K

luvluv:

I thought we just agreed that James' formula only kicks in when there is compelling - but not irrefutable - evidence. I can see how it would apply to an atheist who claimed that there was a great deal of evidence for God, but that it shouldn't be believed unless it were absolutely proven to be true. I don't think there are many atheists in that camp. If you are suddenly removing the requirement for compelling evidence, then we're right back to talking about the Son of Sam and Hitler.

Postulating a character and then citing gaps in our knowledge where that character could exist is not the same as finding evidence for the existence of that character. If that were true, the fact that we have never actually stood at the end of a rainbow or looked under every rock in Ireland would be evidence that leprechauns exist. The only real piece of evidence that the Christian God exists is the Bible and texts about supernatural beliefs are a dime a dozen.

But it justifies ANY belief as long as the believer finds is important, requiring action, and believable. Only when you add the requirement of sufficient evidence does is justify rational beliefs.

I'd still like to know if you find it rational for Scientologists and astrologers to believe what they do. Or do you hold their beliefs to a higher standard of evidence than your own?

K

SOMMS:

But the whole point of James' formula was to determine when it was rational to believe something. Maybe he should have called it an 'uplifting' belief or 'motivating' belief. Calling it 'rational' implies that it meets the standards of what society calls rational. James' formula doesn't yield beliefs that meet those standards as evidenced by the counter-examples. A formula for rational beliefs should produce rational beliefs no matter who beliefs them.


It is for judging whether it is rational to believe things. If it calls an irrational belief rational, there is something very wrong with it. Insane beliefs are obviously irrational. So, if using James' formula, we would label an insane belief as rational, there is a problem with the formula.

You insist that this formula is only for the individual. How exactly would an individual use it to determine that he/she held an irrational belief? Basically, if the individual finds it important and believes it, James' tells them that their belief is rational.


So anyone who kills people is insane?


Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. His story was so unlikely (given how we see the world operate), that he would have had to provide overwhelming evidence of the talking dog to clear himself. Here (as with all incredible claims) the default position is that of disbelief without an appropriate amount of evidence.

What exactly? Did you and the others SEE God with your eyes? Did you hear Him with your ears? Did you touch Him with your hand?

Remember that seeing, hearing, and feeling things in your mind is not the same as using your senses.

If you don't believe that astrology, Scientology, and New Age beliefs are irrational - even if people have strong experiences associated with them - then we are using two different meanings of the word rational. When I use the word rational, I mean based on reason and having explanatory power.

It seems far more rational (by my definition) that your experiences are not due to the one true God, but are instead just like those of the adherents of the myriad other religions and supernatural beliefs out there.

luvluv

Family Man:

I love you to death, but you still aren't getting it. I can't do anymore. I suggest you read the actual essay if you actually want to understand what he was saying. If you don't, carry on.

Family Man

No, luvluv, you don't get it. The framework you have presented us doesn't work.

Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

K,
Uh...no. K please listen up.

James' essay is the statement:
IF someone searches for truth using the 'I must not miss this if it is true' strategy
AND that person finds X live, forced and momentous
THEN that person is justified in precursive faith in X. That persons precursive faith in X is rational.

James' essay is not:
-A 'formula'(?) or method for determining what is and what is not rational.
-Addressing a symptom of insanity in which insane people can find crazy ideas live. (ie all your examples)
-A discourse on how society at large should pursue scientific knowledge.


The problem with our conversation K is that I am talking about what James' essay is saying...you are arguing about what James' essay is NOT saying.



How can we talk about the same thing?





Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

K,
Again...I'm not asking about your belief (ie you think it is more rational by your definition that...etc).

I am also not presenting why you as an athiest should consider one belief over another.


I am only asking this: Given the evidence and my experiences above...how is my belief in God irrational?

I'm using Websters definition of irrational: 'lacking usual or normal mental clarity or coherence'



Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

luvluv

Well the following statement of yours makes it clear to me that you do not get it:

I've said in nearly every post, including the OP, that James' formula is not a means of separating rational beliefs from irrational ones. It is not a justification of any belief. It is only a justification of the decision to risk belief in certain circumstances. It says that there are situation sin which it is more irrational to withhold belief than it is to believe without compelling evidence.

Say you were on a ship that sunk, and you managed to survive the initial sinking and are treading water in the middle of the atlantic. Now lets say you saw a tree branch floating by about a quarter of a mile off. Should you wait for evidence that if you expend precious energy in trying to reach the branch, you will succeed? Or should you simply act on faith and go for the branch? If you choose to wait, the branch will float further and further away from you until it is no longer an option. The decision to withhold belief, in that circumstance, is more irrational than the decision believe despite a lack of compelling evidence.

That's all James was saying. He wasn't saying that precursive faith is an overall alternative to evidentialsim. A believer in precursive faith can be an evidentialist in 90% of his decisions. Precursive faith is a method for when evidentialism doesn't apply, for when the costs of waiting out the evidence are too high. Do you get it now?

Here's the deal. Evidentialism fails as an epistemic method because it cannot establish our most fundamental beliefs. (That there is an external world, that our memories are reliable, or that authority ever tells the truth). It is also impractical. A human being cannot live his life making his every decision on the basis of demonstrative evidence. Can you agree to this much? Do you really wait for evidence that a chair can support your weight before you take a seat in it? Do you do this everytime you encounter a chair.

So my question for you is this: when you encounter these situations, when you are trying to assess the validity of our most basic beliefs, or when you are making the hundreds of daily decisions to trust in certain facts when you have no expectation of compelling evidence in support of them, what epistemic method are you using?

If you are an evidentialist, how is it that you know that there is an external world, or that your memory is reliable, or that authority is ever truthful?

If a stranger came up to you and told you that someone was trying to steal your car, would you believe him? Or would you wait for evidence that your car was being stolen? You would probably ask yourself "Is it possible that my car is being stolen? What happens if I wait for evidence that my car is being stolen? Can I wait for evidence for this man's claim without consequences? How will it affect my life if my car is stolen?"

These are the questions upon which you act. You do not act, in that situation, on evidence. By the time evidence came, it would be a moot point. If your car is really being stolen it will be too late for you to do anything about it by the time evidence of this fact reaches you.

But what you will have essentially been asking yourself is, is this man's claim live (Is it at all likely that my car is being stolen?) forced (What happens if I wait for evidence that my car is being stolen?) and momentous (How will it affect my life if my car is stolen?).

You are objecting to an epistemic method which you in fact use more regularly than you use evidentialism. Chances are you are a practitioner of precursive faith, but you would deny it's relavence because it offers an alternative epistemic method which would make God belief possible for you. You are throwing the baby out with the bathwater. But in all likliehood you do use precursive faith for certain practical positive claims, correct? Is it safe to say that you do not require absolutely certain evidence for every one of your current beliefs? I'm trying to understand whether or not you reject precursive faith as an epistemic method overall, or simply reject the notion that it applies to the existence of God?

My opinion is that if you heard an atheist philosopher make the same arguments I am making in favor of believing that there is an external world, you would have found the argument compelling. Though you cannot prove there is an external world, you are justified in risking belief in it because 1) It seems to you that an external world exists (Thus, the existence of an external world is a live option for you), 2) If you chose to withhold belief in an external world until it was proven to you, you would lose the benefit of acting with purpose in the external world (thus the option is forced), and 3) you benefit greatly from the belief that there really is an external world (thus, the option is momentous).

My guess is you wouldn't have a problem with the above argument for believing in the external world, something for which there can NEVER be independant evidence. Why then do you reject it as a method for believing in the existence of God? My honest opinion is that you have an anti-God bias, and this compels you to reject any epistemology which would make belief in God possible for you.

(If you do have a problem with the above argument for believing in an external world, then again, I would really like to hear how you, a stauch evidentialist, goes about establishing the existence of an external world).

K:

No, in my opinion the evidence does not have to be compelling, it only has to be inconclusive. All that is required is that the truth of a claim cannot be proven conclusively or even compellingly suggested by the evidence. It has to be a proposition about which equally intelligent, equally informed people can legitimately disagree. It isn't necessary that it is more likely to be true than not. I think the only requirement is that the proposition is as likely to be true as it's alternative in the mind of the person analyzing the question. Further, I think the more momentous a belief is, the further one may ratchet back the evidential requirements, all the way back to a 50-50 shot in the dark. Anything unproven, but more than likely false, probably would not apply. But again, this is a subjective phenomenon, and what is more than likely false for one person is more than likely true for another.

And can you understand that Hitler and Son of Sam could have easily been evidentialists? A man in Son of Sam's mental state could have easily seen that talking god as proof positive that he was sent to kill. Hitler could have taken the ease with which the Jews were rounded up and destroyed as evidence of their inferiority. Will you address the fact that evidentialism is just as apt to make Hitlers and Sons of Sam as is precursive faith for the simple fact that evidentiary standards are subjective and arbitrary. All evidentialists agree on is that evidence is required. What they cannot establish is HOW MUCH EVIDENCE is required before a proposition can be believed in. Given that fact evidentialism is in the same boat as precursive faith in terms of producing madmen.

Okay, well insted of debating this as an argument between the existence and the non-existence of God, let us treat this as broad argument as to whether nature is all there is and is capable of explaining itself or whether there is, in addition to nature, something else upon which certain aspects of nature depend. The nature of that something else need not enter into the discussion.

If you are a naturalist, the fact that there is anything which naturalism cannot, in principle, explain is evidence that the supernatural exists. If there is a single in the whole universe which the universe itself is in principle incapable of explaining then that entity is evidence for supernaturalism.

If it becomes the case that no naturalistic explanation for the origin of life is possible, then at that point life itself becomes evidence for the existence of the supernatural. Similarly the origin of the universe, the workings of the mind, etc. Now none of these are evidences specifically for Yahweh, but they do suggest that something beyond the natural exists, and that this something resembles what is said about Yahweh. This is evidence for his existence.

I have argued elsewhere that a staunch enough naturalist will insist that naturalistic explanations exist for EVERYTHING, and will do so contendedly FOREVER, even if no explanations are found for some of these phenomenae and even if it is found that naturalistic explanations are not likely to exist (as with the origin of life problem, IMHO). Naturalism is unfalsifiable. For such a person, the inability of science to provide naturalistic explanations for basic phenomenae is can never be evidence of anything, because they have decided ahead of time on a purely philosophical basis to only believe in naturalistic explanations.

God of the gaps is not a good argument, but supernaturalism of the gaps is a good argument. Even though the mere existence of something inexplicable to naturalism is not evidence for any specific concept of God, it is evidnece of the supernatural. Which makes belief in God, one conception of the supernatural, a live option.

I'm going to punch somebody in the face if I have to type one more time that Jame's process does not justify beliefs, only the decision to risk belief. If someone finds a certain belief live, momentous, and forced, and if they would rather not miss it if it is true, then it is rational for a person who finds himself in this situation regarding a certain belief to risk believing in it, REGARDLESS of the content of the belief.

Yes, their DECISION TO BELIEVE is as rational as my own, but there beliefs, in my opinion, are not as rational. But if they find Scientology or astrology more live, momentous, and forced than any of the alternatives, and if they are more inclined to prefer not to miss their opportunity to benefit from their respective beliefs if they are true, then their DECISION TO BELIEVE is rational. The belief itself may be irrational.

James' precursive faith, as I understand it, is not a means of seperating rational beliefs from irrational ones (and frankly I am exasperated at having to repeat this same statement over and over again to a room full of supposedly intelligent people, only to have them reply in post after post that James' formula fails because it justifies irrational beliefs). It only seperates beliefs that can be settled by evidentialism from those that cannot, and provides a framework by which we may risk believing in something important to us when evidence for and against it is inconclusive. He says simply that you will find yourself having to make a decision about whether or not to believe propositions for which the evidence is inconclusive. In some instances waiting for evidence is not a rational course of action. In such instances, how can we establish a method for making good choices as to how to direct our belief?

Family Man

Then it isn't providing a rational framework, is it? A rational framework must exclude the irrational by definition.

Sure it is. It is trying to say that belief is rational and trying to set up conditions where it is rational. It isn't saying that the belief is true, but it is justifying it.

True, that is what it says -- whether it succeeds is another matter. I don't believe it, because it permits all beliefs -- to revise my criticism, it doesn't tell us when it is ok to believe in a proposition. For example, it tells us that ok for Hitler to believe what he decided to belief in. Do you get our criticism yet?

That depends on the situation, doesn't it? If I'm a strong swimmer, of course I go for it. If I'm a poor swimmer and I know that there will soon be boats and seaplanes out looking for survivors, then perhaps I save my energy. If I'm a poor swimmer and there is no chance of rescue or land, then there isn't much of a point, is there?

The problem with this analogy, along with all the others that you have provided, is that I do have evidence here to make a decision. What you are trying to justify (belief in God) doesn't have any solid evidence. It is a different thing entirely.

I never claimed that people wouldn't use evidentialism, but I've never seen anyone use precursive belief in any situation. And I don't see the validity in it.

No, I quite strongly disagree in fact. Every morning, I sit in my chair. It always holds me. Every chair I've ever sat in has held my weight. That is evidence that next chair I encounter will hold my weight. Moreover, from my experiences with chairs, one that wouldn't would show signs of wear that would indicate to me that it would be dangerous to sit on it. Evidentialism works, luvluv, and it does establish our most basic beliefs. The problem is that it doesn't establish the cherished belief that God exists, which is why theists go fishing for alternative methodologies.

(Why it is that theists think that every time I see a chair it is new to me? Do you have any idea how many times I've seen and rejected this stupid analogy?)

Through my senses and through experience. For example, I experience event B with my brother. Thirty years later, my brother has the same memory of event B as I do. Gosh, my memories appear to be reliable. (And, personally, I don't find authorities 100% truthful).

First of all, a claim even by a stranger that my car has been stolen is evidence that my car has been stolen. But let's put that aside for a minute (since it's not really the point). Do I, on the strength of that report alone, believe that my car has been stolen and immediately call the police? No, I run out to the parking garage and see if my car's there. Why? Because I do not yet have sufficient reason to believe my car has been stolen. A claim, even from a friend, is not enough. However, if it isn't there, then I believe it is stolen (and call the police) because now I have the evidence that the claim is true.

What you appear to me to be forgetting is that Clifford's standard tells us when belief is justified. James seems to be telling us when we are motivated to find out whether a belief is true, but it isn't telling us when it is more rational to believe on inadequate evidence. In other words, James' theory tells us that it is reasonable to check out the claims for God's existence, but it doesn't tell us that that belief is reasonable.

Umm, aside from the fact you just said we probably use evidentialism 90% of the time, this methodology doesn't appear to be epistemic at all.

No, it doesn't appear to me to justify belief in any proposition. It simply indicates when a deeper investigation might be warranted.

From what you've written so far, it does not appear to be a epistemic method.

I'd be more careful with your opinions, if I were you. Especially if you don't want to appear condescending.

No, those are inadequate grounds for belief. I believe that there is an external world because I appear to interact with one every day. Based on actions I make, I can anticipate how the external world reacts. That's evidence and adequate reason for belief. (And let's not raise the bar for evidentialists by demanding proof. We're discussing when we have adequate reason for belief, not proof.)

Of course I have a problem with it. There is independent evidence.

Because it fails to establish a reliable method for deciding whether belief is warranted.

And you have a pro-God bias that makes you overlook obvious problems with theories that seem to confirm that bias. So there.

Take a hammer and hit your thumb very, very hard. Then tell me you have no evidence that there is a hammer external to your own existence. (And remember, we're talking evidence, not proof.)

K

SOMMS:

What you describe is PRECISELY a formula for rational beliefs. It is not a formula for generating ALL rational beliefs and I never claimed that it was. So, by your own descripition above, precursive faith meeting all of the three criteria above must be rational regardless of who believes it. That is, unless you want to add a fourth criterion that the belief must be rational (sane) - but that kind of defeats the whole purpose.


No, but since it is supposed to generate only rational beliefs (by your own description above), if it fails to filter insane beliefs, then it fails outright.


By your own description, James' essay is saying that it is rational to believe things when they meet the three criteria listed. Then you try to disqualify insane beliefs because they are insane. If insane beliefs meet the three criteria listed, then those criteria are not sufficient to determine when it is rational to believe something as both you and James have claimed.

K

SOMMS:

I know you're not asking about my belief or presenting a belief I should consider. You are presenting a justification that belief is rational without evidence if that belief meets certain criteria. I've demonstrated with numerous counterexamples that it those criteria are not sufficient to determine when a belief is rational.


By your definition, it is irrational because it lacks the coherence requirement. You use James' justification for your belief, but you dismiss it as a justification for others (the beliefs you called insane).

I don't think you ever said whether you feel that belief in Scientology is rational. It meets all the requirements and its followers aren't insane.