FRDB Archives

Freethought & Rationalism Archive

The archives are read only.


Go Back   FRDB Archives > Archives > IIDB ARCHIVE: 200X-2003, PD 2007 > IIDB Philosophical Forums (PRIOR TO JUN-2003)
Welcome, Peter Kirby.
You last visited: Today at 05:55 AM

 
 
Thread Tools Search this Thread
Old 06-19-2003, 07:40 PM   #1
Veteran Member
 
Join Date: Nov 2002
Location: California
Posts: 1,000
Default Is the problem of qualia tractable?

What are qualia? Qualia have been defined, most usefully, I think, as the substance of conscious experience.

Quote:
"Qualia" is the technical term that describes the redness of red, the mysterious, indescribable, apparently irreducible quality of redness that exists above and beyond a particular frequency of light. If a JPEG viewer stores a set of red pixels, pixels with color 0xFF0000, does it see red the way we do? No. Even if a program simulated all the feature-extraction of the human visual modality, would it actually see red?
First, those unaquainted with the issues should read the classic papers involved:

Facing up to the problem of consciousness
Quining Qualia
Qualia! (Now Showing at a Theater Near You)

Then ask yourself this question: Is the problem of qualia solvable within a broadly materialistic framework?

Ready set, debate!
Dominus Paradoxum is offline  
Old 06-19-2003, 08:01 PM   #2
Junior Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: Georgia
Posts: 87
Default

Holy cow, Dominus

I just started reading the first paper. That one is going to take me a few days to fully grasp. It's, like, some really abstract stuff.

Thank you for suggesting that article - it looks pretty cool.

I'll post a comment on it after I have properly pondered it.

In the meantime - do you think consciousness has an effect on reality?

Anti-Materialist is offline  
Old 06-19-2003, 08:44 PM   #3
Veteran Member
 
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Massachusetts, USA -- Let's Go Red Sox!
Posts: 1,500
Default

I think so.

The confusion is primarily in thinking of qualia as something mystical or magical, and not a causal property of our brains. First person ontologies need not be special substances or carry religious overtones.

John Searle expands on this nicely in his books.

-GFA
God Fearing Atheist is offline  
Old 06-20-2003, 12:43 PM   #4
Veteran Member
 
Join Date: Nov 2001
Location: South Africa
Posts: 2,194
Default

I don't think qualia is a "problem" at all.

The utility of the term is in describing the experience of being a thing as opposed to the experience of seeing a thing. Since these of necessity must be seperate and different experiences, where's the problem?

The issue of how you see feel vs. how I think you feel is logically equivalent (in the scope of this discussion) to the issue of what the mass of a stone is vs. what you estimate it to be when it rests in your hands.

I'd have to agree with GFA that the "mystery" and "magic" of qualia is illusory. As a buddist influenced thinker I'd have to say part of the blame lies in our innate belief that we somehow function according to a different set of laws than rocks and running water (we don't)

Farren
Farren is offline  
Old 06-20-2003, 01:11 PM   #5
Veteran Member
 
Join Date: Nov 2001
Location: South Africa
Posts: 2,194
Default

Now an example of this innate belief in human differentness (in the physics sense) to rocks and rivers is provided in one of the links posted above by Dominus Paradoxum (my emphasis added):

Quote:
Throughout the higher-level sciences, reductive explanation works in just this way. To explain the gene, for instance, we needed to specify the mechanism that stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next. It turns out that DNA performs this function; once we explain how the function is performed, we have explained the gene. To explain life, we ultimately need to explain how a system can reproduce, adapt to its environment, metabolize, and so on. All of these are questions about the performance of functions, and so are well-suited to reductive explanation. The same holds for most problems in cognitive science. To explain learning, we need to explain the way in which a system's behavioral capacities are modified in light of environmental information, and the way in which new information can be brought to bear in adapting a system's actions to its environment. If we show how a neural or computational mechanism does the job, we have explained learning. We can say the same for other cognitive phenomena, such as perception, memory, and language. Sometimes the relevant functions need to be characterized quite subtly, but it is clear that insofar as cognitive science explains these phenomena at all, it does so by explaining the performance of functions.

When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of explanation fails. What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open.
See the problem? I can say

When a rock falls down a mountainside we can ascribe this to <insert physics explanation here>, but why is the function accompanied by experience?

"Nonsense!" you say. "We don't know that the rock is having an experience! But we can establish by communicating with other human beings that they in fact, do"

But applying this reasoning compels you to consider a different set of physical laws for humanity and rocks. If "experience" is a fundamental, rather than emergent quality, then rocks must have it too or there is a glaring inconsistency. Note that I'm not talking about the experience of being human and experiencing things in human ways: I'm talking about the generalised experience of being a thing.

If, on the other hand, the issue under consideration is specifically human experience, then there is equally little mystery. Douglas Hofstader illustrated it excellently in "Godel, Escher", Bach. Human qualia is like the emergent pattern of an ant farm.

1. Examine the ants and you will not experience the experience of being an entire ant farm
2. Examine the entire ant farm and you will not experience the experience of being an entire ant farm
3. Be an entire ant farm and you will experience the experience of being an entire ant farm!

See? Its simple.

So how can a collection of things experience being a single thing?

This too is easy. It would be hard if the set of physical laws we have made any one piece of the universe entirely discrete from the other, but nothing is.

In quantum mechanical terms, the entire universe is one vast inseperable wave function. Buddism (no, I'm not evangelising, its a system of thought not a religion) puts it like this: You see a wave. You can identify it as a wave but is is not "not the ocean". Its a continuous part of the ocean, inseperable. Note "continuous", not simply "contiguous" or "consecutive" which would allow discretion.

So the entire universe is one thing to start with. It works from the top down, not the bottom up. Modern physics agrees with this. The continued use of reduction to explain phenomena is because the configuration space of that universe, like waves in the ocean, is fractal in nature, and progessively closer examination, like a fractal, reveals more useful, not more true information and algorithms.

Its easy to concieve, from this point of view, how any collection of things within this one thing can consider themselves (and act as) one thing.
Farren is offline  
Old 06-20-2003, 01:39 PM   #6
Senior Member
 
Join Date: Apr 2001
Location: On the edge
Posts: 509
Default

I will try to read those links, but in the meantime could somebody please sum up what exactly the problem in the problem of qualia is?
tribalbeeyatch is offline  
Old 06-20-2003, 03:00 PM   #7
Veteran Member
 
Join Date: Nov 2001
Location: South Africa
Posts: 2,194
Default

If you examine my brain by any modern means you cannot see my thoughts.

Because thoughts and feelings are extremely complex interactions between many parts of the brain they are difficult to trace in the practical sense, but this is not quite the problem.

The "problem" as I have seen it presented time and again is that the "experiencing" of those things remains unexplained (that we are conscious of what happens in our brains) even if the mechanical processes are explained.

Philosophers of consciousness have coined the term "qualia" to describe the experience of thinking as opposed to the observed mechanical behaviour of the brain when thinking, and have a reference term for this "problem"

Personally, I think its a nonevent, for the reasons given in my preceding posts.
Farren is offline  
Old 06-20-2003, 03:12 PM   #8
Senior Member
 
Join Date: May 2001
Location: Sarver, PA, USA
Posts: 920
Default Re: Is the problem of qualia tractable?

This is just an updated version of:

"If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?"

It's a Buddhist koan, an unsolvable problem.

Other examples (not necessarily confined to Buddhism, but similar philosophical paradoxes) are:

If anyone who claims to be enlightened cannot be enlightened, then how can we know anyone is enlightened?

If one man suddenly begins to see reality for what it really is -- unmediatedly, like the man in Plato's Cave -- and he tells us the rest of us are still just seeing shadows, how can we know for sure that he is really seeing what is Real, and not just shadows like us?

All you have to do to become enlightened, is to stop desiring (After taking vows of poverty, chastity and silence, and isolating yourself on a mountaintop, to give up everything humanly possible, you realize you still desire to become enlightened).

In all of these cases, the "solution" is rendered impossible by the very way the problem is presented in the first place.
Wyrdsmyth is offline  
Old 06-20-2003, 03:29 PM   #9
Veteran Member
 
Join Date: Nov 2001
Location: South Africa
Posts: 2,194
Default

I've just realised my earlier post (ant farms et al) didn't quite close the loop on what I was trying to say.

The final question, why do we experience (brain) functions rather than just do them, without any experience of the event.

This is because we have accepted that action/experience is a valid dichotomy.

Einstein took science forwards in leaps and bounds by going against just such thinking. Great minds wasted immense energy trying to establish how the experiment showing that lightspeed is constant to all observers was wrong, because it was so counter-intuitive. Einstein said: Lets assume its right and see what comes up.

A similar thinking is in order here. If you assume that action (interaction) is experience, or qualia, then doing the function is the same as experiencing the function. What's more, you can make appropriate substitutions (I experienced love/ I loved) in any relevant scenario and absolutely no logical absurdities or difficulties crop up.

This is why I started out earlier about rocks experiencing things. IMHO its a valid application of Occam's razor to assume that experience is just another word for action.

You might say, but the observed action is then still different from the action. Of course, because observing the action is another action. No problem here. Try it out
Farren is offline  
Old 06-20-2003, 03:31 PM   #10
Veteran Member
 
Join Date: Nov 2001
Location: South Africa
Posts: 2,194
Default Re: Re: Is the problem of qualia tractable?

Quote:
Originally posted by Wyrdsmyth
In all of these cases, the "solution" is rendered impossible by the very way the problem is presented in the first place.
Precisely
Farren is offline  
 

Thread Tools Search this Thread
Search this Thread:

Advanced Search

Forum Jump


All times are GMT -8. The time now is 09:22 PM.

Top

This custom BB emulates vBulletin® Version 3.8.2
Copyright ©2000 - 2015, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.