njhartsh

I posted this a few years ago on iidb (I am not a "New User," grrr...), but the thread didn't go very far. Maybe it'll have better luck this time.

It's probably worthwhile to note that I was (and am) using "objectivism" to mean "the belief that there are certain moral truths that would remain true whatever anyone or everyone thought, felt or desired." Meanwhile, and largely consequently, I'm defining "subjectivism" as "the belief that moral truths stem entirely from what sentient beings think, feel and/or desire."

Of course, those definitions are debatable and arguably insufficiently precise, but I'm skeptical that any legitimate revisions to them would make a difference with regard to what follows here.

--

One sling that is frequently cast at subjectivist ethical theories is that considering ethics to be subjective reduces it to a "matter of taste." This is meant as an insult, but actually I think there are some revealing parallels between the two phenomena.

In essence, I think taste (by which I mean "the preference for or against a given food") is a good example of a subjective system of perceptions; it enables subjectivists like me to demonstrate that several objectivist canards (such as "subjectivism implies that there is no right or wrong") are clearly false.

I would also like to point out that I'm not saying that taste and ethics are entirely identical; for instance, the vast majority of people (IMO rightfully) consider ethics to be far more important than taste in food. However, it appears to me that the epistemological status of the two is exactly the same.

To illustrate, here are two propositions:

(1) George Bush (Sr.) thinks that broccoli tastes awful.
(2) Njhartsh thinks that broccoli tastes delicious.

If certain of my empirical observations (about ex-President Bush's tastes, about my identity, etc.) are correct, then both (1) and (2) are objectively true. But what is the objective truth about the taste of broccoli? Is it awful or delicious?

Clearly--and I think that ethical objectivists and ethical subjectivists can agree here--there is no objective truth about that taste; and absent some means (which could only be subjective) of valuing one food over another, Bush and I are at simple loggerheads.

Significantly, no one in his right mind would argue that the above disagreement means that "there is no such thing as delicious" (even though it does at least call into question the existence of objective delicious-ness). Further, no reasonable person would claim that the above disagreement means I have no right to claim that broccoli is delicious. Obviously I have that right; I'm just voicing my subjective response to a particular stimulus.

In contrast, here are two further propositions:

(3) George Bush (either one) thinks that capital punishment is right.
(4) Njhartsh thinks that capital punishment is wrong.

Once again, if my empirical observations are accurate, then both (3) and (4) are objectively true. (I assure you that (4) is objectively true.) But what is the objective truth about the morality of capital punishment? Is it right or wrong?

For exactly the same reasons as the earlier situation, I don't think we have any reason to say that there is an objective truth on that matter. And for the same reasons as above, such a subjectivist conclusion certainly does not imply that "there is no right and wrong."


There are other parallels between the two phenomena. For example, taste, like ethics, is very likely instilled in human beings through inborn genetic drives (there's a reason manure doesn't taste good but sugar does), cultural conditioning and personal will. Second, there is at least an analog to "ethical argumentation" in food, to wit: "Junior, what do you mean you don't like your lasagna? You like everything in it: noodles, hamburger, tomato sauce and cheese. Of course you like it." And third, the way we describe our tastes has an important similarity to the way we describe our moral perspectives: much of the time, we don't admit the subjectivity involved. (I generally say "Broccoli is delicious," not "Broccoli tastes delicious in my aesthetic judgment"--even though the second statement is much more accurate.)


In any case, the existence of unquestionably subjective standards of taste in food demonstrates the existence of a system with most, if not all, of the attributes that subjectivists claim morals have. To my mind, this constitutes powerful evidence that a subjective theory of ethics is anything but impossible; and it remains for objectivists to show either (a) that taste (and every other aesthetic system) is objective or (b) that there is some fundamental difference between taste and ethics that makes the comparison objectively useless.

Good luck.

- Nathan

tronvillain

Well, no argument here. That is pretty much the position that I usually argue for when subjective/objective morality comes up around this place.

Wiploc

Maybe if you did a worse job then you could get more responses because we could make corrections.

Nice post.
crc

Alonzo Fyfe

So, when Njhartsh "thinks that capital punishment is wrong," what is it, exactly, that Njhartsh thinks?

When he thinks that capital punishment is wrong, is it truly the same type of thing as what he thinks when he thinks that broccoli is delicious?

I would bet that when Njhartsh thinks "broccoli is delicious", one of the things he does NOT imply from this is that George Bush ought to eat broccoli. Or that, if George Bush were to refuse to eat broccoli, George Bush is doing something wrong.

And, yet, when Njhartsh thinks "capital punishment is wrong," he does draw the implication from this that George Bush ought not to be executing people.

This illustrates that there is a fundamental difference between moral value and food value. Preference-claims have an entirely different meaning from moral claims. This is illustrated by the fact that the two different types of claims use entirely different types of evidence, and allows for entirely different types of implications.

Can you imagine two people in a forum debating with each other whether broccoli is delicious or not? Drawing in evidence, trying to convince the other? Of course not. Such a situation would be absurd.

And yet, here we are surrounded by people arguing about whether capital punishment, or homosexual acts, or church/state separation, or the eating of meat, or suicide, or adultery, or whatever is right or not.

Further evidence that moral claims are an entirely different type of claim than food-preference claims.

When it comes to your definition of objective and subjective, I would be one to say simply that it is not precise enough. The only type of value that exists, exists in the form of relationships between states of affairs and desires. Without desires, there is no value. That is plain enough.

But there is a huge number of different types of relationships that can exist. And when we want to know what 'moral value' is, we need to find the relationship between states of affairs and desires that makes sense both of the forms of evidence people draw upon when making moral claims, as well as the implications that they take to be legitimately drawn from those claims.

And the food-preference model fails utterly on that regard.

What succeeds?

I would not be able to give the full argument here, but the relevant differences that I see are as follows.

(1) Just as the ultimate object of food-preferences claims are foods, the ultimate object of moral-claims are desires themselves.

(2) With respect to food-preference claims, the only desires (tastes) that are relevant are those of the person doing the eating. With respect to moral claims, desires are evaluated according to how they stand in relationship to all other desires, regardless of whose they may be.

(3) Food preference claims are only concerned with the "direct" effect of the food -- is it pleasing to taste or is it not. It pays no attention to the indirect value of the food (it's vitamin content, its ability to lower cholesterol or to fight cancer, its contribution to diabetes, etc.). Moral evaluations are concerend with both the direct and the indirect effect of desires in the fulfillment of other desires.

When objectivists mock agent-subjectivism, I think that the mocking is justified. Agent-subjectivism really has very little to recommend it. Of course, intrinsic value theory has even less to recommend it. To somebody who thinks that these are a mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive set of options, I can see how agent-subjectivism can be a tempting theory.

However, the mistake is in thinking that those who reject intrinsic values have no option but to accept agent-subjectivism. There are a great many other options available.

If you wish to read, in detail, the option that I think makes the most sense -- as well as, in detail, why I find agent subjectivism to be totally without merit, you may find my reasoning in a series of posts I have been submitting in the thread:

Ethics Without God

Note: You do not need to read these in order. Each section has been written to make sense on its own -- I hope. You can, if you wish, simply look for those having to do with objective value and read those.

Wiploc

He can refuse to eat it all he wants, but if he can't recognize that it tastes good, he's like, brain damaged or something.

I say that tongue-in-cheek, but we really do feel a little bit that way, don't we? Look at how evangelical the lovers of that nasty jazz music are. Don't we think people get it right when they come to agree with us on matters of taste.

Quote:

And, yet, when Njhartsh thinks "capital punishment is wrong," he does draw the implication from this that George Bush ought not to be executing people. This illustrates that there is a fundamental difference between moral value and food value. Preference-claims have an entirely different meaning from moral claims. This is illustrated by the fact that the two different types of claims use entirely different types of evidence, and allows for entirely different types of implications. Can you imagine two people in a forum debating with each other whether broccoli is delicious or not? Drawing in evidence, trying to convince the other? Of course not. Such a situation would be absurd.

It couldn't be more absurd than some of the ethical arguments we see here.

We don't see that kind of argument about broccoli because there are checks on our perceptions of rightness. "I didn't used to like bleu cheese dressing, but now I do. My father, who is a great man, drinks <yuck!> coffee with every appearance of pleasure. He may be slightly reduced in superiority by this, but it doesn't make him actually evil."

We don't have those checks, at least not as strongly, in the metaphysical realm. "Yes, my metaphysical opinion has changed, but for the better (not just to a different position). Yes, some otherwise good men promote belief in original sin, but that makes them positively evil."

So, it seems to me interestingly plausible that moral claims are similar to claims about taste. I really truly believe that Pulp Fiction is a better movie than Attack of the Killer Tomatoes 2, and that is exactly the kind of thing that gets debated at length.

Quote:

And yet, here we are surrounded by people arguing about whether capital punishment, or homosexual acts, or church/state separation, or the eating of meat, or suicide, or adultery, or whatever is right or not. Further evidence that moral claims are an entirely different type of claim than food-preference claims.

I don't say that you're wrong. I'm just toying with the notion that you're wrong. I made the above arguments to see how they feel to me, not because I'm convinced they're right.

Quote:

When it comes to your definition of objective and subjective,

I pretty much quit reading another thread because I couldn't keep track of your different types of objectivity and subjectivity. I encourage you to seek better mnemonics than just numbering them. You're a really good writer, and you blindside me with insight. I just think you could be even better if you were, in this specific way, easier to read.

Quote:

I would be one to say simply that it is not precise enough. The only type of value that exists, exists in the form of relationships between states of affairs and desires. Without desires, there is no value. That is plain enough.

You can't have a value without a valuer. Nothing can be good unless it is good for something.


Change of subject:
Here's where I, at least tentatively, disagree with your moral theory: Yours is a theory about what what people would mean if they were not contradicting themselves. I entertain the notion that we are contradicting ourselves, that our moral thoughts conflate contradictory ideas but our moral language presents them as though they were had a single consistent basis.

You're saying, "If moralists aren't nuts, what do their statements mean?" And I'm saying, "Maybe they're just nuts."

I don't really mean that. But I do mean that when someone --- let's call him Joe --- when Joe says loyalty is moral, he means it helps the tribe to prosper; but if he says incest is immoral, he means it disgusts him and is forbidden by god. Different meanings for the same word, with the inconsistency hidden from both the speaker and listener.

Therefore, while I love your theory, and find it very illuminating, I'm not sure it is a description of what people really mean by moral language.


Above, I said, "Maybe they're just nuts," but I don't want to leave it there. I assume there are articulable moral theorys that underlie moral language. People aren't really nuts just because they contradict themselves. It's worth studying the nature of the underlying theories, and how they conflict, and how they are harmonized, and how people hide their internal conflicts from themselves.

There's nothing wrong with me using first gear on a steep hill and drive on the freeway; nor is it wrong for me to prefer utilitarianism most of the time but to fall back on Kantian rationalization when I can't make anything else work. I don't confuse myself when I say I always use the "best" gear, but I may confuse myself when I say I always make the "moral" choice.
crc

Alonzo Fyfe

There may be some of this snobbishness, but nothing that can come remotely close to covering the distance between that exists in the differences between 'good and poor taste' and 'right and wrong'.

Whether it is jazz music, or a 'fine wine', or opera, or a Picasso, the cost of 'getting it wrong' is simply to be looked down upon.

But, where one 'gets it wrong' in the sense of committing rape, or murder, or theft, or or any of the long list of moral wrongs, the penalty is far more severe. 'Poor taste' is not generally taken to imply that punishment is justified.

This is the crucial difference between 'taste' and 'morality' that the original essay fails to account for. 'Taste' is intrapersonal -- it concerns only the taster. Morality is, by its very nature, interpersonal.

To speak of an intrapersonal morality is like talking about a round square. Such a person is doing nothing more than inventing a different language.


Oh, but if morality were truly a 'taste' as was originally proposed, then we would have the same checks to our perceptions. In talking about right and wrong, we would merely report whether or not a person has a 'taste for' having sex with their step daughter, or a 'taste for' embezzlement, and that would be the end of it.

We do not have these checks on our perception because perception alone is not sufficient for moral value the way it is for taste. Again, the difference lies in the fact that morality is essentially concerned with interpersonal value in a way that taste does not. So, in an ethics discussion, people come armed with all sorts of arguments that aim to prove their point about this interpersonal value -- a type of evidence that is entirely out of place when discussing the relative merits of vanilla vs. chocolate ice cream.


Thank you.

I try to be 'easier to read' -- and try not to use several different ways of saying the same thing, and to test by the types of reactions that I receive which seems to make the most sense to others.

However, some have complained even about this, arguing that my disposition to try different ways of saying the same thing is ITSELF confusing.


In a sense, I agree with both of these claims -- but both are susceptable to misinterpretation.

You can't have a value without a valuer.

Moral value, I would wager, requires more than a valuer, it requires at least two -- again, this is because morality is essentiall interpersonal. If the universe consisted of only one person, now and in the future, without any possibility of a second person coming into existence, then there is no such thing as morality, or immorality. The same cannot be said about taste, because taste, as I said, is essentially intrapersonal.

[i]Nothing can be good unless it is good for something.[i].

Try this instead. Nothing can be good unless it is good to somebody -- but not necessarily for something.

If A can only be good if it is good for B, and B can only be good if it is good for C, and C can only be good if it is good for D, then you have started an infinite chain, unless something, ultimately, can be good in itself without being good for something else. There is a legitimate question to ask, then, about what ends this infinite chain.

I argue that desire ends this chain. The two most common forms of desire, are the desire for pleasure, and the aversion to pain. Pleasure is not desired for something, it is simply desired. Period.


I agree that people often make contradictory claims and hold contradictory beliefs. Yet, at the same time, I hold -- and I take it to be a very common belief -- that where there is a contradiction, there is a mistake. And mistakes are to be corrected (removed, obliterated, squashed). The ultimate objective (even when we have failed to reach the goal) is to discover what the end product would be once the contradictions and errors are removed.

It may still be the case that, once the contradictions are removed, there is nothing left. If this is the case -- if there truly is nothing left -- then we should quit talking about morality and talk, instead, about something that actually exists.

Such an outcome would have no real effect on the theory I propose. We would have to change the language a little -- to a search and replace that switches particular combinations of letters (words) with others. But the substance would remain the same.


There is another option -- that when he says it is immoral he says that it is something that no person ought to do. When asked why they ought not to do it, his answer may be that "it helps the tribe to prosper" or "it is forbidden by God." But neither of these are a part of the meaning of the term.

Take, for example, acceleration (in physics). Acceleration is change in velocity over time. Why did something accelerate? A person may answer that it is because of gravity, or because somebody pushed it, or because God willed it. These are different explanations. However, none of these explanations are built into the meaning of the term 'acceleration.' The meaning of 'acceleration' is limited simply to the brute fact of change of velocity over time.

Notice what happens, in the case of acceleration, when it is discovered that God does not exist. Suddenly, the explanation of things accelerating because God willed it disappears. However, acceleration itself does not cease to exist.

The same is true of 'ought to be done' and 'ought not to be done' if we take God as an explanation, rather than a part of the definition. Once God is removed, the 'ought to be done' or 'ought not to be done' remains. It is only the explanation that changes.

Now, to add a different level of complexity, assume that a physicist actually builds 'God willed it' into his predictions, and assigns a non-zero value to this 'force', and uses it to predict the motion of things. His answer is incorrect. Things will not move as his theory predicts, until he assigns a zero value to 'willed by God.'

Again, the same applies to morality. A person who assigns a non-zero value to 'forbidden by God' is going to get an incorrect answer. He will not get the correct answer until he assigns a zero value to 'forbidden by God'.

We can deal with all of these issues, without building 'forbidden by God' into the very meaning of 'wrong' -- just as we can, in physics, by not building 'willed by God' into the very meaning of acceleration.

tronvillain

Alonzo Fyfe:
Well, I can't speak for Njartsh, but when I think that capitcal punishment is wrong, it is truly the same type of thing as what I think when I think that broccoli is delicious. It is an interesting comparison, since I do not find broccoli especially delicious and am only slightly opposed to capital punishment.

Ah, the classic confused response to the "morality as taste" argument. To make things a little more symmetrical, let us say that "broccoli is disgusting." When we say "capital punishment is wrong" we mean that capital punishment bothers us, so in this case, George Bush executing someone is analagous to Njhartsh eating broccoli, not to George Bush eating broccoli. Our moral sense of taste is exposed to the entire world, not only to what we do ourselves.

Ah, but that is only evidence that moral claim are entirely different type of claim than food-preference claims if you assert that arguments about the morality of capital punishment, homosexuality, adultery, vegetarianism and so on are not absurd. As far as I can tell, the vast majority of such arguments are exactly analagous to people debating about whether or not broccoli is delicious. Oh, there are cases where evidence is relevant and people are convinced, but that is simply a matter of morality being a more complex than flavour: sometimes the dish is not completely exposed to your taste buds.

Wiploc

I'm reminded of a Baptist I met in Houston. We were drinking whiskey. He considered his glass, and said, "I'm going to Hell for drinking, I know; but at least I'm not a Presbiterian. Presbiterians sit right down with the preacher and drink. Now that's wrong."

I'll admit he was disturbed by the libetine behavior of the Presbiterians, but he didn't seem the least bothered by his own behavior, which he also regarded as wrong. And of course some things bother us which we don't think of as wrong, having our teeth drilled, for instance.

And some people just like to be bad. For them, badness is not botheration; badness is where the juice is.
"A stolen apple is always sweeter than a boughten apple."

While there is a positive correlation between what bothers people and what they think is immoral, often the immorality is the only thing about it that bothers them.
crc

Alonzo Fyfe

Actually, I do not think this is true. Why? Because I assume that, as you grew up, you learned English at an early age -- when you were much too young to reflect on the meaning of various terms. In doing so, you learned to use words like 'right', 'wrong', and other moral terms in their standard English ways. That even today you use these terms in these ways without giving it much thought. That even though you may think that 'taste' best describes the way that you use the term, but in fact it does not.

Of course, this assumption could be incorrect. Maybe you did not learn English at a young age, or in learning English did not include the standard English usage of moral terms in that learning. If you actually acquired an understanding of moral terms that is the same as your understanding of matters of taste, then you have your own personal language. You are not talking about the same thing that native English speakers are talking about. It is like the person who decides that they will use the word 'triangle' to refer to four-sided figures (instead of three-sided figures). The fact that this may be true of one person or another provides no objection to the geometry text book that says that the sum of the interior angles in a triangle equals 180 degrees. When discussing the properties of triangles, the relevant definition remains the English definition, not the Tronvillain definition. When it comes to standard English usage of moral terms, the 'taste' definition makes as little sense as the four-sided figure definition of 'triangle'.

Ultimately, my prediction is that if one were to follow your around and track your usage of moral terms, that they would find all sorts of uses that deviate from that which would be consistent with the 'taste' theory and, instead, be more consistent with the traditional English meaning of the term. It is just a prediction. I could be wrong. But if I am wrong, then the problem of using the four-sided figure definion of 'triangle' would still apply.


Ah, the classic equivocation of the agent-subjectivism, to switch to assessor-subjectivism when the flaws of agent-subjectivism is identified. And then, to switch back to agent-subjectivism when the flaws of assessor-subjectivism are pointed out.

How is the taste-theory of value like the four-sided-figure theory of a triangle? The taste-theory of value (in either agent-subjectivist or assessor-subjectivist forms) fails to account for the following:

(1) When one person says 'X is wrong', and another says 'X is not wrong', native speakers take this to be a contradiction. But differences in taste are not taken to be a contradiction.

(2) In making and defending moral claims, native English speakers take the wellbeing of others to be necessarily relevant. 'Taste' theory treats it as contingently relevant.

(3) Another essential element of moral claims that does ot apply to taste claims is that the former are required to be universal. A person who is not willing to universalize a claim about right and wrong is understood to not be making a moral claim; but there is no requirement of universalizability in matters of taste.

(4) Taste exists even if a world consists of just one person (is intrapersonal), morality requires more than one person (is interpersonal).

(5) People discussing items of taste take a claim such as 'I like X' to be not only relevant, but decisive, in setting certain relevant questions. People discussing right and wrong take a claim such as 'I like X' to be substantially irrelevant, and certainly not decisive, in settling such issues.

(6) When it comes to translating other languages into English, translating 'taste' terms in another language into 'moral' claims in English is considered a mistake.

(7) Native speakers never take another person to be mistaken about what he likes and does not like. But we often take other people to be mistaken with respect to what they claim is right and wrong.

'Taste' theory is woefully inadequate in accounting for the way that native English speakers use moral terms, just as the 'four sided figure' theory of 'triangle' is woefully inadequate in accounting for the way that native English speakers use the word 'triangle'.

Now, a common rebuttal to this is to say that the 'problems' above cannot be addressed without supposing the existence of intrinsic value. And intrinsic value does not exist. Thus, we must toss out all of the elements above. And when we toss them out, we are left with agent-subjectivism (or assessor-subjectivism).

But this is not true. There are ways of accounting for all of the above elements without 'intrinsic value'. All that is required is a simple shift. Where 'taste' claims directly relate certain objects of evaluation to the desires of an individual, 'moral' claims both directly and indirectly relate certain objects of evaluation to all desires regardless of who has them.

On this account, there is still no intrinsic value -- no value independent of desire. But the question of which desires are relevant is answered differently in matters of morality than it is in matters of taste. Matters of taste take the relevant desires to be those of the individual. Matters of morality take the relevant desires to be all desires, regardless of who has them.


You know, you can say the same thing about controversial science questions -- such as the evolution/creationism debate. One can hardly infer from this that questions of whether evolution or creationism is true is merely a matter of taste.

njhartsh

Oh, boy--my favorite (sort-of) objectivist. Hi, Alonzo!

Please note, again, that I am not claiming that taste and ethics are exactly the same. There are, as both you and I have noticed, differences between the two phenomena. Your chief focus, for example, seems to be how we apply and react to our ideas about what is "delicious" and "wrong." But that's beside the point: my concern is epistemology--how we know that Thing X is "delicious" and Thing Y is "wrong." What we do with those beliefs is a (set of) separate question(s).

Indeed not; those are statements of ethics, not taste.

I don't know if it matters, but when Bush pere made his infamous comments about broccoli, certain parties (mainly concerned with either public nutrition or vegetable farmers) did indeed complain publicly that Bush was "doing something wrong."

Furthermore, there definitely are people who will happily argue that certain aesthetic perspectives (taste in food is one arena, but so are taste in music, visual art, film, literature, etc.) are "right" and "wrong." I don't think you'd have to look very far to find a film critic who would feel perfectly comfortable telling you that the proposition "BASEketball is the greatest film ever created" is "wrong." Or music critics who would argue that it's "wrong" to assault one's ears and coarsen one's musical sensibilities with Iron Maiden--or, for that matter, with the "1812 Overture." On television, we have "Iron Chef," "American Idol," figure-skating competitions and (ha ha!) "Moral Court"--all of which involve apparently-objective scores and conclusions based upon (what seem to me to be) entirely subjective premises.

Doesn't the above prove you incorrect? More to the point, what does any of this have to do with epistemology?

Precisely how is that fundamental? You've identified a difference (and, as noted above, one that does not always obtain) between how we apply notions of taste and ethics. That's not fundamental, it's incidental.

Surely nothing logically stops me from being either a perfect Taste Tyrant ("Anyone whose palate differs from mine is Wrong, Wrong, Wrong! Broccoli is delicious, and no one may disagree!") or a total ethical relativist ("Yes, I think capital punishment is wrong for me, but for you I can't say; everything you believe in, including capital punishment and genocide, is right for you.") Ergo neither side of the contrast you draw is logically necessary.

Evidence? What evidence is there that broccoli tastes good? Or (directly, now) that capital punishment is wrong?

As I just demonstrated, both sides of the coin allow for a vast panoply of implications.

Have you noticed how fruitless the vast majority of the arguments you mention in your second paragraph are? I don't remember the last time I converted anyone from a capital-punishment supporter to an abolitionist. I made a little headway, once, on convincing people that male circumcision is wrong, but that only worked because I was able to present some ugly facts that were news to my opponents.

Your argument relies on the postulate that "ethical argument isn't absurd." Actually, I agree with that, because humans tend to have pretty substantial agreement about several basic (I claim subjective) ethical and meta-ethical premises, from which we can then reason; but it's worth noting that said postulate is entirely undemonstrated. It seems to me that your case requires you to prove that the public ethical discourse you rely on isn't based on delusion.

Frankly, I think this concedes me the ballgame. As an epistemological proposition, subjectivism needs little if anything more than your "Without desires, there is no value." It seems to me that that's it; the game's over.


Oh, well. Alonzo, I think your objectivist credentials are pretty suspect, but you sure write and argue better than most people I've debated on iidb.org!

- Nathan