Totalitarianist

The "naturalistic fallacy", says Moore, is when we call something good, we are actually defining "good". "Naturalism" provides no logical reason for any ethical principle, for it incorrectly assumes that it has defined "good". The naturalistics fallacy is committed in such Naturalistic Ethics as Hedonism and Evolutionistic Ethics.

"Evolutionaristic Ethics" assume that it has defined what is good, i.e., that the evolution of nature determines what is good. Yet there is no logical reason to believe that nature evolves toward what is good. (And the condition of being "better" does not at all imply being more highly evolved, and vice versa.)

Hedonism assumes that what produces pain is necessarily bad, and what produces pleasure is necessarily good. We do not need to be conscious of our happiness, then, if the consciousness of pleasure is not an end in itself. But, Moore argues, how can we have pleasure if we are not conscious of our being happy? This problem reveals the misleading assumptions of Hedonism. It is an error to assume that pleasure and the consciousness of pleasure are the same, and that they are both good considered as ends in themselves. Hedonism does not makes a distinction between its end and its means.

Hedonism exists also in Egoism and Utilitarianism. Egoism asserts that each person’s happiness is a means to something else, and not an end in itself. Egoism as a doctrine of means can be seen in Utilitarianism. To be good, an action must produce the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness, thereby producing happiness for the greatest number of persons. Utilitarianism asserts that things that promote happiness are good, and things that promote unhappiness are bad. The value of an action, therefore, is determined by its consequences. Utilitarianism is contradictory, forasmcuh as it does not distinguish between actions that promote happiness only as a means to future happiness, and actions that promote happiness as an end in itself. If every one's happiness is a means to happiness for the greatest number of persons, then every one’s own happiness cannot be an end in itself. This, says more, reveals another false assumption of Utilitarianism.

[ December 23, 2002: Message edited by: Embodiment of The Absolute Idea ]</p>

Dr. Retard

Does he? I thought he pressed the 'open question' argument against hedonism (and all other ethical naturalisms).

Jamie_L

Well, at some point we DO have to define good don't we?

Jamie

[ December 23, 2002: Message edited by: Jamie_L ]</p>

Vorkosigan

The "naturalistic fallacy", says Moore, is when we call something good, we are actually defining "good".

Interesting. I would have thought we were using a definition we already had. I suppose it would be context-dependent, though.

Vorkosigan

Dr. Retard

Moore says No. He says good is like yellow in that you can't define it.

dnChrisTENson

Surely this analogy is faulty. "Good" in this case is functioning as a universal. "Yellow" is a paricular instance of the universal "color". "Pleasure" would thus be a particular instance of the universal "good". Like the color yellow there are many varieties and intensities of pleasure (and pain). Hedonists simply take it up another step and equate pleasure with good.