luvluv

In this post I want to critique the evidentialist epistemology offered by Clifford in his "Ethics of Belief" and also address A.J. Burger's critique of William James "The Will To Believe". For those interested, all three essays are reprinted in their entirety on this webpage:

http://ajburger.homestead.com/files/book.htm

The essays are reprinted in chronological order, as James' essay was in response to Clifford's, and Burger's is in response to James'.

Briefly, in Ethics of Belief Clifford defends the premise that believing by faith is immoral because it encourages credulity in the populace, leaving them susceptible to ambitious charlatans. He therefore declares all unevidenced claims to knowledge to be not simply rationally unjustified, but also unjust:

William James' essay, "The Will To Believe" was written partially in response to this essay, and partially to make a case for the propriety of faith in certain instances. While James', a self-identified empiricist, did not deny the duty of tailoring belief to evidence where evidence is sufficient, he makes the claim that a person retains the right to risk believing on faith certain propositions which evidence alone cannot decide. James maintains that if a proposition is meaningful enough to a person, and it cannot be decided by evidence, such a person is justified rationally in risking believing in that proposition. James' says that what we want to believe has a role in deciding what we may believe, so long as what we want to believe is not contradicted by the evidence:

Burger, with Clifford, feels that believing on the basis of faith is not only rationally unjustifiable but morally heinous. He claims that James' notion of precursive faith confuses beliefs with knowledge such that James' affords any true beliefs the status of knowledge, whether those true beliefs were rationally justified or not. He also claims that James' criteria for establishing grounds wherein faith is a legitimate option fail to eliminate pernicious beliefs, and is therefore disqualified as an epistemolgical system.


In this essay I plan (hope?) to expose the central weaknesses of Clifford's version of evidentialism and to show the inadequacy of Burger's critique of James' "Will To Believe". My contention is that Clifford's evidentialism is not sufficient as an epistemelogical method because it a) is incapable of justifying many of our basic beliefs, and b) would require us to hold that belief in God is not only rationally unjustifiable, but immoral even if God exists.

I further intend to defend James' thesis against Burger, by showing that Burger's essay betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of James' premise. Specifically, contrary to Burger's statements James never intended precursive faith as a means of acquirring knowledge but as a legitimate and often rational alternative to withholding belief. James proposes faith not as a means for acquirring knowledge, but as a means of gaining the benefits of acting on true beliefs, even if those beliefs are unjustified.

CONTRA CLIFFORD:

It is difficult to assess Clifford's essay primarily because it develops an epistemelogical case through a moral critique. Clifford, from the outset, does not set out to prove that evidentialism is superior to faith because of it's greater ability to determine true beliefs. Instead, he seems to set out to prove that evidentialism morally superior to believing on faith, and it is for this reason that evidentialism is superior. Clifford therefore believes that belief upon insufficient evidence is rationally and morally reprehensible. It is therefore problematic to call "The Ethics of Belief" a discourse on an epistemelogical method, although he does develop morally (and we should think rationally) acceptable grounds for forming beliefs.

According to Clifford, we should not hold any beliefs which:

1) We do not have confirming evidence for ourselves.

or

2) Is not based on the testimony of an authority upon matters within his field. Provding that:

a) The testimony can be verified "by men as men." (Meaning, the claim would not require superhuman power or perspective to verify).

and

b) We have no reason to doubt the authority's moral character.

There are several problems with Clifford's notion of evidentialism.

Firstly, Clifford's epistemolgy is self-refuting because it cannot justify the major premise of the essay; namely, that believing on faith is morally wrong in an objective sense. The claim that believing on faith is morally reprehensible is not a claim for which personal evidence can be conclusive, nor is it a claim that can be adequately justified on the authority of moral philosophers acting "as men."

Indeed, it seems that no moral claim can be validated or invalidated by Clifford's evidentialism. When addressing the inadequacy of his system in regards to it's ability to justify our moral beliefs, Clifford never offers a means by which they can be justified. When anticipating a response that his epistemic method would force us to withhold belief on whether or not stealing, for instance, is morally wrong until we first steal, Clifford replies:

In essence, Clifford says that while it is true that his moral beliefs are unjustified according to his own system, one need not worry about that because evidentialists, after all, are such good people that they would never doubt basic morality enough to require personal evidence for it. But while this answer may suffice for the moral thesis of this essay, epistemelogically it is inadequate, for it appears that Clifford himself holds beliefs which he cannot justify given his version of evidentialism. Clifford gives us no criteria for accepting these beliefs, he ennumerates no ground rules for exceptions to the rule of evidence. While this testimonial on the moral propriety of the evidentialist is comforting to us as fellow members of society, it fails utterly because it cannot establish HOW an evidentialist like Clifford came to form moral beliefs consistent with their strident evidentialism to begin with. The failure of Clifford to elaborate on this ideal is further crippling because, again, Clifford's main contention against believing on faith is that it leads to immoral beliefs. However, what would stop a person who believes on faith from stating, like Clifford, that we needn't worry about that because people of faith are such good people that they never actually WOULD lead people to having immoral beliefs? Unless Clifford can establish that his evidentialism can establish good moral beliefs, it is irrational (and hypocritical) to attack faith on the grounds of moral inferiority.

Furthermore, Clifford seemingly reverses this position later in the essay when he champions the right of individuals to question their local customs and morals by demanding evidence for their support:

So somehow, Clifford states that it is legitimate to question some moral and cultural assumptions, like the belief that slaughtering cattle enables the production of medicine, but not others, like torturing children is morally wrong. For one, he demands evidence, for another, presumably, he would not. But on what grounds is it legitimate to ask for a demonstration that killing cattle produces medicine, and illegitimate to ask for a demonstration that torturing children is morally wrong? Clifford offers no explanation of this, and the question of how moral beliefs are to be justified remains unanswered in this essay.

Secondly, Clifford's evidentialism fails to support another of his beliefs that he says we may rightly hold, which is the belief that nature is, everywhere and always, uniform:

Just what Clifford means by this "may" is unclear. Does he mean that, morally speaking, we may assume a uniformity in nature? Or does he mean that we are rationally justified in assuming a uniformity in nature? In either case, this belief in the uniformity of nature is unjustifiable according to Clifford's own criteria, for it is impossible for "men as men" to verify that nature is the same everywhere in the universe or that it is the same at all times. (Indeed, certain current theories of cosmology make the opposite assumption.)

Clifford enumerates an epistemic system which excludes both morality and the assumption of the uniformity of nature, yet he allows, ostensibly on on no other grounds but his say-so, those two beliefs to co-exist with his evidentialism. They are exceptions to his rules, but he offers no explanation as to whether or not they are the ONLY exceptions to his rule, nor as to how to assess whether other problematic beliefs may also be excepted. (For instance, Clifford's evidentialism could also not establish the validity of our memory, or of the existence of an external world. Should we withhold belief in these, or "may" we believe in them?) He does not establish an epistemic foundation for those beliefs, or how he arrived at them. Indeed, it would appear that James accepts at least two very principal beliefs (morality and the uniformity of nature) on nothing more than faith.

This is an embarassing development, as Clifford's thesis statment is "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." Well, Clifford himself seems to have at least two such beliefs, and quite possibly many more, which cannot be held up by evidence. Since, by Clifford's own admission, actions must be premised on rightly held beliefs, Clifford would be unable to act on the belief that there is a moral code to which he is bound nor would he be able to act on the belief that nature is uniform. He could not believe, for instance, that if he jumped in the air, he would return to earth again, because no astronomer, "acting as a man" can verify that the laws of nature will operate ten seconds into the future the way they operate at present. Nor could he believe that rape was always morally wrong, because even if it could be established that it was generally wrong, what evidence can be provided that it will be wrong in this particular case? After all men, acting as men, cannot verify that moral laws will hold ten seconds into the future as they are now.

There are two more problematic issues with Clifford's thesis that are of particular concern to the atheist.

One, Clifford's epistemelogy would lead one to the conclusion that it is immoral and irrational to believe in God EVEN IF GOD EXISTS because God's existence cannot be verified by any authority acting within the limitations of being a homo sapien. Even if we were all presented with simeltaneous confirmation in the form of the appearance of the Lord God Himself upon the earth, performing might miracles, Clifford would presumably have us reject this evidence because such a being could not be VERIFIED as being God by men acting as men.

Similarly, Cliffords epistemelogy would prevent us from believing that there is no God, since this statement in similar fashion cannot be verified by men acting as men. (Signifigantly, for the atheist, commiting to Clifford's evidentialism would mean abdication of the argument from evil, since it is impossible for men, acting as men, to verify that the present world holds more evil than would be necessary for God to bring about the most possible good. Such a belief is unverifiable, and thus cannot be lawfully held.)

But certainly one is justified in rejecting an epistemic system which would, IN PRINCIPLE, prevent us from being theists OR atheists even given that one or the other is true, but would commit us withhold belief until we were on the other side of the grave.

It is against this assumption that James reacts most forcefully in his "Will to Believe." Says James:

James says that it is irrational to hold to an epistemic method which would prevent us from taking advantage of certain options EVEN IF THEY ARE TRUE. James states that there are certain propositions which cannot be decided on evidence, (such as the existence of God or the existence of a moral law) and that some of these questions are important enough to make withholding belief in regards to them an irrational, unliveable option.

I will omit here, for the sake of brevity, a presntation of James' hypothesis. Interested parties can find a brief summary of his ideas along with an ongoing critique of his stance on this thread:



CONTRA BURGER

Burger, in his essay, takes umbrage with James's claim for several reasons. Firstly, he says that James' notion of precursive faith fails as an epstemic system because it affords the status of knowledge to all true beliefs, irrespective of whether or not those beliefs were rationally justified:

However, this statment betrays a basic misunderstanding of the entire essay "The Will To Believe". Nowhere in the essay does James equate believing on faith with the possession of actual knowledge. James did not believe that faith produced knowledge (generally defined as rationally justified true beliefs) but that acting on true beliefs always produces benefits, regardless of whether the beliefs are rationally justified or not. James therefore stated that if the benefits which would be gained by a certain true belief are deemed to be great enough, one is perfectly free to risk holding that a certain rationally unjustified proposition is a true belief in order to gain those benefits.

James would never say, of the dice player who picked the right number, that he possessed knowledge of the right number. Of course, he did not. But, according to James, the dice player will benefit from having the true belief that the dice would land on, say 3, even if that belief was not justified. And if those benefits are worth the risk to the dice player, he is rationally justified in acting as if that belief were true and betting his money on the 3. James never claimed that beliefs based on faith amounts to knowledge. He is saying that perpetually withholding belief as to which side the die will land on is irrational if what we want more than knowledge is the fruit (in this case money) of risking belief.

Thus there are circumstances, James says, when a man is rationally justified in holding a belief which is not, itself, rationally justified.

Imagine a case where a man is drowning, alone, in the middle of an ocean. Now a plank of wood floats past him just before the horizon. Should the man believe he can make it to the plank, if he swims now with all his might, or should he withhold belief until he shall be given demonstrative evidence that the plank is within reach? There is, of course, the third option (which perhaps James fails to sufficiently develop in his essay, so Burger's contention that James occasionally commits the bifurcation fallacy is an accurate critique... in fact in my mind it is the only accurate critique of Burger's entire essay.). A person may swim on the PROBABILITY that he will reach the plank. He need not BELIEVE that he will reach the plank in order to swim for it. In a way James' grants that, but he aslo says that in many cases faith ENABLES an act where acting on mere probability would not. A person who legitimately believes that by swimming with all their might they will reach the plank may ON THE STRENGTH OF THAT BELIEF, be able to make it to the plank where a man, acting only on possibility and questioning himself every step of the way, may not. James states that it is positively irrational to withhold belief in such cases as these were the belief actually acts to help CREATE the fact:

So James does not reccomend faith as a means to knowledge, as is claimed by Burger, but as an alternative to withholding belief when withholding belief is either irrational or inadequate to a certain dilema.

In fact, James consistently develops his notion of faith in terms consistent with his belief that faith entailed a risk:

For James, the importance of faith was not that it enabled us to know but that it enables us to act:

Burger also erroneously claims (in increasingly ad hominem terms) that "James is loathe to suspending belief."

But this is false. James self-identifies, SEVERAL TIMES, that he is himself an empiricist, and he states categorically that when an option is not forced, one SHOULD suspend judgement:

Burger further falsely claims that Jamews is making an argument ad ingnorantiaum, and that James believes that "because it had not been proven to James' satisfaction that certain propositons are false, he concluded that they are true."

Again, this betrays such a bewildering misaprehension of James' premise that Burger opens himself up to criticisms of having not even read the essay. Nowhere does James say that all live beliefs are true. He simply says they MAY be true, and thus in the absence of significant defeaters we may believe them if we take them to be worth the risk.

(More on Burger tommorow. I'm serious this time. Got to give up the computer to kids who need to do homework.)

Family Man

Reading luvluv' critique it is clear that he has 1) badly misread Clifford and 2) holds Clifford to a much higher standard than he does James. For I will show not only does Clifford's critique fail against Clifford, but his complaints boomerang badly against James.

First, let's assess what Clifford's essay is: it is an attempt to demonstrate when it is justified to believe something and the benefit of using that system. While he does claim that one gains moral benefits by using this system, he is not claiming to set up a moral system itself. As we will see, a moral system is separate from what Clifford is claiming. While I do agree that Clifford could have spelled this out better, most of luvluv's thesis falls apart when we realize that his complaints fall outside of what Clifford had to say.

Luvluv's main complaint is that evidentialism can't establish good moral beliefs. luvluv says:

But this, of course, is a gross distortion of what Clifford actually says. Here is what luvluv provided, along with a crucial previous paragraph that luvluv didn't provide. Note the points I highlighted, which makes it clear that Clifford believes that there is already a body of evidence that exists that we can rely upon to establish the correctness of such beliefs as "Is it wrong to steal?"

It is clear that Clifford thinks a body of evidence already exists for many moral beliefs that, with a little thought, establishes the correctness of it. Consider the case of stealing and the following reasoning:

1. I don't like it when someone takes something from me.
2. Taking things from me is wrong.
3. If I don't like it when others take from me, others probably don't like it if I take it from them
4. It must be true that taking things from others is always wrong.

In other words, Clifford is saying that it is not necessary to gather evidence for every belief -- including moral ones -- when there is substantial body of evidence that it is true and when it stands up to reasonable scrutiny.

Of course, James doesn't set up a system by which we can decide that stealing is morally wrong either. If one accepts the proposition "It is ok for me to steal from others" as live, James' system would declare that as a reasonable belief. Of course, James wasn't trying to set up a system of moral beliefs either, so that would be as unfair to James as luvluv's critique was to Clifford's.

So, when luvluv says:

his critique falls flat because it is clear that Clifford did address that issue adequately, although it is not essential to his argument. He is merely pointing out that certain beliefs do not require personal evidence because there is already substantial reason to believe them to be true that stands up with a little thought.

So when luvluv turns around and says:

He is basing his criticism on a misreading of Clifford's thought. Do the villagers have a large body of evidence that they can rely on to demonstrate that their belief in the benefits of cattle-killing is justified. Clifford's point is that they don't! Even if the practice has been the custom for years, the villagers have no evidence (unlike those who believe that stealing is always wrong) that there is any benefit to that practice at all. But even worse for luvluv, while Clifford clearly identifies this as an irrational belief, James position would have to accept this as a reasonable belief -- as they obviously accept this as a live belief. This, of course, has been the heart of the skeptical attack on James' position that luvluv has yet to address.

Then luvluv says the following:

We have plenty reason to believe that torturing children is wrong. (Do you like to be tortured? Does it hurt? Is it reasonable to generalize that, if it is wrong to hurt you, it is wrong to hurt everyone?) There is no reason to believe that killing cattle does anything beneficial. luvluv is comparing apples and oranges here, and his critique fails.

Then when Clifford asserts that we "may" assume uniformity in nature, luvluv replies.

First, it is very clear that Clifford says that the assumption of uniformity of nature is something we can rely on. There is no ambiguity, and it is amply justified by evidence. If you've ever taken a physics class, you know that all objects (barring air resistance) fall at a rate of 9.8 m/s*s. That is true whether you drop it in the US, Iraq, England, France, China or in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. We can even predict accurately how fast an object would fall in a different gravitational fields, such as the moon. In other words, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that uniformity of nature is a reasonable assumption.

Ah ha! says luvluv. But modern science has demonstrated that nature isn't as uniform as we were led to believe. True, but remember two things: first is that scientists will tell you that the situations where nature is not uniform only occur in extreme situations (for example, relativity can really only be seen when an object approaches the speed of light. Under normal conditions, Newtonian physics work just fine). Second, Clifford's thesis talks about the practical world. Thus, his assumption of uniformity of nature is a practical assumption that we can rely on given the it meets the critieria of sufficient evidence.

Thus, when luvluv says:

That is simply false. They are clearly supported by evidence and reason.

That is also an mischaracterization of Clifford's position. His position isn't that we have absolute knowledge (a point James also fails to grasp) but that we have sufficient evidence. If a being came to Earth and demonstrated miraculous powers to everyone we don't have the evidence to reasonably conclude that this god? Of course we do. Of course, some (myself, for example) might argue that all that has reasonably been demonstrated at that point is that the being has extraordinary powers, but I don't think at that point I could deny that belief that that being was God is unreasonable. But the point is this: Clifford does not require absolute knowledge, just sufficient evidence. luvluv, again, is wrong about what Clifford has to say.

Again, incorrect. Clifford's position is when it is ok to believe, not when it ok not to believe. Do you believe that ritually killing cattle gives any benefit to tribesmen? In the absence of evidence, lack of belief is perfectly justifiable. Clifford offers nothing that would bother an atheist.

True, he does say that. But it is also total nonsense. Clearly, in many cases, we can determine that a belief is irrational. I doubt even luvluv would claim that the tribesmen slaughtering cattle example above is a rational belief. So how do we determine whether it is rational under James system? We can not use the possibility that it might be true; even irrational beliefs could be true, though extremely unlikely. In fact, as has been repeatedly pointed out, James' thesis fails to eliminate obviously irrational beliefs. While with Clifford, we have a clear methodology to decide when belief is justified, with James, practically all beliefs are justified, a clearly ridiculous position.

Family Man

Given time constraints, I have no plans to respond to luvluv's critique of Burger. I plan to restrict my comments on Clifford and James. luvluv is free to bring in points that were inspired by Burger, if he so wishes, but I think that there is enough meat on the bones of Clifford and James for me to gnaw on.

Pyrrho

“Family Man” states:

That is most unfortunate, given the comments you have made so far about Clifford.

Family Man

Thanks, Pyrrho. I had anticipated that luvluv would respond to my critique of his position, and I felt that there was enough meat there to occupy the free time I have for this board. However, as that discussion hasn't taken place, I might take a look at his critique of Burger this weekend.

luvluv

Family Man:

I apologize for the lateness of my reply as I have been somewhat preoccupied during the week. I think this discussion will go better if we address each other in the first rather than the third person. While I am sure others will be listening in on our discussion, we are the actual participants. Therefore simple courtesy would seem to dictate that we direct our responses to each other rather than to some anticipated audience. If I had any notion that Burger or (more shockingly) James or Clifford intended to participate in this debate, I would afford them the same respect.

A few preliminary statements before I get into your particular critiques. These are attempts to address some issues regarding precursive faith that, perhaps due to my inability to explain the concept properly, you seem never to have fully accepted. These issues are, firstly, the notion that a decision to believe in a proposition can be justified where the proposition itself is not. And secondly, that precursive faith and evidentialism are not mutually exclusive propositions.

I will take the latter first. Please understand that, for matters such that an appraisal of the evidence yields a plainly evident result, precursive faith simply nevers enter into the picture. Precursive faith is not an overall alternative to evidentialism, it is merely a supplement thereof. Precursive faith applies ONLY to those propositions for which the evidence is so inconclusive as to compel an evidentialist to simply withhold their belief (or, less frequently, to propositions for which evidence is intrinsically impossible). Precursive faith is simply a statement that in such cases belief is not irrational. It is at best unrational (i.e. it is not based on reason, whereas an irrational belief is contrary to reason). But precursive faith as a concept developed by James simply is an attempt to outline instances where withholding belief is irrational (contrary to reason) and believing without compulsory evidence is merely unrational (based in something other than reason, like survival or efficacy).

Thus, your repeated claim that precursive faith is not a proper epistemic system because it is incapable of filtering out irrational beliefs is really a red herring. An empiricist (as James repeatedly says he is on all matters which can be decided upon evidence) can use the same standards of evidential requirements for every proposition that his evidentialist brother can to eliminate unrational beliefs while denying his evidentialist brother's claim that one can only believe that for which one has overwhelming evidence. A person can be an empiricist, and allow every single proposition to be weighed by it's evidence. Such a person could thereby eliminate a number of beliefs for which there is absolutely no evidence, or those beliefs which have so many defeaters as to render even such evidence as can be given in it's defense to be comparatively meaningless.

It is plain that if a person were to follow such a strategy, he could succesfully eliminate most irrational beliefs. However it is also plain that if a person were to follow such a strategy he would be left with a signifigant number of beliefs, some of them of great importance, which upon the evidence he could neither confirm nor deny.

Now it is important to keep in mind that an evidentialist and a believer in precusive faith could have used identical empiricist procedures to arrive at this same batch of uncomfirmable undeniable propositions. The only difference between these to is this:

The evidentialst believes that one must always withhold belief where evidence is inconclusive.

The believer in precursive faith believes that there are sometimes occasions where one is justified in not withholding belief where the evidence is inconclusive.

As precursive faith does not intend to usurp evidentialist requirements, but only to supplement them where evidentialism cannot decide Precursive faith does not need to be able to eliminate irrational beliefs. One's preliminary empiricism is responsible for that.

It is important to note that James did not reccomend precurisve faith as an alternative for empiricism in any case for which empricism was sufficient. Precursive faith was never, repeat was NEVER intended to operate without an exhaustive preliminary search into the evidence for a proposition. If a person uses precursive faith to justify an irrational belief, that will be because a person's empricism has failed him (or perhaps more likely, he will have failed it), not because of precursive faith. And if a person's emprical qualities are so poor that he is not able to eliminate plainly irrational propositions by an appraisal of the evidence, than such a person is no more and no less likely to believe irrationally if he were an evidentialist.

So, the fact that precursive faith cannot eliminate irrational beliefs is an irrelavent questions, because precursive faith presupposes an emprical process which will eliminate irrational options from consideration. Precursive faith applies only to those propositions for which empiricism can offer no solution. It applies only to propositions that evidence cannot declare to be rational or irrational.

I don't think I've made this clear in my previous posts on the issue, so I'll take the heat for this misunderstanding.

Secondly, I have tried to establish that in certain cases a belief in the absence of compulsive emprical evidence can be justified even in cases where the belief is not. You (Family Man) have countered on a consistent basis that this simply cannot be true. In response to that I offer, again, this example, from my earlier post:

Now, it is clear (to me at least) that if reaching this log is the only way for this man to save his life, and if acting on faith that he can reach this log gives this man his best opportunity to reach the log (rather than withholding belief or acting on the probability that he may reach the log) that this man would be rationally justified in risking belief that he can reach the log. However, in a situation where the option was not forced (when he was not compelled by other considerations to have to make the decision immediately), he might consider the speed and distance of the log and his own swimming abilty and conclude that the belief that he could reach the log were unjustified.

In other words, taken in isolation (if he were considering this possibility from the comfort of a couch in his own home), his belief that he can under his own power reach a log at a certain distance moving at a certain speed would be irrational. But if he were actually in this situation, and his own life was at stake, and every second he took considering the question of whether or not to believe he can reach the log, or of considering the possibilities of him reaching the log, put the log further and further out of distance, he would be justified in risking believing that he could reach the log. (Indeed the faster he arrived at this conclusion, the more reasonable he would be.)

Not because of the proposition ("I can reach a log moving at a certain speed at a certain distance"), but because of the circumstances surrounding that proposition ("If I do not reach this log moving at that certain distance moving at that certain speed, I will die, and I have only seconds to make up my mind about it, because every second of consideration puts the log further and further away") that makes believing the proposition rationally justifiable where the proposition in isolation is not.

This is James point in bringing in the criteria of live, forced, and momentous. It is not, as Burger argued, an ad hoc addition simply to guard precursive faith against irrational beliefs. It is an attempt to articulate scenarios where withholding belief or acting on probability is irrational (because it may, in this circumstance at least, lead to death) and where acting on belief is merely unrational (where the person decides to believe a proposition not because of the evidence for or against it, but for other considerations. In this case, survival.)

So that was my attempt to counter your two primary claims. I hold that 1) The claim that precursive faith should be rejected because of it's inability to eliminate irrational beliefs is an innacurate and irrelavent critique, because precursive faith pressuposes an emprical process which would eliminate those beliefs. Precursive faith applies only to propostions that evidence cannot decisively declare to be either plainly rational or plainly irrational. 2) It is possible for a decision to believe to be rationally justified in even in cases where the belief, in isolation, is not, because of the circumstances surrounding that belief.

Now to our specific bones of contention:

1) In Clifford's system, can morality be evidentially established?

It is true that I too hastily passed over Clifford's attempt to establish an exempt status for the serious questioning of certain moral beliefs, perhaps becuase I found them so obviously problematic as to exclude the need. But it appears I was wrong, so let me elongate by critique.

It is true that Clifford seems to state that certain moral propositions are evidenced enough from the bulk of human opinion and tradition as to eliminate the need for personal evidence. This claim is extraordinarily problematic on numerous fronts.

1) Firstly, Clifford will go on to argue against ad populum arguments later in the essay, but this statement appears to directly contradict such a stance. If the belief that slaughtering cows leads to medicinal rewards is not one that can be upheld because of ad populum considerations, then why can a belief in simple morality be held because of ad populum considerations. The majority of humanity for the majority of time considered slavery to be not only an acceptable, but a desirable state of affairs.

Should a person living during slavery have questioned slavery or not? What makes it legitimate to question some moral and cultural beliefs and not others? Clifford does not address this question adequately in his essay, and seems to give different answers based not on any explicit methodology but based on his personal preference for society.

2) Secondly, this presupposes that there is a universal or near-universal acceptance for all or nearly all moral proposition, and as I am often reminded in the moralilty forum, this is not the case. A review of the history of human morality can lead to numerous evidential cases for and against the same proposition.

Take the propostion, for example, "It is morally wrong for women to be financially equal to men in a society."

Now, historically, and even today, human society disagress vehemently about this proposition, and there are evidenced cases for both sides.

Francis Fukiyama, for instance, in his book The Great Disruption gives some evidences that would support this claim (though he never actually argues in the book that financial equality for women is morally wrong). He presents a strong evidential case using crime statistics, goverment statistics on the participation of women in the workplace and their income, and statistics about family disintergration (divorce, illegitimacy, etc.) to build the case that there is a direct, empirically verifiable link between women working, family disintergration, and a rise in crime. He shows that in societies where women achieve financial parity with men marriages become less binding and less frequent (the financial incentive thereof having been removed), and where there is a breakup of the family there is always a concommitant rise in certain types of crimes and the loss of certain values (which he establishes via survey data compiled over decades).

Obviously, there is also an evidential case to be made for women working. The financial independance of women opens up new markets and provides for more overall wealth in a society.

But the point is that we cannot rely on either ad populum arguments, appeals to the practices of most of humanity, or evidential considerations about morallity to guide us because it is apparent that there has been no general consensus among anyone anywhere about nearly any moral issue. So how can Clifford oblidge us so blandly to decide such propositons on the wealth of the evidence compiled by our ancestors, when the wealth is, in many instances, so overwhelminingly contradictory as to prohibit a clear choice.

For instance, I am told that in half the world, and for a very long time, in the instance of rape the woman is more at fault for having allowed herself to be raped (rather than to honorably accept death) than a man is for having forced himself upon the woman. In these countries it is the woman who recieves the harsher punishment for rape than the man.

In our society, of course, the position is nearly opposite. No matter the circumstances, even if the woman is the man's wife of 20 years and if the act occured while the two were in bed alone and naked, is rape ever even PARTIALLY the fault of the woman. It is the man, and the man alone, who receives punishment for this act regardless of the surrounding circumstances. Now, other cultures would consider this to be absurd. How can a man rape his wife? How can a man be at fault for taking a woman who had no care for covering herself, and who did not have the dignity to fight off her attacker or die in the attempt?

Now should a person in either society demand evidence for the opposing propositions that rape is primarily the fault of the man or primarily the fault of the woman? Should a man in our society not believe that rape is primarily the man's fault until he has evidence that what a woman wears has nothing to do with her likliehood of being raped? Most of us would say no, but Clifford would presumably require that we withhold belief on this until we have conclusive proof that what a woman wears has no bearing on the probability of her being sexually assaulted.

3) Evidence can only decide morality, but morality is undergirded by values and evidential support cannot be given for values.

Let us use, again, the question of whether or not women should be allowed to be equal participants with men in social and financial status. Suppose an evidential argument can be made, and it is a strong one, that if women are allowed to participate fully and in full financial equality with men that this state of affairs will lead to a substantial loss of social cohesion, and a resultant rise in fatherlessness, violent crime, delinquency, and loss of values. Suppose that there is also a strong evidential argument, consisting of polling data of women, that suggests that over half of all the women in a society desire financial equality, even if this results in a loss of social cohesion and all of the pathology predicted by Fukiyama.

Given these two opposing, yet equally evidentially supported, propostions, how can simply the evidence decide whether or not women working is morally right or morally wrong. The evidence given, in order to be compelling, must pressupose a value system. Thus, if our values were such that individual freedom and happiness was of greater importance than social cohesion, than we would decide that women should work regardless of the anticipated moral consequences. However, if our values are such that social cohesion is more important than individual freedom and happiness, than we would decide that women should not work, even if this fact made the majority of women unhappy.

So it is clear that the evidence can be decisive WITHIN a value-system if everyone in society has the same value system, but if their value systems are different than evidence is plainly useless. If a person values social cohesion over individual system, than no amount of evidence that a certain course of action will restrict individual freedom will convince him that this course of action is wrong. And if a person values individual freedom over social cohesion, than no amount of evidence that a certain course of action will prevent social cohesion will convince him that such a course of action is wrong.

But what is essential here is that no evidence can be given in support of the preeminence of a certain value over another value. An attempt to prove that individual freedom is a higher value than social cohesion would be inevitably circular.

This is my belief, at any rate. If you disagree, I welcome you to present an evidentiary methodology by which values can be measured. This attempt, however, would presuppose the value that demonstratively superior methodologies must (morally) be adhered to before it could establish any values, and would thus be circular. (You would have to demonstrate that your methodology for establishing values is morally right before they would accept it, however it is only by accepting your methodology that they could establish what actually is morally right). This is my opinion anyway, but if you can disprove it I am all ears.

So it is to me (and to many moral philsophers, I take it) inconceivable that moral issues can really be decided by evidence alone without consideration of value.

4) Clifford seems to be suggesting that issues of morality can be justified by an appeal to the authority of human kind in general without the demand for personal evidence. However, later in his essay Clifford claims that authority can only be accepted where the authority is thought to be an expert in his field and where the claim being considered is one which can be verified by men as men.

Well, who, in human history, is an authority on moral matters? What people or group of people constitute this authority? And how will we decide when these authorities contradict each other?

And can we really verify any moral statement? I have attempted to establish that moral statements cannot be decided upon the evidence because moral issues presuppose values, and evidence cannot be provided for base values. If this is correct, than moral statements are not verifiable. It would be impossible to evidentially verify the statement "It is morally right for women to be financially equal to men in society" to someone whose basic values contradict whatever evidence can be brought to bear on that claim. If you support this claim with evidence that women working is better for the realization of human freedom, but my base value is social cohesion, than your evidence to me is worthless. So given that values differ, and no justification is possible for values which will not be circular, how can we verify moral statements with evidence alone?

So while it is true that Clifford did address the issue of morality, his discussion of the issue is very abrupt and problematic. He gives no methodology by which one could assess the evidence for moral claims, particularly when different value perspectives could produce equally compelling evidence. It seems to me that Clifford does not take the issue seriously enough, at least in this essay. Thus I have to conclude that it would be nearly impossible to develop a moral system within Clifford's rules that could be adequate for all of the actual moral demands of life. Perhaps these could establish whether one should steal or murder, but beyond that one would have to withhold belief on almost any position complex enough for good evidence to provided on both sides. Unfortunately for Clifford, most moral decisions are this complex, and his epistimelogy would force us to be constantly frozen in indecision on issues such as abortion, stem cell research, cloning, affirmative action, pacifism, just war theory, the value of the individual vs the value of society. We would simply have to remain uncommitted to each of these propositions, and we would have to do so while lives hang in the balance. Further, given the role values play in such judgements we could not even act on the probability that one stance is more just than another. Since we can give no evidential support for values we cannot give probabilities for which value is the most superior, if indeed any value is.

And so it is my opinion that Clifford's entire essay fails because it cannot establish any moral values at all, and the entire essay is premised on the notion that it is morally wrong to believe based on faith. If Clifford cannot prove that faith is morally wrong evidentially then his essential critique cannot get off the ground. (In my opinion it was a mistake for Clifford to make the argument against faith on the basis of morality. He could have made things much easier on himself if he argued as you do, that faith is inferior to evidence in producing rational beliefs. There is a much stronger case for that, but I am forced to take Clifford at his word when refuting Clifford.)

You presented this as a justification, presumably, of the evidentiary support of the moral impropriety of theft:

Well, firstly, I must say that this is not an evidential argument. It is a rational argument with some rather questionable premises, and some that are entirely missing. Some premise should establish that you and other people are significantly similar in your likes and dislikes, otherwise the fact that you don't like it when someone takes something from you is not evidence that others don't like it when something is taken from them. Now, it is obviously true that others do not like things taken from them, I am not disuputing that, I am simply disputing the notion that you have sufficient evidence here. The only real evidence you have is YOUR OWN dislike of having things stolen from you, and from this you conclude that it is ALWAYS (?!) wrong to take things from OTHERS. But surely your own dislike is insufficient grounds for such an extensive conclusion, even in a purely rational argument such as this one. But it doesn't even get off the ground as an EVIDENTIAL argument, which is what you seem tobe supporting.

Secondly, in no way does 2 follow from 1. It simply does not follow that because I don't like it when a certain thing happens to me that this thing is wrong. From that (again, missing) premise, the following argument would be totally justified:

1. I don't like it when someone refuses to sleep with me.
2. Not sleeping with me is wrong.
3. If I don't like it when others refuse to sleep with me, others probably don't like it if refuse to sleep with them.
4. It must be true that refusing to sleep with others is always wrong.

This is obviously absurd, but totally justifiable if we proceed on the ridiculous grounds that whatever I don't like is morally wrong.

This could be true except that neither you nor James has provided any such evidence, and that evidence seems to me to be in principle incapable of resolving moral issues.

But you are welcome to attempt an evidentiary case that theivery is wrong. (The case you presented above is a rationalistic case for the immorality of theft, not an evidential one.)

Well, again James' system and Cllifford's system are not in direct competition with each other as regards most beliefs. However, while Clifford perhaps does not intend to set up a moral system he does base the superiority of his system on the immorality of faith. But Clifford's position centers on evidence, and Clifford gives no evidene that beliefs based on faith is morally wrong, he simply asserts it. This is a signifigant flaw in his paper. James, wisely, makes no such extravagant claims. Again, Clifford could have escaped this critique had he decided to base his case on the superiority of evidentialism in producing rational beliefs. Clifford chose to base the superiority of evidentialism on it's moral superiority to faith, a claim for which he can give no evidence. This is a crippling defect of the essay.

What exactly is this body of evidence ? What documents constitute it, and from whence do these documents get their authority?

It is essential to his argument. He never admonishes us to abandon precursive faith because it leads to irrational beliefs, but because it leads to morally destructive habits ABOUT belief. And Clifford provides no evidence for this claim. Like you, he presents a rational argument for this claim, but it is incomplete (as he does not present or anticipate any scenario presupposing the total absence of faith from society and what ills that reality would contain... hopelessness for one). Since Clifford based his argument so strongly on the immorality of faith, and on how essential evidence is for any claim, he should have provided evidence that faith was immoral. That he did not do so was an esential failure on his part, for ife we adopt his methodology he has given us no grounds for believing that a central statement of his essay is true... that faith is immoral.

Again, what is that large body of evidence that stealing is always wrong? If either you or Clifford would present this evidence you would find that the rest of us would accept it much more easily, and your stance would be a lot less hypocritical.

(For the record, even I, as a Christian theist, do not believe that stealing is ALWAYS wrong, depending on who you are stealing from and under what conditions. It seems to me that if you have a starving child and Bill Gates drops a twenty dollar bill, you are at least morally justified, in some sense, in taking that twenty bucks to feed your baby. I only mean to say that I can conceive of some conditions where it would be difficult for me to say that stealing is ALWAYS wrong. FWIW)

Well, first of all I've addressed it several times. In fact, nauseatinlgy numerous times. I'll no doubt have to address it again, through no fault of my own, because you continue to steadfastly believe that justifying, under circumstances of duress, a decision to believe is not the same as justifying a belief.

The belief itself, in isolation, James would never consider to be rational. But what if the evidence for and against this proposition was inconclusive (let's say this tradition is two years old, and the first year beneficial medicines DID seem to come, and the second year no medicines came). And what if you had no knowledge of medicianal practices, and further if you had a son who would CERTAINLY die within the next 24 hours unless he recieved the appropriate medicine? In THIS TYPE OF INSTANCE the DECISION to believe would be justified becuase the decision is a) forced. The child will CERTAINLY die in 24 hours if you do not act, he may survive if you do. Waiting for evidence is not an option; b) momentous, because your child is obviously worth something to you, and c) live because according to this hypothetical person's knowledge of medicine and science, the evidence for this propotion is inconclusive.

So in such a situation James would absolutely say that the persons decision to risk believing is rational because of the CERTAIN, and immediate adverse consequences of withholding belief or denying belief. A person can certainly act on the probability that the slaughtering the cattle will produce medicine without believing it, but James says that is a distinction without a difference, since to believe is to act, and to act is to believe. Either way one is equally committed. Besides, I could similarly justify my decision to be a Christian on similarly probalistic grounds, but that wouldn't be as effective for me (or anyone else) as actively believing in Christianity.

At any rate, to recap, James would not be forced to say the belief itself was rational, only to say that the DECISION TO BELIEVE is rational based on the surrounding circumstances. I sincerely hope that, by now, this distinction is clear, because if it isn't I sincerely despair at the prospect of ever making it clear. For the umpteenth time to the umpteenth power, justifying a decision to believe is not the same as justifying the belief itself.

Again, this is a rational and not an evidential argument. Again, there is no logical connection between the fact that I dislike being tortured and the fact that torture is morally wrong. I dislike eating shrimp, but eating shrimp is not morally wrong. There is no reason to believe that because something hurts, that it is morally wrong. Flu shots hurt. I've been told by certain people who have been abused that INITIALLY, the abuse was confusing becuase the touching felt good. Was it therefore morally right?

I'm afraid that you are going to need something far more substantial than the notion that "because I dislike something, it is morally wrong." That doesn't hold up.

Well, I challenge this assumption being made on Clifford's rules of evidence on at least two grounds. Firstly, the notion that equations and predictions can be used to predict how fast objects will fall on the moon PRESUPPOSES the uniformity of nature, and therefore cannot count as evidence thereof. Only if a person were presently on the moon, or Jupiter, or wherever, and could measure the speed with which an object feel, could this claim be evidential support of the uniformity of nature. Secondly, Clifford makes it clear that we can only accept claims by authority in cases where the claim is verifiable by men as men. He flatly states that while we can accept that the temperature under the ice of a certain glacier is what it is reported to have been by someone trained to make such observations, we would not be justified if this man were to attempt to describe the molecular state of all molecules under the Ice of the entire Artic regions. Such a claim could not be directly verified by human experimentation.

Well, if this is the case for the molecules in the Arctic, how much more is it true for the entire universe? It is simply impossible to provide evidence for the proposition that "nature is uniform everywhere in the universe, and will continue to be so". There is no authority that can establish this claim, and no way to verify it without being EVERYWHERE and EVERYWHEN.

A scientist cannot provide evidence (this is what Clifford demands, remember) that nature ONLY strays from uniformity under extreme situations, she can only provide evidence that we only have OBSERVED the uniformity of nature breaking down in extreme situations.

Practical or not, Clifford's epistemology provides no ground for any ASSUMPTIONS that are without evidentiary support. If there can be exceptions to this rule, and if we can allow certain assumptions to sneak in under the velvet rope, then Clifford needs to establish why these assumptions are exempt and whether or not any other assumptions also could be granted that status. The fact that nature is uniform right now, and even the fact that it has been uniform for most of history until now, is not evidence that it will be uniform ten minutes from now (*according to Clifford's system, which has the requirement of human verification*). So his assumption would be disqualified by the actual application of his system, and is therefore in need of explanation.

Another crippling fault of Clifford's essay, (and, in my experience, of evidentialism in general) is that it fails to establish a universal threshhold for precisely what, under heaven, constitutes "sufficient" evidence. Some people believe in God because of the evidence of big bang cosmology, religious experience, the near impossibility of a naturalistic origin of life, the mystery of the mind, and evidence of teleology. You would obviously say these evidences were insufficient, others would not believe so. Who is right? How much evidence is enough evidence?

Maybe I was unclear, I meant that Clifford's postion would prevent one from being a strong atheist, and would prevent one from using the argument from evil as an argument against theism.

I said:

To which you replied:

So you disagree with him here? Is it, in your opinion, problematic if a certain epistimic system prevents you from having true beliefs? Is it more problematic or less problematic to you than a system that is incapable of filtering out irrational beliefs?

It seems that, while I feel your critique of James on the grounds that his system cannot eliminate irrational beliefs to be groundless and inconsequential (as it pressumes that James intended precursive faith to work WITHOUT the consideration of evidence, which it does not), it is interesting to me that we seem to be living embodiments of his distinctions of the two different types of belief.

You seem to be incapable of accepting a system that could lead you to make certain errors, even if that system offered you a means to truth. I am incapable of accepting a system that could prevent me from accepting certain truths, even if it could help me eliminate errors. So it seems that perhaps even you must admit that he was right about something.

But again, the upside about all this is that you can to a great extent be both an evidentialist and a believer in precursive faith.

I hope I have explained why I feel you are wrong about this last statement, on both counts.

Look forward to your response and again sorry I am so late in responding (it had nothing to do with the NCAA tournament, I swear!). I wasn't ignoring you I just didn't have time.

Family Man

At the outset, I want to make it clear I'm not interested in defending Burger. His essay makes many valid points, but I don't feel compelled to defend all of them. There are, however, several things about luvluv's response that are clear misconceptions of the issues involved.

First, I have to wonder why James (and luvluv) are talking about true knowledge at all. I don't recall Clifford using the term at all. Clifford's formulation is not a guarantee that are beliefs that are derived from it are true beliefs; it is a formulation that is designed to reduce errors. Surely, everyone has believed something in the past based on information that later proved incorrect -- call that a false positive. It is also possible to disbelieve in something that is true but for which inadequate evidence is available -- the false negative. This is, of course, why the wise constantly question their own beliefs. The use of evidence in developing beliefs is used to reduce errors, not eliminate them entirely.

What this leads to is what Burger calls James' confusion of actions and beliefs. Beliefs certainly guides our actions, but we certainly do not have to formulate beliefs to take an action. Consider this admittedly facetious, but clear example of the point:

Imagine I've been kidnapped by luvluv's evil twin brother, hatehate. hatehate puts me in a chamber with two large doors. At this point, I have enough evidence to believe the following:

1) If I don't go through one of the two doors in ten minutes, hatehate will fill the chamber with poisonous gas, killing me instantly.
2) Behind one of the doors are 72 clones of Halle Berry eager to tend to my every need and desire.
3) Behind the other door is a lion pack that hasn't been fed in three days.
4) Opening one door means it can not be closed, and the other can not be opened.
5) The doors offer no clue as to which is the door to paradise: they are identical and soundproof.

A la James' critique of Clifford, am I required to freeze in indecision because I am unable to uncover evidence as to which door leads to safety? Of course not. A 50% chance of survival is certainly better than 100% chance of death, and I'm better off making a random pick without even trying to form a belief about which door is correct.

Thus, James' criticism that we can't make a decision, say about marrying someone, without being absolute certain that the decision is correct is a misunderstanding of Clifford's position. I would hope no one would marry without gathering enough evidence that the person they're marrying is a worthy person, but one doesn't need to absolutely certain either.

A point I do agree with Burger is that James' formulation is that it is basically a random model. Why does luvluv believe in God? He finds it live. Why do I disbelieve? Apparently, it is dead to me. What makes it live to luvluv and dead to me? Who knows? It is an apparently random event.

Which brings us to luvluv's famous Floating in the Ocean illustration, which can be effectively called the Argument from Rosy Scenario. Let's assume that I am floating in the ocean where, in the distance, I see a piece of floating lumber. Let's further assume that I know that boats and planes are out looking for me, but I do not know when they will find me. Obviously, the rational decision is whatever will allow me to remain in the water the longest.

luvluv's first mistake is to assume that reaching the board is the best choice. That isn't necessarily true. If I'm a out-of-shape middle-aged man, it is very possible that the effort will tire me out and I'd drown before I get halfway to the board. I'd be better off treading water because I'll survive longer. On the other hand, if I'm in great shape and a strong swimmer, the decision is an easy one -- I know I can reach the board. What is clear is that considering the evidence is a sound strategy here.

But what about the case that I don't really know if I can or not. What luvluv does is to blithely assume that going for it is the right decision and, of course, my belief will carry me through and allow me to survive. But that is not necessarily the case. It is possible that I overestimated my abilities, and I drown before reaching the board. It is also possible that I underestimated my abilities and I reach the board more easily than I thought I would. It is also possible that I assessed the situation accurately and, through guts and determination, I manage to reach the board but expended so much energy in the effort that I'm unable to hold onto the board (thus, I've gained nothing).

What should be obvious here is that, contra luvluv, beliefs do not make facts. In fact, that would suggest that God exists because people believe, not that people believe because God exists -- a position I don't think luvluv means to take.

What has become apparent in the discussion, and reading the relevant essays, is that James' theory is worthless. Deciding something is "live" is essentially random, and what we end up with is faith justifying faith. Clifford's formulation, while not guaranteeing success, at least provides us with a guide with which we can make decisions more effectively. James doesn't help us do that at all.

Family Man

luvluv --

Believe me, I'm busy too so I do understand. In fact, I have to leave right now to pick up my daughter, so I don't even have time to read your response, and I don't know exactly when I'll get around to it (it may take a week). But rest assured, a response will be forthcoming.

Family Man

Let me start by making one criticism of Clifford. His theory is inadequate in that there is a second way to come to a belief: reason (read logic). For example, if the Argument from Design was a valid argument, then theists could claim to hold a rational belief, even though the Argument from Design doesn't conclusively prove that God exists -- it just suggests it. Of course, I don't believe the Argument from Design is a valid argument, but that's another thread.

Having said that, I can say that the problem with James' formulation isn't so much that it doesn't sift out irrational beliefs, it is because the formulation itself is irrational. Let me explain.

A rational belief is one that is supported by reason. One way to provide reason is to provide evidence. Hence, an irrational belief is one supported by neither logic or evidence. Since James wants to say that we can believe without evidence, he must come up with a logical methodology on which we can rest our beliefs. But he doesn't do that; as I've noted a dozen times (and to which you haven't adequately responded) the forced and momentous critieria simply rule out the trivial, while the live option simply validates that which you've already decided to believe. In other words, it is no criteria at all.

To illustrate this, let's return to K's example of David Berkowitz's belief that a 2000 year dog instructed him to kill. How do we determine that such a belief is irrational? By noting that there is no evidence to support such a claim. Beliefs without evidence (or logical support) are irrational. You want us to believe that evidence will rule out the irrational, but what evidence rules out as irrational is precisely that subset of beliefs that James claims to be justifying. It's like building a machine that takes input that doesn't exist. If you accept that evidence is a valid way to come to beliefs, then you have to conclude that James' framework is useless.

As for your moral argument, you are still misreading Clifford's arguments. First, he is not putting forth an ad populum argument. He is saying that it is valid if it is tried and true. Do I really need to put forth an evidential argument that rampant stealing causes social disruption (to follow Fukuyama)? Don't you think that a bit of logic more than amply demonstrates that, if we allow people to steal from another willy-nilly, that harmful social effects will be present. And if you want an evidential argument, I suggest you study the history of the rise of centralized governments in Europe and the United States from about 1400 on. I just don't think it is necessary to spend the time to belabor the obvious. (And, yes, arguments can be made that there are times when stealing is not wrong, but that's beyond what this thread is about, isn't it?)

Second, you still don't seem to understand that Clifford's arguments do not guarantee that the beliefs that are deemed rational are correct. What he does say is that, if we are careful about our beliefs we are more likely to be correct, but there is no guarantee of correctness. Are Fukuyama's beliefs rational? Yes, he has provided a rational basis for his position. Is it a correct belief? Perhaps, but I suspect not. Could I come up with an evidential and logical argument to counter his? I believe so, though I'm not going to do it because it goes beyond the topic at hand. The point is, luvluv, is that all you have done is to point out that there are some difficult moral questions for which the answers are not easy. None of it, however, has any relevance to what Clifford is saying. His essay is about the benefits of using an evidential support for beliefs, not that it provides correctness 100% of the time.

In that vein, you'll have to excuse me for shouting, but I've pointed this out so many times I want to be sure you get this. When you say things like:

I have to say this: CLIFFORD DOES NOT REQUIRE WE HAVE CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF ANYTHING. HE REQUIRES THAT WE HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS. PLEASE REFRAIN FROM MAKING THIS MISTAKE IN THE FUTURE.

And I do hope you realize that we have considerable evidence that rape has to do with power, and not sex.

No, I don't consider it a problem because no system will ever guarantee that our beliefs will be true. James' system doesn't guarantee that the beliefs will be true either, but using his system will practically guarantee false beliefs. And a system that guarantees false beliefs certainly is problematic.

James' system doesn't offer a means to truth. It merely succors those who wish to believe without evidence. To offer a means to truth, it has to demonstrate that what comes out of it is likely to be true. Clifford doesn't guarantee truth, but at least we have reason to believe that what we adopt is true. I'm perfectly willing to be wrong; I'm not willing to accept a system which provides no means to determine whether the beliefs I accept are at least likely to be true.

Nope. You've misread me too.

Jobar

An excellent and scholarly discussion, gentlemen!

luvluv, I think you are requiring absolute certainty from the evidentialist side, and only possibility from the precursive-faith side.

Plus, as Family Man has so ably pointed out, you have in no way shown us how James' rationale prevents us from having faith in actively harmful, silly, or insane beliefs. His Berkowitz example is a fatal flaw in your argument, and I see no way to patch it.