bd-from-kg

jlowder:

To be sure, why not say that? On the other hand, why say it?

Look, as long as this is divorced from any substantive question, it’s just of matter of how you define or conceive of “value”. It’s not as though “values” are the sort of thing, like rocks or Edsels, that exist in a concrete, tangible sense. Whether a value “exists” is purely a matter of what conceptual framework you choose to use to organize your thoughts and understand your experiences. In other words, it’s essentially a matter of definition. There’s no “right” or “wrong” answer to definitional questions. At best we can look at common usage to get some guidance as to how this question might be answered by a typical user of the term “value”. This approach is not likely to be decisive since my examples are far removed from “real-life” situation, and ordinary usage may turn out to be inconsistent, or there may be no consensus on whether one should say that values “exist” in this rather weird situation. But I don’t know how else to approach it at this point.

With all this understood, let’s look again at your question. It seems to be based on the idea that it doesn’t make sense to say that a thing has value unless someone is valuing it right now. But this is inconsistent with the way the term “value” is ordinarily used. For example, this trophy that I won in the seventh grade would ordinarily be said to have value to me (or that I value it) even when I’m asleep, or for that matter when I’m in a coma. Since ordinary usage allows one to say that something has value even in situations where no one is valuing it right now, there would seem to be no objection in principle to saying that something has value if someone will value it in the future. Or at any rate, if there is a principled objection, I don’t know what it is.

However, this sort of discussion seems rather barren and pointless unless you connect it to something that actually matters, such as a moral question of some kind. One has the feeling that you must have some such question in the back of your mind that you think this question is related to. If so, it would be helpful if you would spell this out so that we won’t be discussing a hopelessly abstract question in a total vacuum.

Dr. Retard

This question turns on what it means for something to be a value. Note that many people seem to think that the entire issue can be decided by appeal to definitions of "value":

When many people claim that definitions settle an issue, thought to be a live one by others, then it's a good guess that the two groups are working with different conceptions of the same terms, and so talking past each other.

I'd wager that most of these 'Obviously No' answers rely on something like this conception:

* A value is something that some agent has some affective attitude towards, an attitude that perhaps animates his behavior.

But this is a non-normative conception, an "anthropologist's conception" of value. On it, being valuable is like being loved or being feared -- it all depends on the affective attitudes of real-world persons. And so just as being loved implies some real-world lovers and being feared implies some real-world fearers, being valuable implies some real-world valuers. Simple as that (well, some complications from bd-from-kg's end -- being valued currently or just being such that people have some (possibly dormant) disposition to value it? -- which I won't address now).

I'd also wager that most of the 'Good Question' crew are relying on something like this conception:

* A value is something that any agent ought to have some affective attitude towards, an attitude that perhaps animates his behavior.

This conception is nice and normative. On it, being valuable is like being loveable or being fearsome -- it all depends on whether affective attitudes are warranted (not whether they are felt by real-world persons). And just as something can be loveable (deserving of love) without having anyone to love it, or fearsome (deserving of fear) without anyone around to fear it, it seems possible that something be valuable without anyone valuing it.

I note that the surface grammar supports the second conception. When we want to express merely that something elicits some response, we usually use the passive -ed participle: loved, feared, valued. When we want to say that something deserves some response, we usually use -able or -ible: loveable, valuable, laughable, risible, mootable, etc. Which suggests that advocates of the first conception, to avoid possible confusion, should say: "I don't think anything is valuable. Sure, plenty of stuff is valued, but there isn't anything that's valuable." (Also, note that above I simply saddled them with the belief that something's being a value entails that it is valuable; perhaps some of them would never go in for this entailment, for the reason I just gave; in any case, nothing philosophically important hangs on this paragraph, so whatever.)

Staying with this second conception, then, what could decide the issue? What would have to be true for values to require valuers? The only answer I can think of is this doctrine:

* In order for something to be valuable (to be such that any agent ought to have some (possibly animating) affective attitude towards it), it must be valued (be such that some agent really does have that attitude towards it). You can't deserve to elicit said attitute unless you really do elicit it. Contrapositively, and simply, if no one cares about something, then it's not valuable.

Note first the difference between this doctrine and that of the 'Obviously No' crowd. For the latter, if no one cares about something, then it's not valuable, for the simple reason that that's what it means to be valuable! Caring about it is all there is to it. This new doctrine, on the other hand, is making a substantive claim about what sorts of things we ought to care about. It claims that we are under no obligation to care about something that nobody at all cares about.

Note the analogous doctrines with fear and love: Nothing can be fearsome unless feared. Nothing can be loveable unless loved. Our fear or love makes the difference as to whether something can be fearsome or loveable. Similarly with value, our real-world responses are important, then, for either conferring value, or for conferring some prerequisite of value. That is, if the doctrine is true.

Note that utilitarian theories probably entail this doctrine. Utilitarianism says that value consists in pleasure, desire-satisfaction, goal-achievement, or some such. And each of these things entail being valued by someone. To be pleasureable is to really elicit a pro-attitude from someone. To be desire-satisfying or to be goal-achieving, the same. Whenever these matters of fact are realized, there is some agent who is pro-their-realization. And this pro-attitude is presumably just the sort of attitude the doctrine has in mind. Contrapositively, states of affairs that do not affect anything that anyone is interested in (not for pleasure's sake, nor the sake of some desire or goal) are valueless.

"Objective" is a philosopher's term of art, of course. We can, on one hand, talk about objective values as things that deserve a certain pro-attitude, whether or not they elicit one. In that case, the above doctrine rules out objective values. And note that utilitarianism also rules out objective values. On this account, what are subjective values? Things that deserve a certain pro-attitude, partly because they really elicit one. Utilitarianism, for example, would be committed to a subjectivist theory of value.

But on the other hand, we can talk about objective values as things that deserve a certain pro-attitude, whether or not anyone thinks they do. To think that something deserves a certain pro-attitude is a different matter than to have the pro-attitude. A crowd of people (not unlike iidb's inhabitants) could have all the pro-attitude in the world toward, say, kindness without thinking that kindness somehow deserves their pro-attitude. On this account, what are subjective values? Things that deserve a certain pro-attitude, partly because people think they do. This subjectivism is just plain weird, in my opinion; for, in general, it's very hard to find uncontroversial cases where thinking something really makes it so. (An attempted, but trivial, case: Thinking that I am thinking makes it true that I am thinking).

I think most people's gut-feel "objectivism" corresponds to the second account. I think most people's gut-feel "subjectivism" corresponds to neither account, but instead to the alternate 'Obviously No' conception of value, wherein a value is just something that's valued. Of course, another gut-feel platitude is that objectivism and subjectivism are opposites in some sense. But perhaps that just goes to show that people's gut-feel use of words is often stupid.

jlowder

Suppose we define a "value" as something that has worth. Given that definition, does it make any sense to say that values exist without valuers?

Is the point of your hypothetical example to demonstrate how value might be construed as an emergent phenomenon?

Let's adopt the meaning assumed in common usage.

It makes sense to say that your trophy has value even when you're asleep, since there was a point in time when you consciously made the choice to value the trophy, and it is likely that you will awaken. I am not as confident about the situation in which you are in a coma, at least I'm not as confident if the coma is one from which you never recover.

I think ordinary usage is consistent with a thing's value being somehow dependent on someone assigning a value to it. So although I fall asleep, things that I value continue to have value (at least to me) while I sleep, since it is still the case that I assigned a value to them.

I'm trying to figure out the relationship between values and morality. For example, does moral objectivism require that objective moral values exist? And, if so, is there any way for moral values to be "objective" even if they depend upon the existence of a valuer?

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ November 12, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

Ms. Siv

IMO the relationship is pretty simple. Values are the functions to be optimized (intentionally or by default).
Morals are the bahviour we adopt in order to optimize these values.

- Sivakami.

Pomp

Dr. Retard,

I'm pressed for time, but I'd like to quickly hit on one comment of yours:

This conception is nice and normative. On it, being valuable is like being loveable or being fearsome -- it all depends on whether affective attitudes are warranted (not whether they are felt by real-world persons). And just as something can be loveable (deserving of love) without having anyone to love it, or fearsome (deserving of fear) without anyone around to fear it, it seems possible that something be valuable without anyone valuing it.

I disagree that a thing can be "lovable" or "fearsome" in the absence of any other thing (or hypothetical thing) to love it or fear it. For example, if I say that a tiger is "fearsome" am I saying something about the tiger itself or am I saying something about my relationship to the tiger? If I am saying something about the tiger, then does it not follow that, for example, a powerful alien (say, the ones from Aliens, with the acid blood and so forth) who is immune to any attack the tiger might be able to muster ought to also regard the tiger as fearsome?

Likewise, I may regard a fluffy kitten as "lovable" but, if I am making a true observation about the kitten, as opposed to an observation about my relationship to the kitten, does it not follow that a mouse, who actually regards the kitten as "fearsome" also ought to regard it as "lovable?"

Saying that a given thing is "fearsome," "lovable," of "valuable" is, as far as I am able to determine, meaningless unless we specify some point of view from which to regard it. Much as we can't say whether or not a thing is "deserving of fear" until we know what sort of creature's point of view we are taking as our own, we cannot say whether or not a thign is "deserving of valuation" until we know whose point of view we are considering that thign from. Hence, value requires a valuer, fear requires a fearer, love requires a lover, etc.,

jlowder

Dr. Retard,

Thanks for the informative post. I found it very helpful.

So if I understand you correctly, then, we have two competing definitions of "value." According to value subjectivists, values are what people (valuers) do desire, whereas value objectivists maintain that values are that which we ought to desire. Is this an accurate summary?

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ November 13, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

bd-from-kg

jlowder:

And what does it mean for something to “have worth”?

That’s what we’re exploring.

No.

OK, if something can have value because it has been valued, why can’t it have value because it will be valued? It seems to me that this is far more relevant, or at any rate that it is far clearer that it is relevant. I don’t really see why past “valuation events” should matter at all. If the valuer has died you seem to be saying that what he valued no longer has value, at least on that account. If so, why does it matter whether he’s died or not? What’s past is past. On the other hand, if something will be valued, it is possible to affect now whether the valuer will obtain what he will value at the time he obtains it.

Well, I think this is the wrong way to approach such questions, but I think that it is possible to define “value” in a way that agrees pretty closely to ordinary usage, and that allows us to say that a thing has value regardless of whether any actual person (past, present or future) ever values it. But I don’t have time to delve into this right now today.

jlowder

I'm simply quoting Pojman's definition. That's what we're exploring.

On the assumption that value requires a valuer, it doesn't make any sense to me to say that something could be valuable before it was valued by someone. The reason "past valuation events" are relevant, if they are relevant at all, is because we were discussing the implications of the view that value requires a valuer.

Perhaps, but not necessarily. On the assumption that value requires a valuer, what follows is that when valuer A dies, things that A valued will continue to have value if and only other valuers continue to value those some things. If no one else assigns a value to those things, then, yes, those things would lose their value.

Again, we were discussing a subjectivist conception of value, where "value" is a property of a valuer (a person) and not of the object that is valued.

I'm not sure I understand your point. Suppose a given person P greatly values art. Other persons can effect whether or not P gets a given piece of art. But, on a subjectivist conception of value, this doesn't affect the issue of whether art has value. If P says that art has value, the art has value (at least for person P), regardless of whether P obtains art.

What is the wrong way to approach such questions? And what is the right way?

When you get the time, could please elaborate on this? Inquiring minds want to know.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ November 14, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

tronvillain

jlowder:
I doubt that many people makes a conscious choice to value a trophy. Still, the trophy can be said to have value under your value system, whether you are awake, asleep, or dead. Diamonds were always valuable, under our current value system, but in the past no one had our current value system, so diamonds were not valued.

[ November 14, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]</p>

bd-from-kg

jlowder:

OK, let’s consider this. Suppose that there’s a set of old family photos in John Smith’s attic that he doesn’t know about. If he knew about the photos, he would value them greatly. But he doesn’t know, so he doesn’t value them at all. Now suppose that Smith asks you to redd up his attic. He wants you to throw away the stuff that’s of no value to anyone but keep the valuable stuff. Should you throw away the old photos? Of course not! You’d say that they were valuable to Smith, even though he doesn’t value them. This is simply a fact about the way the word “value” is actually used. It also corresponds the more or less universal moral judgment that it would be wrong to throw away the photos merely because Smith doesn’t know about them. If your purpose in exploring the question of when values “exist” is to connect it to moral questions, you’d better keep an eye on the implications of your choices on moral issues.

Now let’s take this a step further. Say that Smith is actually a one year old boy, Johnny, and that his parents have just died. Since Johnny is only a year old, he won’t remember anything about his parents, but the chest containing the photos not only contains photos of his parents and their families, but a treasure trove of other information about them. Of course, Johnny not only doesn’t know about any of this, but he wouldn’t care about it if he did know. Now once again you’re assigned the task of clearing out the attic, saving the valuable stuff and throwing out the junk. Would you throw away this old chest on the grounds that it contains nothing that anyone values? Of course not. You’d say that its contents are valuable to Johnny because when he gets older he will value them greatly.

This isn’t rocket science. It’s simple common sense.

The wrong way is to start by setting out to define “value” in a completely abstract way and trying to derive moral implications from the definition you arrive at. The right way is to think about the moral issues first and then define “value” so that it corresponds to what you consider to be valid moral principles. This is the right approach (IMHO) even if you’re only interested in arriving at a “personal moral code” that works for you. There is no way that you should allow some abstract conception of value control your moral code rather than the other way around.

OK, first let’s consider the last example again. You don’t actually know that Johnny will grow up. would you say that the contents of that chest are valuable now only if he grows up? Or that they’re valuable now because he probably will grow up?

Here’s another example. Suppose that there’s a law that sets up a trust fund for every child to be used to help pay for his college education (if he goes to college). There’s every reason to think that Johnny will want to go to college, and that he won’t be able to afford it without the money in the trust fund. Now the law provides that no one but the designated beneficiary should benefit from the fund, if the beneficiary dies or chooses not to go to college the assets in his fund are destroyed. Now, is Johnny’s trust fund valuable? It seems absurd even to ask the question. Yet Johnny doesn’t value it in the least, and (assuming that no one else cares whether Johnny goes to college) no one else has any reason to either. So if we say that there must be a valuer in order for something to have value, we get the paradoxical result that the fund is actually of no value whatsoever. This is completely contrary to ordinary usage. So if we are taking common usage as our guide, we must reject the idea that something must be valued in order to have value.

Moreover, it is possible that Johnny will die before he even cares whether he will go to college, although we have no way of knowing this. But supposing that it happens to be true, would you say that the fund has no value? Again, this seems to be clearly contrary to ordinary usage. Most people would say that the fund has some value so long as it’s possible (so far as anyone knows) that Johnny will want to use it to go to college. So here we have a case where something has value even though there is no valuer – past, present, or future.

Of course, you are free to say that you personally don’t use the term “value” in this way; that you would say that Johnny’s fund really doesn’t have value when he’s one year old, or if he is going to die before he cares about going to college. But if you’re going to arbitrarily assign your own meaning, the original question is absurd: how can the rest of know whether or not you’re going to arbitrarily choose a personal, private meaning of “value” under which values cannot exist independently of valuers? And if you argue for one definition of “value” over another on the grounds of the implications it has in moral terms, you’re doing exactly what I think you should have been doing from the start – namely, using your moral code to determine your definition of “value” rather than the other way around.

[ November 15, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>