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Goodman:Talk of unstructured content or an unconceptualized given or a substratum without properties is self-defeating; for the talk imposes structure, conceptualizes, ascribes properties. Although conception without perception is merely empty, perception without conception is blind (totally inoperative). Predicates, pictures, other labels, schemata, survive want of application, but content vanishes without form. We can have words without a world but no world without words or other symbols.
You The essence of structure is at issue here. That part of our reality (generally referred to as mind) interprets the state of other parts of reality as having form.
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Irrelevant. This line of thinking is a sloppy insertion of 200 year old representationalism is your problematic assertion, projected onto Nelson Goodman's avant-garde philosophizing, which is a neo-nominalist account that takes a Nietzschean perspective: that every word is a metaphor. Nelson thinks a nominalist “recognizes no distinction of entities without a distinction of content.” Things, qualities, and even similarities are the byproducts of our habits of speech, yet lack any ontological foundation in reality.
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You The forms that any particular mind is capable of perceiving seems to be a function of (sensors feeding that mind, the processes of that mind and prior experience of that mind).
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You seem to be ascribing Kantian epistemology to Nelson illegitimately, which is in itself
rife with problems analytic philosophers long abandoned.
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You Furthermore, words are part of the world a.k.a. reality and are used by minds to describe parts of the world to other minds. There are specific parts of the mind/brain that handle the language encoding/decoding. Hence, the assertion there can be words without a world is nonsense and inconsistent with the structure laid down by the author.
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No, I think that’s rather poorly argued and even worse, false. There is no reason for superceding Kantian phenomenology onto the philosophical speculation in the rather progressive linguistics of Nelson beyond your bald assertions.
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Goodman: But truth cannot be defined or tested by agreement with 'the world'; for not only do truths differ for different worlds but the nature of agreement between a version and a world apart from it is notoriously nebulous. Rather ≈ speaking loosely and without trying to answer either Pilate's question or Tarski's ≈ a version is taken to be true when it offends no unyielding beliefs and none of its own precepts.
You Truth is determined through testing for agreement with the world!
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Crieth the realist! But you miss Nelson's point - he is an irrealist, who doesn't think we need a contrived, 20th century version of God - reality - to justify what is truth for us. The "world" is a presupposed structure, a
hinter-welt, inherent in the language employed by the user, not some transcendent arbitrator of meaning.
I already made this point earlier, but I want to repeat myself. Did you now that most theistic urges of knowledge requires an idea of a center, a
transcendental signified? In semiotic terms the ultimate source of meaning that which cannot be represented or substituted by any other signifier is the transcendental signified. Your fundamental axiom is that by any signifier, ‘reality’ is the thing that all signifiers in a system (your epistemology) ultimately refer to. There is very little difference between the
Transcendental Signified in both Metacrockianity’s “God as Being itself” and the world of the uncritical realist. Wouldn’t it be far better to drop such metaphysical postulations which goes beyond the nakedly empirical evidence (“reality” and “appearance” ) and go in another direction – FYI, more relativistic one - ‘what works’ or ‘what doesn’t.’
God is dead, and so is the transcendental signified. There is no super-center that holds a system of signifiers together. Therefore, the realist’s longing for a view
sub specie aeternitatis is a theistic one, and should be discarded. If you look at the history of philosophy, the nominalists are the ones who fought against the dominant current of thinking, theism and its inherent realism the most.
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You Truth-telling is a phenomenological process that we formalize into various systems of logic which are then processed by the mind/brain to arrive at a more “repeatable” result than with intuitive truths.
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Yes, according to a different and foreign epistemological model, but that seems to miss Nelson's point by a couple of parsecs. He is not only dismissing the model of the realist, he is also arguing against its inherent fundamental theory of truth,
correspondence. It would behoove you to address that instead of projecting a foreign and terribly outdated model as something worthwhile. For the relativist, perspectives go
all the way down.
The idea that ‘corresponds’ to reality has never made much sense to me.
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You Again, the mind/brain is part of the world (a.k.a. reality) and compares two internal states in order to arrive at truth functional results – the truth is not written on the paper, it is inherent in the mind.
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But not the body?
Dualistic ontology is always a sticky issue, especially how an epistemology that adopts the model of representationalism easily succumbs to skepticism. The Bishop will be remembered for his devastating critique of Locke for posterity. BTW, FYI, phenomenalism is more of a relativistic doctrine than this realism/representationalism you're selling. Unless you'd rather be a half-assed relativist who is frightened of his uncritical loyalties to naturalism? Or am I taking your self-styled title as a relativist too seriously?
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Goodman: On these terms, knowing cannot be exclusively or even primarily a matter of determining what is true.
You With truth being a fact testable against reality, and knowing being the state of a mind bearing a fact, there is no basis for the author’s claim, see response to prior post.
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Nice, but wrong model of epistemology. You need to explain why the author argues so and show how he is mistaken without unnecessarily importing your slightly moldy framework in the process. You have managed to take reality as a ‘center’ for granted and scold Nelson’s apparent negligence of realism, but not show you understood what you just read. It’s more difficult to explain what X is philosophizing than just parade your convictions and whine the writer isn’t falling in lock-step.
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Goodman: The prospect of paradox looms here. If what is said is sometimes an aspect of style, and style is a way of saying what is said, a tactless logician might point to the unwelcome consequence that what is said is sometimes an aspect of a way of saying what is said ≈ a formula with the ambivalent aroma of a self-contradictory truism.
You Well this depends entirely upon the style of logic employed by said logician. (So I agree!)
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Are you relativistic enough to endorse Lukasiewicz’s logic?
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Goodman: How is it that color transition not only works quite differently from transition in place or size or shape but stubbornly so? Even when accompanied (and one would suppose influenced) by smooth change in these other respects, the color jumps. Abundant bridging still occurs; each of the intervening places along a path between the two flashes is filled in, but with one of the flashed colors rather than with successive intermediate colors.
You: Color is perceived differently (i.e. by a different part of the brain) than shape, so the phenomena you report arise (I guess) from the way that shape and color characteristics are integrated in perception (as opposed to analysis) of sense data.
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That is neither here nor there. Not only you are a miserable misreader, you are also skilled at the non-sequitur. What does the location of the brain have to do with the transition of color? It shouldn’t be surprising you confuse the first-person account of phenomenology with the 3rd person account of the brain.
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Goodman: Suppose for now that our universe of discourse is limited to a square segment of a plane, with the two pairs of boundary lines labelled "vertical" and "horizontal". If we assume that there are points, whatever they may be, then the two sentences
(14) Every point is made up of a vertical and a horizontal line
(15) No point is made up of lines or anything else'[9]
conflict, but are equally true under appropriate systems. We know that simple relativization to system, as in (3) and (4), is a specious way of resolving the conflict. The truth of the statement in question made by each system must also be affirmed; and if the systems, respectively, say (14) and (15) as they stand, the conflict remains.
Can we, then, perhaps reconcile (14) and (15) by restricting their ranges of application? If in our space there are only lines and combinations of lines then (14) but not (15) may be true, while if there are only points then (15) but not (14) may be true. The trouble is, though, that if there are both lines and points, (14) and (15) still cannot both be true, though neither is singled out as the false one.
You: I cannot see the conclusion from the premises. A point may be defined as the intersection between two lines but this assumes lines of zero width – which implies the line only exists in concept (i.e. in the mind).
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How platonic of you. Nelson is not even talking about the existence or the location of lines. Once again you are misreading Nelson to the point of misrepresentation. He is talking about a supposition, a thought exercise, fer chrissakes.
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You: I can assert the same of a point – it is a theoretical thing that has a location but no dimensions. (Note: This is different from the common use of the term point and line which are usually marked with a pencil and thus have dimensions). The issue is thus one of lack of clarity in the concepts and their definition, not an issue with truth or “relativization” as later discussed in the paper.
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No, it’s not a lack of clarity, but rather an inability to follow along. Nelson is talking about a philosophical exercise about a potential discourse limited to the reality of a single plane. Do try and keep up.
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Goodman: Incidentally, recognition of multiple worlds or true versions suggests innocuous interpretations of necessity and possibility. A statement is necessary in a universe of worlds or true versions if true in all, necessarily false if true in none, and contingent or possible if true in some.
You: The truth is in the mind that is part of the world, I see no conflict or necessity for an ultimate truth (true versions if true in all) the same as I see no necessity for an ultimate mind that could know such an imaginary truth.
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Not quite. The ‘truth’ does not have a location, because it is not amenable to the principle of significance. (Any reader of Strawson should recognize this phrase) It does not follow that your assertion a truth must be in the mind, which is part of the world that must entail an ultimate truth. By the by, I think belief in realism comes from a belief in the necessity for the ultimate truth.
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Goodman: "'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" must be revised to something like "'Snow is white' is true in a given world if and only if snow is white in that world",
You: In line with my previous comments in this post, I suggest changing this to “Any proposition may be true in a system of truth telling if and only if it is true within that system of truth telling”, conventionally expressed as the Law of Identity or A=A. Of course, this is only necessarily true within the system that makes such an assertion .
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Wow, this makes no sense to me. How does a ‘given world’ translate to the Law of Identity, when there are a number of ‘worlds?’
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Goodman: Philosophers would like, though, to arrive at a characterization of truth as definitive as the scientific definition of iron; and some have argued with considerable ingenuity for the identification of truth with one or another accessible feature.
You: I don’t know what an “accessible feature” is, but I favor a cognitive explanation of why you think what you think is true.
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Why?
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Goodman: Among the most explicit and clearcut standards of rightness we have anywhere are those for validity of a deductive argument; and validity is of course distinct from truth in that the premisses and conclusions of a valid argument may be false. Validity consists of conformity with rules of inference ≈ rules that codify deductive practice in accepting or rejecting particular inferences.[15] Yet deductive validity, though different from is not altogether independent of truth, but so relates statements that valid inference from true premisses gives true conclusions. Indeed, the primary function of valid inference is to relate truths to truths. Furthermore, validity is not the only requirement upon a right deductive argument. A deductive argument is right in a fuller sense only if the premisses are true and the inferences valid. Thus rightness of deductive argument, while involving validity, is still closely allied with truth.
You: IMO the author shots themself in the foot here, whose rules of inference shall we choose?
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It comes without any surprise you miss the point Nelson is making here. He is not saying the rules of inference depend on a person, but on the principles of logic in itself that refers to other truths. An argument may be valid but false, and that validity is dependent on what is intersubjectively accepted. Yet, each time we establish something by argument we assume the truth of the premise. The premise describes the ‘condition’ under which the conclusion is true. What is the truth of this ‘condition’? Even if that is established by argument it will turn out to possess truth only ‘conditionally.’ Therefore, reason as ‘inference’ inevitably leads us to search for the ‘unconditioned’ or the ultimate premise which truth is derived from no other source. And that, my dear good lad, is the logic of illusion.
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You: Is this what is really going on in the mind?
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No, that’s your misreading. This is what is really going on with the medium of language, which is full of agreed-upon rules.
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You: All that is happening here is making statements that (may be) true within the axioms of the formal system – back to relativism, do not pass Go, do not collect $200.
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Another non-sequitur winner. How does relativism follow?
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Goodman: But for representational versions, where there is no explicit negation…
You: Why not? If it is a “true” and accurate representation all characteristics will be present. If this A is the subject and this A is a representation, ~A is apparent for both.
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It is quite disingenuous of you to chop up the quoted material. Apparently you’re neglecting the context that ‘snippet’ is lifted from, where Goodman is talking about two ‘right versions’ that conflict, such as two pieces of artwork that supposedly represents a common object.
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Goodman: Procedures and tests used in the search for right versions range from deductive and inductive inference through fair sampling and accord among samples.
You: …and intersubjective agreement that some degree of objectivity has been reached in the results! “right” is I think the “wrong” word here, perhaps accurate would serve better.
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Is that the right version?
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Goodman: Furthermore, rightness of design and truth of statement are alike relative to system:
You: First, they’re not eternal and as far as I’m aware the only things that can know truths is a mind – no minds therefore no truth, just stuff that doesn’t know itself. As I wrote at the beginning of this post ‘That part of our reality (generally referred to as mind) interprets the state of other parts of reality as having form.” Show me how there can be form, of which truth is a derivative, without mind. Cheers, John
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That misleading question with unexamined assumptions is trumped with another one:
“Show me how there can be form, of which truth is a derivative, without language.” Nelson thinks there are different ways of seeing the world. The ancient age saw the world differently than the middle ages, or the modern age. As a nominalist, Nelson denies the world is intrinsically arranged in any particular way independently of how we think of it. Unlike the unphilosophical realist, the nominalist thinks there are a number of worlds contingent on our descriptions of it. Despite the number of different ‘right versions’ of the world, none of them can claim to be the way things really are.
Instead of talking past Nelson, can you argue why he is incorrect within his philosophy without importing realism? This leads me to the inference that you are not interested in what he wrote, much less explain it, and your response is nothing more than a mind numbing soliloquy for realism.
It is not necessarily the case that true beliefs represent anything. Reality has no intrinsic structure. Nothing has any intrinsic properties. In other words, there is no description-independent way reality is.
Cheers!