Luiseach

I never said you were, thank you...and if you read what I said again, you'll see that I was actually agreeing with you.

To reiterate:

'I'm not sure if Hugo actually wants to mix up the conversation regarding Gill's article with a discussion of the arguments for and against postmodernism.'


Okay, I don't appreciate the sarcasm I detect in the tone of that post to me...this is where I bow out of the conversation...

Tyler Durden

Read this and then get back to me with your convictions intact, if you dare.

Tyler Durden

A passing semblance of education. The person should be educated by the professors in both fields before he or she deserves any merit in his or her observations on either field.

The sokal affair is often cited by people who do not understand post-modernism/post-structuralism/post-foundationalism.

I thought Sokal did a good thing in rattling a saber in the hornet's nest. However, he did not have the intellectual integrity to respect non-scientific fields of discourse to study and learn from them in order to really do any damage. Hence the slipshod approach he took, and ergo, my disappointment. I advocate renewal of philosophy more than anyone else, even its self-destruction, but not by privileging another field of discourse.

Newsflash: There are more ways to skin a cat than an affirmative and negatory answer to any question. Ask me again and my answer for the MTV-addled generation is: I couldn't possibly care less.

Well, the words "objective reality" and "existence" are conceptualizations based on the inherent structure of the grammar in our language. So we could be more careful

Sure, you can examine the works of the logical empiricists who thought the same in the early 20th century and save you the trouble. However, their turn to linguistics lead them into the post-analytic position most philosophers are grappling with today.

All metaphysical speculation comes from psychological weaknesses, and the need to believe in an external world generates convictions and presuppositions. Our psychological configuration is responsible for most of our knowledge.

John Page

No problem:-
The essence of structure is at issue here. That part of our reality (generally referred to as mind) interprets the state of other parts of reality as having form. The forms that any particular mind is capable of perceiving seems to be a function of (sensors feeding that mind, the processes of that mind and prior experience of that mind). Furthermore, words are part of the world a.k.a. reality and are used by minds to describe parts of the world to other minds. There are specific parts of the mind/brain that handle the language encoding/decoding. Hence, the assertion there can be words without a world is nonsense and inconsistent with the structure  laid down by the author.

Truth is determined through testing for agreement with the world! Truth-telling is a phenomenological process that we formalize into various systems of logic which are then processed by the mind/brain to arrive at a more �repeatable� result than with intuitive truths. Again, the mind/brain is part of the world (a.k.a. reality) and compares two internal states in order to arrive at truth functional results � the truth is not written on the paper, it is inherent in the mind.

With truth being a fact testable against reality, and knowing being the state of a mind bearing a fact, there is no basis for the author�s claim, see response to prior post.
Well this depends entirely upon the style of logic employed by said logician. (So I agree!)
Color is perceived differently (i.e. by a different part of the brain) than shape, so the phenomena you report arise (I guess) from the way that shape and color characteristics are integrated in perception (as opposed to analysis) of sense data.
I cannot see the conclusion from the premises. A point may be defined as the intersection between two lines but this assumes lines of zero width � which implies the line only exists in concept (i.e. in the mind). I can assert the same of a point � it is a theoretical thing that has a location but no dimensions. (Note: This is different from the common use of the term point and line which are usually marked with a pencil and thus have dimensions). The issue is thus one of lack of clarity in the concepts and their definition, not an issue with truth or �relativization� as later discussed in the paper.
The truth is in the mind that is part of the world, I see no conflict or necessity for an ultimate truth (true versions if true in all) the same as I see no necessity for an ultimate mind that could know such an imaginary truth.
In line with my previous comments in this post, I suggest changing this to �Any proposition may be true in a system of truth telling if and only if it is true within that system of truth telling�, conventionally expressed as the Law of Identity or A=A. Of course, this is only necessarily true within the system that makes such an assertion .
I don�t know what an �accessible feature� is, but I favor a cognitive explanation of why you think what you think is true.
IMO the author shots themself in the foot here, whose rules of inference shall we choose? Is this what is really going on in the mind? All that is happening here is making statements that (may be) true within the axioms of the formal system � back to relativism, do not pass Go, do not collect $200.
Why not? If it is a �true� and accurate representation all characteristics will be present. If this A is the subject and this A is a representation, ~A is apparent for both.
�and intersubjective agreement that some degree of objectivity has been reached in the results! �right� is I think the �wrong� word here, perhaps accurate would serve better.
First, they�re not eternal and as far as I�m aware the only things that can know truths is a mind � no minds therefore no truth, just stuff that doesn�t know itself. As I wrote at the beginning of this post �That part of our reality (generally referred to as mind) interprets the state of other parts of reality as having form.� Show me how there can be form, of which truth is a derivative, without mind.

Cheers, John

Tyler Durden

Irrelevant. This line of thinking is a sloppy insertion of 200 year old representationalism is your problematic assertion, projected onto Nelson Goodman's avant-garde philosophizing, which is a neo-nominalist account that takes a Nietzschean perspective: that every word is a metaphor. Nelson thinks a nominalist �recognizes no distinction of entities without a distinction of content.� Things, qualities, and even similarities are the byproducts of our habits of speech, yet lack any ontological foundation in reality.

You seem to be ascribing Kantian epistemology to Nelson illegitimately, which is in itself rife with problems analytic philosophers long abandoned.

No, I think that�s rather poorly argued and even worse, false. There is no reason for superceding Kantian phenomenology onto the philosophical speculation in the rather progressive linguistics of Nelson beyond your bald assertions.

Crieth the realist! But you miss Nelson's point - he is an irrealist, who doesn't think we need a contrived, 20th century version of God - reality - to justify what is truth for us. The "world" is a presupposed structure, a hinter-welt, inherent in the language employed by the user, not some transcendent arbitrator of meaning.

I already made this point earlier, but I want to repeat myself. Did you now that most theistic urges of knowledge requires an idea of a center, a transcendental signified? In semiotic terms the ultimate source of meaning that which cannot be represented or substituted by any other signifier is the transcendental signified. Your fundamental axiom is that by any signifier, �reality� is the thing that all signifiers in a system (your epistemology) ultimately refer to. There is very little difference between the Transcendental Signified in both Metacrockianity�s �God as Being itself� and the world of the uncritical realist. Wouldn�t it be far better to drop such metaphysical postulations which goes beyond the nakedly empirical evidence (�reality� and �appearance� ) and go in another direction � FYI, more relativistic one - �what works� or �what doesn�t.�

God is dead, and so is the transcendental signified. There is no super-center that holds a system of signifiers together. Therefore, the realist�s longing for a view sub specie aeternitatis is a theistic one, and should be discarded. If you look at the history of philosophy, the nominalists are the ones who fought against the dominant current of thinking, theism and its inherent realism the most.

Yes, according to a different and foreign epistemological model, but that seems to miss Nelson's point by a couple of parsecs. He is not only dismissing the model of the realist, he is also arguing against its inherent fundamental theory of truth, correspondence. It would behoove you to address that instead of projecting a foreign and terribly outdated model as something worthwhile. For the relativist, perspectives go all the way down.

The idea that �corresponds� to reality has never made much sense to me.

But not the body? Dualistic ontology is always a sticky issue, especially how an epistemology that adopts the model of representationalism easily succumbs to skepticism. The Bishop will be remembered for his devastating critique of Locke for posterity. BTW, FYI, phenomenalism is more of a relativistic doctrine than this realism/representationalism you're selling. Unless you'd rather be a half-assed relativist who is frightened of his uncritical loyalties to naturalism? Or am I taking your self-styled title as a relativist too seriously?

Nice, but wrong model of epistemology. You need to explain why the author argues so and show how he is mistaken without unnecessarily importing your slightly moldy framework in the process. You have managed to take reality as a �center� for granted and scold Nelson�s apparent negligence of realism, but not show you understood what you just read. It�s more difficult to explain what X is philosophizing than just parade your convictions and whine the writer isn�t falling in lock-step.

Are you relativistic enough to endorse Lukasiewicz�s logic?

That is neither here nor there. Not only you are a miserable misreader, you are also skilled at the non-sequitur. What does the location of the brain have to do with the transition of color? It shouldn�t be surprising you confuse the first-person account of phenomenology with the 3rd person account of the brain.

How platonic of you. Nelson is not even talking about the existence or the location of lines. Once again you are misreading Nelson to the point of misrepresentation. He is talking about a supposition, a thought exercise, fer chrissakes.

No, it�s not a lack of clarity, but rather an inability to follow along. Nelson is talking about a philosophical exercise about a potential discourse limited to the reality of a single plane. Do try and keep up.

Not quite. The �truth� does not have a location, because it is not amenable to the principle of significance. (Any reader of Strawson should recognize this phrase) It does not follow that your assertion a truth must be in the mind, which is part of the world that must entail an ultimate truth. By the by, I think belief in realism comes from a belief in the necessity for the ultimate truth.

Wow, this makes no sense to me. How does a �given world� translate to the Law of Identity, when there are a number of �worlds?�

Why?

It comes without any surprise you miss the point Nelson is making here. He is not saying the rules of inference depend on a person, but on the principles of logic in itself that refers to other truths. An argument may be valid but false, and that validity is dependent on what is intersubjectively accepted. Yet, each time we establish something by argument we assume the truth of the premise. The premise describes the �condition� under which the conclusion is true. What is the truth of this �condition�? Even if that is established by argument it will turn out to possess truth only �conditionally.� Therefore, reason as �inference� inevitably leads us to search for the �unconditioned� or the ultimate premise which truth is derived from no other source. And that, my dear good lad, is the logic of illusion.

No, that�s your misreading. This is what is really going on with the medium of language, which is full of agreed-upon rules.

Another non-sequitur winner. How does relativism follow?

It is quite disingenuous of you to chop up the quoted material. Apparently you�re neglecting the context that �snippet� is lifted from, where Goodman is talking about two �right versions� that conflict, such as two pieces of artwork that supposedly represents a common object.

Is that the right version?

That misleading question with unexamined assumptions is trumped with another one: �Show me how there can be form, of which truth is a derivative, without language.� Nelson thinks there are different ways of seeing the world. The ancient age saw the world differently than the middle ages, or the modern age. As a nominalist, Nelson denies the world is intrinsically arranged in any particular way independently of how we think of it. Unlike the unphilosophical realist, the nominalist thinks there are a number of worlds contingent on our descriptions of it. Despite the number of different �right versions� of the world, none of them can claim to be the way things really are.

Instead of talking past Nelson, can you argue why he is incorrect within his philosophy without importing realism? This leads me to the inference that you are not interested in what he wrote, much less explain it, and your response is nothing more than a mind numbing soliloquy for realism.

It is not necessarily the case that true beliefs represent anything. Reality has no intrinsic structure. Nothing has any intrinsic properties. In other words, there is no description-independent way reality is.

Cheers!

John Page

Tyler:

Having looked closely at your post, my best suggestion is that we attend to and debate the issues rather than get into what school of philosophy is right or wrong. For example:
Your latter statement is unfounded *kicks Tyler*. To take every word as metaphor denies meaning of any kind. Where does meaning come from, Tyler? The last sentence of the above lacks any ontological foundation in reality!!
Not so! What is Nelson's epistemology, anyway?
. This is your bald assertion, and pretty content free at that. Kanitian phenomenology? Anyway, why not? Can Nelson not explain how he exists other than verbiage?
Presupposed? No, supposed and described using language. I do not think truth needs "justification" as you put it but the question remains as to how truth comes about. Truth is relative to the mind of the knower, not the language they use to express it. The mind/brain implements language - how do you coherently describe it otherwise?
Yes, but you confuse meaning arising from an arrangement of reality called the human mind/brain with "absolute truth" which, I agree, appears to be a pre-requisite of monotheistic religions.
Very droll! Reality and appearance appear to be relative so what's not to like?
No, but there does appear to be a set of causal forces at play that holds the set of signifiers (language) together.
Content free, Tyler. And you think Nelson's epistemology is what? How are his meanings worth any more than the mumblings of a cunning linguist?
No, too literally. So I'm selling "realism/representationalism" am I? Are you saying objects do not exist? Are you saying objects are conjured up outside the mind by mere use of language? Your interpretation of reality is a function of your mind and the concepts contain therein - some of which are linguistic in nature and some of which are non-linguistic syntheses of visual, smell, aural and other sensations. If everything is linguistic in nature then what is this barrier to exchanging first-person direct conscious experiences using language, for example?
It seems you read a different Nelson. I am arguing Nelson against Nelson in his concept of world where he never provides an epistemology - hard for me to critique his ontology, then, because he provides no clue how he thinks he knows what he knows.
And beyond - logics are systems for defining/telling truth. Truth is dependent on (relative to) the mind of the truth teller.

Rest of response in next post.

Egeshgedreg! John

John Page

Color is perceived by the brain, it is not an intrinsic property of objects. Color is perceived in specific locations within the brain. You shouldn't confuse your opinion with the results of scientific research. Next you'll be arguing that things are red because Nelson Goodman says language is prime!!
His thought exercise is based on a misunderstanding of what lines and points are, hence his misleading conclusions.
Yes, but he shot himself in the foot! Pay attention and think, please. A line is a concept described by a word. We all see these lines and share the concept through language that enables us to match our individual observations and agree what we're talking about. All this stuff about multiple planes and so on is sophistry reinventing dualism. Get real.
"The truth" is a generalized concept and I do not subscribe to the view that there is some kind of ultimate truth. A truth most definitely has a location (the mind/brain, which is why different people can have different thoughts as to what the truth is, witness this debate). That certain operations of the mind yield repeatable results can give the misleading impression that there is some kind of universal absolute truth that 2=2. 2=2 is a truth that is arrived at within the human system of decimal arithmetic etc. How else is the truth determined, Tyler, Nelson? Is it written on scraps of paper that have no meaning withou mind to interpret them?
Sorry to dazzle you by going beyond Nelson. Our world appears differently to each of us because of the differences in our minds and environment. But this is only my mind axiomising the properties of minds in general. With this caveat, I maintain that something which is true within a particular mind must be consistent within that mind - this enables us to intersubjectively share the concept expressed by the Law of Identity.
Truth depedent on cognitive functions (analagous to biological systems of logic) explains subjectivity without the need for some external absolute standard.
So what? If Nelson takes the extreme position that "truth" is arbitrary then it becomes meaningless and without utility. Like I said, whose rules of inference shall we use - I'm not fussy so you choose the weapons.
And language is implemented in the mind. (Please don't tell me that language is written down on pieces of paper that weren;t even invented until 3,000 years ago...)
Relativism. There are no absolutes. Nelson's assertions are only true within his world, it looks very different to me.
Not so, its subjectively right or wrong for two observers and one piece of artwork. It may be wrong for one observer and two pieces of artwork depending upon the observers frame of reference. I still don't see the justification for his claim that for representational versions there is no explicit negation. Is there a cognitive theory that supports this?
LOL. No, its the "wrong" version.
Yes, but Nelson hasn't proved his point and, if he's right, never can. In short, the world existed before human thought. Oh yes, and you didn't answer the question.
*Kicks Tyler* again. Right, and Nelson's greatest mistakes partake in a mind-numbing eulogy for retro solipsism. Relativism, on the other hand, embraces multiple points of view without expressing any view as to their validity. However, there are some points of view that explain how it is possible to hold other points of view. I think you will find that nominalism is stuck in a vortex of infinite regress without explaining how nominalism came to be. This being the case, I consider it less than coherent.
Are you some kind of creationist? Descriptions are a function of language which is implemented by the mind. How did the mind come to be? Is physics imaginary? Am I free to choose Tyler from the set of descriptions that I wish? Is Tyler free to me from the set of descriptions that exists? Does Tyler control it all?

Cheers, John

Tyler Durden

That�s a bad idea because you have to show where you and the other person is coming from instead of talking past one another in a display of convictions that goes nowhere.
I don�t subscribe to a need of foundationalism. Nor does Nelson, which is why your reading is problematic, and in the end, silly.

Wrong. It means every word refers to another word.

The function of �meaning� comes from how we use the words in our communication. Ascribing causality is a theistic pastime and I suggest you to refrain from that!

Correct, because there is no need for a foundation in the first place.

I�m not sure, but it seems to be a pure system of signs and symbols. I plan on reading Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Maybe there�s a better answer in there.

I take it you are not familiar with Kantian phenomenology, given what you wrote.

Not quite. It�s called the limits of private language. Cartesian philosophy is unmasked as pure solipsism.

Sure, but that�s regressing back to Lockean representationalism which proposed the same thing in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. What you call the �mind of the knower� is a linguistic artifact in which its meaning depends on other words in a system of signs and symbols.

Whatever you call them, these both serve the same function as a center of a system of thought. True or false?

Nor is there any need to posit such metaphysical dinosaurs!

Uh oh I smell the principle of sufficient reasoning in the offing. Is it me or is the engine of analysis identical to the engine of skepticism?

I�ve never met one. What are they like?

Here�s hoping!

Intersubjectivity. there�s no such barrier but the mundane day to day agreements between people on what they mean in their conversations. There is no need to attempt such a generalization of the concept of the mind (first-person, conscious experience) which takes us away from the conditions that make the concept meaningful. Ontological stickiness, you see.

Might be due to what ontological commitments you take for granted to the table.

Nice axiomatic iteration. I would love to see a perspectivist take on this relation.

Bill Snedden

<moderator hat on>

Gentlemen: the topic is interesting and the discussion thus far has been engrossing, however could we please try and keep the discussion civil and leave the snide comments aside? Thank you.

<moderator hat off>

At the risk of becoming embroiled in this debate, the above makes little sense to me.

I can find little to disagree with in the idea that "reality has no intrinsic structure", but to state that "nothing has any intrinsic properties seems to go a bit too far. If "things" aren't anything in particular, then our perceptions of properties aren't caused by anything in particular. But why then do we perceive any particular property? Indeed, why do we perceive properties *at all*?

How can we impose structure on a reality that isn't amenable to structure?

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Tyler Durden

Agreed � yet you still miss the point. The author wasn�t talking about brain processes.

If you mean there is brain activity that correlates to the experience of sight, not that it is seen in the brain, then sure!

Actually it was Wittgenstein, not Nelson Bad philosophy happens when one attempts to privatize language � see Descartes and Husserl.

Why call what you suppose to be an existent object a misunderstanding? That is the question.

No, you try honesty. How does dualism follow, indeed, if it was you who kept ascribing the mind/reality schema? Just how did you ever manage to interpret the posted passage?

Truth is determined by agreement, by majority, by popularity, by consensus, by our psychological deficiencies.

And what constitutes the concept of a mind and a self is the language which is derived from the environment of the person/individual (people�s social activities). Do you take law of identity to be something transcendent?

That�s a mouthful, a hint of a possible framework for a cognitive science program. But I have yet to see a coherent explanation for subjectivity and I�m not holding my breath.

Which isn�t his position. Hence, your misreading continues.

We already chose the rules of logic by agreeing with the language of ordinary grammar.

Chomsky I presume!

Maybe, but this blanket assertion doesn�t help me understand your last comment much.

How is the observer�s frame of reference any different from a piece of artwork? They both serve as windows to a �world� of meaning.

Possibly but I�m not sure.

According to a perspectival knowing that we agree as realism, sure.

How would you answer it otherwise? Perhaps you don�t like the answer I gave you.

How melodramatic of you � but I disgress! The need to find a cause for nominalism is a pseudo-problem, and a leftover supposition of causality thanks to the ancient Greeks. Some more straw, sire?

Says fuck-all how much you understand anything that�s not realism. What does creationism have to do with nominalism? Perhaps you�re blind to your stone-deafness. Recognize anyone?



Sorry, that�s a misconstrued axiom that overlooks a lot of unexamined suppositions.

Structuralists will tell you that the �mind� is a concept generated by the culture that practices the object-subject dichotomy, but I disagree with them. You seem awfully hung up with bad questions about causality and bald suppositions.



The invention of a private language awaits you!


Cheers!