jdawg2

my layman's opinion:

all these omni-characteristics should only be used in comic book storylines. Trying to make "sense" out of the nonsensical is a lost cause. All this omni stuff just does not apply in the real world. Sure it sounds good to say something is "all-powerful", but what the hell is that supposed to mean? How would we know if something is "all-powerful"? Saying it doesn't make it so...

And square circles can exist...if you somehow brainwash everybody to believe that the word "square" is a synonym for "round"

Philip Osborne

"A: Why can't God do X?
B: Because X is logically impossible.
A: Why is X logically impossible?
B: Because God can't do X."

I think there is some interpretation of this that does not lead to circularity. Suppose I replace first statement "B" with "God is omnibenevolent, and hence cannot instantiate evils." A truth about something's essence is a necessary truth, and hence requires no further explanation. Thus we have:

A: Why can't God do X?
B: Because X is inconsistent with God's essential omnibenevolence.
A: Why is X logically impossible?
B: Because God can't do X.

There is no circularity in this at all, yet it allows us to conclude that God's inability to do evil things does not violate our definition of omnipotence. Of course, this assumes that the realm of possibilities is co-extensive with the realm of what God can instantiate, which must be established by seperate argument.

"It must, however, be shown that there exists a being 'God' which has necessary characteristics that are logically incompatible with 'evil' for this analogy to hold."

If the question of whether or not omnipotence is a meaningful concept is exactly the same as the question of whether or not an omnipotent being exists (which seems to be what you are saying), then it is obvious that an argument against omniscience would be incapable of answering that question-the only way to determine its soundness would be to determine whether or not God exists. In this case, it seems that such arguments are bound to be pretty worthless things.

"Which runs headlong into the circularity problem already mentioned by Automaton."

Consistency with omnibenevolence is not the same thing as consistency with one's own nature. The ability to do all things consistent with omnibenevolence does not lead to the conclusion that all things are omnipotent; clearly, some omnibenevolent beings can be more powerful than others. If you take the greatest amount of ability any possible being with omnibenevolence could have, you have arrived at omnipotence.*

"A: Why can't God do evil?
B: Because evil is not a part of God's nature.
A: Why is evil not a part of God's nature?
B: Because God can't do evil."

This argument is unsuccessful; there is no requirement that I find further justification for "why isn't evil a part of God's nature." The fact that evil isn't a part of God's nature is a conceptual truth, and is true whether or not God exists. As mentioned before, truth about the essence of a given thing is necessary; as such, it requires no further explanation for why it is true. Thus, there is not need for me to say "Because God can't do evil" and end up with circularity.

Sorry for the delay in response. I am not able to use the computer as often as before, so responses may be few and far between.

Sincerely,

Philip Osborne

[ September 27, 2002: Message edited by: Philip Osborne ]</p>

Jobar

So, God is the creator of good- but not of evil?

You have to then say that either evil does not exist, or that some other being created evil.

Good and evil seem inseparable- we can't know of one without knowing of the other. If either is real, then both are.

So either God must not be omnipotent, or else you must say he creates evil as well as good.

ManM

Jobar,
The problem goes away if you define evil as the absense of good. Saying that God creates evil is like saying the sun creates darkness.

Taffy Lewis

ManM,

It would mean that God has the ability to make himself no longer omnipotent.

However, most theistic philosophers believe that God is essentially omnipotent and thus it is logically impossible for him to give up his omnipotence.

Also, consider this counter-argument:

Either omnipotence includes the ability to do that which is logically impossible or it does not. If it does, then God can bring it about that he is no longer omnipotent while remaining omnipotent. (Not many theistic philosophers would accept this. Descartes is the only philosopher I can think of who believed that God could do that which is logically impossible.)

Now suppose that omnipotence does not include the ability to do that which is logically impossible. Consider the following proposition:

(A) It is logically possible that 1)God is omnipotent and 2) there exist a rock so heavy that God cannot lift it.

(A) is either true or false.

If (A) is true, then God can create a rock he cannot lift and remain omnipotent.

If (A) is false, then it is logically impossible for there to be a rock God cannot lift. But omnipotence doesn't include the ability to do logically impossible acts.

Either way, the paradox involving the rock does not undermine the concept of omnipotence.

[ September 27, 2002: Message edited by: Taffy Lewis ]</p>

Taffy Lewis

Jobar,

The theist is committed to saying that everything is ultimately dependent upon God. So the theist must say that in the end evil does derive from God in some way. But this doesn't seem like an objectionable admission.

The reason is that it doesn't seem to be true that (P) Some object or state of affairs which contains no evil is necessarily better than one which does.

Consider two states of affairs:

(A) Our present universe.

(B) Nothing exists.

A contains some evil and B contains none. So A contains more evil than B. If we believe that it is better that we exist than that we do not then we cannot believe proposition P from above.

If we do not accept (P) then on what basis can we claim that God would be better if he did not contain the potential to bring about evil or bad states of affairs?

Vorkosigan

Taffy, there are a lot more than two choices here.

Taffy Lewis

Vorkosigan,

The purpose of my example is to demonstrate that (P) is not true. My example also undermines variations on (P) such as:

(P') Some object or state of affairs with less evil is necessarily better than an object or state of affairs with more evil.

HRG

How about P'':

If two situations differ only by the fact that S1 contains one evil act or result less than S2, S1 is better than S2.

And let's not forget that an omnipotent being can always bring about S1 if ir can bring about S2.

Regards,
HRG.

jdawg2

so evil is the absence of good...

hmm. Is sitting in my chair "good"? And if it lacks any "goodness", does that mean sitting in my chair is therefore evil?

It seems like by that definition of evil, everything that we normally consider morally neutral all of a sudden becomes evil simply because it doesn't "have good" *shrug*