Kim o' the Concrete Jungle

AAAARRRRRGGGGGGGGHHHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!!!

After all this time, I've only just noticed an error in my initial analysis way back in the first post. Worse still, LinuxPup has already pointed it out.

In the first sentence of the second paragraph of my analysis, I wrote: "The fact that reality is not uniform (as I have already pointed out), and that truth relies on context, means that truth cannot be absolute or universal."

This is, of course, not the sense in which I originally used the words "not uniform". My original sense is better reflected in this passage: "I perceive that sensory data is not uniform, but differentiated, such that I can distinguish between parts of my sensory world..."

I didn't mean to imply that "discontinuities in the universe" is a central assumption of my philosophical model. At best, I only ever meant to pose this idea as a hypothetical possibility, which cannot be ruled out, but which my "contextual truth" model would avoid.

When I say that, within the context of my philosophical model, absolute truths do not exist, I mean it in two senses:

(1) One can never know whether any statement is true with 100% accuracy, because we are only human beings who can make errors, and who cannot transcend our limited knowledge and cultural context.

(2) A true statement is only true within the limits of its context, since a truth is "a continuous relationship between the points of reference that comprise the context." If the points of reference (and hence the context) changes then so does the statement of truth.

Notice that in this new, and I hope clearer, analysis, I have carefully referred to "statements" of truth. A statement of truth -- i.e. the thing that we can say, and write down, and "know" -- is really the only thing my truth model deals with.

I have now slightly edited my original post. Just ignore the bit in between (DELETE) and (/DELETE).

[ April 01, 2002: Message edited by: Kim o' the Concrete Jungle ]</p>

jpbrooks

I hope you guys forgive me for interrupting your exchange, but this quote from LinuxPup has raised an interesting point ...

Kim's claims appear to be true if they apply to our knowledge (including our knowledge of truth) and not to "truth" itself.
Thus, for example, when Kim says:

this can all be accepted as true if it is interpreted as applying specifically to human knowledge and not to "truth".

Having said that, however, it is also the case that "absolute truth" is a (theoretical) assumption (exactly as Kim seems to be suggesting) that is part of a "model" of the world. The fact that an alternative model, that doesn't assume it as a fundamental truth, can be created, demonstrates that the existence of "absolute truth" is an assumption (even if the idea that it exists can be demonstrated to be true).
The mere fact that such an aternative "model" exists does not automatically establish that "models" that assume the reality of "absolute truth" are false (especially if the alternative "model" turns out to be epistemologically problematic).

But since "absolute truth" is an assumption that is part of a "model" of the world, it, like any of our "models", was derived on the basis of, and tested by our "continuous perceptions of the world" which can never provide us with 100% certain knowledge about the world.
Thus, we can never be 100% certain that any "model" of the world, that holds that "absolute truth" exists, is true.

[ April 02, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p>

owleye

Kim....

Following an account that one would think, from the title given, to be on the concept of 'truth' you ask us:


"What do you think?"

After reading through an assortment of "definitions" I can only say: "Not much." The most significant problem I think is your approach. You seem to think we can begin an enquiry with definitions in much the same way as, for example, mathematicians do. Kant, for one, found this to be the most signficant fault in all prior metaphysical enquiry (for an example of this, read Spinoza's Ethics). This was known at the time as advocating a process that was favorably looked on as "more geometrico." For Kant, since mathematical reasoning is not the same as philosophical reasoning, definitions come at the end of the inquiry, not at its beginning.

Of course you may wish to argue that you have in fact done an exhaustive analysis and have concluded with definitions, carefully crafted. Indeed, we see that Kant usually starts his Metaphysical works with definitions. One may note, however, that prior to these writings he had completed his masterpiece, the Critique of Pure Reason, which in fact followed a ten year period in which he was relatively silent. Moreover, his definitions did not have the kind of equivocation yours seem to have. You warn us that we can "substitute" other words, if we don't like them, as if words themselves didn't mean much. It is reminiscent of the lack of linquistic skills I find from those who add with every attempt at expressing themselves "you know what I mean." Well, I'm afraid I don't. If you want me to be more specific with my criticism let me know. Otherwise, be well and good luck to you.

owleye

WJ

Kim!

From an ethical, pragmatic, (and perhaps a empiricist's) view, one would never know the complete truth. An individual could not experience all that there is or exists as a possible experience from the world as we percieve it. If you had, then you would know yourself differently in a different way. In fact, for this reason, I submit no one person can really say they 'truly' even know their own selves except for that reality. Pragmatically, it is when we are close to death that we know as much as we're going to ever know in this world.

So I would agree with what you said:

"Truth is a continuous relationship between all the reference points in a given context."

In that context/reference points, truth seems to be both out-there, and in-here; an uncovery *and* discovery. However, we must first exist before we can concieve of the "relationship". And that of course lends itself to absolute epistemic Subjectivism.


Walrus

[ April 02, 2002: Message edited by: WJ ]</p>

LinuxPup

Kim: As far as my statement "Do you believe that (1/2)(base)(height) = Area of a triangle in euclidean geometry? Do you believe it's true in every case, absolutely?" I was expecting a yes or no answer.

I agree. But we're talking about truth itself, not just what people think, which is highly limited and in many cases incorrect. Forget about the "we can't know everything that's true" argument. Yes, we cannot know everything, but that is a red herring argument, which tries to walk around the issue of absolute truth being actual.

We can however know this: as long as logic holds, absolute truth does as well, and logic is impossible to defeat.

The fact that you said "A true statement is only true...", makes me believe we're getting somewhere in this discussion. I would agree that some *statements* have the ability to change their truthfulness: Example: The earth is about 4.5 billion years old is true, but this wasn't true a billion years ago. However the fact remains that a billion years ago, the statement "The earth is about 4.5 billion years old is absolutely false." Likewise, the statement, "The earth is about 4.5 billion years ago", spoken today, is absolutely true.

The *statement* of truth doesn't change, it may become false, which would then make it absolutely true that it is false. And you could make a statement on something that does not change, such as mathematics, and that will never change, and is indeed absoulute truth. It's interesting how the non-physical substances are completely absolute and unchanging.

John Page

Is there any particular logic you had in mind?

Kim o' the Concrete Jungle

If you cannot humanly see something, or perceive something, or know something -- if you cannot in principle know it, or perceive it, or detect it -- on what basis would you assert that it exists? Isn't metaphysical naturalism the head-honcho philosophy in these parts?

Kim o' the Concrete Jungle

Bill Snedden,

Your example of an axiom (A is never not A), is what, once upon a time, I would have called a "founding assumption" of the logic model. "A is never not A" is something that you assume, in an arbitrary way.

At the moment, I have a book on mathematics open in front of me, and I am looking at the section on logic. After a bit of a preamble that mentions Aristotle and George Boole, it begins like this:

You will notice here that the author doesn't try to justify his definitions or assumptions in any way. And nor would anyone. You have to start with a few "founding assumptions" -- preferably the smallest number possible. And if you are sensible, you do not try to "prove" these assumptions using the philosophical system you have built from them, because people will point at you and shout, "circular argument!" Of course, "circular argument" is part of another philosophical system, but since the list of "fallacies" is the hoop that most people are going to make you jump through before they accept your model, you would be wise to pay heed to it. So what do you do instead? You admit that your "founding assumptions" are arbitrary. Of course, you probably good reasons for assuming what you do, but you still admit that they are arbitrary, nonetheless.

I will admit that you can make a number of arbitrary "founding assumptions", and refer to these using the words "absolute truth". It is perfectly possible for you to do that. In fact, you can choose to define any term you want. You can say, "Let us use the word purple to refer to the color green." But if you make a definition, then I am going to insist that you stick to it. If you have a formal definition of "absolute truth" that is equivalent to "absolute truth is the arbitrary founding assumptions of the logic model." then I want you to stick to it. I will not allow you to present that definition, but argue from a different definition that eliminates the "arbitrary" qualifier. I will allow you your own definitions, but I would say that the above definition of "absolute truth" is misleading, because most people wouldn't automatically suppose that the words "absolute" and "arbitrary" could refer to the same thing.

These days I consider that "founding assumptions" are covered by the broader idea of "points of reference", so I don't use the term anymore. You will find that I referred to "points of reference" (or "reference points") in my first post, and that they form the basis of what I have called "a context". If you like you can refer to the context of the logic model as "a set of axioms", but I would refer you to the common practice of assuming arbitrariness.

Adrian Selby

"Definition: A statement is a sentence that is true or false, but not both."

What makes you think this is merely an assumption?

Is this definition borne of the continuity of perception you ascribe to? How do we know that continuity of perception isn't justified because the world is as it is, and we truly perceive it? I refer to another thread and metaphors I used there, of which more below. If we stick to that which we sense, then I'm not sure what the context is to which truth statements about the universe applies. I suppose sense experience is a different context to thermodynamics, but I would be more inclined to think that sense experience, and the statements made regarding what is perceived were the foundation for the assertions made in contexts. To illustrate the point, I'd like to ask in what context a normal human being could pass through a foot thick stone wall, unaided, under earth's normal gravitation and the stone being stone, rock, lets call it marble. I'd rather be inclined to think that what I continuously perceive, in an experiment where the whole human race attempts this feat, is actually objectively true. If I can't imagine a context where under the same conditions someone could walk through the wall, why must I think that the truth of the statement 'humans cannot walk through marble walls unaided' is only dependent on a given context. I don't understand what context it is. Isn't it true for now and all time that under these conditions, this species cannot walk through this substance?

"If you cannot humanly see something, or perceive something, or know something -- if you cannot in principle know it, or perceive it, or detect it -- on what basis would you assert that it exists? "

I'm concerned here that something can only exist simply because we see, perceive or know it. I didn't realise the universe only came into being as we perceived it. Isn't that solipsism?

There is a distinction between the former assertion in this quote and the latter, regarding the 'in principle' bit. The basis I'd use relates to my above comment, that to assert that there can be no basis for saying things we can't perceive exists leads us to conclude that we cannot assert anything exists until we've perceived it. Which brings up points made earlier in the thread, about the round earth etc. Was the earth round before we perceived it was round? Was the sun the centre of our solar system before we realised it was?

"(0) I am, and my state of being is perceptual."

In relation to Bill's point about the law of non contradiction, you make this your very beginning assumption, and so in making it you are unequivocally not asserting the contradictory statement to this. In doing this you have assumed the law of non contradiction must hold, or else you would have to say, 'I am....perceptual, or not'. In making this assertion as a foundation of your position, you must not be making the contradictory assertion simultaneously.

I have to agree with Bill that in using the law of non contradiction like this, you have something that seems to underly your most basic assumption, and that while you state that the truth of something is only contextual, if it is true that you made this statement and not its contradictory, isn't it true that you presume an underlying logical law? If this is true, in what context is it true, if it underlies the context in which you try to frame your statements about truth, which are obviously to me statements that purport to be truth candidates?

It seems that to assert anything as true, one must be negating the contradictory assertion by definition, and that this state seems to underly all contexts.

I'd like to know how its possible that there is a context of truth that can hold that it is true that you made a number of statements in your first post that in fact were contradictory to the statements you made in your first post, as opposed to a context where someone asserted that it was true you did make the post you initially did. I'd also like to know that if such a context exists, why is it not possible to arbitrate between the two contexts when deciding which of the truth claims reflects reality, only it seems to me that you're saying truth is dependent on context?

Adrian

John Page

No, he was guessing (as are we all). If not, then all guesses are true, even if they contradict your presumption of underlying (man-made) laws of logic.