Theli

Kenny...

But this renders the argument hollow and useless, doesn't it?
I mean, you could put whatever you want in premise 1, call it 'truth', and then have the conclusion comfirm it.
The problem is that the conclusion is completely based on P1. Everything you put in P1 will show up on the conclution.
About your intuition. Your own intuition is worthless when inducing it in your argument.
You must show us why we should accept your P1 for this argument to have an effect/value.

I don't understand why so much discussion is put into an argument that has as much evidencial/logic and debatable value as screaming "I know I'm right!!! Shut up!!!"

[ July 28, 2002: Message edited by: Theli ]</p>

Kenny

Theli,

You can put various premises into any sort of valid logical structure. Some of those premises will have warrant for certain rational agents and others won’t. Some will be true; some won’t. I don’t see the problem here.

The argument follows from P1 and the definitions. Yes, the conclusion does follow -- because it’s a valid argument. I don’t see how that’s a problem.

I didn’t bring this argument up to convince atheists that God exists. I brought it up as an illustration of the point I was trying to make when I began this thread. Differing intuitive and intellectual commitments condition one’s epistemic attitudes regarding whether or not a particular argument is sound. I believe this argument is sound. Here’s a sound theistic argument (I believe) as the original thread demanded, but obviously not everyone here regards it as such. Point made.

God Bless,
Kenny

Theli

Kenny...

You didn't even respond to my complaint.
How is this argument usefull?
How does it show anything?
How could it seperate a true claim from a false?

The problem is not with the argument's structure, it's with the argument's lacking evidencial/logic value.

Sound? maybe.
Unnecessarily long and complex? Yes
Of any value? No.
I would never use this argument to make my point. And I don't think anyone else would try to make a point with this argument either.
Unless they are trying to trick someone, that is.
I'm pretty sure Koy wasn't asking for tautologies.
If he is reading this post I think he will agree that the argument that he was asking for would be of any logic/evidencial value.
Not just - "if god exist, then god exist"

[ July 29, 2002: Message edited by: Theli ]</p>

John Galt, Jr.

Kenny,

I think that Koy, Theli, and others, have to give up too much of their anti-theism to see your point. So, of course, they can't see the importance of the point either.

John Galt, Jr.

Synaesthesia

Kenny.

Let me just be quite clear upon what begging the question is. This definition is from Todd Caroll: “Begging the question is what one does in an argument when one assumes what one claims to be proving.”

It is an informal fallacy. (“An informal fallacy is one that is not formal, that is, it is a type of fallacy in which the content of the argument is relevant to its fallaciousness, or which is fallacious for epistemological, dialectical, or pragmatic reasons.”*http://gncurtis.home.texas.net/begquest.html)

As such, pointing out that it is valid can in no way defend the argument against the claim that it does assume it’s conclusion. (that a maximal being is instantiated.) All question-begging is valid.

The epistemological reason in question is whether that argument adds any “warrant” to it’s conclusion. This ontological argument cannot, in principle, do so because it’s conclusion is logically identical to it’s premises. The conclusion has no more warrant than the premise.

You are quite correct. In this sort of logical syllogism, we can come down to no more than a clash of intuitions. It is in the very nature of begging the question that this should happen. What dubious intuitive warrant it does have is entirely derived from the intuition that a necessary God exists.The reasons for belief must lie entirely outside the confines of question-begging sophistry. The ‘reason’ in this case is the intuition not the argument.

High order considerations may make us reconsider a belief. Basic considerations may make us reconsider our belief. An interplay may make us reconsider our belief. Question begging can do nothing but forcefully propel us in logically valid circles.

The warrant we derive from informed opinion is necessarily provisional. In cases where there is known to be much intuitive plausibility in incorrect conclusions, such as the well known human tendency towards superstition, the conclusions we draw based upon such second-hand intuition are by that fact more unreliable than the mathematician’s intuition on how to go about solving a math problem.

I agree that it is inescapable that our mind will always be a larger domain than our consciousness. We can’t always be totally clear upon why we fail to question a certain component of our theories or why we find an analogy plausible. As Dennett points out in his very interesting article “Do-it-yourself understanding”, we rely to a very large extent upon the knowledge of others.

At the same time we recognize that not everything people tells us is true, not even remotely. Our intuition is much the same. It is important, therefore, to maximize the other considerations we bring to bear. Hopefully, in the long run, we can prevent the status of two hypotheses from the mire of ‘all things being equal’ unless, perhaps, they really are equal.

Regards,
Synaesthesia

Theli

Yes, ofcourse.
There must be some hidden meaning to the argument that we can't see because we're blinded by hatred.

I would never use such an argument against the christian god. So, what does that say about my "anti-theism"?

[ July 29, 2002: Message edited by: Theli ]</p>

Theli

BTW. Thanks, Synaesthesia for the link.
There are alot of good terms here. Terms that I've needed.
<a href="http://gncurtis.home.texas.net/begquest.html" target="_blank">Question Begging</a>

Tercel

For the record: I think Plantinga's argument has a grand total of no value whatsoever in proving anything.

Plantinga's version of the Ontological Argument pretty badly begs the question (as does Hartsorne's). The arguments are bad, I'm not defending the arguments. I'm simply trying to explain why technically "possibly necessary" equates to "necessary".

If you are using modal logic then to say "X is possibly necessary" is equivalent to saying that there exists a possible world in which it is true to say that X is true in all possible worlds. Which, by the axioms of modal logic is equivalent to X being true in all possible worlds.

This is a lesson in modal logic, not an attempted proof for God.

Theli

Good post, Tercel.

There is one thing I find strange about the argument. It's the phraze used to describe X.
"Possibly Neccessary".
It seems abit ambiguous. On one hand you have "possibly-", meaning that the latter is a possibility only (not necessary).
And on the other hand you have "-necessary", wich is a positive claim that X must be true (making the preceding meaningless).
The only thing the argument does is that, with it's possible worlds scenario eliminates one of the meanings.

[ July 29, 2002: Message edited by: Theli ]</p>

John Galt, Jr.

Theli,

In response to my comment,

you said, Not blinded by hatred, but by your unwillingness to allow the possibility that your view that there is no proof for the existence of God is just mistaken.

John Galt, Jr.