Toto

I always knew that there was something bogus in this criterion, but this puts it in concrete terms:

Richard Carrier on Baysian Statistics

the_cave

Yes, but Carrier is making a non-sequitur. It does not follow from his syllogisms that Jesus was mythological (like Attis); it follows that if Jesus' existence is in question, then the crucifixion provides no evidence of his existence, which is a weaker conclusion.

a) In a context where Jesus' existence is not called into question, I think the criterion of embarrassment might still carry weight--or at least, it isn't subject to the criticism that Carrier levels here.

b) In a context where Jesus' existence is already called into question, then I think Carrier is right that the criterion of embarrassment carries less weight.

With Attis, there is an additional premise along the lines of "Attis is probably a mythological being". One needs to hold a parallel premise about Jesus in order for Carrier's argument to be effective.

andrewcriddle

It is an interesting argument.

I think one problem is the cultural and temporal gulf between the origins of the Attis myth and people like Tacitus. Pre-Hellenistic Phrygia may have had very different ideas about what was embarrassing than did Imperial Rome.

If we compare the baptism of Jesus by John the baptist it seems clear that Matthew Luke and John found this embarrassing, something that had to be explained and/or toned down. Although it is possible that Mark did not see the baptism of Jesus as problematic, the attitudes of the other Gospel writers are better evidence of Mark's position, than is Tacitus' attitude evidence of the views of the original worshippers of Attis.

Andrew Criddle

Toto

The latter is the only conclusion he would draw.

This was just an example in Carrier's primer on Bayes' theorem, not a fully developed argument for either the historicity of the crucifxion or of Jesus.

The general principle is still the same. You can argue that it is more likely that an embarrassing fact was not invented, but this still does not mean likely enough to make it probable that it is true.

This doesn't follow. :huh:

GakuseiDon

As much as I truly respect Richard Carrier for going against the grain on a lot of occasions, he seems to be slowly building up a body of (dare I say it) embarrassing and ill thought-out statements. He's added to that body here.

Lets take his earlier one:

EXAMPLE 2: Multiple Attestation : “If a tradition is independently attested in more than one source, then it is more likely to be authentic than a tradition attested only once.”

Major Premise: If a tradition is independently attested in more than one source, then it is
more likely to be authentic than a tradition attested only once.

Minor Premise: Jesus healing the sick is independently attested in more than one source.

Conclusion: Therefore, Jesus healed the sick.

But "Therefore, Jesus healed the sick" is NOT the conclusion based on those premises. It is "Therefore, as the tradition of Jesus healing the sick is independently attested more than once, it is more likely to be authentic than a tradition which is attested only once". Carrier's conclusion simply doesn't follow from the premises he himself gives.

Carrier does give the reasons for why the premises might be flawed, and those reasons are fair enough. But surely independently attested traditions have a greater probability of being authentic than those attested only once? And even then, we're talking about the traditions, not the events themselves.

His "Criterion of embarrassment" states that "Since Christian authors would not invent anything that would embarrass them, anything embarrassing in the tradition must be true."

MUST be true??? "Must" is a strong word here. Someone can repeat something embarrassing that they BELIEVE to be true, without it being true. All the Criterion of Embarrassment can say is that it is more likely that the person telling the story believes it to be true, all other things being equal.

This is from Criterion of embarrassment (my bolding):

The Criterion of embarrassment is a tool used by some Biblical scholars to help determine whether certain actions or sayings by Jesus in the New Testament are historically probable or not. John P. Meier, in his book A Marginal Jew, describes the purpose behind this criterion (p. 168):

"The point of the criterion is that the early church would hardly have gone out of its way to create material that only embarrassed its creator or weakened its position in arguments with opponents. Rather, embarrassing material coming from Jesus would naturally be either suppressed or softened in later stages of the Gospel tradition, and often such progressive suppression or softening can be traced through the Four Gospels."

This criterion is rarely used by itself, and is typically one of a number of criteria, such as the criterion of discontinuity and the criterion of multiple attestation along with the historical method.

Again, Carrier comments on why the Criterion of Embarrassment is flawed, and that's fair enough. But I have to wonder how many scholars reading his paper would have cringed at reading "MUST be true".

Perhaps Carrier is trying to refute that hypothetical apologist who conveniently keeps bringing up bad arguments, but I hope that the Jesus Project will ignore that hypothetical apologist in future.

GakuseiDon

Really? Toto, if you had been asked to describe the Criterion of Embarrassment, would you have described it as "anything embarrassing in the tradition must be true"?

Toto

But this is how it is used by Christians apologists and historicists.

First of all, it is claimed that something embarrassing is more likely to be true and not invented, or at least more likely to be embedded in tradition which goes back to some historical event. Then somehow "more likely" becomes "likely" and then becomes an "established historical fact" and anyone who disagrees is going against the expert consensus and must bear a heavy burden of proof to even be taken seriously...

And remember, Carrier is translating this into Baysian statisitics, so he is not saying that "anything embarrassing must be true." That is just the position which is used in his probability calculations.

GakuseiDon

I apologise for harping on this, but I'm sorry Richard, the more I look at it, the sillier it becomes. Let me correct his argument. This is Richard's original one:

Major Premise 1: Cybeleans would not invent anything that would embarrass them.
Minor Premise 1: The castration of Attis would embarrass Cybeleans.
Conclusion 1: Therefore, Cybeleans did not invent the castration of Attis.

Major Premise 2: A report is either invented or it is true.
Minor Premise 2 (= Conclusion 1): The castration of Attis was not invented.
Conclusion 2: Therefore, the castration of Attis is true.

Here is how I think it should be expressed:

Major Premise 1: Cybeleans would not invent a report that would embarrass them.
Minor Premise 1: The castration of Attis would embarrass Cybeleans.
Conclusion 1: Therefore, Cybeleans did not invent the report of the castration of Attis.

Major Premise 2: A report is either invented or it is believed to be true.
Minor Premise 2 (= Conclusion 1): The report of the castration of Attis was not invented by the Cybeleans.
Conclusion 2: Therefore, the report of the castration of Attis was believed to be true by the Cybeleans.

Toto

Playing along, your major premise 2 is flawed. The report must have been either true (based on observation) or invented. If it is believed to be true but is not, somebody somewhere invented it.

GakuseiDon

Yes, Toto, I think I remember reading those papers by Prof Strawman and (Greek Orthodox) Father Stereo Typeo...

Well, if Richard's argument is refuting that damn hypothetical apologist (darn, he gets around), then go for it, Richard! More power to you.