This is in response to the various articles on the Secular Web about the "fine tuning" argument. I think the writers do not argue forcefully enough in showing that the many universes idea is more consistent with observation and Occam's Razor than theism. I'm posting it here so these writers will have a better chance of seeing this response. Some of these arguments may be similar to those put forward by others, but I think more forcefully argued.

Reasons to believe in the possibility of multiple universes

1. Viable theories predict them. Viable, although not experimentally verified, theories, such as the inflationary Big Bang model and Superstring theories predict the possibility of other universes directly from their equations. Yes, these theories are not established, but no theory predicts the existence of God from the equations in a similarly direct fashion. Is it the position of theists that unverified theories that have not been falsified be considered *false* until they have been experimentally established. It would seem more appropriate to hold them out as viable possibilities, something theists seem not to do in relation to other possible universes.

2. There are many problems associated with the idea of a non-contingent intelligent being, not the least of which is whether such a being is logically possible. Such a being may be logically impossible in principle. It may be that intelligence and certain types of knowledge are contingent entities, and therefore cannot exist as part of a transcendent non-contingent being. However, the possibility of other universes is established by our own. Why is it considered preposterous to propose other universes when we have the example of our own, establishing a prior principle of possibility, when God has no such principle.

3. Occam's Razor. A misapplication of Occam's Razor would lead one to presume God over other universes based on Occam's principle of simplicity - "do not multiply entities unnecessarily". However, if we applied that to most theories, the widely accepted theories of our day would not fare well. The germ theory of disease, the cellular theory of biology, the atomic theory of matter, the charged discrete electron theory of lightening, and many others are more complicated than actual or conceivable supernatural counter theories. (For example, a theory of disease holds that God and spirits cause disease and health, which is clearly simpler than proposing countless trillions a multiplied bacteria.) In fact *any* naturalistic based theory proposes more multiplied objects and complexity then supernatural ones. It's true that Occam's Razor speaks of competing theories with equal evidentiary weight, but if in most cases where a theory is experimentally verified, the more "complicated" is always the best (at least when compared to supernatural counter theories) then Occam's Razor is demonstrably wrong in its supposition, i.e. that the simpler theory is usually the best.

4. But that is only true if we have an outdated interpretation of Occam's Razor. A better statement of the principle is "do not multiply *theoretical constructs* unnecessarily." This is the interpretation that most scientists would endorse, I presume, and is most consistent with our findings, as stated above. However, under this principle, God fares worse. It would not be proper to view each proposed universe as a separate "theoretical construct," any more than it would be to view each atom, cell, germ or electron as being a separate theoretical construct within the above stated theories we all accept. Each universe would be a multiplied entity within a *single* theoretical construct. However, God is clearly and obviously a separate construct from our universe. Any natural universe is part of the natural world, and a God is a transcendent, non-natural proposition. A theistic God is clearly a very different sort of thing. So applying (the correct) Occam's Razor, one realm of existence (multiple universes) is more economical than two (universe + God).

5. Nature works in large numbers of multiplied entities. In nature, we have large numbers of multiple atoms, cells, germs, people, animals, planets, stars, galaxies - yet only one universe? Yes, nature could have all that great redundancy and still have only one universe, but why should that be considered the most reasonable presumption - given all the prior examples. (This is a more inductive agrument, rather then one based on Occam's razor.)

6. God is not an economical proposition in another sense. If we assume that it takes a finite amount of power to create a universe, say N amount of power, then God would have N(infinity) power, a multiplication of amounts by infinity. Clearly, God would not need an infinite amount of power to create a universe - it is certainly possible to create a universe but not be able to create a second, or not be able to create angles and devils assuming that is possible, etc. So proposing a being with infinitely more power than is needed to create a universe is clearly a violation of one version of Occam's Razor. An objection that power is not quantifiable because it is a "continuous" entity is false. Many entities are not objectively quantifiable, like time and space, but principles of economy should apply to amounts as well, not just objects. Power also can be objectively quantifiable in terms of what a person can and cannot do.

7. A cumulative case based on all the above taken together.

In sum, it is true that other universes cannot be confirmed by experiment or direct observation, but that is true of God as well. But at least the idea of other universes has some direct mathematical support coming from the equations, which God does not. And even if we consider the two to have equal evidentiary support, the multiple universes theory is better in light of Occam's Razor, for the several reasons I have stated.

-DM-

[Copied here from <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=1&t=002336" target="_blank">Feedback</a> in order to facilitate further discussion. Note: There may eventually be additional responses in the Feedback forum from one or more authors of fine-tuning articles. -Don-]

Jobar

I would say that any theist willing and able to argue at this level would say that God is not just 'outside' or 'beyond' the universe, He is outside the multiverse- the totality of all possible universes predicted by the Many Worlds (MW) theory.

I've often wondered if there is any way to put a number on the number of possible worlds assuming MW is true. Might we multiply the estimated total number of interacting particles, by the total number of quantum instants (a quantum instant being the 'rate' at which universes are spun off, calculated using Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle- one particle generates one new universe every quantum instant- it's greater than 10^42 per second) by the number of universes generated by each particle every quantum instant (a number which I think is infinite- not certain about that, if it's not we might actually be able to compute this.)

And if/when we get a final number- we take the factorial of it, to find all the possible permutations and combinations, all the myriad ways these particles interact. Even if none of the terms are infinite, the number has got to be stunningly huge- powers of powers of powers of ten. (10^10^10 is a one followed by ten billion zeros.) Are we getting close to infinity yet?

Hypothesize that the number of possible worlds under MW is infinite. We are told that God is infinite, too. Is God outside the infinity which is the multiverse? Do we need transfinite mathematics to describe God? Why not just equate God to the (also infinite) multiverse?

This is o'course all blue sky theorizing- but it's relevant to the topic, I think. J.

eh

He wasn't talking about the many worlds interpretation.