Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Wizardry · 03-03-2002, 08:53 PM

Tercel,

My post was a not-so-subtle challenge for you to present evidence for your valuation of P(E|C). Without that evidence, I reject any valuation of P(E|C) as totally arbitrary.

You’ll note that I never actually make the claim that necessity is true, because, as I said, there is no evidence to support that claim. Nor do I rest my entire rejection of the Fine-Tuning argument on either necessity or many-worlds. They are merely possibilities. I believe that the Fine-Tuning argument suffers from internal logical flaws as well which are I think well demonstrated by Dr. Retard’s analogy as well as my reformulation of it.

Quote:

In your next post you give an analogy which looks to me exactly the same as that given by Dr Retard at the beginning of the thread save you’ve replaced the magic troll with government officials. Why don’t you have a read of my posts to Dr Retard.

I did, but I do not feel you adequately refuted his analogy, so I presented it again with slight modifications.

Your critiques focused on the low probability of the existence of a magic troll, so I adjusted it to something a bit more plausible. If you like I can demonstrate where your original refutation is lacking.

Quote:

Dr Retard
With regard to your initial analogy.
As I noted to Malaclypse we are comparing P(E|D) * P(D) with P(E|C) * P(C), so lets do that to your analogy.
We already know P(E|C) - it's one in 10^12.
(Your analogy differs slightly to the fine tuning argument because here P(C) <> P(~D), but that doesn't matter because this system of assessment to find the most likely cause will still work, it simply means we have to make up two values -P(C) and P(D)- instead of just the one)
Personally I would say that the existence of a magic troll who is interefering with your RNG is fairly arbitrary and random and extremely unlikely: P(D) = 1 in 10^12 perhaps to be generaous? (That is, one in a million million)
The probability of the troll liking 1093 as opposed to any other number is exactly normal random chance - ie P(E|D) = 1 in 10^12
The probability that your random generator is working by chance, I would put at about 99.9999% say: P(C) = 0.999999
Thus feeding the numbers through the equations we get:
P(E|C) * P(C) = just under 10^-12
while
P(E|D) * P(D) = 10^-24
That is to say: the troll hypothesis has been found to be a million million times more unlikely than chance (and I was being generous to P(D) too).
Let's face it the probabilities behind the Fine Tuning argument do work. They're just the normal way of assessing probability, nothing's been cooked up specially for the Fine Tuning argument - As you can see by my analysis of your analogy, the statistics are valid for assessing the most likely cause of any event.

If I assume this logic to be valid, that means that if I were to construct a random number generator that generated a random number between 1 and 10^150 that the best explanation would be a magic troll. Absurd!

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But in summary the problem in the analogy is P(L|F). It should equal 10^-50 in the analogy. But for some reason you’ve got it equal to approximately one.
Look at it this way: What’s P(L|F) measuring? Well F is that the government officials fixed the result of the lottery. L is that you won the lottery. So, P(L|F), is: given that government official are fixing the lottery, what is the probability that they’ll fix it in your favor (as opposed to someone elses). Well, unless the officials are your friends, they are no more likely to fix the results in your favor than they are for any given other person. Therefore P(L|F) is equal to one in the number of possible outcomes of the lottery = 1 in 10^50.
Compare to the FT argument where P(E|D) -the equivalent of P(L|F)- is pretty close to 1 (that is to say it’s within a few orders of magnitude thereof).

P(L|F) should not be set to 10^-50. Even if you assume that the officials chose randomly among the population, this is at best, a value of 2.7x10^-8 (assumes every person in America entered the lottery). The probability of a fix is still pretty good.

But I don’t see how this is any different from the Fine-Tuning argument. What is the justification for assigning P(E|D) a value close to 1 that couldn’t also be used to assign P(L|F) a value close to one?

Peace out.

Vorkosigan · 03-03-2002, 09:35 PM

Why is the universe the way it is? Answer: Random chance.

Answer: random chance has nothing to do with it. Any stable universe (one with selection processes operating under natural law) does not operate "randomly."

I love the delicious redundancy of that phrase, "random chance."

The FT argument should demonstrate that acceptance of these two ideas is unreasonable. Because of Fine Tuning the probability that both these claims are true is tiny. So tiny in fact that the theistic claim of a divine creator looks absolutely certain by comparison.
Now this doesn’t disprove atheism or prove theism. It only shows that this one position is unacceptable. There are effectively two possible positions which remain for the atheist:
* Necessity
* Many-many worlds

Your analysis is completely backwards, and you appear to have ignored the explanation entirely. Tercel, any universe, as long as it has natural laws and runs on selection processes, will appear to the credulous to be Fine Tuned. There is NO WAY selection processes can produce objects in that universe that violate natural laws.

FT is just a shorthand for noting that all the objects in the universe fall within natural constraints. No shit. They couldn't be any other way. Properly understood, FT is an argument AGAINST theism, not for it. For an omnipotent god would have no need of natural law, it could sustain any object in the universe simply by willing it so.

That is why probability and necessity do not enter into this discussion. In a universe that has selection processes and natural laws, Fine Tuning is INEVITABLE. The probability is 100% that the universe will appear Fine Tuned. It simply can't be any other way.

I don't blame you for not understanding this. Many people don't. But at least you could engage with the argument before presenting the stunningly naive claims above.

Michael

Vorkosigan · 03-03-2002, 09:39 PM

If the premises of the FT argument are invalidated by the possibility that the distribution of the physical constants might be necessary, then so are such atheistic arguments. You cannot have your proverbial cake and eat it too.

Actually, if the physical constraints are necessary, then your god cannot exist. Euthyphro, you know. There cannot be a constraint on the Christian God.

Michael

Tercel · 03-04-2002, 12:08 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Malaclypse the Younger,
Yet again you demonstrate your deficiencies in basic logic and the interpretation of probability theory.

And here I was, laughing at you for exactly that...

Quote:

You simply have no idea what you're talking about. If the constants are as they are by necessity, the fundamental premise of the FTA is simply false and the argument is unsound.

I think you have read some straw-manned version of the FTA and got it into your head that that is the FTA argument. I�m looking at my version of the FTA here which doesn�t have a fundamental premise that�s defeated by necessity because I�m not trying to prove very much with the argument.

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It is not trying to prove God, or that there was an intelligent creator. The FT argument is about showing a given atheist position to be inconsistent, or at least showing it to be unevidenced.

Since metaphysical naturalism is (obviously) a metaphysical position, it is not claimed to be evidenced. So showing the position is unevidenced is pointless.

Okay, if your going to be pedantic. My FT argument is attempting to demonstrate that the position that this universe is all that exists and that it is the way it is by chance is so very unlikely as to be untenable when compared to other possibilities. -In this case I�m comparing it to the theistic one.

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But in summary the problem in the analogy is P(L|F). It should equal 10^-50 in the analogy. But for some reason you�ve got it equal to approximately one.

Again you demonstrate your deficient understanding of probability theory. The claim is, if the lottery is fixed then the chances of my winning are nearly one. This is an obviously true statement.

No it isn�t. It�s only true if you add �in my favour� between �fixed� and �then� - which is the whole point under dispute here.

Quote:

Look at it this way: What�s P(L|F) measuring? Well F is that the government officials fixed the result of the lottery. L is that you won the lottery. So, P(L|F), is: given that government official are fixing the lottery, what is the probability that they�ll fix it in your favour (as opposed to someone elses).

F is the hypothesis that the government has fixed the lottery in my favour.

~sigh~ You�re doing your same trick of incorporating P(L|F) into P(F) like you did with my Fine Tuning argument earlier. I�ve already outlined why it only serves to obfuscate things.

Tercel

Tercel · 03-04-2002, 12:10 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Wizardry:
My post was a not-so-subtle challenge for you to present evidence for your valuation of P(E|C). Without that evidence, I reject any valuation of P(E|C) as totally arbitrary.

I�m not entirely clear on what form of evidence you expect me to provide. Scientists can examine the possible-universe space around our existing values and analyse what volume of this space allows for a universe capable of sustaining life. Not being a professional scientist in this area I�m at the mercy of what information I can scavenge from other sources. From what I can gather there appear to be about five or so independent conditions whose volume ratio of: possible-universe space analysed capable of sustaining life / total possible-universe space analysed, which range in value between 10^-30 and 10-120.

Quote:

In your next post you give an analogy which looks to me exactly the same as that given by Dr Retard at the beginning of the thread save you�ve replaced the magic troll with government officials. Why don�t you have a read of my posts to Dr Retard.

I did, but I do not feel you adequately refuted his analogy, so I presented it again with slight modifications.
Your critiques focused on the low probability of the existence of a magic troll, so I adjusted it to something a bit more plausible. If you like I can demonstrate where your original refutation is lacking.

Um, no. I specific argued that the important point in the refutation wasn�t the low probability of the magic troll and I seem to remember writing a detailed post on the subject of exactly why it wasn�t the case.

Quote:

Dr Retard
With regard to your initial analogy.
As I noted to Malaclypse we are comparing P(E|D) * P(D) with P(E|C) * P(C), so lets do that to your analogy.
We already know P(E|C) - it's one in 10^12.
(Your analogy differs slightly to the fine tuning argument because here P(C) <> P(~D), but that doesn't matter because this system of assessment to find the most likely cause will still work, it simply means we have to make up two values -P(C) and P(D)- instead of just the one)
Personally I would say that the existence of a magic troll who is interefering with your RNG is fairly arbitrary and random and extremely unlikely: P(D) = 1 in 10^12 perhaps to be generaous? (That is, one in a million million)
The probability of the troll liking 1093 as opposed to any other number is exactly normal random chance - ie P(E|D) = 1 in 10^12
The probability that your random generator is working by chance, I would put at about 99.9999% say: P(C) = 0.999999
Thus feeding the numbers through the equations we get:
P(E|C) * P(C) = just under 10^-12
while
P(E|D) * P(D) = 10^-24
That is to say: the troll hypothesis has been found to be a million million times more unlikely than chance (and I was being generous to P(D) too).
Let's face it the probabilities behind the Fine Tuning argument do work. They're just the normal way of assessing probability, nothing's been cooked up specially for the Fine Tuning argument - As you can see by my analysis of your analogy, the statistics are valid for assessing the most likely cause of any event.

If I assume this logic to be valid, that means that if I were to construct a random number generator that generated a random number between 1 and 10^150 that the best explanation would be a magic troll. Absurd!

~sigh~ then P(E|D) would now be 10^-150, and the best explanation would still be chance not a magic troll. Look you really are wasting your time here. All I�m using is very basic statistics that models the way we reason out most likely causes. If you can�t follow it or think I�m doing something weird then I can only recommend a college-level course in statistics.

Quote:

But in summary the problem in the analogy is P(L|F). It should equal 10^-50 in the analogy. But for some reason you�ve got it equal to approximately one.
Look at it this way: What�s P(L|F) measuring? Well F is that the government officials fixed the result of the lottery. L is that you won the lottery. So, P(L|F), is: given that government official are fixing the lottery, what is the probability that they�ll fix it in your favor (as opposed to someone elses). Well, unless the officials are your friends, they are no more likely to fix the results in your favor than they are for any given other person. Therefore P(L|F) is equal to one in the number of possible outcomes of the lottery = 1 in 10^50.
Compare to the FT argument where P(E|D) -the equivalent of P(L|F)- is pretty close to 1 (that is to say it�s within a few orders of magnitude thereof).

P(L|F) should not be set to 10^-50. Even if you assume that the officials chose randomly among the population, this is at best, a value of 2.7x10^-8 (assumes every person in America entered the lottery). The probability of a fix is still pretty good.

I would argue that the officials are extremely unlikely to fix a result in favour of a random person. You simply don�t go to the trouble of fixing a result for no reason: P(L|F) should therefore be correspondingly tiny.

Quote:

But I don�t see how this is any different from the Fine-Tuning argument. What is the justification for assigning P(E|D) a value close to 1 that couldn�t also be used to assign P(L|F) a value close to one?

Because the designer in the FTA has only two types of universe to choose between - those that are capable of sustaining life and those that aren�t. The government fixers on the other hand have several million people to choose between. That�s the difference.

Tercel

Vorkosigan · 03-04-2002, 02:20 AM

Because the designer in the FTA has only two types of universe to choose between - those that are capable of sustaining life and those that aren’t.

This is a non-argument, Tercel. What are the grounds for making life the reason for FT? What if "life" is a by-product of processes the Designer instituted to get really neat lightning bolts in the atmosphere of Jupiter?

It is irrelevant how many "basic constraints" there are. Few or many, they will always produce a universe that appears Fine Tuned. Except for universes without laws, there are no universes that would not appear Fine Tuned.

Michael

HRG · 03-04-2002, 04:36 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Tercel:
I’m not entirely clear on what form of evidence you expect me to provide. Scientists can examine the possible-universe space around our existing values and analyse what volume of this space allows for a universe capable of sustaining life. Not being a professional scientist in this area I’m at the mercy of what information I can scavenge from other sources. From what I can gather there appear to be about five or so independent conditions whose volume ratio of: possible-universe space analysed capable of sustaining life / total possible-universe space analysed, which range in value between 10^-30 and 10-120.

Tercel

This is an artifact of a particular choice of "fundamental constants": they are not fundamental to nature, but to our description of nature. We can replace them with equivalent, but different sets.

Thus even if we had any ideas what universes are "possible" *), volume ratios are completely arbitrary. As I've shown on this thread, I can rewrite the equations of physics so that they yield the same results, but the life-friendly region of constants occupies 95% of the total volume.

Fine-tuners are actually on the horn of a dilemma. If the parameters of the universe can be varied continously , volume is not a
measure for a priori-probability; "all outcomes equally probable" is meaningful only for discrete probability spaces +). If they can take only discrete values, perhaps there are just 5 combinations allowed, with 3 of them being life-friendly ?

We just don't know.

Regards,
HRG.
"The Seine must have been fine-tuned to fit exactly under the bridges of Paris ...."

*) There are good arguments for the stance that the criterion for a universe to be possible is that it exists.

+) unless there are symmetry considerations. If f.i. the underlying dynamics are invariant under rotations, it would be reasonable to expect an equal a priori-probability for equally large angles. Mathematicians will recognize the uniqueness of the invariant Haar measure on (locally compact) groups ....

Malaclypse the Younger · 03-04-2002, 06:37 AM

Tercel

Quote:

Yet again you demonstrate your deficiencies in basic logic and the interpretation of probability theory.

And here I was, laughing at you for exactly that...

The difference is that you are laughing alone.

Quote:

You simply have no idea what you're talking about. If the constants are as they are by necessity, the fundamental premise of the FTA is simply false and the argument is unsound.

I think you have read some straw-manned version of the FTA and got it into your head that that is the FTA argument. I�m looking at my version of the FTA here which doesn�t have a fundamental premise that�s defeated by necessity because I�m not trying to prove very much with the argument.

Generally speaking, it is expected that you show your rebuttal, not merely assert it.

Your argument is that if the probability that the universe is a product of chance then statistics show it is more probable to believe it is a product of design. Since we stipulate that the universe is a product of chance and the statistics are correct, we conclude that it is more probable to believe the universe is a product of design.

If the premise that the universe is a product of chance is stipulated to be false, then your argument is unsound.

Perhaps a Junior-High level course in elementary logic would help you here.

Quote:

Okay, if your going to be pedantic. My FT argument is attempting to demonstrate that the position that this universe is all that exists and that it is the way it is by chance is so very unlikely as to be untenable when compared to other possibilities. -In this case I�m comparing it to the theistic one.p.

You are comparing it to your arbitrary and unjustified assumption of alternative probabilities.

Quote:

Again you demonstrate your deficient understanding of probability theory. The claim is, if the lottery is fixed then the chances of my winning are nearly one. This is an obviously true statement.

No it isn�t. It�s only true if you add �in my favour� between �fixed� and �then� - which is the whole point under dispute here.

True indeed. But the assumption of fixedness in my favor is identical in character to your asumption of designedness in our favor. You have no rational basis for assuming a designer would define life. You are merely assuming a designer that would design life--i.e. to have fixed the outcome in our favor.

Wizardry's assumption is as rationally arbitrary as your own--to deny his premise is to deny your own and hold P(E|D) as without rational value, and your argument is again unsound.

Quote:

~sigh~ You�re doing your same trick of incorporating P(L|F) into P(F) like you did with my Fine Tuning argument earlier. I�ve already outlined why it only serves to obfuscate things.

This is true if by "obfuscating" you mean "highlighting the arbitrary assumptions in my own arguments."

Quote:

My post was a not-so-subtle challenge for you to present evidence for your valuation of P(E|C). Without that evidence, I reject any valuation of P(E|C) as totally arbitrary.

From what I can gather there appear to be about five or so independent conditions whose volume ratio of: possible-universe space analysed capable of sustaining life / total possible-universe space analysed, which range in value between 10^-30 and 10-120.

As noted, this value is sensitively dependent on our arbitrary choice of the way we express physical laws. As HRG has demonstrated (and you have not rebutted), it is possible to express our physical laws such that the probability of life is arbitrarily high.

Even the stipulated premises of the FTA are seen to be arbitrary, rendering the entire argument ludicrous for drawing any firm conclusions.

Quote:

Um, no. I specific argued that the important point in the refutation wasn�t the low probability of the magic troll and I seem to remember writing a detailed post on the subject of exactly why it wasn�t the case.

Which I seem to remember missed the point entirely and denied--without justification--arbitrary assumptions that you yourself make.

Quote:

Look you really are wasting your time here. All I�m using is very basic statistics that models the way we reason out most likely causes. If you can�t follow it or think I�m doing something weird then I can only recommend a college-level course in statistics.

And showing that arbitrary assumptions lead to arbitrary conclusions. We understand the statistics--no one is seriously challenging your math. It is your assumptions which are deficient.

Quote:

I would argue that the officials are extremely unlikely to fix a result in favour of a random person. You simply don�t go to the trouble of fixing a result for no reason: P(L|F) should therefore be correspondingly tiny.

Right. But what is "extremely unlikely"? You yourself say that any value for extremely unlikely in this case is absurd to hold at lower than about 10^-18.

Again you deny forms of the assumptions that you yourself make. Why are these assumptions reasonable for your argument but not for an alternative formation? If your method is correct, then it should be applicable in all instances.

Quote:

Because the designer in the FTA has only two types of universe to choose between - those that are capable of sustaining life and those that aren�t.

That's patently absurd. As turtonm shows it is impossible to know the kinds of universes a designer would design, and to what purpose, and it is easy to speculate on other purposes.

[ March 04, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]

Kenny · 03-04-2002, 07:04 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by turtonm:
Actually, if the physical constraints are necessary, then your god cannot exist. Euthyphro, you know. There cannot be a constraint on the Christian God.

Michael

Nonsense. The classical definition of omnipotence in Christian theology has always been that God can do all that is logically possible. It is no constraint on God’s power to say that He cannot do a logically impossible task.

Regardless, there is no evidence that the fundamental constants are necessary. The evidence seems to point in the opposite direction, in fact.

God Bless,
Kenny

Edited because I accidentally said "Omniscience” when I meant “Omnipotence.” Pay attention to what I mean, not what I write

[ March 04, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]

Malaclypse the Younger · 03-04-2002, 07:18 AM

Kenny

Quote:

Actually, if the physical constraints are necessary, then your god cannot exist.

Nonsense. The classical definition of omniscience in Christian theology has always been that God can do all that is logically possible. It is no constraint on God’s power to say that He cannot do a logically impossible task.

The "constraint" of logical possibility raises more questions than it answers: Why logic? Which logic? Under which assumptions? If God is truly mystical and omnipotent, why can he not create a rock too heavy for him to lift and then lift it? We merely cannot understand such a proposition; however a mystical god is, by definition, also beyond our powers of understanding. But this is a discussion for another time.

In this context, it does not seems obvious that it is logically impossible for life to exist even if the physics of the universe were unsuited for it, whether grossly or subtly. Indeed, ID-ists and other anti-evolution types assert the opposite: that it is not only logically possible, but actually the case. It may or may not true, but it is certainly not obvious.

Quote:

Regardless, there is no evidence that the fundamental constants are necessary. The evidence seems to point in the opposite direction, in fact.

You have not yet addressed HRG's interesting arguments rebutting this assertion.

[ March 04, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]

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03-03-2002, 09:35 PM	#92
Vorkosigan Contributor Join Date: Jan 2001 Location: Barrayar Posts: 11,866	Why is the universe the way it is? Answer: Random chance. Answer: random chance has nothing to do with it. Any stable universe (one with selection processes operating under natural law) does not operate "randomly." I love the delicious redundancy of that phrase, "random chance." The FT argument should demonstrate that acceptance of these two ideas is unreasonable. Because of Fine Tuning the probability that both these claims are true is tiny. So tiny in fact that the theistic claim of a divine creator looks absolutely certain by comparison. Now this doesn’t disprove atheism or prove theism. It only shows that this one position is unacceptable. There are effectively two possible positions which remain for the atheist: * Necessity * Many-many worlds Your analysis is completely backwards, and you appear to have ignored the explanation entirely. Tercel, any universe, as long as it has natural laws and runs on selection processes, will appear to the credulous to be Fine Tuned. There is NO WAY selection processes can produce objects in that universe that violate natural laws. FT is just a shorthand for noting that all the objects in the universe fall within natural constraints. No shit. They couldn't be any other way. Properly understood, FT is an argument AGAINST theism, not for it. For an omnipotent god would have no need of natural law, it could sustain any object in the universe simply by willing it so. That is why probability and necessity do not enter into this discussion. In a universe that has selection processes and natural laws, Fine Tuning is INEVITABLE. The probability is 100% that the universe will appear Fine Tuned. It simply can't be any other way. I don't blame you for not understanding this. Many people don't. But at least you could engage with the argument before presenting the stunningly naive claims above. Michael

03-03-2002, 09:39 PM	#93
Vorkosigan Contributor Join Date: Jan 2001 Location: Barrayar Posts: 11,866	If the premises of the FT argument are invalidated by the possibility that the distribution of the physical constants might be necessary, then so are such atheistic arguments. You cannot have your proverbial cake and eat it too. Actually, if the physical constraints are necessary, then your god cannot exist. Euthyphro, you know. There cannot be a constraint on the Christian God. Michael

03-04-2002, 02:20 AM	#96
Vorkosigan Contributor Join Date: Jan 2001 Location: Barrayar Posts: 11,866	Because the designer in the FTA has only two types of universe to choose between - those that are capable of sustaining life and those that aren’t. This is a non-argument, Tercel. What are the grounds for making life the reason for FT? What if "life" is a by-product of processes the Designer instituted to get really neat lightning bolts in the atmosphere of Jupiter? It is irrelevant how many "basic constraints" there are. Few or many, they will always produce a universe that appears Fine Tuned. Except for universes without laws, there are no universes that would not appear Fine Tuned. Michael

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