Kip

I understand. This is the fallacy of the converse. Thank you for correcting me.

Yes, I deny your second premise, that "people make decisions". I agree that most people would disagree with me and assert that people do make decisions. However, neither your direct experience nor especially "general consensus" is an infallible guide, and we must remember that the usage of the word "decision" is qualified in this discussion. In particular, decisions are not only the choices we make, but you have specified that decisions cannot be programmed or predetermined (because in that case the decisions would belong to whomever did the programming or determining). According to this usage, it is not at all obvious that people make decisions. I certainly have no direct experience with these sorts of "unprogrammed" decisions and I am not sure a consensus to the contrary would exist among enlightened, reflecting observers. There is no shortage of candidates for that which determines and programs human behavior, including genes, vocal speech, social behavior, hormones, etc. Indeed, without considering this narrower sense of "decision", I agree that your second premise is not controversial. Rather, your previous claim that robots and machines cannot make decisions was controversial, but I am willing to grant you that much.

Apparently we part ways at your second premise.

I assure you that I have no idea, nor am I convinced that such a cause even exists.

Nowhere357

Of course. Equally however, if we don't use direct experience and general consensus, then what exactly CAN we use?

"Decision" is qualified here yes, but I don't agree with your paraphrase. It's the "fallacy of the converse" again, I think.

I deny it's controversial that people make decisions. We could post a poll thread, but only those people able to make decisions could actually decide to participate, and that would skew the results.

Of course we make decisions, so the problem must be with the way you're defining it.

One of the things which deterministically arises from humans is the mind, with passive awareness and active will.

When we apply the will, we affect our behavior. And this is how we affect the world.

We are using "decisions" to imply a willful choice, so there is nothing controversial about denying that robots make decisions, since they have no will.

Really? You deny that people have will? Is that your decision?

Let me jump ahead a bit, and ask: what in your opinion is the cause of subatomic particle decay?

And yet subatomic particle decay exists in the deterministic world. It is not necessary to know - or even postulate - a cause, in order to have an effect.

The effect here is the ability to make (willful) decisions. The only known cause is that matter gives rise to life which gives rise to mind - and the mind can make willful decisions.

Kip

Indirect logic, reasoning, evidence, argument, philosophy, etc. Of course we rely upon experience -- I only wished to remind you that many people had "direct experience" of the earth being flat or the sun moving. Direct experience called "eye witness testimony" is notoriously fallible and suspect in courts of law. Humans are not immune to deception or even self deception and many philosophers argue that the sensation of "free will" is an illusion. But of course consensus is no guide.

I am glad that you agree that "decision" is qualified here because I think you are equivocating. We need to distinguish between ordinary "decisions" and these qualified *decisions. If you disagree with my paraphrasing of what a *decision is (because I commit the fallacy of the converse again), let us abandon that definition and I invite you to explicitly state how a *decision is distinct from a decision. Surely you are the better judge of what a *decision is. Your argument seems to be:

P1. If our decisions are preordained, then in fact we have no *decisions to make.
P2. But we make *decisions.
C. So decisions are not preordained.

I added the * to your first premise because I think you mean the qualified form of decision there. However, P2 is only uncontroversial if you are referring to decisions and not *decisions. Therefore I would deny P2.

Alternatively, you may be arguing:

P1. If our decisions are preordained, then in fact we have no decisions to make.
P2. But we make decisions.
C. So decisions are not preordained.

In which case, P1 is false, as I originally claimed.

Or perhaps you are arguing:

P1. If our decisions are preordained, then in fact we have no *decisions to make.
P2. But we make decisions.
C. So decisions are not preordained.

Here you are equivocating. Your argument requires something like the first P2 to be valid, but I think the willingness of others to agree with your logic depends upon the third equivocation. In all of these cases, your argument does not succeed, and if we are going to progress I need you to explicitly distinguish how a *decision is a qualified decision.

There may be nothing controversial about denying that a robot can make *decisions. But robots and computers make decisions all of the time. This is how dictionary.com defines a decision:

1. The passing of judgment on an issue under consideration.
2. The act of reaching a conclusion or making up one's mind.
3. A conclusion or judgment reached or pronounced; a verdict.

So according to standard usage (except perhaps for the end of definition 2), nothing about a decision requires "will". To illustrate this, I am going to run spell check on this paragraph and the computer will decide if I have made any errors or not.

However, you remind me that you are referring to "willful choice" and not ordinary decisions. (Is "willful choice" all a *decision is?). But you claim that robots do not have wills. If will is a subjective phenomenon, I do not think that robots obviously lack even a rudimentary form of will. Nor do I think that, what is more important, more sophisticated robots cannot, in principle, develop wills as authentic as our own. We are biomechanical, carbon based robots ourselves, with our own computational brains and electric currents.

Please correct me if I am mistaken, but are you attempting to seek refuge from a deterministic understanding of human decisions, within the random, causeless behavior of quantum particles? Is your "free will" random or controlled? Are you not a bit larger than a quark?

Nowhere357

"Evidence" amounts to direct experience, of course, unless it's evidence we accept but have only heard about - in which case it's general concensus. BTW I consider concensus of experts to be part of general concensus.

"Logic", "reasoning", "argument", "philosophy" etc are methods we use to manipulate our knowledge - without direct experience and general concensus of facts, there is nothing for these tools to work on.

The flat earth is a good example. At that time in history, it took insight to describe the hills and valleys as "flat". I can imagine some of the debates back then! Anyway, calling the earth "flat" was a result of applying logic, etc, to the direct experiences (and general concensus).

I could also argue that logic, etc, is PART of the direct experience, and also PART of the general concensus. So my point still stands.

These points are absolutely correct. And yet they don't contradict my position. I've never claimed that direct experience or general concensus were infallible.

Notice again that it is the things that we claim to experience, and the things that people claim to be true, on which we apply our logic and reasoning - in order to determine the truth.

So experience and concensus is no guide to the truth, but it is a guide to where we should investigate. If we don't use experience and consensus, then what CAN we use?

I have been consistent in my use of the word. I've stated I used the word to mean 'willful choice'.

P1. If our willful choices are predetermined, then in fact we have no willful choices to make.
P2. But we make willful choices.
C. So willful choices are not predetermined.

I've changed "decisions" to "willful choices" (and "preordained" to "predetermined"). Hope that helps.

So yeah you object to P2. Because you believe our choices are predetermined. Which I suppose is possible, but your idea requires a large and unnecessary assumption, so is vulnerable to Occam's razor, and is not the default position.

Of course. In the same way that a dropped die 'decides' which face to land on. Or a light 'decides' to come on when we flip the switch. Or that a rock 'decides' to fall down, when it gets the chance.

That's another subject. I have no doubt the our current robots have no more subjective awareness than is present naturally in matter itself. Whether one day we create true "artificial" life, and how we would be able to tell, are interesting but off-thread topics.

Close, but no. I am attempting to seek refuge from the notion of "illusory" will, within the deterministic understanding of reality. And in my experience it is a secure refuge indeed.

This shows you have missed the point - which is that quantum randomness exists in a deterministic universe, proving that "determinism" does NOT imply that all actions are predetermined.

Btw, it is not the case that random subatomic behavior is known to be without cause. The interesting thing imo is that whatever that cause may be, if there is a cause, the effect takes place as a range. Iow a given deterministic cause can lead to a range of results. Well, our brain/body states arise deterministically, and a given brain state can lead to a variety of outcomes. If will is real - and it is - then this is where it would operate.

Free will and materialistic determinism are not in contradiction.

Kip

I think we understand each other on this point and agree.

Thank you for clarifying this. As you have written the argument, I would disagree with P1 and not P2. I surely do think that we make willful choices. But why should I think that P1 is true? It seems to me that if our willful choices are predetermined, the choices do not become unwilled simply because the choices are predetermined! Indeed, the laws of physics and state of nature together seem to do the determining and not whatever "will" may or may not exist simultaneously.

To illustrate my point, remember that human will, and not only human action, is subject to the environment and genetic causes. The man who "wills" to love a woman rather than another man or a dog, the son of a basketball coach who "wills" to play basketball in high school, the daughter of a fundamentalist preacher who "wills" to join the local humanist society, etc. These are only the more conspicuous causes, most causes are more subtle and difficult to analyze. But these examples, and so many others, should firmly establish that simply because something is willed does not necessitate that the will was not predetermined. Quite the opposite.

None of these are "passing judgement on" anything, as the dictionary defines a decision, except in a very remote sense.

Yes, not *all* actions are predetermined. But we are not discussing *all* actions. We are discussing humans, not quarks. And the more rational and controlled human behavior is (the only behavior worth defending), the less likely that behavior is to be not predetermined. Humans are so much more predictable and reasonable than quarks - and that is a good thing.

Also, I want to call attention to your argument's being a "just so" story. In short, you are pointing at quantum particles and saying "quarks are not predetermined, therefore not everything is predetermined, therefore humans definetely/perhaps are not predetermined." But you have no reason to compare humans to quarks, and very many reasons to think that humans are behave more like classical, rather than quantum, bodies of matter.

Normal

IMO, it's very arrogant to think that each action you perform cannot be explained by looking at the quantum state of each sub-atomic particle in your body.

Nowhere357

Timeline. The fact is that "predetermined" means to determine beforehand, while "willful choice" means the deliberate act of choosing.

So was the choice determined beforehand, or was it made during the act of choosing?

If we freely choose, then the choice was not predetermined.
If the choice is predetermined, then we do not freely choose.

Yes they do seem to do that. They also seem to give rise to life which gives rise to mind. And this perfectly natural mind has some wonderful properties, and one of those properties is the ability to make willful choices.

I understand your point - we are affected by our environment. But of course we can apply will only to those choices presented to us by our minds.

Not all actions are predetermined, agreed. And we are discussing free will.

I disagree with this conclusion, I don't see how it follows.

I think the opposite occurs. On a path of reason and control, a person would strengthen his ability to apply his willpower, and so reduce the amount of predermination he is subject to.

I've never been compared to Kipling before!

Close enough.

This is wrong. First, you use classical physical law to support the idea of predetermination, then deny I can use quantum physical law to support existence of will. Why the double standard?

More importantly, I have a very good reason to think our minds relate more to quantum law than to classical law.

There is nothing in classical law which allows or explains the existence of mind.

While quantum law doesn't explain the existence of mind, it does go a lot furter in allowing for it.

---------------------------------------------------------------
Merriam-Webster

Main Entry: will·ful
Variant(s): or wil·ful /'wil-f&l/
Function: adjective
Date: 13th century
1 : obstinately and often perversely self-willed
2 : done deliberately : INTENTIONAL
synonym see UNRULY
- will·ful·ly /-f&-lE/ adverb
- will·ful·ness noun

Main Entry: 1choice
Pronunciation: 'chois
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English chois, from Old French, from choisir to choose, of Germanic origin; akin to Old High German kiosan to choose -- more at CHOOSE
Date: 13th century
1 : the act of choosing : SELECTION
2 : power of choosing : OPTION
3 a : the best part : CREAM b : a person or thing chosen
4 : a sufficient number and variety to choose among
5 : care in selecting
6 : a grade of meat between prime and good
- of choice : to be preferred
synonyms CHOICE, OPTION, ALTERNATIVE, PREFERENCE, SELECTION, ELECTION mean the act or opportunity of choosing or the thing chosen. CHOICE suggests the opportunity or privilege of choosing freely <freedom of choice>. OPTION implies a power to choose that is specifically granted or guaranteed <the option of paying now or later>. ALTERNATIVE implies a necessity to choose one and reject another possibility <equally attractive alternatives>. PREFERENCE suggests the guidance of choice by one's judgment or predilections <a preference for cool weather>. SELECTION implies a wide range of choice <a varied selection of furniture>. ELECTION implies an end or purpose which requires exercise of judgment <doing a tax return forces certain elections on you>.

Main Entry: free will
Function: noun
Date: 13th century
1 : voluntary choice or decision <I do this of my own free will>
2 : freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

Kip

Nowhere, your post assumes that willful and predetermined are mutually exclusive. But I did not find any convincing argument that this first premise is true. Let me focus on what you wrote in response to that challenge:

Now this is a collection of statements, with a question in the middle. I agree with all of the statements (none of them show that willful and predetermined are mutually exclusive) and my answer to your question is that the choice was determined beforehand.

I must say that if you intend to demonstrate the truth of your crucial first premise, I need you to be more rigorous.

My use of classical physics is not a double standard. We are discussing human beings, classical bodies, and so I always refer to classical laws. The random, uncontrolled behavior of quantum particles is irrelevant.

Also, your last sentence is false. Both classical and quantum physics are theories about the behavior of matter which can be objectively measured. "Mind" is a subjective phenomenon and both classical and quantum physics are silent about the subject.

Nowhere357

I'm not trained in formal logic, but I'm enjoying this.

In the context of this thread, yes - a given mental decision is willful or predetermined but not both.

Timeline. The fact is that "predetermined" means to determine beforehand, while "willful choice" means the deliberate act of choosing.
So was the choice determined beforehand, or was it made during the act of choosing?
If we freely choose, then the choice was not predetermined.
If the choice is predetermined, then we do not freely choose.

You've agree to the statements, so in what way do the last two statements not mutually exclude 'willful' and 'predetermined'?

You claim the choice was determined beforehand. This means that when it's time for the willful act of choosing, the choice had already been predetermined and there is no choice to make.

So the first premise stands, I think.

We are discussing human beings, but people are more than classical bodies, so it is inappropriate to refer only to classical laws. The entire realm of human knowledge - including quantum reality - is open to us here.

So quantum reality is not irrelevant, and you are applying a double standard, I think.

I never claimed otherwise, so my sentence was not false.

Kip

I am not either. But I have taken a discrete math class.

The above mutually excludes "freely chosen" (as opposed to simply chosen) and predetermined. To assert that "willful" and "predetermined" are mutually exclusive, you would need to replace "freely chosen" with "willful". But of course I would not agree and that would simply assert their mutual exclusiveness without argument.

The definitions you provide suggest that you think "free will", "willful", "voluntary" and "freely chosen" are synonymous. In that case, I surely agree that we have free will. However, you have also asserted that our decisions are not predetermined or the necessary results of antecedent causes. This is a stronger statement than simply saying a choice is voluntary. There is ambiguity in your posts as to whether you are defending not only the first definition of free will but also this second. Remember I provided a brain manipulation argument showing how the first definition may not be sufficient for free will.

So are you defending the first or second definition of free will?

And if you are defending the second, can your provide an argument to show that "willful" and "predetermined" are mutually exclusive?

You claimed:

But if both physical theories are silent about subjective phenomena such as "mind" and "will" then neither "allows" one more than the other.