Thomas Ash

The reason I chose Catholic, and the reason I think I might have subconsciously assumed you were a Catholic, is that Catholics are traditionally much more committed to the conception of God as timeless, rather than just an eternal being who does nonetheless experience ("...") a set of states in temporal sequence, alongside beliebers. It seems like you accept the timeless conception more, and I know a lot of Protestants do too - I don't want to generalise.

To join in on the what-would-have-been-the-ideal-creation-by-God debate, what if you simply imagine the state after humans have with great effort redeemed themselves and overcome evil, and then say why couldn't God create that. This might sound like something of an easy option ( ) - but if you think that after humans had redeemed themselves in your imagined narratives, their lives and existence would still be worth living, indeed possibly even more worthwhile with their full understanding of good/evil/their-position-in-the-universe/their-relationship-with-God/etc., then surely you should think a state like this would be a good thing to create?

Amos

But Lamma, it is only becuase the gnostic position exists that the agnostic postion can be conceived to exist. This same is true with atheism which cannot exist without theism.

The only difference is that the gnostic knows (is omniscient) and the agnostic does not know and therefore probably will deny the existence of God.

Amos

Thanks Thomas and I would like to add that Catholics are right in this. God is timeless and it is not until we are born into eternal life that we can have intimacies with God. The state of temporal sequences alongside believers is just an imitation performed by the angel of light.

Kenny

I’m not comfortable with conceding that I regard free will as more epistemic than metaphysical. It is true that I do not hold to a libertarian conception of free will in which free will would entail that if a free agent makes a decision in a particular exhaustive set of circumstances, there remains the possibility that the same free agent in the same exhaustive set of circumstances would have made a different decision. I believe that there is only one decision any particular free agent will make in any given exhaustive set of circumstances.

However, I also believe that if a choice is freely made by an agent then there is a very real, metaphysically objective, sense in which there is more than one option available to that agent to choose from. I believe that if a choice on the part of an agent is free, then the determining cause of that choice is a volitional act on the part of the agent herself acting in accordance with her own desires (those desires also originating from within herself in accordance with her character). A choice on the part of an agent is not free if that choice is strictly determined by inputs external to that agent’s violation in accordance with her desires originating from herself in accordance with her character. Consequently, for the actualization of a state of affairs to be brought about by the free choice of an agent, the external inputs (in the sense defined) must causally underdetermine that state of affairs and present the free agent’s volition with a range of options so that the deciding causal factor in actualizing that particular state of affairs is a volitional act on the part of that agent.

Now, given the above discussion, is it a problem for free will if an agent knows what choices she will make in advance of her making them? Upon reflection, I would say no. I know for certain, for example, that if someone were to come and offer me a sum of money, of any amount, to kill my wife, I would choose to refuse that offer. How do I know that? Well, while I don’t posses exhaustive self knowledge and there are many potential moral choices where I am uncertain as to how I would act, I know enough about my own character, my morals, my desires, the degree to which money fails to motivate me, not even to mention my extreme love for my wife, to know that I would never kill my wife at all, let alone for money. Still, it does not seem that my rejection of such an offer would fail to be the result of a free choice on my part simply because I know in advance that I would reject it. I would still have the option of choosing to kill my wife for money in the sense that the inputs external to my own volition in accordance with my desires in accordance with my character do not determine that I will not do it. The fact that I know I would not do it, in turn, is not what would cause me not to do it; that knowledge simply follows from my knowledge of my own character. So, in spite of that prior knowledge of what my decision would be, the deciding causal factor in my choosing not to kill my wife would still be my own volition in accordance with my desires in accordance with my character.

Actually, this is a new insight for me, though I now kick myself for not thinking of it; it seems so obvious to me now given my view of how free will works. My response to the original post could have been a lot simpler. I could have simply said that free will does not entail that one not know what one’s choices will be before one makes them, elaborated on that position, and left the mechanics of how God’s decision making processes work unaddressed (because it is really irrelevant to the question). Though, I suspect the question of the mechanics of God’s choices would have come up anyway.

However, I still hold my original position concerning the logical relationships between God’s natural knowledge, God’s choices, and God’s free knowledge. I still do not think that God knows what His choices are prior (logically or temporally) to when He makes them. I still believe that God’s natural knowledge, His choices, and His free knowledge all come into being simultaneously as part of a single eternal a temporal act. But, this model is unnecessary for answering the OP, because no matter how the mechanics of God’s choices works, knowing what one’s choices will be prior to making them does not entail that one’s choices are not free, for God or for any other free agent.

I think that’s a good argument against libertarian free will in general, but not against the proposition that God has free will in a meaningful sense. Not only God, but all free agents, act in accordance with their character. I wouldn’t want libertarian free will even if it were possible. I think it would be very terrifying if my volition functioned independently of my character in such a way that any decision becomes possible for me to make, including decisions like killing my wife or abusing my relatives. I think, on the contrary, that as long as I remain a free agent, there is no possibility that I will do any of those things, precisely because I am free. The only way I could imagine myself ever doing any of those things is if my free volition were taken away from me.

Actually, I don’t think that time passes in any metaphysically objective sense at all. I view the passage of time as a subjective illusion and I think all moments in space-time simply “are” as part of a four dimensional (or possibly more than four dimensional given certain contemporary theories in physics, such as string theory) space-time manifold. So, for God, there is only an eternal timeless present, even in His relationship with our own universe. To say that “God has done something” or that “God will do something,” in a temporal sense, is simply a statement made relative to our own subjective perceptions. From an objective standpoint (the standpoint from which God perceives), however, God is simply “doing.” That is not do say that God does not relate differently to different locations in our space-time manifold, but, from the divine perspective, all these relationships are simultaneous.

That being said, though, I really don’t see how this is a problem even if one maintains that the passage of time is metaphysically real. We know what we “have done” in the past, for instance, and we cannot change those decisions as they are set for us. Yet, that doesn’t pose a problem for us having free will (even libertarian free will) so why should it pose a problem for God’s free will?

I don’t think that God’s decisions depend on contingent stimuli, but I also don’t think that such is a necessary requirement for free will. Why would it be? On the contrary, it seems that the presence of contingent stimuli is often a factor which limits the range of options available to free agents such as ourselves and thus limits the degree of freedom we have.

Interesting, but still not a valid objection to soa omnipotence in my opinion. I think that God can bring about the soa that “Thomas brings about Thomas learns” simply by actualizing a possible world in which that soa occurs. If you were to maintain that God cannot bring it about that “Thomas brings it about that Thomas learns without any other agent being directly or indirectly causally involved,” then I do not think that you have presented a logically consistent soa, at least not on theistic metaphysics, since on theistic metaphysics there are no possible worlds which are entirely causally independent of God’s actions.

However, you do raise an interesting point. It is conceivable that there might be a problem with omnipotence defined as the ability to actualize any logically consistent state of affairs if there is a certain state of affairs, which, by itself, is internally consistent, but one that cannot be actualized in any possible worlds. This might be the case if X represents a logically consistent state of affairs, but X is logically incompatible with the state of affairs Y and Y is a necessary truth, for instance. For example, if God exists in all possible worlds as a morally perfect being with the power to prevent certain types of evil, then certain internally consistent states of affairs in which there is horrendous evil with no redeeming value might be logically incompatible with the God’s necessary existence. So, upon reflection, perhaps soa omnipotence isn’t the best way to go. I would be comfortable with defining God’s omnipotence as the ability to actualize any logically possible world, but many theologians and philosophers of religion who hold a libertarian view of free will and a middle knowledge view of God’s omniscience (such as Alvin Plantinga, whom I deeply respect and have been influenced by a great deal) do not think that God is capable of actualizing any possible world. But, this is all a discussion for another thread as it does not directly pertain to the question of God’s free will.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ November 01, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Douglas J. Bender

Kenny,


Are you at all Calvinistic in your theology, particularly as it relates to free will? I noticed you said something about your being "Reformed" or Reformed-minded, or something like this.

Also, my point was not whether God creating or not creating would result in a "morally superior" universe, but whether, assuming Creation, a universe where redemption takes place would be "morally superior" to a universe in which no redemption needs to occur. Personally, I feel that it would, but I haven't reasoned out the whys.

In Christ,

Douglas

Douglas J. Bender

By the way, to answer the question in the title of this thread: Certainly, God is a "determined being". There is no wishy-washiness with God.


In Christ,

Douglas

Philosoft

Now, to clarify, this would be the OT God or the NT God? Just curious.

Amos

Not true at all. It is because God is free that we are determined beings and therefore can we not be free until we are one with God.

I have no problem with Gods no "wishy-washiness" which can only conceived to exist if freedom is sought. In other words, if freedom did not exist determism and subsequent wishy-washiness could not be conceive to exist.

Douglas J. Bender

I was joking about using the "no wishy-washiness" defense to prove that God is a "determined being" - I was using "determined" as in "adamant" or "steadfast". Ah ha ha ha ha...ha.

But to the person who noticed this, and asked whether I was referring to the OT God or the NT God: Both, since they are the same (the Trinity) and there is no "wishy-washiness" in either of the descriptions of God in the Old or New Testaments.

In Christ,

Douglas

Philosoft

How could I have overlooked the obvious humor within the crystal-clear medium that is text-based messaging?

<strong> I'm having trouble visualizing the mental gymnastics that doubtlessly accompany such a blithe dismissal of the incongruities between the NT and OT Gods. I have noticed you are fond of blanket assertions, though. Whatever.