Plump-DJ

JJL

Whoops! Perhaps i jumped in to eagerly. There's been so many of these discussions on a number of message boards *all at once* that i assumed I was "on target". None the less I shall respond as best i can below.

Well for a start i was speaking of my initial inspections. Given the reudctionism that Atheism entails for me and all the obvious implications of such reductionism (moral sense created by time+chance+darwinian 'survival of the fitest') I could at least see that theism doesn't have that same "nothing but-a" sense about it. In otherwords we have another option for the source of our moral sensibilities given the truth of the theistic position, something other then this Darwinian process.

If atheism cannot affirm a solid foundation, then there are two options. However *I* was working on the presumption that theism does not have the same problems as atheism in regards to our meta-ethical foundations -- having read something about the issue's involved here. Hence I only have 1 real option. I could conclude that morals are purely subjective, but that's rather problematic when we come to the meainging of terms like "right" and "Good" and "Evil".

1) How does it follow that a Good God which exists and allows the existence of 'bad stuff' is moraly bankrupt and therefore not a valid foundation for an ethical system?

2) What are we to mean by a moraly bankrupt foundation anyway, if i may ask? I would assume the basic argument is that it entails a contradiction at some point (between God and the justified existence of bad stuff) and therefore on logical grounds it must be rejected.

As for free will or Deontic constraints, it effectively removes the problem of "human centred or created evil".

[ October 24, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

Rusting Car Bumper

Well is this the ONLY question you are asking?

If I may rearrange the question:
If a creator is the basis or foundation of morality itself, then does that imply that one must understand the creator in order to understand morality?

Take a parallel analogy to deism. Deists tend to believe that, even though God is the creator, the workings of the universe can be known through methods that don't require understanding the deity. (i.e. science.)

Likwise, the mere proposition that god is the source of morality does not imply in itself the proposition that one must believe or understand god to understand morality.

Thus, even if a supernatural creator is the basis of morality, it would be yet another discussion to show that one needs to believe in it or understand the diety to "be a moral person" or "to act morally."

DC

[ October 24, 2002: Message edited by: DigitalChicken ]</p>

Plump-DJ

Bumpty Boos.

jlowder

When I worded my question, I chose my words very carefully. Your re-wording of my question destroys the very meaning I was trying to get across. My point was this: assume for the sake of argument there exists a disembodied mind who created the physical universe (and hence metaphysical naturalism is false). From the fact that such a supernatural being exists, what reason is there to believe that it is the basis or foundation of morality? Your re-wording of my question missed my point, since it is NOT part of the concept of a supernatural creator that that creator is the foundation of morality. Indeed, for the sake of argument, we can even throw in the assumption that the creator is morally perfect. It makes no difference to my question. The point of my question is to solicit an argument for the conclusion that God is the foundation of morality.

That would indeed be another discussion, for it is not at all what I was asking about. (Please don't misunderstand me. I'm not saying it would not be a worthwhile or valuable discussion; rather, I'm just saying that that is a different question from the one I'm asking.) Your question presupposes that a supernatural creator is the foundation of morality, whereas my question disputes that presupposition.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

jlowder

Plump-DJ,

I still do not find any reason in your latest post for believing that God is the foundation of morality. You wrote:

I agree that our "moral sense" can be given a Darwinian explanation. But there is a big difference between our "moral sense" and moral realism. Our "moral sense," as I understand the expression, refers to moral epistemology: it refers to our sense of what is morally right and wrong. In contrast, moral realism refers to moral ontology. So what you have shown is that metaphysical naturalism has implications for moral epistemology. (I agree with that.) You have not shown that metaphysical naturalism has implications for moral ontology. More importantly, <strong>and this is the actual topic of the "Can Theists Have Morals?" thread (as opposed to the "Can Atheists Have Morals?" thread),</strong> none of this shows how God is the foundation of morality.

I wrote:

You replied:

This isn't an argument. Again, even if (for the sake of argument) atheism logically entailed nihilism (and hence moral realism were false), that still wouldn't answer the question of how theism provides a basis or foundation for morality. We are still waiting for an explanation of how God is the foundation of morality.

To refer to the Holocaust as "bad stuff" is to trivialize the suffering and misery and depravity of what happened. To refer to a "God" that allows moral evils (e.g., the Holocaust) and natural evils (e.g., the biological role of pain and pleasure) as "good" is to beg the question. If such a being existed, it would not be morally good. That is why, in that sense, such a god who allegedly forms the basis of morality is morally bankrupt.

As I understand Grunbaum's argument, Grunbaum wasn't really trying to defend the atheological argument from evil. Rather, Grumbaum was using theistic responses to the argument from evil to show that theistic ethics is bankrupt. I interpret Grunbaum's comment that theological ethics are "bankrupt" to mean either (1) that such ethical systems entail objectively false ethical statements (e.g., "It was morally permissible for God (if he exists) to allow the Holocaust"), or (2) theistic answers to the argument from evil have made theism so plastic that virtually anything could be morally permissible for God to allow. In any case, that's my interpretation, but I refer you to Grunbaum's article so that you can form your own opinion.

Regards,

Jeffery Jay Lowder

P.S. Sorry for the delay in getting back to you.

kctan

Plump-DJ, allow me to give it a shot.

What are the problems here ? Giving objectivity to subjectivity is something which we must have inorder to make sense of this world. To make a social contract viable, it is neccessary that certain subjective actions or behaviours to be made objective.

However, it is still open to debate as to the objectivity of such actions or behaviours as allowance are always given when it can be demonstrated or justified that the action or behaviour being carried out contrary to the agreed norm is warranted.

How do you define an action to be 'right', 'wrong' & 'evil' ?

What & where do the standards come from ?

What about actions or behaviours not defined before ? How sure are you that the standard you're using for these actions or behaviours is correct then ?

Said god is said to be omnipotent. If you don't know what it means, check it up first.

Yes.

It never removes such 'evils' as tornadoes, earthquakes, sudden infant death syndromes, ebola virus, AIDS, typhoons, droughts, floods, famines, the common cold, headaches, migrants, influnenza, typhoid fever, small pox, EHDs, strokes etc...

Using a non-deistic morality, you don't have the above 'evils'.

Plump-DJ

JJL.

Well that's your choice. I don't believe i'm here to defend that proposition . I'm here to contest the claim that God is a bankrput foundation for a rational ethic. For the record the argument you mention here seems to rely on a certain definition of God does it not? The word omnipotent and it's meaning is crucial to this discussion. I accept omnipotent to mean "do things consistent with God's own nature". If God can condradict himself then we can have no thoughts about that. (ie create the universe and not create the universe)

Ok.. since we're discussing this in the other thread let's leave it there.

Yes I know. One could start with because 'God works as a foundation and athiesm does not'. I mean we really are going to end up covering the same ground in the other thread I think so maybe it should be left there.

Perhaps i need to keep things on a serious level here.

1) Who is to blame for the holocaust? Is it God? Let's just say God exists, and God is good and the holocaust happened. Shall we conclude that God is to blame for the actions of men? Is this not where your argument leads? If not, should God have "come down" as it were and prevented this? I can't see what other options exist here?

2) Lets say God exists and God watches on as the Germans decimate 6 million Jews does it follow that God approves of this? Does he wish his creations to cause pain and suffering to each other? Does it follow that he's a bad God perhaps?

I would argue that if God did prevent it he would contradict his own nature by removing the honest choice of his creations. A God that denies the honesty of choices that we make would contradict his own nature as a good, honest God and therefore he cannot do. I hope you agree and see that this is a moral tight tope to walk. A moral balancing act (freedom vs "interference / planning" or limitations) so delicate you'd probably need to be a God too pull it off.

3) In regards to Natural evil, I would personaly see this as the strongest argument against the existence of a goodly "interested" in his creation God. (Impersonal grounds of being remain unaffected) I've never seen the problem with evil caused and perpetuated by humans as holding against God's existence. I will have to admit ignorance on this issue. In fact i've read very little on the problem of natural evil and possible responses. I'm sure however the issue of freedom, honest freedom may play a role in such a theodicy.

Well fair enough. If i may say it seems obvious to me that one must balance freedom with limitations. That is why i never saw human centred evil as an argument against God's existence. You know the sort of -- "Damm you God for allowing my brother the freedom to get drunk and then allowing him the freedom to drive himself into my wife's car killing her. *Dam you to Hell*" I personaly would only consider natural evil as holding any real weight as an argument against God's existence.

No need to apologise. I assume you are spreading yourself 'thin' across different threads.

PDJ

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

Plump-DJ

This is all to much at this stage. (it's very late here) I agree that the terms must be agreed upon first. However i assumed that JJL and myself are working on a sort of "collective intuition" in regards to the meanings of these words like Evil and Wrong, etc.

I explain what i think it means below. That is doing things consistent with his own nature.

Each natural 'evil' must be looked at on a case by case basis. The positives and the negatives must be wayed up. The case must be constructed. However intialy i would agree that natural evil is the strongest argument against God's existence in my view. I've never really found any of the other's compelling.

Rusting Car Bumper

Yes. Intentionally so as I was trying to expand the discussion into more practical and everyday realms. Regardless of which two categories of answers are given to your question, (ie "no reason" or "some reasons") it still may be the case that either category of answer is not really relevant with regard to practical consequences.

If we answer your question, "There is no reason" then that's one thing. However, *even if* we answer that "there are reasons to believe that creator is the basis or foundation of morality itself" then we are still burdened with additional questions in order to determine that there are any practical consequences to *either* answer.

That is why a parallel to deism is interesting. If we say that "the creator is the foundation for natural laws in the universe but doesnt take an active role in the universe" then this has little or no consequential difference when compared to a state of affairs where natural laws were not the result of a creator. In both cases, natural laws are (presumably) knowable, testable and understandable without need for knowledge of a god or creator.

Likewise, we can replace "natural law" in the above passage with "morality" (and make any other sensible changes if needed), and we can see that we can make similar argument and thus the theist might actually have an extra burden.

DC

Ted Hoffman

Plump-DJ : I'm here to contest the claim that God is a bankrput foundation for a rational ethic.

Intensity : By definition, belief in God is irrational because it is not based on any reasoned evidence or rational argument. It is based on faith: unquestioning belief.

So to act based on the rules purpotedly underlined by this deity (whatever his definition) is not a rational act but an act of piety. It would involve killing ones son when told to do so (thanks to Abraham).

So any ethic based on a deity is bankrupt in terms of rationality for the precise reason that piousness has no room for rationality but total obedience. And because if one were to start reasoning, it would discount the need to rely on the deity's wishes as a basis for morality or ethics: it would be a claim of ones ability to determine the best course of action based on his/her own reasoning ability.

But we would sure like to see you lay out how God can provide a valid foundation for a rational ethic.

Plump-DJ : The word omnipotent and it's meaning is crucial to this discussion. I accept omnipotent to mean "do things consistent with God's own nature".

Intensity : To have a nature is a constraint and thus God can NOT be said to be omnipoent if he has a nature, because he must then act ONLY according to his nature.

And that would open a can of worms: how did God get his nature? why does God have a nature? what would happen in the absence of Gods nature - would he lose "control" of himself?

Plump-DJ : 1) Who is to blame for the holocaust? Is it God? Let's just say God exists, and God is good and the holocaust happened. Shall we conclude that God is to blame for the actions of men? Is this not where your argument leads? If not, should God have "come down" as it were and prevented this? I can't see what other options exist here?

Intensity : Man is to blame for the holocaust. But man was acting on his God-given instincts and with the abilities that he was given by God. So God cannot be absolved from responsibility.
Is free-will good when it is clear that it is bringing a lot of pain - especially to the same agent that granted it? Would you design a robot with feelings and give it free will then sit back as the robots kill each other and then claim that all you want is happiness for the robots?
Would intervening rob man of free-will? Are you saying that God is incapable of intervening in a subtle, covert manner to change the acts of mankind? a disease, a bad weather, he could have implanted the belief in Hitlers mind that no human should be killed etc, and could have saved lots of lives by that kind of intervention.

But God did not. He stayed up. That means "staying up" is more important to him that the hapiness of mankind (making him irrational). Or, he was incapable of acting (contradicts omnipotent), or he doesnt exist (makes a lot of sense).

His inaction during a period of pain and suffering for mankind is inconsistent with the claim that God wants mankind to be happy. He has no overriding desire for mankind to be happy because if he did he would have intervened. But he did not, for no known reason.

Plump-DJ : 2) Lets say God exists and God watches on as the Germans decimate 6 million Jews does it follow that God approves of this? Does he wish his creations to cause pain and suffering to each other? Does it follow that he's a bad God perhaps?

Intensity : It depends on what you define as a good God. If it is in his nature to watch passively as mankind suffers, we can't say he is bad because he can't help being himself - acting according to his nature.
If he has an overriding desire for the happiness of mankind, then I would expect a rational God to act in intervention and stop the suffering. If he does not, then he is irrational - he cannot act to bvring his desires to reality.
Why did God give us free will? So that we would be happy and free. If the guiding principle behind granting mankind free-will was for mankind to be happy, then its only rational to intervene when the free-will idea goes bad - dont you agree?

Plump-DJ : I would argue that if God did prevent it he would contradict his own nature by removing the honest choice of his creations.

Intensity : Why is it Gods nature not to remove the honest choice of his creations? And how do you know this?

Plump-DJ : A moral balancing act (freedom vs "interference / planning" or limitations) so delicate you'd probably need to be a God too pull it off.

Intensity : Well, did God pull it off according to you? (as far as the holocaust is concerned)

Plump-DJ : I'm sure however the issue of freedom, honest freedom may play a role in such a theodicy.

Intensity : Well, it doesn't.