-hum"; but the crux of the bisquit is "Y yum" (and not X yuck). Practical-oughts (efficient) are obviously objective with regard to specific subjective moral-oughts (yum/yuck).

Of course, there are different X predicates. For instance, "broccoli, yuck" is ambiguous. Do I mean "me eating broccoli, yuck" or do I mean "you eating broccoli, yuck". In the first case, the obvious pragmatic method to maximize that value is to simply not eat broccoli--whether you eat broccoli does not affect the fulfillment of this value. In the second case, the pragmatic method to maximize this value is unclear.

Well... hmmm... my opinion about murder and broccoli are pretty much the same; I don't want to experience either. However, since no one is trying to force me to eat broccoli, but there are many people who might kill me, my pragmatic approach to protecting my self from these experiences radically differs.

Please give me an example, where I have no subjective reason of my own, but would perform an action based solely on the reasons of others.

Also note that if I have my own subjective reasons based on the reasons or opinions of others (such as valuing public admiration or freedom from coercion), I base my decision only on my own reasons. This is clear because if you remove only my own reasons, and not any of the external reasons, my behavior will definitely change.

[ March 22, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>

Malaclypse the Younger

This is probably more precise stated as, "...if I have my own subjective reasons that reference the reasons or opinions of others..."

Pomp

Alonzo Fyfe,

I think you're going to have to explain your collective subjectivism a bit more specifically. You've already stated that moral-oughts are determined by some sort of averaging process on all existing reasons (my option #3 a few posts back). How, exactly, is that process to be carried out? I ask because your most recent post to me seems to suggest that your position would lead to some counterintuitive results.

You claim that there are always some people in a society who have a reason to "promote morality," by which I assume you mean that these people want to do, and will do, whatever they moral-ought to do and, further, that they want everyone else to do whatever they moral-ought to do. Do I understand you correctly thus far?

You further state that moral-oughts are based on all reasons that exist. Presumeably, they are derived by the averaging process you agreed to earlier, correct? This is where I'd like you to fill in the details of the process. Is it a simple majority-rules process? Is there some critical proportion of the population which must hold a reason before it becomes a moral reason? What if 9 out of 10 people in our very small hypothetical society hold reason A and the remaining person holds contradictory reason B? Is it fair to say that reason A is a moral reason and reason B is not?

You further state that there are reasons that exist but are being excluded by non-moral-ought judgements. I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Certainly, these reasons are not being excluded from judgements by the individuals who hold them. I'm guessing that you mean that these reasons are excluded from non-moral-ought judgements by everyone but the individuals who hold them?

You conclude that persons whose personal reasons are excluded in this manner therefore have a reason to promote morality. There is, of course, a practical issue at hand: if these persons are unable to influence the population at large to accept their other reasons, they are unlikely to be able to influence the population at large to accept their reasons for promoting morality.

Further, the details of your averaging process may well invalidate this particular argument. I haven't seen those details yet, but it seems almost certain that they will result in some form of majority-rules. Thus, in a socity of, say 1,000, if 10 people are enslaved, their reasons are being excluded from the reasoning of society at large but they do not have any reason to promote morality, as you define it, because the averaging process will almost certainly conclude that the majority moral-ought to keep tham enslaved and they moral-ought to stop griping and get to work.

It seems to me that, without some fancy juggling in your averaging process, the only individuals who have reason to promote morality are those in the majority, whose practical reasons are already beign considered.

I apologize and request clarification if I have misconstrued your argument in any way.