beastmaster

We have a couple threads running about free will vs. determinism, and I was surprised to see so many fellow determinists. I wonder, however, if we aren't simply more vocal. I'm curious where the majority of people fall. So what say you? Which better describes what you are?

BigBadShrubbery

I chose 'none of the above'. I believe that if the universe was somehow restarted, everything would happen EXACTLY the way it has happened. It's all just a big chain reaction. If there's a some sort of a beginning for the universe, and before the beginning there's NOTHING, then the first event to happen would determine everything. It's not fate. It's not "This happens no matter what we do." It's "This happens BECAUSE of what we do." Simple.

DoubleDutchy

The question is pointless, the two belong to different levels of interpretation and can't figure in an either or question.
'Is this the Mona Lisa or a pigment-coated cloth ?'

Ensign Steve

None of the above.

Have given it much thought, to the point of headaches, and cannot come to a satisfactory conclusion.

Have decided to stop trying because whether I could have made a different choice or not has no detectable bearing on the choices I make (or feel like I'm making).

Jen

Wiploc

I like this answer.
crc

jpbrooks

I agree with DoubleDutchy on the pointlessness of viewing "free will" and determinism as being in actual conflict with one another. But the absence of an actual conflict between "freedom of choice" and determinism is why I consider myself a "soft" ("self") determinist.

Aethari

Personally, I'm not sure how the term 'free will' is even useful in any precise philosophical sense. If there is any cause to our actions, our actions cannot be free, so in order to claim a person has free will, we'd somehow have to claim that a person's decisions and actions are uncaused. (Which, beyond invalidating so much apologetics crap that it makes the mind boggle, is simple nonsense.) Some clarification:

1~ If a person's decisions are the result of forces outside of themself, then the decisions are not free.
2~ If a person's decisions are the result of forces inside themself, then their decisions are still bound by the nature of the person, and therefore not free.

We might say a person has "free will" to choose between options A and B, but how is that meaningful? It isn't clear why being able to choose between two possible options (and not being able to pick any of the infinite others choices) is substantially any different than being able to only choose A (and not being able to pick any of the infinite other choices.) It's just a redux of the common atheistic comment, "I have free will, I just have one less possible choice than you do." Free will is only feasible if we denote a limited set of choices, but where does this leave us with a useful definition? We end up dealing with free will as "the ability to choose within a set of arbitrary and preselected options." In essence, free will only makes sense when it isn't truly free, as true free will would entail not only omnipotence, but an entirely necessary and uncaused essence. (Unless we treat all contigent components of the essence as totally divorced not only from actual decision-making, but from all parts of the essence that do perform actual decision-making. This seems pretty absurd.)

My quick commentary on the whole dilemma.

~Aethari

Neilium

The nature of the person is the person. The forces outside the person only affect that person via his/her consciousnes, which makes them no different from the inside forces you describe.

It seems that the definition of free will people object to (particularly the Christian doctrine of free will) requires a decision-making apparatus that is somehow separate of the person or separate of nature. It seems also that a lot of the objections I read also require some sort of duality. This is the reason why no one's convinced me either way.

-neil

Aethari

Neil-

Kinda. Outside forces can affect us in different ways than internal forces, though. For example, we might not have the free will to run 100000 mph simply because it isn't physically possible. While some external forces might reduce to internal ones (especially if materialism is true), it isn't *always* the case.

I'm not sure exactly what you mean, but the "decision-making apparatus" isn't external of the person or of nature. In everything I wrote above, the decision making apparatus is the mind or soul, which in either case is part of the person and their nature. Mind/body dualism or not, the arguments I wrote above are equally valid.

~Aethari

Nowhere357

IMO this post describes determinism. Like a big pool table. You say 'the first event determines everything' (paraphrase). That means everything is predetermined. I thimk you checked the wrong box.

The last two statements aren't simple at all. If there is no free will, then "This happens no matter what we do" seems valid.

If there IS free will, then "This happens BECAUSE of what we do" seems valid.

BTW it occurs to me that the existence of suicide is evidence that free will exists.