Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"First, a question: What is 'intuitive background probability'?"

What we would estimate the general probability of an event to be, without knowing the specifics. For example, if you ask me what the probability of my monitor spontaneously floating off my desk is, I would have to give you an estimate of intuitive background probability.

"I would not say that winning a 'Googleplex' lottery is any evidence of cheating. Proof of cheating would require a specialized investigation. High odds do not, as you say, indicate cheating."

Good so far...

"Other elements are observing information, beauty, elegance, specificity, and variety."

This is a different argument, the classic teleological argument. I would say it's far weaker even than the teleological argument from improbability. Information exists either independently of humans or in the minds of humans, and beauty and elegance are certainly mind-dependent. Specificity also seems to exist either indpendently of humans or in the minds of humans, as does variety. You'll bear quite a large burden of proof if you claim only a God could produce these.

"Effective impossibility: an event is effectively impossible if the improbability of the event is greater than the number of atoms in the universe, which is approximately 10 to the power of 70.'

It's a little problematic, because then we'd have a bunch of situations in which effectively impossible events must happen. Every time there is a random event, and the chance of any particular outcome is one in 10 to the power of 70, we know with 100% certainty that an "effectively impossible" event is about to occur. Why not use "ridiculously improbable" instead? Very little is "impossible." But I'd be willing to accept that definition for the purposes of argumentation.

Nick Tattersall has also alluded to a Problem of Finetuning for the theist. What are the chances that there would just happen to be a God with all the properties theists ascribe to Him? If any of several of His properties varied just slightly, we would not call Him "God." The chance of God existing on the hypothesis of no God-designer is therefore very small, so we should instead posit the existence of a God-designer.

Philip Osborne

I said my previous post would be my last, but I felt I ought to respond to this argument:

Let "p" be "a modally-neutral (may or may not be possible, necessary, contingent, or impossible) God-like entity." Is this acceptable, given the two sentences above? I don't see how anyone could derive either of them simply from p. If God's alethic modal status is defined simply as "not contingent," we've already made statements about existence in possible worlds. And if we're simply asked to accept the principle "If God exists, God is necessary, and if God does not exist, God is impossible," without special (and modally-specifying) definitions of God, well, I don't see how anyone could argue for that principle.

The point at issue is that saying God is not contingent is not asserting what God's modal status is. We haven't made any statements about existence in possible worlds other than that it is not true that God exists in some worlds, and fails to exist in others. To my knowledge, there is no argument to demonstrate that this is an illegal procedure.

Suppose that every possibly true proposition possibly has an explanation. This seems to be an intuitively appealing statement. Therefore, if God could fail to exist, possibly, there would be an explanation of why He did not exist. But God is not the type of being that could be "explained away" by any contingent feature of the world. Hence, God cannot fail to exist unless He is impossible.

Sincerely,

Philip

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"The point at issue is that saying God is not contingent is not asserting what God's modal status is."

But if it's so derivable, I think we've still got a problem. We are defining God as a being Who is not contingent, right? Doesn't that directly entail "God is necessary or impossible"? If it does, we're making a statement about existence. (Whether or not this can be turned into an objection to the modal ontological arguments remains to be seen, for now.)

Vanderzyden

Thomas,

OK, if I substitute your suggestion for the probability characterization, the modified argument reads as follows:

"(A) Many highly specified universal constants are necessary to permit life.
(B) We observe these constants in nature.
(C) It is ridiculously improbable that the constants of the universe would otherwise permit life.
(D) It is ridiculously improbable that the quantity and high specificity of the universal constants would exist without the prerequisite existence of God.
(E) Therefore, a God exists."

Do you find this now to be a cogent argument?

You also mention a "fine-tuning" problem for God himself:

I don't find this subject in either of his two articles he has in the library. My initial reactions are:

1. God's properties are qualitative, so it is difficult to speak of "varying them slightly".
2. It is the specificity of the design, not the designer, that is in question.
3. In general, it doesn't make sense to speak of fine-tuning of character traits of persons (beings).


Vanderzyden

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"(A) Many highly specified universal constants are necessary to permit life.
(B) We observe these constants in nature.
(C) It is ridiculously improbable that the constants of the universe would otherwise permit life.
(D) It is ridiculously improbable that the quantity and high specificity of the universal constants would exist without the prerequisite existence of God.
(E) Therefore, a God exists."

I don't see what (C) is doing in the argument, but more importantly, I say (E) is a non sequitur. We can't conclude that God exists based only on the ridiculous improbability of our set of constants. Consider a similar argument:

(A') Many highly specified physics events are necessary for Jane to win the lottery.
(B') Jane won the lottery.
(C') It is ridiculously improbable that the highly specified physics events that happened would have caused Jane to win the lottery.
(D') It is ridiculously improbable that the quantity and high specificity of these physics events would happen unless Jane cheated.
(E') Therefore, Jane cheated.

Why is this argument unsound?

"1. God's properties are qualitative, so it is difficult to speak of 'varying them slightly'."

Instead of God being all-powerful, He could be 90% powerful, or 80% powerful, or some-powerful, or sometimes-powerful, etc. Instead of morally perfect, He could be mostly morally perfect. Instead of always desiring life, He could desire life most of the time, or desire a different kind of life, or desire a universe with set of constants C which is a totally different set of constants.

"2. It is the specificity of the design, not the designer, that is in question."

This looks like begging the question. You're assuming God Himself isn't a design. I'm saying it looks as if He is, because the chance of Him "just existing" with all these specified characteristics is very slim.

"3. In general, it doesn't make sense to speak of fine-tuning of character traits of persons (beings)."

I think it makes sense. Suppose I'm creating a character in a book. I determine how often he says what he says, thinks what he thinks, does what he does, down to the tiniest detail if I wish.

Jack the Bodiless

No, it is not a cogent argument. And the reason is easy to see.

If something is "ridiculously improbable", this should be demonstrable. It is possible, in principle, to calculate the probability of a monitor lifting off a desk: the number of atoms can be estimated, and the probability of all these oscillating atoms moving in the same direction at the same time is calculable.

No such calculations are possible even in principle for universal constants.

It is a statement of faith that it is "ridiculously improbable" for universal constants to have the values we observe. I am equally justified in making a "statement of faith" that it is NOT ridiculously improbable.

I hereby choose to do so.

Therefore I do not accept premises (C) or (D), and the argument fails.

Incidentally, is this the "overwhelming evidence" you alluded to earlier? You have nothing more?

Keith Russell

Greetings:

We evolved here. Of course we would evolve to take advantage of the conditions here.

(The 'miracle' would be if we hadn't evolved to live here, and yet we were able to live in an unfit, or hostile environment.)

As to the probabilities, the only way to know the 'odds' of this universe forming, would be if we knew what other universes (where vastly different conditions would have made the development of life impossible) might have been formed, instead.

Silly.

Keith.

Philip Osborne

But if it's so derivable, I think we've still got a problem. We are defining God as a being Who is not contingent, right? Doesn't that directly entail "God is necessary or impossible"? If it does, we're making a statement about existence. (Whether or not this can be turned into an objection to the modal ontological arguments remains to be seen, for now.)

If we say that "God is necessary or contingent," we are saying something about existence. I don't think this objection can work, however, because making a statement about the layout of logical space is not the same as making an existential proposition, and Kant's criticisms are only sound against the latter. I don't see why we can't use "If God exists, then God exists necessarily" as a conceptual truth which tells us about the properties of God. Clearly, it tells us something about the nature of God; God cannot have a nature that can be contingently caused not to exist; necessary or impossible existence, therefore, seems to make a substantive, non-trivial claim about a thing's nature.

Sincerely,

Philip

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"I don't see why we can't use 'If God exists, then God exists necessarily' as a conceptual truth which tells us about the properties of God."

Because I don't think that conditional is derivable unless necessary existence is packed into the definition of God. As I see it, "If God exists, then God exists necessarily" can mean one of two things:

1. If a necessary being with God's other properties exists, then the necessary being with God's other properties exists necessarily.
2. If a being with God's other properties (not necessity) exists, then this being exists necessarily.

I don't see how anyone could confirm the latter, and the former seems pretty trivial. But as for Kant's criticisms, it still seems true that when we define something, we never say whether it's necessary, contingent, or impossible alone, and when we're trying to figure out whether something exists, we don't decide antecedently whether it's necessary, contingent, or impossible.

Philip Osborne

I would probably favor the second interpretation of the definition; I think this is what Anselm had in mind, and it is based on the intuitively plausible idea that God is not just some cosmic dude who might not have existed. I have already provided argument to support interpretation #2, which works for certain conceptions of God, based on the premiss that every proposition possibly has an explanation. If "God contingently does not exist" was a possible proposition, it would also be possible that there was some proposition that would explain why God does not exist. However, because God is an unlimited being, and causal contingency can plausibly be said to be a limitation, it follows that no possible event, object, etc. could explain why God fails to exist. Hence, "God contingently fails to exist" is an impossible proposition.

Sincerely,

Philip

[ October 25, 2002: Message edited by: Philip Osborne ]</p>