NearNihil Experience

"I mean, could you demonstrate that this distinction (object versus perception) is metaphysically valid? I believe it is not. "


Taste is not even metaphysically valid. No stand-alone proof is available, the "other minds" enigma. Please describe the taste of something without refering to any other tastes.

You are right, metaphysically it is impossible to prove just about anythingwhen a skeptic steps up. But, I'm talking about a distinction between the world we encounter(everything in existence- objects) and the world of reflected encounters(our im-material thoughts and the hypothetical universe created in every mind, at every moment as it sees itself in relation to objects-perceptions).

Existants can have the qualities of being in-mind only. Imaginary things for example, IPUs say. However, these qualities, invislble, pink, and unicorn had to come from some other source than the object in question if that object truly does not exist. If it truly does not exist, in any fashion, then these qualities could not be put together to describe something that doesn't exist. How can you describe something that doesn't exist. you can't. These are the things that exist in mind. ONe brings together their perceptions of the world to describe it, not the objects themselves.

"Could you please explain this further? I'm not sure I understand how your framework "provides" for contradiction in any more robust of a manner than anyone else's metaphysical framework. "

It doesn't. You've just answered yourself for me. I'm just saying that contradiction and correlation are products of perceptions, not objects. Say it with me...s-q-u-a-r-e c-i-r-c-l-e. Can't make a picture in your head. Can't find one in the world. Must not exist...no. It does exist as a perceptual manifestation of to other perceptions trying to come together in a faulty fashion.


"So logical contradiction (and theism) are just results of a psychological phenomenon? Got a proof for that? Most logicians consider contradiction to be a function of language, which makes more sense, given that logic is primarily linguistic rather than psychological in its origin and aims. "

I would feel it is obvious that logic and language, in any manifestation, are psychological\ psycho-social phenomoenon. What else could they be? I feel that psychology is primary and that language and logic are both products of psyche. As to whether language or logic spawned one-o-the-other....I can't say.

"Green: Gx
One: ([null]) - that is, the set of all null sets (cf. Frege)
God: Gx (or, if Gx is already "green," how about Tx - Theos, right?)

Impressed yet? Probably not, and I don't blame you: representing green, one, and God logically is no more difficult than representing them in ordinary language. That's because logic is a function of language rather than some unique process of psychology."

I don't think logic is a unique process of psychology. It must function with language and cognition and perception and rationale.

I didn't say represent or convert to logical notation, I said explain in logical notation(how and why these things exist).
:banghead: ->f ;

f= frustrated at my inablilty to clearly communicate myself.

P.S. Thanks John Page for sticking up for me. Smart people can be so merciless sometimes.
Rock and Fucking-a Roll.

SlateGreySky

What does it mean for the brain to implement a system of logic? Does it mean that the brain operates logically? That doesn't seem to me to be the case; the brain just operates; logic has nothing to do with its biochemical processes.

Maybe you mean that the brain is the origin of logic in human beings. This seems closer to the real story, but again, how would one tell the story of the brain's implementation of logic with no reference to language? I don't believe it's possible.

I think that's a fine example, but it is an example that relies fundamentally on language (in the case of the computer, Boolean language). The computer must be taught a language before it can be taught the functions of the operators (or more precisely, the language defines the functions of the operators). Computers cannot manipulate logic without a language in which to do it, even if the language is as simple as Boolean (and here of course the possibilities for logical complexity are limited only by the breadth of the operator's input language).

Can you describe how logic would be expressed through a physical state without referencing language? Please give an example. It doesn't seem to me that physical states have anything to do with logic.

I'm trying to understand what you mean here, and I think you mean something like what I wrote above: that the human brain is the origin of logical relations. I don't know enough to say whether there is an actual "language center" (a la Chomsky) in the brain, or whether language is some other type of phenomenon, but I'm willing to grant, for the sake of argument, that the human brain originates language (whether through behavior or internal cognition, if this dichotomy even holds water).

Having said that, it's still not clear to me how language is not critically involved in the human brain's "implementation" of logic. Even if it were as simple and neurologically clear as to be able to point to a single neuron which performs the "not" operation, another neuron which performs the "and" operation, etc. (and of course it is not nearly so simple as this), language would still be required to cash out the significance of those "logical neurons:" I would still have to know the meaning of "not" before I knew the significance of that particular "logic neuron."

So, while I am willing to grant the possibility that the brain is the physical origin for language, it still seems quite clear that language is the necessary "mechanism" for the implementation of logic: logic would not (cannot) exist without language.

SlateGreySky

I think my request for a demonstration of your object/perception distinction was unclear: I didn't mean to ask for a stand-alone proof for the existence of physical phenomena. I'm asking for a proof that our epistemic encounters of "the world" are distinguishable from our encounters with the "hypothetical universe" of the mind. It seems to me that, given the fact that an individual never transcends his/her own subjectivity, the realm of objects in the world can never be encountered - only the phenomena of that "hypothetical universe" of the mind. I don't think your two-tiered (object/perception) system is demonstrable.

I believe that contradiction is a product of language. Correlation seems to be, as you say, a product of perception, but then, I don't think there could be anything (knowable) that is a product of an object and not a product of a perception. If you know of one, please give an example.

I don't know what you mean by "perceptual manifestation," but no one of whom I'm aware has ever perceived a square circle. This has less, I think, to do with facts about perception than it has to do with mutually exclusive definitions that are inconsistent with one another when taken together. That is a fact of language, not of perception. Had no one ever perceived either a circle or a square in all of human history, a square circle would still be a logically inconsistent notion.

Now you've asked for two very different things. I complied with the first request, but I'll admit that the second is impossible: logic tells no stories that aren't already relatable in ordinary language, and logic originates no metaphysical theses of its own (at least pursuant to this discussion).

Logic is a function of language, and is only a function of psychology insofar as the language that originates logic is a function of psychology.

Witt

John:

I'd like to propose a modification to the explanation here:

Two appearances, one having properties that are mutually exclusive (e.g. no corners, four corners) to the other cannot represent the same object because the properties are contradictory.

Exceptions include appearances that are distorted (through the imposition of an unexpected medium), illusory (where perception shows, for example, that parallel lines appear to converge) or appearances that are in transition (such as an umberella having furled and unfurled appearances, a piece of clay being molded from a circular shape to a square shape, a four legged animal only having three legs because of an accident).

Can we conclude that the appearance of (apparently) contradictory objects is the result of our perception reporting contradictory properties that can be explained under the exceptions rule?
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Interesting, but, I don't think that way.
All physical appearances reflect some existence.
Physical illusions 'appear' to be things that cannot physically be, while they do in fact represent something physical.
Physical illusions are confusions of mind, ie. confusions of interpretation, and they are not unreal things at all.

Contradictory events cannot occur.

Unreal things can only be described...they cannot appear in any physical sense.
There is no-thing that is real, that does represent them.
They have no possibility of being percieved.
They cannot be constructed anywhere, in any possible world.

If X does not exist, then, there is no primary predicate true of it!
That is, there is no primary property that it has.
There is no primary truth that applies to it.

For example:

Everything is bald or it is non-bald.

but,
1. The present king of France is bald, is false.
and
2. The present king of France is non-bald, is false.

That is to say,
The present king of France is not, bald or non-bald.

therefore,

The present king of France is not a thing at all.
i.e. it does not exist.

Witt

John Page

SGS:

I just don't get this. Do you have references or links I can follow to understand how you hold this belief?

Cheers, John

John Page

Yes, but I was refering to things that are apparently contradictory. In order to explain the difference between apparent contradictions and the "real" underlying explanation requires realism (of some kind).

I can agree that with reality defined as everything in toto, unreal means a null entity. The problem is, we can imagine such a non-existent thing in mental form, we're just saying there is no non-mental corollary.

If we admit confusions of the mind are possible, how can we be sure that we are not confused about this?

Cheers, John

NearNihil Experience

"I'm asking for a proof that our epistemic encounters of "the world" are distinguishable from our encounters with the "hypothetical universe" of the mind. It seems to me that, given the fact that an individual never transcends his/her own subjectivity, the realm of objects in the world can never be encountered - only the phenomena of that "hypothetical universe" of the mind. I don't think your two-tiered (object/perception) system is demonstrable. "

Every time your encounter an object you slighty transcend your subjectivity due to the objective relationship between you and the object. Yes, nonone will transcend their subjectivity fully, but a partnership develops between objective relation and subjective relation. Things do not appear in mind that have never been encountered in some way. No one, way back, just went "I'm going to invent round...then stone...hey this is a ...wheel."
The hypothetical mind-universe is where any and everything can exist...in mind. But according to you we can't even begin to show that the objects from which our perceptions are built are real, but you seem willing to say that our perceptions are real, if not more real than objects. I see where your coming from...the Hindu's have Maya...the Place of Encounters...some mystical area between you and the object where interaction plays out. Not in the object or the mind, but somewhere inbetween.

And your right, this is all probably not demonstarable, but I never said I would. I just said I would give my opinion. You don't have to agree, but it works for me fine. However, sense input can be a good marker for epistemic encounter outside of the mind. Please think of something that doesn't leave some sort of sense perception when encountered. Mental manifestations don't smell, or have light. We just think they do. And, can someone else experience the phenomenon?They're just visions in your head due to chemical stuffs interacting. All the logic in the world is a representation of the world,so too language, but I think both are products of mind.

" Correlation seems to be, as you say, a product of perception, but then, I don't think there could be anything (knowable) that is a product of an object and not a product of a perception. If you know of one, please give an example. "

They can not be seperated. Nothing that is a perception can not not have been a product of an object. Objects give us something to perceive, perceptions are products of encounters with objects. You're presenting a trick question. Of course things can not be knowable that have not been perceived. Perceptions are products of objects and and sometimes, yes, products of other perceptions. How did you get a non-induced perception? A perception from nowhere, no object, or no perception?

"I don't know what you mean by "perceptual manifestation," but no one of whom I'm aware has ever perceived a square circle. This has less, I think, to do with facts about perception than it has to do with mutually exclusive definitions that are inconsistent with one another when taken together. That is a fact of language, not of perception. Had no one ever perceived either a circle or a square in all of human history, a square circle would still be a logically inconsistent notion. "

Perceptual manifestation= picture or voice inn your head refering to some existant. Square-circle= [O]. I just perceived one, or at least the mental space or category it should fall in. The space its there to fill will always be waiting to be filled, because a square-circle exists in mind, but a good solid and consistent example will never be found or formed.
As John Page said,
"I can agree that with reality defined as everything in toto, unreal means a null entity. The problem is, we can imagine such a non-existent thing in mental form, we're just saying there is no non-mental corollary."

Language is tricky, but I just think language is a product of perceptions, as only objects and other percpetions can provide fodder for perceptions...the words we use to describe the objects and perceptions we encounter. Language and logic are secondary processes to perception. Existence is primary, perceptions of this existence are secondary, cognition, rationalization and descriptions must come later in the encounter process. I'm not some much talking about some sort of metaphysical reality, but more of the process of how we encounter ourselves and our world. BTW, I'm pretty sure a square-circle is still a logically inconsistent notion.


"Now you've asked for two very different things. I complied with the first request, but I'll admit that the second is impossible: logic tells no stories that aren't already relatable in ordinary language, and logic originates no metaphysical theses of its own (at least pursuant to this discussion). "

I did say explain both times though. You did not comply with the first request. It's okay, the second is what I really meant by asking the first. my un-clarity knows no bounds.
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try to explain in logical notation green or one or God.
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I didn't say represent or convert to logical notation, I said explain in logical notation(how and why these things exist).
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But what about math? I'll admit my math is lacking. But, math and logic just seem to be a syatem of language and communication, they are just not ethnic or local in origins. Does one really need another language to explain to someone who already knows this communication....two scientists trading formulas between each other?

"E=mc^2."
"Ah, but 2\ 9rx(fmv)"
__________
P-3mt^-10

Imagine this made sense as a conversation. No need of another language for explaination. If you know logic or math then it is an ordinary language to that person.
p->~q. Context would be the barrier; what exactly p and ~q meant to those people talking.

And if not God, green or one, what about pain or pleasure, or hate, or anger, or love, .... any hope for logical explaination there?

"Logic is a function of language, and is only a function of psychology insofar as the language that originates logic is a function of psychology."

I still agree logic is a function of language, but language too is a function of logic. I feel both are secondary to the psyche from which they originate and which is the basis for perception(but not without eyes and ears), thought(but not without language for the innervoice), communication(more language and tongue).


Wheew. Tough room.:notworthy

SlateGreySky

John,

Most of what I'm doing here with logic and language comes from some of the following:

Bertrand Russell (particularly in works like "On Denoting")

A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic

Ludwig Wittgenstein, both his early and late stuff. His Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, compiled by Elizabeth Anscombe, are particularly pertinent to my discussion with ContraTheos regarding the primacy of language with respect to perception.

The shift from perception to language is kind of a double shift, and I get the original turn (mind to world rather than world to mind) from Kant. I think Wittgenstein hints at a linguistic idealism beyond the idealism spawned by Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

Other sources for discussion about the language of logic would include Hintikka, Field, Tarski, Searle, Davidson, Lewis, and Stalnaker, to name a few. Contemporary work in modal logic is a great place to see the relationship of logic to ordinary language.

Some of this stuff is what I'd consider good reading; others of it are boring as hell. Still, each has a contribution to make to this discussion.

Happy reading!

Witt

Witt:
Interesting, but, I don't think that way.
All physical appearances reflect some existence.
Physical illusions 'appear' to be things that cannot physically be, while they do in fact represent something physical.
Physical illusions are confusions of mind, ie. confusions of interpretation, and they are not unreal things at all.

Contradictory events cannot occur.

Unreal things can only be described...they cannot appear in any physical sense.
There is no-thing that is real, that does represent them.
They have no possibility of being percieved.
They cannot be constructed anywhere, in any possible world.

If X does not exist, then, there is no primary predicate true of it!
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John:
Yes, but I was refering to things that are apparently contradictory.

This is the concept of 'paradox'.

The presence of 'paradox' requires a repair to the foundations of 'a useful' language.

The 'useful' structure of language is expresed by Logic.

Logic deals with the extensions of our terms, if 'the' extensions exist.

John: In order to explain the difference between apparent contradictions and the "real" underlying explanation requires realism (of some kind).

Agreed, the situation that is presently providing the 'apparent contradiction' is nontheless displaying some particular existence.

This is where logic begins for us and it's where it ends for lesser creatures without a language.

We interpret ..existent states of affairs.. as showing what is the case, in virtue of presence.

A situation expressed as an arrangement of physical objects is interpreted as an atomic fact in language.
That there is a correspondence between linguistic names and physical presentations is *factual truth*.

Note that there is no correspondence for logical words (names)!
For example, 'not' has no physical representative.

The world does not show what is not the case at all.
Negation is inferred and not given.

John: I can agree that with reality defined as everything in toto, unreal means a null entity. The problem is, we can imagine such a non-existent thing in mental form, we're just saying there is no non-mental corollary.

It's the concept of 'thing' that provides differing ontologies.

For some people, the universe is the totality of existent objects.
For others it is the totality of facts.
IMO, it is the totality of: existent object and existent facts and existent systemic truths and existent mental ideas..ie. stories myths, dreams, etc.

We may be able to deny the physical existence of Santa but we cannot deny the existence of the story that describes its character. God exists in the context of the bible, is true..ie. it does have described properties. (but only within the context of the myth)

This notion 'mental corollary' is the essence of factual or correspondent truth, imo.
I believe it to be primal.

Yes, for the nominalist-materialist-empiricist, everything is those objects which are physical.
(even Russell calls numbers 'convenient fictions')

John: If we admit confusions of the mind are possible, how can we be sure that we are not confused about this?

Our axioms assure us that within the system that uses them, there is no confusion.
What can be know can be known clearly.

Definitiveness and certainty are illusions of decidability.

This kind of certainty..that which we are not confused about..cannot have a method of decision.

Absolute truth requires.. that system which decides all truths, and evidently Godel has shown that there can't be such a sytem.

Witt

John Page

My daughter would say a square is just a circle that's been squishered, and she's much smarter than I am.

Cheers, John