Johnny Skeptic

You have refuted you own argument. I said:

You replied:

I replied:

Then you reversed your position and agreed with me when you said:

If a being claiming to be Jesus returned to earth and clearly revealed that he had abilities far beyond those of humans, surely some people would become Christians who were not previously convinced. The intent of those peoples’ hearts could not be fairly questioned.

No you wouldn’t. The evil being might not be God, and the good being might not be Jesus. You would hope that the evil being wasn't God, that he wouldn't be able to send everyone to hell as he promised, that the supposedly good being impersonated Jesus, and that the God the Bible will eventually send you to heaven. If I were confronted with the same scenario, I would also hope that the evil alien would not be able to send everyone to hell as he promised, and I most certainly would not conclude that he was the uncaused first cause. The same applies if a being claiming to be Jesus returned to earth in the manner that is described in the Bible. I most certainly would not conclude that he was the uncaused first cause. Of course, you or anyone else with any world view would accept a comfortable eternal life from any being, whether from a being claiming to be a God or from an advanced alien. Eternal comfort is the goal. Whoever provides it is completely irrelevant.

But that is exactly what an evil, lying, deceptive God would want the Bible to say. The odds are just as good that the Bible describes an evil God who is masquerading as a good God and intends to send everyone to hell. 2 Corinthians 11:14-15 say “And no marvel; for Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light. Therefore it is no great thing if his ministers also be transformed as the ministers of righteousness; whose end shall be according to their works.� Mark 13:22 “For false Christs and false prophets shall rise, and shall shew signs and wonders, to seduce, if it were possible, even the elect.� The problem for Paul and Mark is that they didn’t tell believers how to tell the difference between a good God and an evil God.

But how can we reliably determine whether or not the contrary is true?

Under the present set of conditions, God might be an evil God who is masquerading as a good God.

The point is that it is impossible to tell whether God is good, evil, or amoral by using my hypothetical scenario or by using the evidence that is available in the Bible.

HRG

My beliefs are "forced" on me in the same sense that the existence of the computer screen in front of me is "forced" on me: by sufficient evidence.

Can you choose to believe or not to believe that you see a text on a screen ? No. You can only choose to act or not to act in a particular fashion, based on your belief.

Regards, HRG.

enemigo

And the uncertainty engendered by the possibility of God Z, shows us that it is just as likely that if I choose to believe in any god, then I could be punished eternally. Again, any possible position of belief or nonbelief can be shown to offer the exact same hypothetical potential for escape from a hypothetical threat of hell. Because of that, the Wager can't eliminate even a single possible position of belief or nonbelief. And so the Wager fails to be of even the slightest use and I remain in my default position of nonbelief. Tell me I should then look at the evidence? Fine; nothing there. So once again, I remain in my default position of nonbelief.

You've still not proven that believing in the Biblical god to the exclusion of all others is the most beneficial belief system. Remember, your argument in this thread has been that one should choose the belief system that offers the best chance to escape eternal torment, evidence notwithstanding.

So please explain why it is more beneficial to believe in a single god to the exclusion of all others, than it is to believe in a multitude of gods that don't require exclusive belief in themselves, but instead, have other nonexclusive requirements to escape from their multiple, potentially co-existent and nonexclusive threats of eternal torment. Again, an appeal to evidence won't cut it.

For example, if there are these four possible gods:

God A - threatens eternal damnation for belief in YHWH and nonbelief in God A
God B - threatens eternal damnation for any monotheism and nonbelief in God B
God C - threatens eternal damnation for not believing in God A B & C
YHWH - threatens eternal damnation for anything other than exclusive belief in YHWH

YHWH is the only one that requires exclusive belief. So when facing these four potential threats of hell, believing in YHWH alone leaves you vulnerable to 3 potential threats, while potentially saving you from only one. On the other hand, believing in all three of the other gods leaves you vulnerable to only one potential threat, while being safe from three.

So, given the possibility of a multitude of gods like A, B & C, how could it possibly be most beneficial to believe in only YHWH? Remember, uncertainty overrules evidence, so you should adopt a belief system that will leave you vulnerable to the fewest potential threats of eternal damnation, since it is in your best self-interest to do so. Welcome to polytheism.

rhutchin

What exactly is your point? If Jesus returned to earth today and revealed Himself, it is possible that some would be convinced. It is possible that only those who would be convinced would be the same ones who will be convinced in the absence of Jesus’ return.

Your whole issue seems to be that some people who are not convinced by the Bible to believe in God could be convinced if Jesus physically returned and did miracles for them.

Let’s grant that argument. All right, so what? God knows those whom He desires to save and He will do that which is required to save them. If God sees that some people reject the Bible and He has no desire to save them, then He does nothing. If you personally think that you would believe if Jesus appeared in the flesh and only this action could result in you being saved, then the failure of God to provide this evidence can be taken to mean that He has not seen fit to save you.

You argue as a person who either thinks that (1) God is somehow obligated to save all people, and (2) that God wants to save all people. The real situation is that God desires to save the elect and the elect can be identified in several ways. One way, described by Pascal, is that the elect see that the only rational response to eternal torment is to seek God. The many who yield to emotion and reject the argument presented by Pascal can be identified as the non-elect (although this descriptor is not fixed until death).

Forget God and Jesus for a second. Look at the situation in a logical manner. You face the threat of eternal torment. Is that something you want to avoid? If you are rational, the answer is, Yes. (Otherwise, what argument is there for not wanting to avoid eternal torment – unless you really dumb down eternal torment?) If you are offered a way to escape eternal torment, do you take it? If you are rational, the answer is, Yes. That is the starting point for any further action. Now, you can throw in God and Jesus and all your hypotheticals and decide what to do. So long as you do not stray from your goal (Avoid eternal torment), you make rational decisions.

OK. You have a problem. You know that you need to believe in God in order to escape eternal torment. You know that you are confused by the evidence. You know that there is the possibility that the choice you make could be wrong. C’est la vie. Join the rest of your compatriots who are in the same boat.

You can’t so you assume the risk of making a bad choice.

That is not a problem so long as you do not stray from your goal – Avoid eternal torment.

rhutchin

Your argument seems to be this -- What if a person just doesn’t believe and it turns out that this position results in escape from eternal torment? In effect, the person only knows (e.g., from what the Bible says) that escape from eternal torment requires that one believe. Rationally, he should choose to believe. If the person is irrational (emotional about God), he chooses not to believe. (then, as luck would have it, he finds that he escapes eternal torment).

OK. Let’s let people make emotional decisions not to believe in God. Let them assume the risk of being wrong. As Pascal pointed out through the Wager, that action is not a rational decision that one would make if they purely considered the evidence. Absent some belief that some alternative to belief in God could provide an escape from eternal torment, there is no rational basis not to believe in God.

All that can be proven using Pascal’s Wager is that belief in God is the rational action rather than nonbelief in God. Which of the many alleged gods alleged to provide an escape from eternal torment is the real God is not determined by the Wager.

Now, you are getting into the evaluation of the gods to determine which you should believe. In the simplistic system that you describe, one should believe in as many gods as possible (the Buddhists seem to do this). However, your analysis should take into account other factors. First, do each of these gods actually threaten eternal torment? Do these gods provide a means to escape eternal torment? Can you actually do that which is required to escape eternal torment? and so on.

Mageth

As of yet, I have not read all the responses since this was posted...however, this is where rhutchin's argument from the Wager simply goes to pieces. rhutchin seems to assume that we must choose a belief system to "escape eternal torment." Eternal torment is, once again, nothing more than a superstition.

Once again, I see absolutely no reason whatsoever to seek to escape the superstition of "eternal torment". Further, I see absolutely no reason whatsoever to choose a superstitious belief system that would allow me to escape the superstition of eternal torment.

And Pascal's Wager fails miserably in supplying such a reason.

Once again, it starts with a premise which is a superstition. Taking the Wager is irrational.

Mageth

Another example of a not-so-artful dodge:

We're actually talking about what one believes about God - God in the general sense, not "specific Biblical God" - whether God is the sort who would actually allow people to suffer eternally (in Hell or wherever), and what God might think and do about someone who believes/teaches that he would.

You're simply appealing to your particular religious text (the one you've "chosen" in an attempt to avoid eternal torment) to answer what is actually a general question about the "general" God. You're apparently answering that "I don't have to worry about that with my chosen God." You're assuming that your God won't condemn you for believing, and teaching, that He will allow people to suffer eternally in Hell for such things as unbelief. That's a pretty big assumption, even about the Biblical God. One that I'm guessing you cannot prove. The safer route would seem to be to not believe, or at least not teach, that people will be condemned to eternal suffering, for example for unbelief.

(Put another way, you're trying to answer "Mageth's Hellish Wager" after you've "chosen" a particular God, its accompanying religious texts, and your interpretation of the religious texts, based on "Pascal's Wager", when in fact "Mageth's Hellish Wager" should precede "Pascal's Wager", as it deals with the premise on which you base "Pascal's Wager" - that a God (if a God exists) would allow people to suffer eternal torment, and the risks associated with holding such a belief.)

Is it not possible that the Bible (or your interpretation of it - I know "Bible Believers" that teach that there is no Hell taught in the Bible as you believe it is) is flat wrong about Hell, and about a God that will allow people to be condemned to eternal suffering in Hell? Is it not possible that God will not condemn people to Hell for this-or-that, for example for simple unbelief? Is it not possible that such a God would be greatly offended by someone who believes or teaches that He would do such a thing? That God considers teaching that He will condemn you to eternal torment for unbelief blasphemy? That one would suffer some sort of negative consequence for believing/teaching that God would do such a thing, perhaps even eternal torment?

Conversely, it seems unlikely that one would be condemned or judged by God for simply not believing that God will allow people to suffer eternal torment.

Again, the safer, more "rational", belief, the one that carries less risk, appears to be to lack belief in (a God that will allow people to suffer eternal torment in) Hell.

Well, that's flat wrong, according to my understanding of the Bible. According to the Bible, everyone has sinned. "Not sinning" is not what gets you to Heaven, the way I understand it.

And, in any case, it is possible that believing and/or teaching that God will allow people to suffer eternal torment in Hell is a sin (even assuming the Biblical God). It's possible that it's a sin of the worst sort. It seems much less likely that not believing and not teaching that God will allow people to suffer eternal torment in Hell is a sin.

Then, according to the Bible, no one will get into Heaven.

"For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God."

Again, you're trying to answer "Mageth's Hellish Wager" under the assumption that you have chosen the right God, and the right beliefs about that God.

As such, your attempt fails. You're dodging the real question. You're dodging "Mageth's Hellish Wager." You're assuming your chosen God is "correct" and basing your rejection of "Mageth's Hellish Wager" on your interpretation of your chosen God. You're ignoring the risk of believing wrong things about your God, beliefs about God that might cost you dearly in the afterlife.

Belief in Hell, and in a God that will allow people to suffer "most undesirable conditions possible" for eternity, carries risk, if it is the case that God would do no such thing. Such a God may consider such a belief the worst sort of "sin." That certainly seems plausible. And I assume that you cannot prove that there is no such risk.

Conversely, lacking belief in Hell, and not believing/teach that God will allow people to suffer "most undesirable conditions possible" for eternity, would seem to carry much less risk - possibly no risk whatsoever (it's hard to imagine that any God would punish you for not believing that He would do such a thing).

Therefore, it appears to be the more "rational" course to lack belief in Hell, and to not believe that God would subject anyone to eternal torment, as lacking such belief appears to carry less risk than believing in Hell/that God will condemn people to Hell.

Mageth

Looking at the situation in a logical manner, I do not face a threat of eternal torment. I'm familiar with the superstition, recognize it as a superstition, and logically/rationally do not act based on superstition.

I do not act based on superstitions.

I'm rational, and therefore I do not act based on superstition. I do not fear superstitions.

It's not a matter of want; it's a matter of need and reason. I see no need, no reason whatsoever, to seek to avoid what is nothing more than superstition.

Note that here, we're back to the religion that invents something to be feared, and then sells the only cure for it.

It's a superstition offered as an escape from a superstition which is part of the first superstition.

There's no logical argument here for accepting the superstition.

I am rational, and recognize superstition when I see it, and rationally ignore the offer. Approaching Pascal's Wager with rationality condemns the Wager to the trash heap of bad philosophical arguments.

Rational decisions based on superstitions?

I know no such things.

Superstition. I'm a rational sort; I do not base my actions on superstitions.

Mageth

Jiminy Christmas. One more time: this fails completely once one recognizes that "the threat of eternal torment" is nothing more than a superstition. It's irrational to act based on a superstition. Without some reason to believe the "threat of eternal torment" is a real threat, it remains a superstition, and acting on it (e.g., "choosing to believe in God to escape eternal torment) is irrational. There is no rational basis to believe in the superstition on which you base your argument from Pascal's Wager. Therefore, your argument above fails miserably as a "rational basis for belief" before it gets off the ground.

Sad, really, since Pascal's Wager clearly does not prove that at all.

And you fail to note that the Wager also does not prove that there is any God, nor does it provide a rational basis for believing in a God.

And you should also (and first) consider "Mageth's Hellish Wager". It is possible that believing in the "threat of eternal torment" from a God will condemn you. Such a belief might be the ultimate blasphemy, the worst sin possible. You may be damning yourself simply by accepting the first premise of Pascal's Wager - that God (if it exists) would do such a thing. The safest route might possibly be to lack belief in the threat of eternal torment!

Hawkingfan

That's the point. The wager is pointless and is not a safeguard from torment, because the wager does not tell you which is the correct god.

The wager is also flawed in that anyone could get you to believe in their god by using the wager to their advantage. Because the concepts of eternal torment are not all the same. You can make some torment worse than others, therefore, making someone who wants to follow the wager choose the god that provides the escape from their worst concept of eternal torment.