Pomp

YHWH666,

Let’s say I did prove to you that dolphins had the ability to return your respect. Would you start buying dolphin safe tuna? Why?

No. I don't like tuna.

I would, however, advocate peacful relations with the dolphin community, including an end to fishing practices dangerous to dolphins if for no other reason, than for the vast scientific benefits of the willing cooperation of an intelligent submarine species.

When was the last time you had a social interaction with a dolphin, one that would allow you to benefit from this respect? How would buying dolphin safe tuna help you personally?

I think I've just explained this adequately. I don't need to have a personal interaction with every member of society in order to benefit from the existence of a social contract.

Let’s say you walk by a farm with cows on it. If you don't bother the cows, and just walk on, they'll leave you alone. But if you where to tease the cows, moo at them and throw sticks and pebbles at them, it's likely that they would break the fence and start to run after you, trying to trample you...If you respect them they'll return that respect.

You're missing a crucial distinction. There is no agreement between the cows and I. The cows do not view throwing rocks as a violation of a nonaggression pact. There is simply the cows' instinctive reaction to being tormented.

You might say it wasn't a conscious decision on their part to respect you it’s just that they had no motivation. But how could we know? We’re not telepaths. What evidence is there for this? Psychology is a difficult science to prove. And it seems to me that the burden of proof would be on you.

I disagree. We don't go around assuming that everything is conscious until proven unconscious. You're making the positive assertion, you provide the proof.

Mageth

Let’s say you walk by a farm with cows on it. If you don't bother the cows, and just walk on, they'll leave you alone. But if you where to tease the cows, moo at them and throw sticks and pebbles at them, it's likely that they would break the fence and start to run after you, trying to trample you...If you respect them they'll return that respect.

Actually, most cows would look stupidly at you and do nothing else, except maybe swat their tail. The smarter ones would wander off. Only certain breeds/individuals might get agressive, and those may well be agressive even if you were "respecting" them. Cows have no idea what "respect" is, anyway. If you feed them, they follow you. Otherwise, they're generally indifferent.

Pomp

Tom Piper,

Variations on the Peter Singer/Tom Regan argument against discrimination against non-human inhabitants of this planet have emerged in these discussions. This line of argument is a matter of maintaining that there is no relevant difference between humans and non-humans that warrants such different treatment.

As far as I can tell, no one has done anything that undermines this line of argumentation. Have I missed something? If so, what?

It depends on what you consider a "relevant" difference. Most of us quite obviously do see a relevant difference between humans and other animals. The problem with Singer's argument (and possibly Regan's...I've never read any of his work) is that he asserts that sentience is the only relevant ethical criterion, but never supports that assertion adequately. Why should I be concerned with the suffering of a being for which I have little to no empathy and which cannot grant me concern in return for my granting it concern? Singer, as far as I know, never addresses this question.

To give you an idea of a contratsing point of view, as a subjectivist and a pseudo-contractarian, I hold that the ability to contract is the relevant criterion that seperates humans from other animals. As justification for this principle, I observe that that an agent has good reason to treat another contracting agent ethically: the expectation of ethical treatment in return. Singer, to the best of my knowledge, presents no goo reason why an agent ought to treat a sentient, noncontracting being ethically.

Pomp

The AntiChris,

Thanks for the reply. I think I understand the distinction you make.

You're welcome. Thank you for being so polite in discussing an emotionally charged topic.

PB: I just don't want to watch {cruelty to animals}.

I can understand this.

It would be interesting to know if you've attempted to rationalise this aversion.

I'm not sure what you mean by "rationalise." If you're asking if I've attempted to figure out why I feel that way then, while I don't have a definitie answer for you, I think that a good case can be made from evolutionary psychology. As I've said before, some sort of social contract is necessary for any society to function. Cruelty is usually detrimental to social cooperation, thus people who value cruelty are likely to suffer from social ostracization and decreased reproductive success. Hence, an aversion to cruelty is probably, to some degree, a biological feature of the human species. That portion of the aversion that is not biological is likely explainable by social evolution, using the same line of reasoning. To the extent that a non-human animal is simlar to us, that general aversion to cruelty will apply to that animal.

I suspect it's similar to my aversion to seeing human cruelty. Like most people, I really don't want to see upsetting scenes of human cruelty and, although I'm aware that acts of extreme cruelty are occurring every minute somewhere in the world, I am, to all intents and purposes, oblivious to them - I can go days without this human misery even crossing my mind.

Yes, that pretty much describes me.

However, despite the remoteness of the cruelty, most of us would actively support coercion to stop others "engaging in it".

Yes. The difference, to me, is that I am repelled to a vastly greater degree by the thought human suffering than I am by the thought of non-human suffering.

I'd be interested to know if you felt human cruelty was a moral issue because of the interests of people repelled by it or because of the suffering experienced by the objects of it (or both)?

Both. Intentional cruelty to human beings defies their interests and it defies the interests of other human beings who are repelled by such cruelty.

Pomp

YHWH666,

I suppose one could corrupt the words meaning and apply it to vegetables, but it would strip it of it's meaning.

Isn't this more or less what you are doing by applying the word "murder" to non-human animals? Most of do not use the word in such a way so as to include the killing of non-human animals.

YHWH666

You're missing a crucial distinction. There is no agreement between the cows and I. The cows do not view throwing rocks as a violation of a nonaggression pact. There is simply the cows' instinctive reaction to being tormented.
__________________________________________________ __________________

Since (at least none that I'm aware of) you don't have a contract with every one in the world, would you view it as wrong to harm some one who has never heard of you before?
What if these intelligent dolphins had no intrest in human contact, save the agreement with humans not to kill each other? how would you benifit from a treaty with beings who have no power to effect you in any way. the same could be applied to bushmen in africa. is it immoral to enslave them? if yes then why? what have you to gain?

---always here for friendly disscussion YHWH

Pomp

YHWH666,

Since (at least none that I'm aware of) you don't have a contract with every one in the world, would you view it as wrong to harm some one who has never heard of you before?

This is a common misunderstanding of contract theory. The hypothetical contract isn't an agreement between A and B, A and C, A and D, etc. It's more of an "Ethical Constitution" that defines normative principles for everyone. It's properly viewed as that set of principles that must be agreed to if one is to successfully live in a cooperative society. In most cases, then, yes, I would consider it "wrong" to harm someone I've never met, as this would undermine the contract.

I'll shut up now, as I really don't want to turn this into yet another thread about contract theory.

What if these intelligent dolphins had no intrest in human contact, save the agreement with humans not to kill each other? how would you benifit from a treaty with beings who have no power to effect you in any way. the same could be applied to bushmen in africa.

The answer to all these questions is essentially the same. The hypothetical contract applies to all beings who are able to contract. Violating the contract by mistreating dolphins or !Kung San advertises to all other contractors that I am willing to break the contract; that I am not to be trusted.

Tom Piper

PB,

I will leave this aspect of Singer unaddressed for the time being.

The criterion that you have chosen, contracting agent, does not, in fact, distinguish humans from non-human inhabitants of this planet. It may distinguish some humans from non-human inhabitants, but you will leave out all of the children, infants, toddlers, fetuses (if you are inclined to include fetuses in the class with infants) with this criterion. Perhaps you are willing to do this, but most are not, since it would make eating baby-burgers permissible if beef burgers are permissible.

The general picture that emerges is this: if you want to make sure that you include all humans that people generally want to include in the circle of those we may not eat, unless you simply pick species, which is unacceptably arbitrary as a criterion, there is no other relevant feature/characteristic that isn't shared by some of the non-human inhabitants of this planet that we eat /and/or hunt for sport and/or use for research of various kinds, etc.

Tom

[ April 08, 2002: Message edited by: Tom Piper ]

[ April 08, 2002: Message edited by: Tom Piper ]</p>

Pomp

Tom Piper,

Please see my comments to The Anti Chris regarding why animal cruelty is generally a no-no to a contractarian. The same argument applies to baby burgers. The fact that most contracting adults find the thought abhorrent means that respecting the interests of other contracting adults involves refraining from eating baby burgers.

Tom Piper

PB,

Just a bit of clarification, if you don't mind.

When you say that strictly speaking this isn't so, is it? It means that respecting the interest of some (you say 'most') other adults means refraining from eating baby burgers. Even if it is most other adults, is it the case that you are simply basing your view of what should not be done to babies on the (mere) fact that a majority of other people don't want it done. Or is it the case that the majority happens to hold a view that you yourself also hold and so you cast your vote, as it were, with the majority?

Tom