rhutchin

You have set up a nonbelief position that allegedly holds the promise of escape from eternal torment. Is a person required, in this case, to have some knowledge that this position could provide an escape from eternal torment? If yes, then you have the person specifically choosing not to believe in God in order to escape eternal torment. The incentive of the person is to escape eternal torment, so the person chooses that course of action that he believes will help him achieve that goal.

If the person has no knowledge that unbelief will allow him to escape eternal torment, and has no reason to "believe" that nonbelief will do this, then he will not choose nonbelief. The person would reject unbelief and choose to believe in God (whatever he perceives God to be).

The person's incentive is to escape eternal torment, so he will choose a course that he believes offers a positive (non zero) chance to escape. If a person were offered a lottery ticket with only a one-in-a-billion chance of winning the prize, he would not turn it down in favor of an option that offers a zero chance of winning. Where people make logical choices, they choose that option which offers the greatest positive potential to achieve some desired end.

rhutchin

Not really. There are two parts to the problem that people face and you are confusing them. The first part of the problem arises because of the potential for the person to face eternal torment when he dies. The Wager deals with this part. The person who desires to escape eternal torment would logically reject nonbelief as a means to do this.

Having rejected nonbelief (as having no potential to provide a means to escape eternal torment and being worthless), the person encounters the second part of the problem - what to believe. As originally conceived by Pascal, there was only one god, the Biblical god, whom Pascal identified as God and the person who set out to believe in this god would set out to do so as required in the Bible. However, enlightened men have proposed a multitude of gods who might be able to provide a means to escape eternal torment, so modern man faces a mutitude of choices from which he must determine who is God. The Wager has not been watered down -- it has been necessary to have the Wager accommodate the imaginations of men. The problem has been made more complex as people have brought in their emotional baggage in an effort to avoid the obvious conclusion.

rhutchin

The problem still encompasses to basic options - belief and nonbelief. The change that has been made is that God is no longer defined to be the Biblical god; God is now a variable in the equation and must be discovered from among a multitude of potential theistic and non-theistic devices conceived to allow a person to escape eternal torment. The basic conclusion has not changed -- the rational action is to reject nonbelief and seek out God (who now must be identified from among a multitude of gods or solutions to the eternal torment problem).

rhutchin

The Wager eliminates that form of nonbelief that provides no means to escape eternal torment (the zero potential option). If the person has reason to "believe" that not believing in God provides an ecape from eternal torment, then he would rationally consider that "belief" option. The conclusion here is that a person will only pursue those options that he "believes" offer some positive non-zero potential for him to escape eternal torment.

rhutchin

Again, the Wager simply eliminates nonbelief as an option for a person to pursue when his goal is to escape eternal torment. God clearly tells us that if we seek Him, we will find Him. One can be motivated to seek God through selfish purposes and still end up finding Him.

Alf

Ah, so even though I say I don't believe in the Easter Bunny I do anyway because you say so?

Somehow that doesn't sound convincing.

You assert that I must believe in something. Well, maybe I do believe in someTHING but it doesn't imply that I have to believe in someONE. I believe in the scientific method and my belief is based upon a reasoning that we all use every time we open the fridge to get food or stop on a red light while driving a car.

You cannot compare beliefs in such obvious and immediate things to belief in invisible things like gods and easter bunnies, could you? Hmm...seems you can... doesn't mean it is a smart thing to do though.

Alf

Sauron

Unfortunately, you've failed to read any of this thread. Instead of spamming generic information from some web page, how about addressing the posts inside this thread?

If you do, you'll find that Joe Boot's "explanation" has already been addressed and refuted several times.

Sauron

Well, to be clear: this is your claim. No one, including yourself, has demonstrated that such potential exists yet. The thread has continued in spite of that fact, on a "for the sake of argument' basis.

Not necessarily true. You seem to forget:

a. there is still enemigo's scenario of nonbelief resulting in escape from torment;

b. you need to demonstrate that rejection of nonbelief would obtain that end result you seek;

c. you must account for the scenario where belief in the wrong god makes the problem worse; belief in the wrong god might create more torment than generic unbelief would create - in that case, a person who couldn't make up their mind might try to lessen their torment by remaining respectfully in unbelief - or in trying to worship 5,000 gods all at once, in hopes of hitting the right one

That implies that Pascal was not aware of other religions. Given the situation in Europe at that time, that is highly unlikely. What is more likely is that Pascal merely discounted them, and given the audience that he pitched the wager to, felt free to do so.

Except that the two-choice nature of this wager is destroyed, when it is forced to accommodate other religions. As a result, it no longer has the probitive or persuasive value that you would like for it to have.

BZZT. Assuming your conclusion doesn't work here. The logical construction of the wager has always been flawed. It merely required the intellectual honesty to treat other religions as viable options, in order to see that flaw.

Sauron

But that was not the original format of the wager. The original format of the wager was (a) belief in the christian god vs (b) nonbelief in that same god. And the two-pronged nature of that original format was matched up with the two possible outcomes of the assumptive case you were making.

As indicated previously this is your claim. No one, including yourself, has demonstrated that such potential exists yet. The thread has continued in spite of that fact, on a "for the sake of argument' basis.

You apparently desire to plant a flag and claim "belief" as a rational conclusion before you prove such to be the case. You do this, before proving:

(a) the existence of any torment;

(b) that mere belief will suffice as escape from this torment;

(c) that wrong belief will not result in *more* torment than disbelief would have;

(d) that disbelief may be an escape from punishment (enemigo's God Z scenario);

(e) finally, there are problems with the logical construction of your argument - if someone realizes that the possible gods to believe in are numerous, and they also realize that believing in the wrong god will result in punishment, they will then also realize that the odds of picking the correct god are slim to none. In light of that, they may remain in unbelief as the only rational option - since success in "god picking" is nearly impossible, and life is short, the time would be better spent

(i) in unbelief, than possibly

(ii) picking the wrong god, living a life of sacrifice and resolution, only to find out at the end of their life that they picked the wrong god, are now in eternal torment, and didn't even enjoy their life. In that case, they ruined both life as well as afterlife.

Sauron

That is not belief. The fact that you use the word and encase it in quote marks does not make it belief. A decision not to believe is not a belief.