Richard Carrier

Plump-DJ asked me some questions about historical method in connection with my upcoming talk in Sacramento. I will provide brief answers here. Details will have to await either hearing my talk and asking me in person, or the publication of my forthcoming book Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism.

What Tool Kit?

I (and others) have applied the criteria I will discuss to other characters and events from the same period of history outside the 'miraculous'. However, I discuss mainly three sets of criteria, and one of them is certainly limited only to miracles--in fact, to only one particular set thereof: prophecies. The criteria I discuss regarding that subject were actually coined by theists, but I discuss and elaborate them as they are actually employed by organizations like CSICOP when testing modern day "psychics" (this is material adapted and improved from one of my online essays on the subject).

But the other two criteria-sets were actually coined (implicitly or explicitly) by real historians who never originally thought of applying them to miracles. The first is the Argument to the Best Explanation, which I outline and employ in two or three of my online essays already (including the application of the ABE to the question of the historicity of Jesus). The second set is basically just a summary of the standard forms of evidence and argument advocated in almost all historical method guidebooks, which I also discuss in one or two essays online.

In my talk, I will pull all this together, using examples I have already used in various places online, although in a different way. I also briefly discuss the basic procedure of doing history, which is not so much a set of criteria as a list of things you have to do in order, just to resolve a historical question--many of the steps are often skipped or overlooked when people start asking historical questions in the context of a beloved religion.

As to the question whether it is possible to "come up with" criteria that are (1) objective; (2) not based on any logical fallacy; (3) do not destroy what we already know about history; and (4) can show that a miracle did or did not occur: I certainly believe this is possible, and explain in my talk why I think my criteria satisfy these demands. Though I won't be debating these points here, I will raise them in my talk and address questions about them in person:

(1) Any criteria are objective that (a) do not rely upon an element of biased assumption and (b) when properly applied actually do produce agreement despite the operation of biases against a conclusion. The ABE and the so-called Argument from Evidence do just that, as do my Prophecy Criteria. One can certainly get far more technical about the requirements of an objective method, as is evident from the unending debates regarding, for example, the philosophy of science (any adequate discussion of which fills 1400 pages easily). And the method of history is just as complicated as the method of science in that regard. But that's an issue for another day.

(2) There is no fallacy in any of the three sets of criteria I will describe--to the contrary, they are important precisely because, when properly employed, they prevent the introduction of many forms of fallacious reasoning into historical analysis. However, that does not prevent someone from using these criteria fallaciously, i.e. using them improperly to create the illusion that they produce a certain conclusion when in fact they do not. But that is true of any method, e.g. the abuse of scientific method by pseudoscientists, and even flawed studies performed by sincere bona fide scientists.

(3) The criteria I will deploy are actually standard criteria used throughout the historical profession, so clearly they do not destroy ordinary history. The one exception is the prophecy criteria--most historians don't even credit prophetic claims much less give them a fair shake with any particular tool of analysis. But since my criteria there are actually taken from religious believers, they can hardly object to my using them.

(4) It is theoretically possible to confirm an event as miraculous using my criteria (and in my talk I will give examples). But the evidence one would need is much greater in scope and power than is available for any actual example. That isn't the fault of the criteria. If anything, it is the fault of the purported miracle-workers (be they gods or godmen or whatever) to produce the required evidence.

For more on all these issues, come hear me speak!

History vs. Science

This is a subject I take up at length in my forthcoming book (due out in a year or two--I am negotiating a contract now). I have also addressed it in an article for The History Teacher (see my Bio for a link to my list of publications). I will just briefly provide my opinion here:

History does differ from science in that its end-result is usually a conclusion about a particular event, whereas science usually has as its end-result a generalization. This is true even in sciences like botany or geology: though they examine particular facts and produce historical conclusions, this is mainly just a means to the end of producing general propositions. Exceptions usually fall under the category of "applied science" (engineering and forensic criminology being prime examples). Also, to the extent that some sciences "do history" to reach conclusions, they mainly do so not through testimony (the main preoccupation of historians), but physical evidence (hence archaeology is classified closer to the sciences than history).

The most obvious exception is the simple fact that scientists all rely on previous data, which is all by definition a form of historical testimony--but it is a substantially different kind of testimony in that it has undergone a number of controls against dishonesty and distortion that, though not flawless, are nevertheless not available for most other testimony on record. To a lesser extent, such controls also improve the reliability of things like court transcripts, and to a lesser extent again, the results of professional journalism (when editors and journalists do their job, according to the conventions of their own trade), such that these enterprises produce progressively more reliable testimonial evidence than most other sources. Conversely, most other kinds of testimony are much less trustworthy, precisely because they have not been subject to such controls.

Conversely, historians do also seek to produce generalizations about the past, but they only do so when they have either a valid argument from analogy (which draws on established science or established generalizations from other historical periods), or abundant data--either of which relies on or produces the same feature of "repeatability" that science employs (most analogously in fields like astronomy or geology, where "experiment" is not the primary mode of investigation). But even then, historians must establish particular facts before they can turn those facts into a generalization (which cannot be done by direct observation, the way science does it), and they often seek out historical generalizations in order to solve questions about particular facts (much as the applied sciences do). Thus, the "final aim" still tends to be different between history and science.

Any of the general points I've made so far can have particular exceptions here and there, but they remain the principle differences between science and history, and these differences do mean different methods are necessary. To establish generalizations one needs numerous repeated cases, which is what the historian rarely gets (and often doesn't need), and what experimentation and observation serve the function of getting for the scientist. Likewise, ordinary testimonial evidence brings with it tons of baggage that direct observation and corroboratory investigation in science avoids. And that baggage cannot be ignored.

But there is still a difference between "scientific history" and what I would call "dogmatic history." The latter is basically just a branch of rhetoric. The former, however, does share certain features in common with science: preeminence of fact over opinion, thorough documentation and peer review, fundamental reliance on clarity and logic and disdain for misleading or fallacious rhetoric, consensus-seeking among qualified experts, proportioning belief to the evidence, and "standing on the shoulders of giants" (i.e. trusting that thoroughly-and-expertly-confirmed generalizations need not be questioned without good reason, and then building on them).

Apart from that structural similarity, the fundamental underlying method is also identical: the adduction of hypotheses that generate deductions regarding further evidence (which would or would not exist if the hypothesis is true), followed by investigation of the evidence on record to see if any confirming or disconfirming evidence is found there, and generating conclusions by induction from the evidence thus found (or found to be absent).

Most historical questions have very little data to reference, and consequently inductive logic produces relatively weak conclusions, in comparison with science--a fact many religionists despise, being so very terrified of uncertainty, yet uncertainty being so very much the standard in history. More exceptions to this weakness of result are to be found in very recent history than in ancient history--as we see in criminal forensics and journalism--which perhaps misleads many laymen, who see dazzling results in modern history and then assume the same results should be achievable in ancient history. But in practice, ancient history rarely produces conclusions as trustworthy as modern investigations can do.

But apart from this difference in degree, there is no fundamental difference in approach--apart from those differences that stem from having different aims (the frequent need to produce particularizations rather than generalizations). But the similarity remains: both historians and scientists formulate and test hypotheses by observing evidence. Everything else is subservient to this fundamental approach to the problems of their respective fields.

That's my take on the issue at any rate--being a professional historian myself.

edited by Toto per RC's instruction to add the word "many" before "religionists"

Peter Kirby

I don't have time before I go to bed, but I would be interested in comments (whether by theists or atheists) on the essay that Richard prepared for us. Surely the most interesting or debateable element of his work is not this one throwaway generalization. It disturbs me that the thread was derailed quickly into a boorish xian-atheist spat.

The quote was: "Most historical questions have very little data to reference, and consequently inductive logic produces relatively weak conclusions, in comparison with science--a fact religionists despise, being so very terrified of uncertainty..." The real substance is in the assertion that science provides more certainty about its conclusions than history does for its factoids. Does anyone disagree?

I implore the moderators to find a way to get this thread back on track, and free of polemic.

best,
Peter Kirby

Toto

All comments on the phrase "a fact religionists despise, being so very terrified of uncertainty" have been split off into a separate thread Are Religionists Terrified of Uncertainty? split from Historical Method.

Richard - you might want to look at that thread. You may respond here or in that thread, but all other comments by anyone else on that subject will be deleted forthwith.

Toto
moderator, BCH

Vinnie

The one point I see that I disagree with for now:

History works in terms of probability.
History reconstructs the past according to how the world operates today. This appears similar to "a control" in scientific experiments.

Now without even denying miracles I would argue that any violation of natural law (if that is what you mean by miracle) is so improbable as to be absolutely worthless as an historical explanation for any miraculous datum--regardless of how well attested.

For example, I would claim that we have a very good reason to reject out of hand any view which posits a man walking on water: its called buoyancy and knowledge of algebra is all the equations require. Don't believe me, test it for yourself.

Miracles may be possibile within a theists framework but I think a historians should be nuetral. I do not see why "any theory" isn't as credible as "a miracle" or how any historical criteria can get past this problem. I simply do not see why miracles should be touched by historians at all to begin with. They appear to fall outside of the historical purvue. At best we can say "x person" believed "y event to have occured".

When history is so "tentative" to begin with, how could one even hope to use it to argue "this nature defying act is probable as having occurred"?

Say for example "ancient historian x" says Bob decaptiated Bill in "War X." Naturally we conclude Bill died. Why? Thats what hapens when people are decaptitated. That is also how history works. We cannot reconstruct history unless we do so under the assumption that the universe works consistently.

And if the universe did not work consistently, miracles would be possible.
But if the universe did not work consistently history would be useless as its based upon the constancy of how the world works.
Yet, if miracles were rare history would still have some merit. So there is a compromise here. But...(you knew there was a but)

Since we all (overstatement) agree they are rare (if we are granting their possibility for the sake of argument or we actually accept them) what then is the probability of one occuring? Billions of years and and an absurdly large number of chemical and physical reactions transpiring every instant attest to the constancy of the laws of physics.

Given that history is tentative and its conclusion less than scientifically certain, it seems dubious to even suggest that history can theoretically reconstruct nature defying miracles. They simply fall outside of its reach.

And if we are allowing the possibility of miracles in history then why isn't any theory for a tradition just as good as say "gravity stopped and allowed a man to walk on water" as an historical judgement? The ABE surely must undercut any possible positive attestation for a miracle or at least lead us a judgment of non liquet. Surely an historical argument from best explanation can never be "gravity stopped working". That simply sounds absurd to me.

Maybe my reaosning is flawed but it looks like the nature of "miracles" as nature defying events and "history" as reconstuction based upon constancy of nature are incompatible fields.

I think we can all agree that miracles are as as "extraoridinary" as claims come. History should stick with the ordinary.

Vinnie

edited some minor things.

Celsus

Realism and Biblical History

I think it's worth reading for further ideas, although that makes this a shameless plug. I also suggest reading Ziony Zevit's discussion of philosophy of history in his introduction in The Religions of Ancient Israel even if it is avowedly Lakatosian.

Joel

spin

Please, please, people, if we are talking about historical method, by all means let us do so.

First let's get a few terms out in the open:

1) History: this has two basic usages

a) what historians are supposed to produce (eg the History of Bhutan Foreign Policy in the 19th Century); and

b) what happened in the past (which we may or may not be able to arrive at).

Hopefully we can arrive at some derivative of usage "b" for the purposes of discussions of historical methodology.

2) Historical evidence: this is broken into two basic categories

a) primary evidence, which comes directly from the period under investigation (epigraphy eg Tel el-Amarna letters, numismatic remains ie coins, archaeological indications)

b) secondary evidence, usually in the form of literary efforts that come to use from after the event such as Eusebius's History of the Church

Although all evidence needs to be justified in its usage, primary evidence takes precedence over secondary evidence. We listen to eye-witness reports before anything else. We usually use secondary evidence in conjunction with primary evidence, for without primary evidence we have no way of connecting the secondary evidence with the period under investigation.



Hopefully, one can see that a notion of historical methodology is emerging from the few categories I've outlined. It's not the only one, naturally, but one has to put forward a coherent historical methodology that can be agreed on before we can discuss history with any meaningfulness.

What Richard has put forward to me does not directly contain a historical methodology at all, but a set of generic tools for dealing with facts, a bit like the tool kit to be extracted from David Hume's writings.


spin

Plump-DJ

RC,

Well then...... that certainly was a response far more worthy then my question.

I'd like to add a couple of points If I may.

Let me get straight to the point. I assume from reading your post you have already applied your criterion ('behind the scenes') and found various events of history that do not "rise to the baseline". (or meet the criteria) I'm also assuming that the historcity of JC and the Rez would be included in that group? (ie that they cannot be rationaly affirmed as being true based on the evidence)

*But* this is where things get interesting for myself because in the articles (linked below) Willima Lane Craig applies one of the criteria you speak of to JC and the historocity of his 'cental miracle' and finds it meets the criteria.

http://www.leaderu.com/truth/1truth22.html

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billc...ocs/tomb2.html

Is it possible therefore to have two 'objective criteria' (ie not based on our own likes or dislikes) or set of criteria that meet all the requirements outlined before and yet come to contradictory conclusions? One affirms the rez, and one denies? That would be quite the dilema. And with that we're really back to square one then aren't we. How do I pick a worldview? Tough choice that one.

Having been through these discussions before I'd love to see such a criteria produced that meets the points I outlined before -- because I have never seen one. From this vantage point it looks to be the old 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence' wrapped up in disguise and since this so often turns out to be just another way of saying one wants more evidence for events which don't fit readily into their philosophy I find myself skeptical of your ability to produce a viable 'skeptical toolkit' :-)

But we'll have to wait & see though won't we. :-)

Nonetheless if an event we would describe as miraculous meets the criteria we use to accept other events from that period, we must affirm it as well. You see I think most people (and that included me at some point) would think that there exists zero evidence for any event we suspect to be a miracle and therefore belief in such things is based on sheer blind faith. But as the articles above clearly show, when an objective criteria used in historical investigation is applied to the Rez, the event is affirmed as a knowable event of history. Therefore our rejection to that event takes place outside the evidence. (since the event meets the criteria) And that being the case we're no longer doing history.

Also it is my understanding that historical methods do not always (should I say often) reveal 'causes' behind events; rather they deal more in the 'knowable effects' of history. So talking about the miraculous implies the cause of an event and the nature of that cause is a primary in history. This focus on 'miracles' is drawing our eyes away from the simple fact that the event itself (whatever it's cause) is being affirmed by the historical method as a knowable event -- the cause, "miracle" or not is not neccesarily that important to the historical method.

spin

This sounds reasonable. I personally think Richard is imposing criteria other than strictly historical ones.

Whoops, I missed something here. Why are we talking of "events" here as though reified? You have a historical datum, in this case an account of an event, not an event. Historical method is what one employs in an effort to get beyond this point. How is this supposed event "being affirmed by historical method as a knowable event"?

Perhaps you are using terms differently from me.


spin

Plump-DJ

Spin,

If I used the word 'alleged events' instead would that make things better?

spin

As Plump-DJ has edited the last post, my comments on the second last paragraph are no longer quite the same. I am however prepared to accept the possibility of a reputed event which we might call a miracle being an event which happened in the past. If it can be shown to have happened, then that is all that matters; we have established its historicity.

Once Plump-DJ refers to the articles of William Lang Craig in one of the paragraphs, the importance of that paragraph changes and I can no longer quite see eye to eye with the comment, thus changed.

What I read of the articles showed no interest in historical methodology whatsoever, so I can see no relevance in citing them.

Craig is not dealing with historical methodology, but with skeptical scholars applying philosophical criteria such as those of Richard Carrier.


spin