long winded fool

Bring-about-able for any, all, and only beings capable of being limited. Omnipotent beings are incapable of being limited.

A good way to make the argument less specific and therefore clearer, IMHO, would be to ask: "Being limited. Bring-about-able or not?" Being limited is a bring-about-able state of affairs in the universe. Omnipotence is an unlimited quantity of power. Therefore, anything which is already omnipotent logically cannot have its power limited, therefore it is completely logical to answer "no" to the question of "Does God have the power to be limited?" Answering 'no' keeps his power unlimited even though it's worded like it doesn't. Answering 'yes' is a self-contradiction. If God is omnipotent, can there be cases where he's not? No. Can he make cases where he's not? Same question, same answer, and no contradiction.

I apologize for my long-winded rants. Normal says what I'm trying to say very eloquently.

I'd put it: "Is it logically possible that a being that can do anything, can't do something?"

This is, I believe, is a completely interchangeable question with the rock paradox. The answer is always no. You cannot point out something that it cannot do without first presuming that it cannot do everything. "Creating a rock too big to lift is a bring-about-able state of affairs" necessarily rejects omnipotence in the premise and is therefore not applicable to the argument. You could say that any question with the format "If God is all powerful, does he have the power to make himself not all-powerful?" implies an argument which begs the question. The contradictory conclusion is assumed in the premises. Since everything in the universe to human knowledge has the power to be limted and every intelligence has the power to limit itself, this is a natural assumption, but once we posit the existence of omni-potence, we must reject this natural and instinctive assumption. No limitation is a bring-about-able state of affairs for an unlimited thing.

mattdamore

Ok, I see logical and metaphysical impossibility here. I see logical possibility when it is requested that a being who 'cannot' fly to be able, on whim, to fly. When I see the word 'cannot' I interpret it as impossible, at least in the actual world. So if the request is impossible in conjuntion to what we know about beings that cannot fly, then the request cannot be granted, since were asking you to contradict your own nature, which is impossible.

Also, when I said 'non-sensical', I didn't mean meaninglessness. I believe both requests (To ask a being who cannot fly, fly; To an omnipotent being to 'create' (everything which is created can be moved) something which cannot be moved) to meaningful in that they have terms which are understandable. Its just that when these terms are understood (in a logical sense) in isolation, then we can see that the putting into conjunction of those terms implies contradiction.

I see metaphysical impossibility as a necessary consequence of logical impossibility. If something is logically impossible then it can't be instantiated in the actual world. If something can't be instantiated in the actual world, then it is metaphysically impossible.

But when the terms are defined within this quote, then the said difficulties arise. Let us define the creator in relation to which the argument is usally brought against: God. When the creator is defined as God then both narrow and broad logical impossibility are met, I think. First, narrow logical impossibility. It is narrowly logical impossible since certain features/attributes inherent within the notion of an omnipotent creator are logically incompatible with what your quote has that creator doing: using omnipotence to make the user of that omnipotence, not omnipotent. Thus, making the creator omnipotent and not omnipotent at the same time and the same relationship, and, therefore, entailing a contradiction (which is not logical and therefore impossible). It's broadly logical impossibility arises as a necessary consequence of its narrowly logical impossibility, since illogical concepts do not apply to reality.

I rushed throught that, so I'm sorry if I was sloppy with anything.

Philosoft

I disagree. Consider some corollary questions:

1. Can God create a rock too heavy for God to lift?
Corollary: Is there a logically possible being B that can create a rock too heavy for B to lift?

2. Can a being that can do anything not do something?
Corollary: Is there a logically possible being P that can do anything but can't do something?

Apparently, the original questions aren't necessarily talking about the same being, because B is a logically possible being, whereas P is not.

Further, "can do anything" is entirely too vague. If "create a rock too heavy to lift" is an acheivable state-of-affairs for B, then it follows that it is part of the actions that encompass "anything" and leads to a contradiction within question 2.

It doesn't reject omnipotence if being B can create a rock too heavy for B to lift. If "create a rock too heavy to lift" is an acheivable state-of-affairs by some logically possible person, then it must also be acheivable by an omnipotent person.

wordsmyth

I think part of the problem is that some xians believe their deity is only capable of doing what is logically possible, while other xians believe their deity is also capable of doing what is not logically possible. For xians who fall in the former group, the paradox is valid and carries weight, but for xians who fall into the latter group, the paradox is as incoherent as their belief.

Then of course you have the occasional xian who claims their deity is only capable of doing what is logically possible, but then goes on to argue exactly the opposite.

Normal

Wrong, and this is where the error in logic always comes in.

The attribute itself expressed plainly is "the ability to bring about a state of affairs so that it can't bring about another state of affairs", an omnipotent attribute is defined as "A being that has the power to bring about any possible state of affairs".

It is not possible for a being with the omnipotent attribute to bring about a state of affairs where it cannot bring about another state of affairs, therefore, it is not an attribute of an omnipotent being to have "the ability to bring about a state of affairs so that it can't bring about another state of affairs".

Philosoft

So the commonly-formulated Christian God cannot bring about the state-of-affairs, "The Christian God never performs an evil action."

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by long winded fool :

But that's not what I asked. I asked whether it was bring about able. By excluded middle, we know that either it is or it isn't. A bring-about-able state of affairs is just a state of affairs that is brought about in some possible worlds.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattdamore :

I can agree with that so far.

This looks too McEary to me. Yes, it would be a contradiction if God made himself not omnipotent, but that's precisely what makes omnipotence impossible.

"A rock is created that its creator cannot lift" is still a logically possible, bring-about-able state of affairs. So Flint and Freddoso, and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, are satisfied. If you accept their definitions, you have to accept that omnipotence is impossible, so I think you have to try for a new definition.

Here's FF:

p = "a rock is created such that its creator cannot lift it"

And there is a W* in which someone actualizes p, at any time t, but God never has the power to actualize p.

Here's HR:

s = "a rock is created such that its creator cannot lift it"
It is possible for some agent to bring about s at any time t, but God never has the power to bring about s.

I'm pretty sure Wierenga's definition would fail similarly, but I'm too lazy to reach over and grab The Nature of God to look it up right now.

xorbie

Wow.. I didn't expect this thread to be so popular..

(OK, back to the topic now). Let's be rigorous for a second. Let S be the set of ordered pairs (B, R) where B is a being and R is an object it can create that it cannot lift. It is important to stress that this HAS to be a set of ordered pairs because a set of objects that the creator cannot lift makes no sense... you could not put anything in there because there might be someone that could create it and lift it.

The important thing to note about S is that nothing in S will have an ordered pair that includes God, because God can lift anything. You could also say T is the set of all objects that a being that can lift all objects cannot lift. T is, of course, a null set (surprise, surprise).

Another (I think interesting) way of looking at the problem is like so: By defining God as omnipotent, I think it is safe to say that God can lift object X, where X weighs 5 lbs. Now, lets say we keep adding pound after pound to X. No matter what, God can still lift it, because it is finite in weight. So, in asking if God can create an object he can't lift, it would basically be like saying can God create infinity. I don't think infinity exists, and so the whole thing is bull.

Hope this helps...

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by xorbie :

But I would say the correct way to interpret that is that God cannot be omnipotent, because he would have to create infinity. There is a logically possible person who can create something she can't lift, without having to create infinity. So it looks as if God can't be omnipotent, because to be so, he would have to do something impossible.