Freethought & Rationalism Archive

God Fearing Atheist · 02-01-2002, 08:50 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by tronvillain:
God Fearing Atheist, in what sense is it "ideal" for actors to be transparent?

Well, if our aim is to discover strategies or dispositions to strategies that are utility-maximizing, we would need to further suppose the conditions on which it would be rational to adopt them. As you said:

Quote:

So, the best strategy when playing against tit-for-tat is "cooperate, but defect on n". Of course, the more difficult n is to predict, the worse this strategy will be.

This is exactly right (and as i tried to show, CM overcomes the problem). Ideally, rational actors could pick out both CMs and SMs, maximizing their utility accordingly.

God Fearing Atheist · 02-01-2002, 08:59 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by tronvillain:
I'm having a few problems with your last post:

1)You haven't really defined u, u', or u'', since you obviously can't be using the definitions from your previous post.

2)Attempting to figure out the definitions yields something this:

Let the utility of not playing during a given round be u'.
Let the utility of cooperating with a cooperator be u".
Let the utility of cooperating with a defector be zero.
Let the utility of defecting from a cooperator be u.

Assuming these are the definitions, can you explain the reasoning behind them? Specifically, why did you define one utility but leave the rest as variables? It seems that you should have at least defined them relative to each other (i.e. u is greater than u" and u" is greater than u').

Yes, sorry about that (guess I got a bit carried away with the content).

Defection is assigned the value of 1, cooperation u'' (less than 1), non-cooperation u' (less than u''), and exploitation 0 (less than u')

Quote:

3)The use of r and r-1 in your utility functions seems to indicate that a partner is chosen each round, but that a game isn't necessarily played. Is that correct?

Sorry again. R is the probability that a randomly selected person is a CM. If every possible actor is either a CM or an SM, the probability that this person will be an SM is (1-r).

I hope that helps, since im pretty sure the math is accurate.

-GFA

God Fearing Atheist · 02-01-2002, 09:20 AM

echidna,

Im going to cut and paste a post i made in another thread, which addresses a similar comment to your own:

Quote:

1) "Subjective" and "relative", although closely linked, are logically independent concepts. The former sees values as dependent on affective relationships, the latter, that these relationships can differ.

2)In what sense are you using ["morals"]? ["Morals"] and ["values"] are also conceptually distinct. I, for one, hold the subjectivity and relativity of values, while at the same time affirming an objective moral code.

Now, if you do indeed means "value" as in, "the extent to which an actor prefers an outcome to any other", consider the following arguments:

Ontological queerness: if values exist independent of actors, they must be something inherent to objects, or states of affairs involving those objects. But this is difficult to imagine. What sort of property contains prescriptivness? What sort of property has the power to compel us desire it?

relativity: its a simple fact that many people (and many cultures) seem fond of all sorts of different things. This may not be a proof of relativity (as opposed to subjectivity, which is the former), but it certainly gives the position a bit more force.

indifference: Hare asks us to consider two worlds: one in which values are objective, another in which they are subjective. In both worlds, however, the people in them continue being concerned with the same things. The result is there is no fundamental difference between the state of affairs in either. We can then view objective value as so much ethical junk to be shaved off the universe using Occams razor.

More generally, i wanted to make another comment (this one directed at Poly as well). Suppose there are a few marginal cases in which we have no negative duties towards others. So what?

Narveson asks us to think of morals like a "club", where we, the memebers, offer a package to others...rights and duties...which is rational for most people to accept. If our package appeals to the widest audience possible, an audience that could be no larger, the charge of subjectivity and the lack of universalization starts to ring kinda hollow. Those who reject this offer in particular will reject any offer, under any circumstances. Perhaps, while not being 100% universal, contractarianism is universal *enough*.

God Fearing Atheist · 02-01-2002, 09:27 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by hedonologist:
(Edited to change "utilitarian 'ethic'" to just "'ethic'", and another thing. The edited parts are in bold.)

Babies only provide an "aesthetic" contribution, thus you say that only our pallet is offended, correct?

You know, many people could die without exactly causing me a great deal of suffering, other than the empathy (but heck, I kinda enjoy that although it does persuade me to try to save them). It seems basically the only effect many people have on society as a whole, is "merely aesthetic". What more than *our* ("our" not including the aesthetic contributor like you don't include the baby's pain in your equation) aesthetic preferences are offended if an adult who contributes nothing more than aesthetics, is killed? (That is meant as a question not a statement.)

[ January 31, 2002: Message edited by: hedonologist ]

Thats true, but you have to remember the locus of morality.

Morals are required by conflict, and conflict arises on the micro, inter-personal level. Insofar as i dont interact with someone, i obviously have duties toward him (the social contract asks us to refrain from force when interacting). But this is not to say we cant morally condem those that *do* use force when dealing with those you were talking about.
I have no moral duties toward a man i have no contact with, off in some far away land. And you're right, if i hear about his demise at the hands of another, the only effect it has on me is the rearing of empathy. But unlike with our infant kin, we can objectivly say he ought not have died in such a way, and this is the important distinction.

Polycarp · 02-01-2002, 10:36 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by God Fearing Atheist:
Suppose there are a few marginal cases in which we have no negative duties towards others. So what?

Narveson asks us to think of morals like a "club", where we, the memebers, offer a package to others...rights and duties...which is rational for most people to accept. If our package appeals to the widest audience possible, an audience that could be no larger, the charge of subjectivity and the lack of universalization starts to ring kinda hollow. Those who reject this offer in particular will reject any offer, under any circumstances. Perhaps, while not being 100% universal, contractarianism is universal *enough*.

Hold on a second� There aren�t just a �few marginal cases�. You�ve yet to clarify exactly who has rights and who does not, along with a justification for this distinction between protected and unprotected people. Until you do so, I�ll just keep pushing you down the slippery slope you�re standing on. We started with infants, then went to severely disabled adults, then to anesthetized adults. You�ve yet to demonstrate why any of these should be protected, so I�m left to believe that you don�t think any of them are protected. This all started based on your main premise that infants were exempt from protection because:

�The problem I alluded to in the other thread is that infants, as a matter of empirical fact, cannot reciprocate. If moral duties arise from the rationality of individual utility maximization, from the realization that your fellows can harm you if you them, we must also conclude that there are no moral duties toward infants.�

Reciprocation was the foundation of your argument that infanticide could be morally justifiable. I think I�ve shown such a foundation to be untenable, and I�ve yet to pick up a clarification from you in this regard. I apologize if I�ve missed your clarification, so if you could state it in a reply to this post I�d appreciate it.

tronvillain · 02-01-2002, 11:36 AM

God Fearing Atheist:

Quote:

Well, if our aim is to discover strategies or dispositions to strategies that are utility-maximizing, we would need to further suppose the conditions on which it would be rational to adopt them.

Generally, the conditions are defined first and then the utility maximizing strategies are determined. What you are doing is changing the conditions until the stategy you like is utility maximizing.

Anyway, given your definitions, these are the utility functions:

CM [1-r]qu' + rpu"

SM rqu + [1-r]pu' or (since you specified u as one) rq + [1-r]pu'

These are equal when [1-r]/r is equal to [q-pu"]/[q-p]u', and SM is rational for [1-r]/r<[q-pu"]/[q-p]u'. The larger r is, the smaller [1-r]/r is, and the better it is to be an SM. Of course, this is exactly as we should expect - as the ratio of predator to prey falls, the better it is to be a predator.

Now, since [q-pu"]/[q-p]u' will be negative unless q>p or q<pu", SM will not be a viable strategy for pu"<q<p. Under all other conditions, a population of CM will be capable of supporting some number of SM.

tronvillain · 02-01-2002, 11:38 AM

Back to infanticide: I generally consider infanticide defection. What do you say to that?

tronvillain · 02-01-2002, 11:49 AM

Ah, I noticed another problem in your model, or rather in the conclusions you drew from it: You varied r and watched how it affected p and q! What mechanism is supposed to be causing this relationship?

God Fearing Atheist · 02-01-2002, 02:16 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by tronvillain:
Ah, I noticed another problem in your model, or rather in the conclusions you drew from it: You varied r and watched how it affected p and q! What mechanism is supposed to be causing this relationship?

The more CMs there are, the greater the risks they may rationally accept of failed cooperation and possible exploitation. Why? Exactly because its more probable they will not contact an SM.

hedonologist · 02-01-2002, 02:20 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Freedom's Minion:
This is a good point and I have to agree.

I said that was meant as a question not a statement. I've been interpreted much worse, but I prefer people would not try to second-guess my questions.

Quote:

Originally posted by Freedom's Minion:
Even if a person's pain over the death of infants is merely a "an aesthetic preference" that is no reason to dismiss that preference as unimportant.

"Asthetic preference" is assumed to be relatively less important than someone dieing who one were more "dependent" on. However, some people are very dependent on their babies or other's babies, emotionally. Where does one draw the line between an "aesthetic preference" and "physical dependence", etc? Is the desire to live, principally different than an "aesthetics preference"? (Notice, I didn't say that makes aesthetics "important", or relatively as important as "physical need".)

Quote:

Originally posted by Freedom's Minion:
The preferences of individuals -- all their preferences -- are what influence their conduct towards me. IF they prefer not to associate with a baby killer, I could find myself as vulnerable as a baby myself if I proceed to slaughter infants left and right.

That is true also. Similarly, if you prefer not associate with their god, they may kill you for that.

What I am saying is probably best said in my first post, once you have understood this much.

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02-01-2002, 11:38 AM	#37
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	Back to infanticide: I generally consider infanticide defection. What do you say to that?

02-01-2002, 11:49 AM	#38
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	Ah, I noticed another problem in your model, or rather in the conclusions you drew from it: You varied r and watched how it affected p and q! What mechanism is supposed to be causing this relationship?

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