Gurdur

Which would only push back the problem of initial premises, not solve it.

99Percent

The equivalent would be "Ears are an organ for hearing"So what, we are talking about human organs with useful functions.

Alonzo Fyfe: I think we are getting somewhere.Man qua man is an ends for himself - his own happiness. Socially (and objectively), the difference between a tool and man is that you can deal with a man in rational terms if you realize that this man has an end for himself which is to realize his happiness. So not only man is a rational being but he is a self-interested rational being, he acts to satisfy his happiness in a rational way. And this definition is prescriptive.

Alonzo Fyfe

Which are you claiming is the end. "Man qua man", or happiness.

Man <> happiness.

The happiness option, I think, is a little closer to the truth. It ends up falling apart at the fringes, but it is at least heading in the right direction.

The distinction here, as I see it, is the difference between man as object (represented by "man qua man"), and man as subject (represented by "happiness"). So, whichever option you go with makes a great deal of difference.


Man "has an end"? Or man "is an end" (see your first quote). Again, these are not identical. "Man is an end," I would disagree with. "Man has an end" I would agree with.

Again, "man is an end" is consistent with man as object - the thing being pointed to. "Man has an end" is compatible with man as subject -- the thing doing the pointing.

Adrian Selby

99 percent, I think you misunderstand me slightly, perhaps I was being cryptic.

Ears ought to hear is a way of saying that they're what is required for hearing. The meaning of 'ought' here seems to contain an implicit 'Ears ought to hear if there's nothing wrong with them, i.e. ears ought to hear if they're functioning properly' or else 'Ears ought to hear, why else have them?'

There is no normative content in those statements, despite the use of the word 'ought'. This is the only way in which the equivalent is 'Ears are an organ for hearing', no values follow from the latter statement. I do not value my hearing simply in virtue of having ears, for I could not have ears and still value hearing, I simply would have no experience of it.

I thus don't see how you're building values from the facts of us having certain organs. We might happen to value certain organs, but this isn't because they ought to be doing anything.

99Percent

I don't see "man qua man" as an end statement. Man qua man, ie, man as a capacity to be man is the end on itself for him to be happy. To achieve happiness he must fulfill his capacity as man in its essential definition which is to be rational.

Lets use a simple example: Clock qua clock is an ends for itself to keep time.

A clock for it to keep time must first fulfill his capacity as a clock in order for it to keep time. If it doesn't then the clock fails, it not longer keeps time. The clock ought to work as a clock in order for it to keep time.

99Percent

But do you see that if you value something then you are automatically implying an ought? If you value your ears its because they hear. So they ought to hear.

You don't value your appendix because it doesn't do any function for you. There is no "ought" for the appendix.

Adrian Selby

But my choosing to value my ears is entirely subjective. I value them, fine, but this is not derived from the fact of having them. Your use of the word 'ought' here is confusing the issue I think, for me to value them, they have to hear, not 'ought' to hear, 'have' to hear. They have to have the capacity for hearing, which is different from the prescriptive notion.

The clock has to work as a clock in order for it to keep time.

The former is somehow commenting on what the clock should do, the latter is stating that for one event to occur, there is to be a single prior state of affairs, namely, functioning parts of a clock.

The two are equivalent common language ways of saying what clocks do when they work, they keep time. On this reading, a person's valuing the clock is entirely separate from your quote above.

99Percent

I fail to see the difference between "ought to" and "has to". Both are prescriptive to me.

It would be different for example if you said: You hear because you have ears or you don't hear because you don't have ears. In thes cases its descriptive. There is no value judgement involved. But if you value your ears then you say: I value my ears because they are for hearing therefore I ought to hear with my ears. If I don't hear then there is something wrong, something bad with my ears. So yes, your original equivalency "Ears doing hearing is good", is correct too. "Ears not doing hearing is bad"

Alonzo Fyfe

Not such a simple example.

I am unable to parse a meaningful definition of this statement.

A clock has no "ends for itself". The only "ends" that a clock has are the ends of clock-users. Clock-users use clocks to keep time. The clock itself does not care one way or another.

Ears are tools that serve the ends of ear-users -- they, too, have no ends for themselves.

Reason is a tool. It has no end for itself; its end is to serve the ends of reason-users.

Man is not a tool. Man is the tool-user - the being whose ends provide the value for tools such as clocks, ears, and reason. Anything we say about the value of tools qua tools does not apply to man qua man.

This goes to the core of my reasons for ultimately rejecting objectivist thought. They consistently make this unjustifiable leap of logic, from talking about the value of X as a tool for X-users, to the value of X as an end in itself, when, to employ a cliche, "You can't get there from here."

Man is the X-user, not the X.

tk

...seems to lie with the ambiguity of the word "ought" in English. When you say, "He ought to be coming", it can mean two things:

1. The `natural' interpretation: a factual statement: "He is coming, otherwise something odd is happening."
2. An `unnatural' interpretation: a moral statement: "He is morally obliged to come."

To further complicate matters, when you say, "Rape is sinful", you are in fact making a moral statement, even though the statement uses the word "is".

To introduce yet another twist, when you say, "My ear is bad", you are not making a moral statement. Rather, you mean, "My ear is not working as I think it should." But whether your ear has the moral obligation to work for you, or whether it just happened to evolve into a hearing mechanism, is yet another question.

Perhaps we should focus more on the content of statements, rather than the form of statements: instead of talking about "is" and "ought" propositions, we can talk about moral and amoral propositions.

Did I say that the English language is wonderful?